Court Decision Archive (Original)

Hileville

TNPer
TNP Nation
Hileville
Discord
Dennrick#0489
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Attorney General Refusing to bring Criminal Complaints to Trial
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Blue Wolf II and Funkadelia

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 3.1: The Attorney General
2. The Attorney General will be elected during Judicial Elections.
3. The Attorney General must not have been convicted of any crime in the North Pacific.
4. The Attorney General will serve as Chief Prosecutor in all cases brought before the Court of the North Pacific.
5. It is the duty of the Attorney General to see to completion any proceeding they are prosecuting.
6. If the original Attorney General is unable to complete a pending case, the successor Attorney General will take over as prosecutor and complete the pending proceedings.
7. The Attorney General may request expedited judicial review of any executive action by any official.

The Court took into consideration the Oath of Office for all Government Officials of the North Pacific:

I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.

The Court opines the following:

As per the Legal Code it is the duty of the Attorney General to serve as the Chief Prosecutor in all cases brought before the Court of the North Pacific. Currently all cases are brought to the Attorney General in order for their office to bring the charges directly to the Court. The refusal of bringing a case to Trial is not a duty given to the Attorney General in any legal document of the North Pacific including but not limited to the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights. It is the belief of the Court that there is a fundamental issue with how the process currently works. Currently it is the belief of the Court that the Attorney General in refusing to take a case to trial is acting as a higher authority then what they are. While the Attorney General may not feel there is enough evidence to merit a trial it is still the belief of the Court that the decision on whether there is enough evidence should reside with said Court and not the Office of the Attorney General.

The Court suggests the following procedures be adopted for all trial proceedings:

1. The accuser files a complaint with the Attorney General.
2. The Attorney General Notifies the Defendant that a complaint has been filed against them.
3. Within 72 hours from the time the complaint is filed with the office of the Attorney General the Court shall be notified of the investigation into the matter by the Attorney General.
4. The investigation shall last no more than 5 days in which the Attorney General must ask for an indictment and present all evidence to the Court.
5. Within 72 hours for the request for an indictment the Court will determine if a Trial is merited based on the evidence alone.
6. Normal trial proceedings will begin at this point in time.


Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6957546/
Ruling delivered on September 15, 2012.
Ruling stricken on February 15, 2015.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly Voting
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Blue Wolf II and Funkadelia

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mahaj.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

3. Participation in the governmental authorities of the region is voluntary. Participation in the World Assembly shall not be a condition of participation in the governmental authorities of the region.

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

10. Each Nation entitled to a vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region is entitled to the equal treatment and protection of that Nation's right to vote.

The Court took the following into consideration:

The Bill of Rights allows for equal and fair protection of any nation of the North Pacific under the terms and provisions of the Constitution as well as stipulating that World Assembly participation shall not be a condition for participation in the government authorities of the region. The Bill of Rights also protects a nations right to vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region.

Before making a decision the Court had to answer the following questions:

  1. Is the Delegate voting in the World Assembly a "government authority"?
  2. Is voting in the World Assembly protected under the "fundamental laws" of the region?

In response to the above questions the Court has determined the following:

As to the first question, The Delegate and all elected or appointed officials are Government Authorities however the Delegate's vote in the World Assembly is not and shall not be considered a "government authority". It is the belief of the Court that Clause 3 of the Bill of Rights was meant to allow a nation to serve in the Government without having a World Assembly nation in the Region and does not protect a nations right to determine the Delegate's World Assembly Vote.

As to the second question, The Court reviewed the Constitution and Legal Code and came to a conclusion there is no law whatsoever dictating how the Delegate must vote in World Assembly matters.

The Court therefore opines the following:

The law enacted by the Council of 5 does not break a nations rights or any law as set out by the Bill of Rights, Constitution and/or Legal Code. The right to vote in World Assembly matters is not protected under any provision in the Bill of Rights, Constitution, or Legal Code. Therefore the Council of 5 was not in violation of a nations rights under the legal documents of the North Pacific.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6960203/
Ruling delivered on September 25, 2012.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Scope of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Blue Wolf II, with Funkadelia abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Unibot.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court took into consideration the Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration:
The Bill of Rights, by its terms, protects those who are "resident" in The North Pacific. Not every nation present within TNP at Nationstates is a "resident," and not every "resident" is always within TNP.

Who is a "resident" in terms of TNP law? Primarily those Nations who choose to be here and be a part of the regional society; who conduct their in-game activity as a part of TNP, and who identify with TNP as their home region.

A Nation that is born (or created) in TNP does not automatically have residency. Residency requires both presence and some act consistent with that Nation’s intent to remain and become part of TNP (as opposed to any other region). Thus, acts such as voting or making a proposal in the World Assembly, making or seeking "endorsements" in-game with other Nations within TNP, or modifying their National profile at Nationstates.net while that Nation is within TNP are indications of that intent to be a "resident."

A Nation that enters TNP as a representative or agent of some other region at Nationstates does not become a "resident", because they lack that intention that is necessary for residency. Likewise, a Nation that departs TNP at Nationstates.net with the intention to return and resume residency and is acting for or at the request of TNP authorities retains their residency here, as that Nation has not abandoned its residency.

Absent some legislative action that leads to a broader view of residency, then, a Nation which has not been a "resident" of TNP is not protected under our Bill of Rights until and unless they become a "resident" here. The answer to the first question, therefore, is "None."

Turning to the second issue, that is, the authority of Admins, Global Mods, and mods within the official forums as compared to the authority of government officials, requires one to precisely state what that authority is. The Admin have primary responsibility for enforcement of the "terms of service," the "terms of use," and the supplemental forum rules that govern the forums. The forum moderation team has primary authority to enforce that body of rules, while many government officials have a limited amount of authority as forum moderators to assist in their enforcement.

A forum administrator’s primary obligation is to protect the integrity of the designated official forums on behalf of the regional community. If the constitutional process so permit, the members of the forum administration team not otherwise holding a government office, may exercise a very limited form of government power within the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, and the Legal Code, and subject to the protections and limitations provided by the three central documents of TNP law.

Thus, in response to this question:
Specifically, if I as Admin were to preemptively IP ban a player who has no nation in TNP, and presently no account on this forum, what would be the legality of my actions under TNP law?
the answer depends on whether the grounds for such an action are based upon a perceived threat of violation of the body of forum rules, or a threat of violation of TNP law. If it is the former, then the Admin is acting within the Admin’s proper authority to protect the forums; if it is the latter, then the Admin should secure from an appropriate government official approval under paragraphs 8, 9, and 11 of the Bill of Rights [4] before imposing such a ban from the forums. Inasmuch as there are distinct review processes for these decisions under the Constitution and Bill of Rights as to government decisions, and by the moderation review process put in place by the forum moderation team for the team’s non-governmental decisions, the requirements of due process are met so long as the review processes are followed in good faith. Thus, where the reason for the imposition of an IP ban is based on protecting the integrity of the forums, then the Admin is exercising their core responsibility to the forums and the community. If the IP ban is to further any other governmental policy or purpose, approval by the appropriate "governmental authorities of the region" under paragraphs 8 and 11 of the Bill of Rights is required.
The Court took into consideration the ruling on the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly Voting:
As to the first question, The Delegate and all elected or appointed officials are Government Authorities however the Delegate's vote in the World Assembly is not and shall not be considered a "government authority". It is the belief of the Court that Clause 3 of the Bill of Rights was meant to allow a nation to serve in the Government without having a World Assembly nation in the Region.

As to the second question, The Court reviewed the Constitution and Legal Code and came to a conclusion there is no law whatsoever dictating how the Delegate must vote in World Assembly matters.

The Court therefore opines the following:

The law enacted by the Council of State does not break a nations rights or any law as set out by the Bill of Rights, Constitution and/or Legal Code. The right to vote in World Assembly matters is not protected under any provision in the Bill of Rights, Constitution, or Legal Code.

In review of the above the Court has determined the following:

The previous rulings of the Court of the North Pacific are inaccurate. The Courts ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as delivered on 6 August 2010 introduced a definition of "residency" in which no document including the Bill of Rights, Legal Code, or Constitution mentions. After a through review of all the aforementioned documents the Court has no choice but to overturn the previous ruling. The Court also reviewed its most recent decision on World Assembly Voting and has come to a conclusion it is slightly flawed. The Court introduced an incorrect definition of "Government Authorities" in this ruling.

The Court therefore opines the following:

The Court hereby establishes that under the Bill of Rights all nations in the North Pacific with the exception of those who are performing regional recruitment on the regional message board of the North Pacific are afforded protection under said document. The Court reverses the previous ruling of the Court which created a flawed definition of "residency".

The Court in reviewing the term "Government Authorities" hereby establishes a "Government Authority" is any elected or appointed office of the North Pacific and not the individual being elected as the Court eluded to in our first ruling on the matter. The Court in this matter also re-evaluated whether or not the Council of 5 World Assembly Voting Policy was illegal. It is the determination of the Court that the policy does violate part of the Bill of Rights but is not completely illegal.

The Court establishes the following answers to the questions posed by Unibot.

Does this provision require "equal and fair treatment" of Nations in The North Pacific in every government affair?

The answer would be simply no. This provision requires "equal and fair treatment" to all nations of the North Pacific in relation to the provisions as laid out in the Constitution. This does not include every government affair.

Does this provision require "equal and fair" protection of the provisions of the Constitution for every citizen?

This provision in Clause 9 does require "equal and fair" protection of the provisions of the Constitution for every citizen as well as all other nations covered under the Bill of Rights.

Therefore after further review the policy regarding World Assembly Voting violates the provision requiring all nations to have the right to be "heard". The Court wants to be clear here that this clause in the Bill of Rights does not set requirements on the Delegate to vote a certain way in the World Assembly. There is also no current provision in the Constitution that sets this requirement.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6972796/
Ruling delivered on October 22, 2012.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Vice Delegate's Voting Rights within the Security Council
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Blue Wolf II, with Funkadelia abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Tim.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

6. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.

The Court opines the following:

The only mention of the Vice Delegate in regards to the Security Council as the quoted section of the Constitution above. This section of the Constitution does not stipulate the Vice Delegate does not have voting powers in the Security Council. This establishes the Vice Delegate will serve as the Chair of the Security Council. The Court has no choice but to assume the drafters of the Constitution intended for the Vice Delegate to have voting powers within the Security Council body.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6973096/
Ruling delivered on October 28, 2012.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Jurisdiction of the Criminal Code
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Funkadelia, with Blue Wolf II abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Abbey.

The Court opines the following in response to the quests posed:

1. Can a nation be prosecuted for anything other than Treason (as specified in http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/single/?p=8055484&t=6927180 ) if they are no longer residing in the region? This specifically relates to -T-h-o-r- and treetar.

Yes any nation may be prosecuted for crimes other than Treason. The Courts ruling that was linked was specifically speaking of just Treason while other crimes may be tried as well. If the nation committed a crime or is expected of committing a crime in the North Pacific they may be tired even if their nation no longer resides in the North Pacific.

2. On a similar vein, can a nation be prosecuted for anything other than Treason for offences which were not commited within property of TNP or an ally, such as a forum embassy of ours located on a different region’s offsite forums?

This depends on the region in which the crime was committed in. If the region we hold an embassy with considers said Embassy as our property the answer would be yes they can be tried here. Whether or not the North Pacific considers all Embassies property of the North Pacific is not determined and the Court directs you towards the Assembly for discussion of that matter.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6974169/
Ruling delivered on October 30, 2012.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Speaker's Powers to Restrict the Format of Votes
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Blue Wolf II, with Belschaft dissenting

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Iro.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 2.6 of the Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Bill of Rights:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

10. Each Nation entitled to a vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region is entitled to the equal treatment and protection of that Nation's right to vote.

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.

The Court opines the following:

The Speaker by making these policies was within their powers as laid out by the Constitution and not in violation of the Bill of Rights. The Court looked extensively at the Section 10 of the Bill of Rights and determined that the rules that were adopted still allowed the protection of each nations right to vote. We are aware the Speaker discounted votes that were not in line with the adopted polices but again the voters that lodged an invalid vote were still given the right to vote in the matter. It is our belief that once these rules were adopted they were enforced evenly and fairly.

The Court thanks all those involved for their patience while we made a determination in this matter.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6979870/
Ruling delivered on November 24, 2012.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Belschaft, with Blue Wolf II recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by King Durk the Awesome.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 4.5: Special Elections
16. A special election will be held in the event of a vacancy in any elected office or position.
17. The Delegate, or if the Delegate is not available, the Speaker, or if the Delegate and Speaker are not available, any Court Justice, will serve as Election Commissioner for the special election.
18. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy in the special election will last for five days, beginning within two days after the vacancy is noticed.
19. Voting will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Bill of Rights:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court opines the following:

It is the belief of the Court that the accidental omittance of a Candidate from the Ballot does in fact violate that Candidates Rights under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore ordered that the voting period for the Special Election of Vice Delegate is restarted immediately. The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Court recognizes mcmasterdonia's immediate attempt to rectify the situation by adding the missing candidates name back to the ballot as soon as being made aware of the situation. The Court does appreciate when an official in the Government attempts to correct a mistake however this specific rectification was not enough to satisfy the Bill of Rights.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6988506/
Ruling delivered on November 25, 2012.




Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Usage of the Arms, Flag, and Seal of The North Pacific
Opinion drated by Hileville, joined by Belschaft and Blue Wolf II

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Iro.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 7.1: Arms, Flag, and Seal
2. The following arms as designed by ThelDRan and revised by Eluvatar and Gulliver is adopted as the coat of arms of the North Pacific:
[ image link removed: http://www.thenorthpacific.org/images/arms.png ]
3. Each institution in the North Pacific's government may establish for itself a seal which uses the arms of the North Pacific.
4. The arms of the North Pacific may not be used except to represent the North Pacific or an official regional entity.
5. The following flag, as designed by ThelDRan and revised by Eluvatar and Gulliver is adopted as the official flag of the North Pacific:
[ image link removed: http://www.thenorthpacific.org/images/flag.png ]

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Bill of Rights:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

The Court opines the following:

As to the first question posed to the Court: "1. Does Section 7.1, #4 of the Legal Code contradict the following clause from paragraph #2 of the Bill of Rights."

The answer to this question would be no. The Legal Code does not infringe on a nations right to the Freedom of Press, speech, and free expression of religion.

As to the second questions posed to the Court: "2. Does Section 7.1, #4 of the Legal Code prohibit anyone who is not "an official regional entity" from flying the flag simply because it contains the coat of arms, despite the Legal Code containing no explicit prohibition against flying the flag?"

No it does not. The Legal Code specifically lists both the Coat of Arms and the Flag of the North Pacific as separate items. It is the belief of the Court that just because the flag contains an image of the Coat of Arms does not make the flag THE Coat of Arms. Therefore to be quite clear nations may fly the Flag of the North Pacific but may not fly the Coat of Arms of the North Pacific.

As to the third question posed to the Court: "3. Can nations of The North Pacific who are not "an official regional entity" legally fly the flag of The North Pacific?"

Yes the requirement established in the Legal Code only states that the Coat of Arms may not be used unless by "an official regional entity". As the Court has stated above the Flag and Coat of Arms are two separate items and not one and the same.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6988483/
Ruling delivered on November 25, 2012.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Delegate Term Limits
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Blue Wolf II and Belschaft

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Eluvatar.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 3.9 of the Constitution:
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.
The Court opines the following:

It is the belief of the Court that the Article 3.9 of the Constitution was intended to mean one elected 4 month period was equal to one full term. To elaborate further the restriction laid out in Article 3.9 for no more than two consecutive terms means two consecutive elected four month periods. With that being said the Court also would like to make clear that this does not allow for a Delegate to resign during their second term and then run again for another term in the following election. If the individual was elected to Delegate Seat for two complete 4 month periods they are not eligible to run for a third term even if they are recalled, resign, or abandon the office of Delegate in any way during the second term.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6987454/
Ruling delivered on November 27, 2012.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Applications to the Security Council
Opinion drafted by Belschaft, joined by Hileville and Funkadelia

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kingborough.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 5 of the Constitution:
Article 5. The Security Council

1. Any person who is a member of the Regional Assembly and meets any endorsement and influence requirements determined by law may apply to become a member of the Security Council.
2. The Regional Assembly may exempt a person from Regional Assembly membership or any requirements by a two-thirds majority vote, and may terminate an exemption by a two-thirds majority vote.
3. The Security Council may approve applicants by a majority vote. The Regional Assembly may admit an approved applicant by a majority vote. If the Security Council does not approve an applicant or does not act on them within thirty days, the Regional Assembly may admit the applicant by a two-thirds majority vote.
4. The Security Council will monitor the region’s security and report on it to the public, and enforce decisions of the Regional Assembly to remove the Delegate.
5. The Regional Assembly may establish a line of succession beyond the Vice Delegate among the members of the Security Council by a majority vote. If a new member is admitted to the Security Council, they will be added at the end of the current line of succession. If a member is removed from the Security Council, they will be removed from the line of succession.
The Court opines the following:

It is the belief of the Court that any person wishing to become a member of the Security Council must first apply to the Security Council, and that as part of this process their application will later be placed before the Regional Assembly. Whilst the wording of Article 5.1 does not explicitly state who the applicant is applying to, it is the belief of the court that it is made clear in Article 5.3 that the application is directed to the Security Council itself and not the Regional Assembly. Based upon this and on the wording of Article 5.3 - specifically the order in which the process is laid out within Article 5.3 - the court is of the opinion that the following procedure must be followed for applications to the Security Council;
  1. Application to the Security Council.
  2. Security Council vote on the application
  3. Regardless of the result of the Security Councils vote on the application - or if such does not occur within thirty days - the application is moved to the Regional Assembly to be voted upon.
  4. Regional Assembly vote on the application. Depending on the preceding stages, either a simple or a a two thirds majority will be required for the application to be approved.

In answer to the specific questions of the petitioner;

Do these clauses make the Regional Assembly able to vote a member into the SC without an application to the Security Council?

No. The exemptions detailed in Article 5.2 apply only to the requirements for membership set out in Article 5.1, not the application procedure established in Article 5.3.

If the above is no, do these clauses make the Regional Assembly able to vote a reject application into the Security Council?

Yes, the Regional Assembly is able to admit an applicant rejected by the Security Council to said body under the terms identified in Article 5.3, namely a two-thirds majority vote in favor.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6972837/
Ruling delivered on November 28, 2012.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Abbey, with Gaspo abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Sections 5:
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region.

7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer.

9. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution

The Court opines the following:

The Court had determined that in order for a nation to have equal and fair treatment and protection of law and due process of said law a duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence is in fact created by the Bill of Rights. The Court reviewed the Bill of Rights and the Request filed by Gaspo on this matter. The Court is in unanimous agreement that a duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence does in fact exist under the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Court also notes that if in such a case the prosecution unknowingly posses exculpatory evidence when they are made aware of such evidence it must be disclosed to the Court and the Defense Council immediately.

The Court thanks everyone for their patience during this review.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6992177/
Ruling delivered on January 9, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional Assembly
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Abbey, with Belschaft abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Eluvatar.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Legal Code, Consitution, and Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Section 6.1: Regional Assembly Membership Act
2. The Speaker will work with forum administration to process Regional Assembly applicants.
3. Assembly members must maintain a nation in the North Pacific.
4. Applicants must swear an oath, as follows:
Code:
[nation]TNP Nation[/nation]
[nation]WA Nation[/nation]

I, [forum user name], leader of The North Pacific nation of (your TNP nation's name), pledge loyalty to the region, to abide by its laws, and to act as a responsible member of its society. I pledge to only register one Nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may immediately lose my voting privileges, permanently. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for membership in the Regional Assembly of the North Pacific.
5. New forum members may who register as citizens or join the Regional Assembly must be made aware of the Criminal Code they are pledging to respect..
6. The Speaker will accept applicants with valid applications who are verified by forum administration not to be using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty.
7. The Speaker will process applications within 14 days. If the applicant is not rejected within 14 days, they will be automatically accepted to the Regional Assembly.
8. Regional Assembly members may not vote in any vote which began before they were last admitted.
9. The Speaker's office will maintain a publicly viewable roster of Regional Assembly members.
10. The Speaker's office will promptly remove any members whose removal is ordered by the Court, whose North Pacific nation leaves or ceases to exist, who fail to log in to the North Pacific forum for over 30 days.
The Court opines the following:

The Court in reviewing the matter as brought forth by Eluvatar reviewed the Constitution, Legal Code, and the Bill of Rights.

The Court had determined that the matter is twofold. If the violation occurs after the time in which the nation is no longer a member of the Regional Assembly then they are not violating their oath as they are not bound to that oath at the current moment. Whereas if the violation occurs during the time in which the nation was a member of the Regional Assembly and was bound by that oath they may be tried for an Oath Violation.

The Court reviewed the particluar matter that prompted this Judicial Inquiry and has determined that Justice Belschaft did in fact by not accepting the removal of JAL's RA membership follow the ruling that is being made today. For the record JAL's RA membership periods from the Court removal in March to his re-acceptance in August are listed below. The periods show that JAL was not a member of the Regional Assembly during the time of the alleged telegram campaign and could not have violated a regional assembly membership oath.

Removed on 3/21/12 by the Court
Restrictions removed when acquitted on 5/3/12
Reapplied on 5/5/12 - Admitted on 5/8/12
Removed on 6/20/12
Reapplied on 8/11/12 - Admitted on 8/12/12

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6989623/
Ruling delivered on January 10, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On WA Nation Disclosure Requirements
Opinion drafted by Gaspo, joined by Hileville, with Belschaft recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Cormac Stark.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Legal Code, Constitution, and Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

The Court opines the following:

The Court in this matter faces three questions:
1.Does the requirement for WA disclosures when voting stem from any legal duty established through the Constitution and other Laws of The North Pacific?
2.In the absence of an appointed registrar to whom disclosures may be made, is failure to disclose grounds for disqualification of a vote?
3.Are the WA disclosures required by Section 6.2 in conflict with the Bill of Rights’ Equal Protection Claus (Clause 10)?

To put those anxiously awaiting simplified answers at ease, The Court has answered these questions as follows:
1.No.
2.No.
3.No.

Regarding the first point, a simple search of the text of the law finds no disclosure requirement specifically related to elections; only the overarching requirement which must be met in an ongoing fashion to maintain Regional Assembly membership.

The second issue, regarding vote disqualification, is similarly simple. The Court can find no basis in the law which requires that votes be discarded if disclosure requirements are not met in the absence of a registrar. In criminal law, the impossibility of avoiding an offense (provided one has not exercised volition in leading to the inevitability) is a complete defense to criminal liability. The same is true here; the impossibility of reporting which would result from the absence of a duly appointed registrar is not a reasonable barrier to the voting rights of citizens.

On the third point, the Court must examine the law in its entirety to determine whether or not WA Membership is a requirement, or a choice. At no point, under the Constitution or any element of the Legal Code, is World Assembly membership a requirement to participate. Membership alone is a choice. Choices come with consequences; some choices ease burdens, others impose them. The protections in the Bill of Rights are intended to protect all Nations of the North Pacific from unfair burdens imposed by their government. WA membership, however, is a choice, not an obligation.

Participation in activities which require WA membership is a choice, not an obligation. As such, any duty to report WA nations is, in effect, willingly shouldered by those players who choose to participate in such activities. The reporting requirements are imposed fairly, on all nations. That some nations choose to join the WA, thereby triggering this reporting requirement, is not a choice made for those players; it is a choice made by them. As such, the burden of reporting is willingly shouldered, and is not an unfair burden.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7008792/
Ruling delivered on January 18th 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Right against Self Incrimination
Opinion drafted by Gaspo, joined by Hileville, with Belschaft abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Eluvatar.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
Article 6 of the Bill of Rights:
6. No Nation shall be held to answer for a crime in a manner not prescribed by the Constitution or the Legal Code. No Nation shall be subjected to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. No Nation shall ever be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against itself.
The Court opines the following:

The Court has two questions before it. First, does the right against self-incrimination apply only to parties in the case at hand, or to all individuals testifying as witnesses? Second, does the refusal to answer on self-incrimination grounds constitute evidence against the individual, which may be used to assert guilt related to the matter at hand?

As to the first question, the wording of the law indicates no limitation on this right against self-incrimination. It may be invoked by any witness or party when questioned, and the refusal to answer may not be circumvented by any legal action in the future. This is a fundamental legal principle, and is essential to ensuring the fairness of the justice system.

The second question is similarly simple. The answer is no. The refusal to answer is simply a refusal to answer, nothing more. If it were usable as evidence of guilt, the entire right against self-incrimination would be undermined and become irrelevant. In order to preserve this right, the refusal to answer cannot be used as evidence of guilty, in the proceeding at hand or in any future proceeding.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7004262/
Ruling delivered on January 18, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the TNP Flag as a National Flag
Opinion drafted by Gaspo, joined by Hileville and Belschaft

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Unibot.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Bill of Rights and Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Article 1 of the Bill of Rights:
1. All Nations of The North Pacific are sovereign. Each Nation has the right of self-determination in that Nation's domestic policies, including, but not limited to, issue selection and WA membership.
Section 7.1.4 of the Legal Code:
4. The arms of the North Pacific may not be used except to represent the North Pacific or an official regional entity.
The Court opines the following:

The Court has before it a question examining a potential conflict between Article 1 of the Bill of Rights, and Legal Code Chapter 7.1.4. The question specifically addresses national flags. The Court finds that there is no conflict, and finds that Legal Code Chapter 7.1.4 does not violate the Constitution or Bill of Rights, in spirit or in letter.

The Bill of Rights’ protections of national sovereignty state, and are intended to clarify, that the Government of The North Pacific may not direct the management of the nations in a proactive way. The law at hand restricts use of the Coat of Arms to use by government officials or the government as a whole. The Court does not believe that a conflict exists here, and draws on a number of analogies to explain this position:

  • It is perfectly reasonable for a government to restrict the use of official letterhead, because its appearance conveys significance and meaning indicating that the document conveyed on that letterhead is an official communication. The letterhead bestows formality and legitimacy, In effect, and as such must be restricted. While free expression is important, that free expression would undermine the very purpose and utility of the letterhead, and as such must be restrained.
  • Diplomatic license plates are issued only to diplomats, and confer special privileges upon those who possess them. As such, their use is restricted to a small subset of individuals. This is perfectly reasonable, as those plates convey additional authority and certain distinctions, and as such must be controlled.
  • Governments often restrict access to police uniforms, because the uniform is a de facto symbol of power and authority. Symbols or icons which convey authority or are held to indicate some official status must be controlled, or they lose all validity as an official symbol.
Many other examples are available, such as military uniforms, symbols of authority (legislative gavels, for example), and unique titles of position. The Arms of The North Pacific are the only means which the government has reserved to allow it to convey a degree of official recognition upon statements, posts, and other documents, to separate them from ordinary documents. This is far from an unreasonable or illegal action for a government to take.

As a side note, if any nation is truly enamored with the Arms, and simply must have the Arms as a part of its flag, The Court directs that nation to Legal Code Chapter 7.1.5, which establishes the official Flag of The North Pacific, a flag whose use is not restricted in the same way as the Arms.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6989736/
Ruling delivered on January 18th 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Speaker's Power to End Debate
Opinion drafted by Gaspo, joined by Hileville, with Belschaft abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Blue Wolf II.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.

The Court opines the following:

The court has before it the seemingly simple question of whether the Speaker is within his rights to end debate on proposal unilaterally, potentially barring motions to vote, without giving cause. The Court confines its opinion on this matter to the facts of this case in particular, in which the proposal which was closed was highly controversial and prompted not-insignificant Moderation actions. The court will, however, clarify its understanding and opinion of the Speaker's discretion with regard to closing discussions, so that future Speakers will have some guidance going forward.

Looking first to the case at hand, we find a thread seeking to amend the Bill of Rights to legalize extrajudicial action against a particular citizen. This proposal would not have passed Constitutional muster, and would have been in direct conflict with the very document it sought to amend. It could never have become law. As such, it is reasonable to say that the discussion in question lacked merit, viability, and legality. This finding will have bearing on our final ruling.

The Constitution grants discretion to the Speaker as follows:
Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
The Constitution, Legal Code, and RA Rules are all completely devoid of any additional reference to the Speaker's discretionary powers. Nor are there any rules outlining how the Regional Assembly's business is to be conducted, which have bearing on this matter. As such, the Constitution's grant of discretion to the Speaker in administering the Regional Assembly is the only binding law on this issue.

The question is raised, however, as to whether or not the actions taken using this discretionary power violate the Bill of Rights. This Court believes that they do not. Nations do possess a right to freedom of speech, and the government may not impede that right, but this restriction must be balanced against the demands of a civilized society, which encourages equal treatment of all its citizens. Regardless of the personal feelings of any Regional Assembly member, the proposal in question was a targeted attempt to discriminate against a member of the region. In fact, the proposal would have violated several elements of the Bill of Rights and Legal Code. Furthermore, the target of this proposal had repeatedly asked for the harassment he felt he was experiencing to cease. Under these circumstances, the Speaker's actions are not a violation of the Bill of Rights for one simple reason:
Bill of Rights:
. . . The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.
The Speaker's actions were permitted under his discretion, and using his judgment he acted in the best interests of the region. If any Nation feels that the actions of a government official are in violation of these laws, the proper recourse is a recall proceeding, not a Court proceeding. Particularly not in circumstances such as these.

With that decided, the Court would take this opportunity to comment more broadly on the powers of the Speaker. Under the aforementioned Constitutional clause, the Speaker is granted broad discretion, where no rules exist, to administer the Regional Assembly as he or she sees fit. Under the Bill of Rights segment also mentioned previously, the Court believes that all government officials are obligated by law to act in good faith in discharging their duties. The Court believes that the Speaker does possess the right to unilaterally table proposals, if their continued debate is not reasonably in the best interests of the region. The Constitution grants this discretion, and the Bill of Rights in effect obligates the Speaker to exercise said discretion if he or she feels it is appropriate. If the Nations of The North Pacific disagree, the procedure for Recall is quite clear, and as has been demonstrated over the past few months, is quite accessible. Legal review of the Speaker's discretionary decisions is not, generally speaking, necessary.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7015148/
Ruling delivered on January 31, 2013.





Advisory Opinion of the Court of the North Pacific
Advisory Opinion on the Role of the Attorney General

Given recent actions taken by the Attorney General, which sought to bypass the judicial fact-finding process and undermine the authority conferred upon this Court by the Constitution and Legal Code, the Justices of the Court feel compelled to issue this Advisory Opinion. It will have three main elements: it will clearly define what the responsibilities of the Attorney General are under the law (as there seems to be some lack of understanding within the current AG's office on this point), it will identify what the Court believes to be the unacceptable actions taken by Attorney General Punk D, and it will convey a strong recommendation to the Delegate for actions to be taken in response.

Looking first to the role of the Attorney General, the Law is quite clear.
Legal Code:
4. The Attorney General will serve as Chief Prosecutor in all cases brought before the Court of the North Pacific.
5. It is the duty of the Attorney General to see to completion any proceeding they are prosecuting.
Oath of Office:
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear ... I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office ... within the restraints of my legally granted power ...
Bill of Rights:
11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code.
These elements of the law quite clearly establish that, in accordance with the decisions of this Court, the Attorney General must bring to before the Court all criminal complaints filed with the AG's office. The Justices then make findings of plausibility based on the evidence associated with the complaint. The basic theory is that, if the evidence contained in the complaint were proven to be true, then the person would be guilty of the charged crime. If it's plausible, the indictment proceeds to court, at which point Legal Code 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 govern the AG's actions. He is to serve as Chief Prosecutor (though he is generally allowed to appoint Deputies and supervise their work), and is to see to completion any proceeding they are doing. It is of note that in all of these proceedings, the AG represents the Region; he effectively represents the region's laws in criminal matters, seeking to enforce them where the justices have seen cause for a trial.

So, the Attorney General must prosecute all criminal trials, and see them through to their completion. But how? Can he simply choose how aggressively or competently, or to what extent, he will prosecute each case? No, he cannot. He is bound by his Oath to do exercise his powers and rights in a way that avoids "misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance". This requires the Attorney General to execute his duties to the fullest of his abilities, lest he commit nonfeasance. He must do so regardless of his personal opinions, lest he commit misfeasance. And he must do so in accordance, at all times, with the law, lest he commit malfeasance.

One final note, before we move on to a discussion of the current Attorney General's actions. The Constitution expressly reserves for the Courts, the power to decide all questions of law, or questions of fact as examined through legal proceeding. No other governmental entity is granted such power. This express reservation, under current law and Court rulings, does not grant the Attorney General discretion in either which cases he prosecutes, or the degree of professionalism and zeal with which he prosecutes those cases. The Attorney General is an advocate; a Prosecutor. He speaks for the People and the Region of the North Pacific, in defense of their laws and their government's policies. He ought not judge, nor act based on personal opinion; that is not his prerogative.

This brings us to Punk D. It is the opinion of this Court that he has failed to meet these requirements as outlined by law, and by the Oath he willingly took. In TNP v. Unibot, Punk D indicated a clear intention to willfully abstain from submitting any evidence, effectively foregoing his duty to represent The North Pacific, based on his personal opinion. He explicitly stated his intention to exercise discretion he does not lawfully possess, and to purposefully cause the failure of a case which he is duty-bound to see to completion, to the fullest of his abilities. When confronted regarding these issues, the Attorney General remained defiant, and went so far as to submit one piece of evidence. This was done in response to the Court's stated intent to dismiss the case without the attachment of jeopardy. The Attorney General responded by attempting to force the Court to attach jeopardy at the 11th hour. Ironically enough, the Attorney General's attempt to out-maneuver the Court was foiled by a basic arithmetic error, as he failed to take this action until 23 hours after the close of discovery.

The Court is deeply concerned by the Attorney General's actions in this case. He attempted to force the Court to dismiss this case and bar it from ever being brought, based on no finding of fact, and instead his own opinion. This is not permissible under his own Oath, under the Legal Code, or under the Constitution. As a government official, Punk D may not disregard any of those documents; he has quite clearly done so here. It is not within the power of this court to compel action except as a result of a trial proceeding, however. We find no substantive law, however, which bars us from issuing a condemnation of a government official's actions, and strongly urging the Delegate to immediately request the resignation of the Attorney General, in conjunction with launching an investigation into the extent of this type of behavior within the Attorney General's office. The Court's ability to effectively apply the laws of The North Pacific is deeply undermined if the Attorney General cannot be relied upon to steadfastly carry out his duties; this Court has no faith in this Attorney General's ability or willingness to complete said duties.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7020342/
Advisory Opinion delivered on February 12, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Constitutionality of Prohibiting Sedition
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Sanctaria and Abbey

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
Section 1.3: Sedition:
8. "Sedition" is defined as an intentional attempt to incite the Nations of The North Pacific to revolt in a manner not sanctioned by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
Section 2 and 11 of the Bill of Rights:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.
The Court also took into consideration the Constitution of the North Pacific.

The Court opines the following:

The Sedition Law defines Sedition as "an intentional attempt to incite the Nations of The North Pacific to revolt in a manner not sanctioned by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights".

The Bill of Rights establishes that each Nation has the right to free speech and that that right cannot be infringed upon. The Bill of Rights also establishes that in the event of an actual emergency, governmental authorities with the consent of the Nations of the North Pacific may act in any reasonable manner consistent with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution does not provide for the ability to infringe on Free Speech in any of its provisions.

The only provision that allows for infringement on the right to free speech is Section 11 of the Bill of rights when there is an emergency situation, governmental authorities may act in a reasonable manner with the permission of the Nations of the North Pacific.

Therefore the Court after reviewing the above has reached a unanimous agreement that the Sedition Law is unconstitutional and is therefore stricken from the Legal Code of the North Pacific.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/6999373/
Ruling delivered on February 13, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers
Opinion drafted by Gaspo, joined by Hileville and Sanctaria

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r, and the follow-up posted by Crushing Our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration the following elements of Article 4 of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
. . .
4. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.

The Court opines the following:

The Court has before it two issues, tangentially related but submitted loosely together. The Court will first address Crushing Our Enemies' inquiry regarding the ability of this Court to review the policies of other elements of the government.
Crushing Our Enemies:
I would ask that the court take into consideration Article 4, clause 1:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
It would be preposterous to opine that the court has the power to "resolve conflicts and ambiguities" and "review the legality" in and of every law or policy except the ones the court itself has created.
This request has two interpretations: depending upon where one places the emphasis, and whether or not one comprehends sarcasm, it may either be taken on its face, as suggesting that the Court cannot review anything other than its own opinions. We first address this interpretation.

The Court finds no merit in this position as stated. The Court has been specifically charged with reviewing government policies, and no reason has been given in support of the assertion that this Court cannot review other the policies and actions of other elements of the government, upon request. The Courts are granted this power to provide a balance against abuses of power, and to provide recourse to allow citizens to have their grievances addressed by a neutral party.

Under COE's proposed interpretation, the Court would have no purpose, as it would only be permitted to conduct criminal and civil trials, and clarify ambiguity. It would not be able to hold elected officials accountable for their actions, or determine whether or not policies are in accordance with the Constitution; these powers of judicial review are essential to the operation of the court and the balanced structure of democracy within a 3-branch system.

The Court rejects COE's assertion, and maintains that, subject to the request of an affected party, it may review and offer its legal opinion on any action, policy, law, rule, or decision made by any government official.

If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.

Turning to r3naissanc3r's request for review, the Court recognizes that r3n's proposed interpretation is the most literal, most restrictive view which may be taken of this Court's freedom regarding past decisions. While this Court places strong importance on precedent, and is exceedingly hesitant to overturn it even in part, the interests of justice and the evolution of the law require that the Court be able to overturn precedent where appropriate. At one point, for example, FALCONKATS as Special Assistant Attorney General refused to bring any civil case before the Court, asserting (in direct contradiction with the Constitution) that the Court was exclusively able to hear criminal matters. Let's say that were appealed, and the Court erroneously upheld his decision. Under r3n's proposal, that would stand forever. The only means of bypassing it, would be for the Regional Assembly to pass a law saying that the Constitution says something that it already said in the first place. Inescapable binding in Court decisions would not advance the interests of Justice.

Let's look at another example to illustrate this. Suppose a Counsel submits an Affidavit as evidence in a current trial. Affidavits are neither permitted nor barred, currently - they are not discussed in the current Court Rules. Let's say that this Affidavit was submitted, and objected to, and the objection was upheld. It was then appealed, and the Court opined that Affidavits were not permissible. That would be binding forever. Ah, you say, but the legislature could legislate around that, thus restoring balance! You would be wrong. The RA would not be able to change the rules, because evidentiary concerns are addressed in the Court Rules, which only the Court can change. And the Courts would not be able to contradict binding precedent, thus permanently barring Affidavits from ever being used in TNP Courts. The law must be allowed to evolve to match society, and conclusively binding decisions carry with them the potential to greatly restrict the ability of the law, and the Court, to adjust with the times.

The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court's discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.

In other words, the Court must explain itself fully when overturning precedent. The Court must try, wherever possible, to act in accordance with precedent, so long as that precedent does not conflict with new law, or the fundamental principles of justice established by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

To specifically answer r3n's questions, the binding effect prescribed by the Constitution applies to the Court to the extent that it does not bring the Court's precedent into conflict with the Constitution or with subsequent substantive law. The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to "look again"), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7016999/
Ruling delivered on February 20, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Time Limits in Trials
Opinion drafted by Sanctaria, joined by Abbey Anumia and Jamie

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration Article 7 of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer.

The Court opines the following:

The issue the Court has before it is whether or not the the scheduling of trials, as they currently stand, infringes on one's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. In particular, the Court is asked whether or not the denying the Defence's right to respond to motions due to those time limits, specifically in the case of The North Pacific v. Eluvatar, limited that Defendant's right to a fair trial.

It is the opinion of the Court that the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed to those charged with criminal acts by the Bill of Rights, includes an inherent right of response to the Defendant and/or his/her team. It is the Court's opinion that denying the Defence an opportunity to respond to the Prosecution, in both a pre-trial period and beyond, would pose a danger to a Defendant's enumerated right, especially in a situation where an over-zealous Prosecution intentionally waited until immediately prior to the end of specific phase to make a motion, thereby depriving the Defence of any opportunity to respond.

This Court believes that in order to protect the constitutional rights of the Defendant, should the Prosecution file any motion(s) in the 12 hour period immediately prior to the ending of a phase, the Defence be granted an automatic time extension to respond to that motion(s) if they fail to do so in that 12 hour period before the phase ends. This Court tasks the Court will updating its ruleset to reflect this opinion and to clarify the automatic extension as outlined.

Further, the Court does not recognise that the aforementioned right to respond should apply to the Prosecution also, as although the Bill of Rights guarantees equality for each nation in the operations of governmental authorities, the right to a fair trial (from which this right to respond is found) is explicitly given by the Bill of Rights only to those charged with a criminal offence.

It is also the considered opinion of the Court that this right of response is just and only that; a right to respond to motions made, and not extra time to file motions of their own.

With specific attention to the case of The North Pacific v. Eluvatar, the Court acknowledges its own erring and agrees with the Defence that pre-trial motions should not have begun as pleas for all charges were not filed; motions to dismiss belong only in the pre-trial period and should not have been accepted as it had not yet begun. It is the belief of this Court that the trial in question should return to the plea phase.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7026894/
Ruling delivered on March 4, 2013.
 



Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Vice Delegate Succession to the Delegacy
Opinion drafted by Sanctaria, joined by Hileville, with Gaspo dissenting

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Cormac Stark.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
Article 3: The Delegate and Vice Delegate:
1. The Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate.
2. The Delegate may eject and ban nations from the region as permitted by law, and will eject or ban nations from the region when required by law.
3. The Delegate may negotiate treaties with foreign powers. No treaty will come into effect unless approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the Regional Assembly.
4. The Delegate may veto a proposal of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal a law within one week of its passage. The Regional Assembly may override such a veto by a two-thirds majority vote.
5. The Delegate may appoint executive officers to assist them and may dismiss these officers freely. Executive offices may be regulated by law.
6. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.
7. The Vice Delegate will hold the second most endorsements in the region. The Delegate may eject or ban any nation which exceeds the Vice Delegate’s endorsement count.
8. If the Delegate is removed or unable to serve, the Vice Delegate will assume the duties of the Delegate. If the Vice Delegate is also unable to serve, the first available person in the line of succession will assume the duties of the Delegate.
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.
Article 6. General Provisions:
1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.
2. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
3. No person may simultaneously hold more than one elected office or simultaneously hold offices in more than one judicial, legislative or executive category.
4. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.
5. No law or government policy may contradict this constitution.
6. Procedures to fill vacancies in elected offices may be established by law.
The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
Section 4.2: Election Law Definitions:
4. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.
5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle.
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
7. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The dates for the Election Cycle will be designated at least 30 days in advance by the Delegate .
8. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it. An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election unless a it cannot be completed prior to the beginning of the appropriate scheduled election cycle. Pending an election, however, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body. Vacancies of appointed positions may be filled in accordance with proper appointment procedures.
The Court opines the following:

The issues before the Court are: whether or not Article 6.6 of the Constitution covers the procedure when a Delegate vacates his office, or if it does not and the procedures for the situation when a Delegate vacate his office is covered by Article 3.8 of the Constitution; whether or not being "unable to serve", as said by the Constitution, includes a resignation; does the Vice Delegate succeed the Delegate for the remainder of the Delegate's term, or just until a special election for the office can be concluded. The Court shall take address each issue separately in this opinion.

On the first issue, it is the opinion of the Court that both Articles, 3.8 and 6.6, need not be exclusive and can indeed be complimentary. The Court shall expand on this in the last issue.

It is the further opinion of the Court that a resignation should be taken as being "unable to serve". A resignation is and of itself a severe and serious impediment on the ability for the Delegate to serve; indeed, it should be understood as not wanting to serve. The Court finds such to be implicitly included in Article 3.8 of the Constitution, specifically where it reads "unable to serve".

Finally, and more importantly as the Court has found this to be the major crux of the issues at hand, it is the opinion of the Court that where Article 3.8 of the Constitution refers to the Vice Delegate assuming the duties of the Delegate where he is removed or unable to serve, that clause mandates the Vice Delegate exercise the duties of the office but not the office itself. The Court further finds that Article 6.6 includes the elected office of the Delegate in its remit.

The Court reasons this due to the Constitution referring to "offices" in other provisions of the Constitution (2.3; 3.5; 6.3), however when referring to the situations where the Vice Delegate succeeds the Delegate, it specifies "duties" only. The Court believes that this is a conscious reference and should be read as different to the "office" mentioned in other articles of the Constitution.

It is the opinion of this Court that upon the removal or resignation of the Delegate, and indeed when he is unable to serve as written, that the Vice Delegate should assume the duties of the Delegate, but only the duties, and only until a special election electing a new Delegate has concluded and the new Delegate installed.

To clarify, a Vice Delegate does not succeed the Delegate in office, only his duties for a temporary period of time until a new Delegate elected, currently covered by Section 4.2.8 of the Legal Code which is allowed for by Article 6.6 of the Constitution.

Anticipating questions wherein it is asked "does not the Vice Delegate assume the office by virtue of his assuming the in-game office", the Court advises the following:

Article 3.1 of the Constitutions stipulates that "the Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate". It is the opinion of the Court that the Delegate must hold all positions in order to fulfill what the Constitution defines as the office. That is, the Delegate must be both the Head of State and Government, and hold the in-game position of Delegate. While the Vice Delegate may occupy the latter position, he does not occupy the former, and therefore this Court dismisses the opinion that he holds the office of Delegate just because he sits in the in-game Delegacy.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7029388/.
Ruling delivered on March 14th 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Constitutionality of the Minor Error Clause
Opinion drafted by Hileville, joined by Sanctaria and Gaspo

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
Article 2. The Regional Assembly:
1. Requirements for membership in the Regional Assembly will be determined by law.
2. The Regional Assembly may enact, amend or repeal laws by a majority vote.
3. The Regional Assembly may remove a government official from office by a two-thirds majority vote.
4. The quorum for any vote of the Regional Assembly except elections will be a third of its membership.
5. The Regional Assembly will elect a Speaker every four months by a plurality vote.
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
7. Abstentions cast in the Regional Assembly will not be used to determine the result of any vote, but may be used for quorum and all other purposes.
Article 3. The Delegate and Vice Delegate:
1. The Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate.
2. The Delegate may eject and ban nations from the region as permitted by law, and will eject or ban nations from the region when required by law.
3. The Delegate may negotiate treaties with foreign powers. No treaty will come into effect unless approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the Regional Assembly.
4. The Delegate may veto a proposal of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal a law within one week of its passage. The Regional Assembly may override such a veto by a two-thirds majority vote.
5. The Delegate may appoint executive officers to assist them and may dismiss these officers freely. Executive offices may be regulated by law.
6. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.
7. The Vice Delegate will hold the second most endorsements in the region. The Delegate may eject or ban any nation which exceeds the Vice Delegate’s endorsement count.
8. If the Delegate is removed or unable to serve, the Vice Delegate will assume the duties of the Delegate. If the Vice Delegate is also unable to serve, the first available person in the line of succession will assume the duties of the Delegate.
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.

The Court took into consideration the Preamble of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
Preamble:
In order to present a clearer and more comprehensible legal system, the Regional Assembly undertakes to keep the law of the North Pacific organized and clear. If a minor error is found in this Legal Code, the Speaker will update it on the published instructions of the Court, unless a Regional Assembly member objects within five days. This Code will be divided into several Chapters, which may contain Sections. Every operative sentence must be a numbered clause, numbered within a Chapter. Clauses may be referenced by chapter and clause number..
The Court opines the following:

The Court reviewed the the sections of the Constitution as listed above as well as the Preamble of the Legal Code. The Court notes that the Constitution specifically grants power to amend a Law to the Regional Assembly which requires a majority vote. The Constitution also grants the Delegate the ability to veto said Amendment.

The Court is in unanimous agreement that the Constitution grants Amendment power to the Regional Assembly and also places the restriction of requiring a majority vote on said power. The Court reads the requirement of a "majority vote" as a vote in accordance with Regional Assembly Policy for holding votes. This specifically means that just giving a period of time to object to an amendment does not constitute a "majority vote".

Therefore the Court is in unanimous agreement that the section in the Legal Code's Preamble which gives the Speaker the power to amend a minor error on the published instructions of the Court is unconstitutional.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7011417/.
Ruling delivered on March 15th 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections
Opinion drafted by Abbey Anumia, joined by Sanctaria and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Blue Wolf II.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Legal Code and Constitution of the North Pacific:

Constitution:
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.

Legal Code:
13. The election cycle for the terms of the Delegate and Vice Delegate, and of the Speaker, will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.

The Court opines the following:

1) What period of time constitutes a legal term for Delegate, if at all possible, put in terms of specific months of the year (ex. January to May)?

The legal terms for Delegate are set as 4 month periods, starting in January, May and September.

2) Is it legal for a Delegate who just served two consecutive and elected terms as Delegate to run in a special election for the term he/she was legally barred from running for during the General Elections?

No. The Delegate has still served in 2 consecutive terms - it is irrelevant whether they served the whole term, the first half or the second half.

Having established the set terms, the Court believes that it is not legal for a Delegate to contest any Delegate election, be it general or special, in the term immediately following his second consecutive term. Although this ruling established that finishing out the term did not constitute serving a term, this Court believes that there is no distinction in the Constitution or the Legal Code which would allow for discrimination based on when in a term the special election is held and the new Delegate elected. The Court can therefore not hold with that previous ruling.

3) Is Eluvatar, at this present time, a legal candidate for Delegate in either this Special Election or any other Special Delegate election this term?

No. He has served in the two terms immediately preceding the term in which this Special Election is held, therefore he is not eligible.

4) If Eluvatar is ruled to be a legal candidate and were to win the Special Elections, would he be legally allowed to seek re-election in the following May and September General Elections?

As the Court has ruled that Eluvatar is not a legal candidate, this question is moot.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7033156/.
Ruling delivered on March 19th 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Constitutionality of the Intelligence Exception to the Freedom of Information Act
Opinion drafted by Sanctaria, joined by Abbey Anumia and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
Article 1:
1. All nations are guaranteed the rights defined by the Bill of Rights.
Article 6:
5. No law or government policy may contradict this constitution.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Section 9:
Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
Section 11:
No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 6.3: Freedom of Information Act:
15. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
16. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
17. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
18. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
19. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
20. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.
21. All activities by the designated regional intelligence services are exempt from this law.

The Court opines the following:

The issue before the Court is simple: Whether or not Section 6.3.21 of the Legal Code is unconstitutional due to the Bill of Rights guaranteeing the transparent and accountable operations of its governmental authorities.

The first thing the Court looks at is the principle of constitutional supremacy. That is, that no legal document or law may contradict the Constitution. The Court finds that this principle is indeed in force in The North Pacific due to Article 6.5 of the Constitution and also section 11 of the Bill of Rights. At this point, the Court also wishes to confirm that under Article 1 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights stands a part of that Constitution.

Having established that no part of the legal code may contradict or supersede the Constitution, which we have also established includes the Bill of Rights, we now look to the question as to whether or not Section 6.3.21 of the Legal Code contradicts the Constitution.

The piece of statute in question exempts regional intelligence services from the remit of Section 6.3 of the Legal Code, hereafter referred to as the Freedom of Information Act. It is the opinion of this Court that although Section 9 of the Bill of Rights guarantees the transparent operations of the government, it is only through the Freedom of Information Act in the Legal Code that nations may access undisclosed information; that is, the Freedom of Information Act governs the transparency of the governmental authorities, and specifies procedures on how to access undisclosed information.

Nations in The North Pacific are guaranteed transparency, and it is forbidden for governmental authorities to disregard the Constitution, and it is also forbidden to contradict the Constitution. This Court finds that the Bill of Rights does not create an exemption from transparency for any governmental authority, and similarly this Court finds that the Constitution and Bill of Rights do not create an exemption from constitutional supremacy for any law regarding government authorities.

As such, it is the opinion of this Court that Section 6.3.21 of the Legal Code is unconstitutional and consequently directs the Speaker of the Regional Assembly to strike it from the Legal Code.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7033640/.
Ruling delivered on March 26th 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Standing and the Definition of Affected Party
Opinion drafted by Abbey Anumia, joined by Sanctaria and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Law of the North Pacific:

Constitution:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.

Bill of Rights:
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region. Any Nation of The North Pacific has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.

The Court opines the following:

With regards to “affected party” in general:

The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.

The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.

With regards to flemingovia's specific enquiry:

The Court finds that flemingovia was entitled to request a review of the Election Commisioner's refusal to list Astarial on the ballot. While Flemingovia was not a candidate in the election, the Court is charged with “resolving conflicts or ambiguities” in the law. Flemingovia was unclear how to interpret the law surrounding legal candidates and wanted to ensure that the Elections Commission’s interpretation with respect to Astarial’s candidacy was indeed the correct interpretation. As a voter in the election in question, the choice of candidates directly affected Flemingovia, as well as all voters in the election, and thus Flemingovia met the requirement defined in the Constitution.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7036751/.
Ruling delivered on April 22nd 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Justices as Government Officials.
Opinion drafted by Abbey Anumia, joined by Sanctaria and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant parts of the Constitution and Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Constitution:
Article 4. The Court

5. Justices will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a plurality vote every four months.

Constitution:
Article 6. General Provisions
1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.
2. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
3. No person may simultaneously hold more than one elected office or simultaneously hold offices in more than one judicial, legislative or executive category.
4. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.

Legal Code:
Section 3.2: Appointment of Hearing Officers
8. If there is a vacancy on the Court, or any Justice is unavailable or has a conflict of interest the remaining Justices will promptly appoint a hearing officer to participate as temporary Justices.
9. If no Justices are available or all Justices have a conflict of interest, the Delegate will promptly appoint the needed hearing officers with the agreement of the Speaker.
10. In implementing the previous clause, any person who has a conflict of interest will be treated as absent.
11. Any hearing officer appointed under this Section must not have a conflict of interest and may not hold any other office while serving as a judicial hearing officer.

Legal Code:
Section 3.3: Criminal Trial Procedure
12. When seeking an indictment to eject or ban, or expel from the RA due to oath violation, pending a trial, the Government must inform all the Justices.
13. Any Justice may approve or deny an indictment, and their decision will be final.
14. Once an ejection is performed, the Government must notify the ejected nation of their rights within one hour, and publicly submit a criminal proceeding to the court within six hours.
15. Once a criminal proceeding is presented, the defendant will have 48 hours to enter a plea, or a plea of "Not Guilty" may be entered for them.
16. Once a plea is entered, a period of time set by the Court for the discovery of evidence and witness testimony will begin. This period is normally 7 days.
17. Once discovery ends a period of time for arguments on the evidence and law will begin, its duration set by the Court. This period is normally 5 days.
18. During discovery and arguments, either side may make objections or requests publicly on the forum.
19. Once arguments end, the Court will have 72 hours to decide on a verdict and, if necessary, sentence.

Legal Code Chapter 4: Election and Appointment Procedure]Section 4.1: Oath of Office
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
2. All government officials will be required to take the Oath of Office within one week of the certification of election results by the Election Commissioner, or if appointed, within one week of their appointment being announced. The taking of the Oath constitutes assumption of the office. Failure to post the oath within the allotted time will result in the office being considered vacant, to be filled in accordance with all laws governing elections or appointments, as is appropriate for the office in question.
3. This Oath will be binding and violations are grounds for a recall.

Section 4.2: Election Law Definitions
4. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.
5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle.
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
7. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The dates for the Election Cycle will be designated at least 30 days in advance by the Delegate .
8. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it . An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election unless a it cannot be completed prior to the beginning of the appropriate scheduled election cycle. Pending an election, however, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body. Vacancies of appointed positions may be filled in accordance with proper appointment procedures.

Section 4.3: Overall Election Law
9. In General and Judicial elections, Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the nomination and election processes at least one week before the month in which the election begins. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Chief Justice shall promptly make the appointment within 48 hours.
10. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy shall last for seven days.
11. Voting will begin three days after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for seven days.
12. If a run-off vote is required it will begin within two days of the first vote ending and it shall last for five days.

Section 4.4: General Elections
13. The election cycle for the terms of the Delegate and Vice Delegate, and of the Speaker, will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.
14. Non-incumbent candidates for Delegate or Vice Delegate may not obtain an endorsement level during the election cycle greater than the level authorized for members of the Security Council under Chapter 5.

Section 4.5: Judicial Elections
15. The election cycle for the terms of Justices, and the Attorney General will begin on the first days of the months of March, July, and November.
16. Whenever the position is vacant, the Justices shall elect a Chief Justice from among themselves by a majority vote.
17. In the event that seven days after the conclusion of a Judicial election, including the conclusion of any required run-off votes, a Chief Justice has not been elected, the Justice that received the highest number of votes in said election, and in the event of a tie for highest number of votes the Justice among those tied with the largest amount of elapsed time since that Justice's most recent admission to the Regional Assembly without an interruption, shall become Chief Justice.

Section 4.6: Special Elections
18. A special election will be held in the event of a vacancy in any elected office or position.
19. The Delegate, or if the Delegate is not available, the Speaker, or if the Delegate and Speaker are not available, any Court Justice, will serve as Election Commissioner for the special election.
20. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy in the special election will last for five days, beginning within two days after the vacancy is noticed.
21. Voting will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately.
Legal Code Chapter 2:
Section 1.5: Proxying
16. "Proxying" is defined as use of a proxy server to render a forum user anonymous or any practice which allows a member multiple accounts.
17. Forum administrators will inform the Government and Court of Proxying they observe.

The Court opines the following:

The question before the Court is to determine if Justices are government officials. This question is most directly answered by looking at Article 6 of the Constitution. This notes that “government officials” must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly, and that any election candidate must be a Regional Assembly member for 15 days before the opening of nominations. Because these requirements are included within the same clause, this Court believes that they should be considered together and linked. Justices are elected positions, as is made clear in Article 4 of the Constitution and in Chapter 4 of the Legal Code. Article 6.1 also makes clear that government officials are positions above and beyond just an RA member. In other places in the Constitution and Legal Code (namely, Article 6.3 of the Constitution, and during various parts of Article 4 in the Legal Code, as well as possibly others), Justices and other Judicial posts are included with but also defined separately from the other branches of governance. Specifically, Article 7.3 separates government officials into three categories: legislative, executive and judicial. To this end, the Court finds that all members that have elected extra-Regional Assembly offices are government officials.

With respect to flemingovia's direct question around Astarial's candidacy, the Court opines that at first glance these two clauses could intimate that “government officials” do not include Court Justices. However, within the context of the Legal Code there does not appear to be such an inconsistency. With regards to Legal Code Section 2, Clause 12, the distinction is clearly more of a practical nature, as the Justices will not be the party filing and indictment – the indictment is filed by the 'executive' office. Further, with regards to Section 1, Clause 17, this is a combination of a clarification of the different branches of government, as well as a practical consideration. In this case, the two separate branches are Government and Court.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7030504/.
Ruling delivered on May 9th 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Powers of Election Commissioners
Opinion drafted by Abbey Anumia, joined by Punk D, with Sanctaria abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Funkadelia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant parts of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
9. In General and Judicial elections, Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the nomination and election processes at least one week before the month in which the election begins. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Chief Justice shall promptly make the appointment within 48 hours.

The Court opines the following:

The Legal question before the Court is whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place. The Court was presented with two potential interpretations of the relevant law in this case. One potential interpretation was that the Election Commissioners do not have this power, and that candidates simply have to declare themselves as such. The second interpretation was that they do have this power, and that Candidates must post their declarations in the relevant thread.

In order to make a decision, the Court considered the first of these possible rulings, and found that it would lead to absurdity when all of the relevant Law is considered together. If the Election Commissioners do not have the power to require candidacy declarations to be in their designated threads, then there would be no requirement for Candidates to post their declarations anywhere obvious, or even publicly. This would impact on the Election Commissioners ability to supervise and oversee elections, as set out by the Legal Code. Thus, the Court rejected this interpretation.

To this end, the Court finds that requiring Candidates to post their declaration in a thread designated for such a purpose is a reasonable manifestation of the Election Commissioners' ability to oversee an election. This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7053327/.
Ruling delivered on May 14th 2013.
 



Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Restarting Voting Periods
Opinion drafted by r3naissanc3r, joined by Abbey Anumia and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mall.

The Court took into consideration the following Articles of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

10. Each Nation entitled to a vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region is entitled to the equal treatment and protection of that Nation's right to vote.

The Court took into consideration the following Clause of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 3
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person shall be elected Delegate to a full or partial term in three consecutive election cycles.

The Court took into consideration the following Sections of the Codified Law of The North Pacific:

Section 4.2: Election Law Definitions

4. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.

5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle.

6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.

7. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The dates for the Election Cycle will be designated at least 30 days in advance by the Delegate .

8. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it . An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election unless a it cannot be completed prior to the beginning of the appropriate scheduled election cycle. Pending an election, however, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body. Vacancies of appointed positions may be filled in accordance with proper appointment procedures.

Section 4.3: Overall Election Law

9. In General and Judicial elections, Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the nomination and election processes at least one week before the month in which the election begins. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Chief Justice shall promptly make the appointment within 48 hours.

10. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy shall last for seven days.

11. Voting will begin three days after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for seven days.

12. If a run-off vote is required it will begin within two days of the first vote ending and it shall last for five days.

Section 4.4: General Elections

13. The election cycle for the terms of the Delegate and Vice Delegate, and of the Speaker, will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.

14. Non-incumbent candidates for Delegate or Vice Delegate may not obtain an endorsement level during the election cycle greater than the level authorized for members of the Security Council under Chapter 5.

Section 4.6: Special Elections

18. A special election will be held in the event of a vacancy in any elected office or position.

19. The Delegate, or if the Delegate is not available, the Speaker, or if the Delegate and Speaker are not available, any Court Justice, will serve as Election Commissioner for the special election.

20. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy in the special election will last for five days, beginning within two days after the vacancy is noticed.

21. Voting will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately.

The Court took into consideration its previous rulings:

It is the belief of the Court that the accidental omittance of a Candidate from the Ballot does in fact violate that Candidates Rights under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore ordered that the voting period for the Special Election of Vice Delegate is restarted immediately. The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Court recognizes mcmasterdonia's immediate attempt to rectify the situation by adding the missing candidates name back to the ballot as soon as being made aware of the situation. The Court does appreciate when an official in the Government attempts to correct a mistake however this specific rectification was not enough to satisfy the Bill of Rights.

The Court has before it two issues, tangentially related but submitted loosely together. The Court will first address Crushing Our Enemies' inquiry regarding the ability of this Court to review the policies of other elements of the government.

Crushing Our Enemies:
I would ask that the court take into consideration Article 4, clause 1:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
It would be preposterous to opine that the court has the power to "resolve conflicts and ambiguities" and "review the legality" in and of every law or policy except the ones the court itself has created.

This request has two interpretations: depending upon where one places the emphasis, and whether or not one comprehends sarcasm, it may either be taken on its face, as suggesting that the Court cannot review anything other than its own opinions. We first address this interpretation.

The Court finds no merit in this position as stated. The Court has been specifically charged with reviewing government policies, and no reason has been given in support of the assertion that this Court cannot review other the policies and actions of other elements of the government, upon request. The Courts are granted this power to provide a balance against abuses of power, and to provide recourse to allow citizens to have their grievances addressed by a neutral party.

Under COE's proposed interpretation, the Court would have no purpose, as it would only be permitted to conduct criminal and civil trials, and clarify ambiguity. It would not be able to hold elected officials accountable for their actions, or determine whether or not policies are in accordance with the Constitution; these powers of judicial review are essential to the operation of the court and the balanced structure of democracy within a 3-branch system.

The Court rejects COE's assertion, and maintains that, subject to the request of an affected party, it may review and offer its legal opinion on any action, policy, law, rule, or decision made by any government official.

If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.

Turning to r3naissanc3r's request for review, the Court recognizes that r3n's proposed interpretation is the most literal, most restrictive view which may be taken of this Court's freedom regarding past decisions. While this Court places strong importance on precedent, and is exceedingly hesitant to overturn it even in part, the interests of justice and the evolution of the law require that the Court be able to overturn precedent where appropriate. At one point, for example, FALCONKATS as Special Assistant Attorney General refused to bring any civil case before the Court, asserting (in direct contradiction with the Constitution) that the Court was exclusively able to hear criminal matters. Let's say that were appealed, and the Court erroneously upheld his decision. Under r3n's proposal, that would stand forever. The only means of bypassing it, would be for the Regional Assembly to pass a law saying that the Constitution says something that it already said in the first place. Inescapable binding in Court decisions would not advance the interests of Justice.

Let's look at another example to illustrate this. Suppose a Counsel submits an Affidavit as evidence in a current trial. Affidavits are neither permitted nor barred, currently - they are not discussed in the current Court Rules. Let's say that this Affidavit was submitted, and objected to, and the objection was upheld. It was then appealed, and the Court opined that Affidavits were not permissible. That would be binding forever. Ah, you say, but the legislature could legislate around that, thus restoring balance! You would be wrong. The RA would not be able to change the rules, because evidentiary concerns are addressed in the Court Rules, which only the Court can change. And the Courts would not be able to contradict binding precedent, thus permanently barring Affidavits from ever being used in TNP Courts. The law must be allowed to evolve to match society, and conclusively binding decisions carry with them the potential to greatly restrict the ability of the law, and the Court, to adjust with the times.

The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court's discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.

In other words, the Court must explain itself fully when overturning precedent. The Court must try, wherever possible, to act in accordance with precedent, so long as that precedent does not conflict with new law, or the fundamental principles of justice established by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

To specifically answer r3n's questions, the binding effect prescribed by the Constitution applies to the Court to the extent that it does not bring the Court's precedent into conflict with the Constitution or with subsequent substantive law. The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to "look again"), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.
1) What period of time constitutes a legal term for Delegate, if at all possible, put in terms of specific months of the year (ex. January to May)?

The legal terms for Delegate are set as 4 month periods, starting in January, May and September.

2) Is it legal for a Delegate who just served two consecutive and elected terms as Delegate to run in a special election for the term he/she was legally barred from running for during the General Elections?

No. The Delegate has still served in 2 consecutive terms - it is irrelevant whether they served the whole term, the first half or the second half.

Having established the set terms, the Court believes that it is not legal for a Delegate to contest any Delegate election, be it general or special, in the term immediately following his second consecutive term. Although this ruling established that finishing out the term did not constitute serving a term, this Court believes that there is no distinction in the Constitution or the Legal Code which would allow for discrimination based on when in a term the special election is held and the new Delegate elected. The Court can therefore not hold with that previous ruling.

3) Is Eluvatar, at this present time, a legal candidate for Delegate in either this Special Election or any other Special Delegate election this term?

No. He has served in the two terms immediately preceding the term in which this Special Election is held, therefore he is not eligible.

4) If Eluvatar is ruled to be a legal candidate and were to win the Special Elections, would he be legally allowed to seek re-election in the following May and September General Elections?

As the Court has ruled that Eluvatar is not a legal candidate, this question is moot.
The Legal question before the Court is whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place. The Court was presented with two potential interpretations of the relevant law in this case. One potential interpretation was that the Election Commissioners do not have this power, and that candidates simply have to declare themselves as such. The second interpretation was that they do have this power, and that Candidates must post their declarations in the relevant thread.

In order to make a decision, the Court considered the first of these possible rulings, and found that it would lead to absurdity when all of the relevant Law is considered together. If the Election Commissioners do not have the power to require candidacy declarations to be in their designated threads, then there would be no requirement for Candidates to post their declarations anywhere obvious, or even publicly. This would impact on the Election Commissioners ability to supervise and oversee elections, as set out by the Legal Code. Thus, the Court rejected this interpretation.

To this end, the Court finds that requiring Candidates to post their declaration in a thread designated for such a purpose is a reasonable manifestation of the Election Commissioners' ability to oversee an election. This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned.

The Court took into consideration the following Clauses of The North Pacific Legal Code, TNP Law 26:

"Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made, includes all voting periods, and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The exact dates for the Election Cycle shall not include any legal holidays provided in Law 23, and those dates shall be designated at least 30 days in advance by The Delegate so as to encourage the greatest level of participation by eligible voters during the designated month.

The Court took into consideration the following announcements made by the respective Election Commissioners: here; here; here; here; and here.

The Court opines the following:

The court has been requested by Mall to review the decision made on May 15th 2013 by the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election of May 2013 ("the Electoral Commission"), to restart the vote for the Vice Delegate portion of the election cycle ("the Vice Delegate election"). Mall petitioned for the review claiming that his candidacy in the Delegate portion of the election cycle ("the Delegate election") affords him the status of affected party required of those requesting review. In granting the petition, the Court has recognized this claim.

Mall ("the petitioner") presented the Court with four questions pertaining to this decision of the Electoral Commision. The Court will address these questions separately.

Violation of equal treatment and protection right.

The petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the Electoral Commission's decision to restart the Vice Delegate election has violated the equal treatment and protection right provided by Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific ("Bill of Rights"). The petitioner specifically presented the Court with the following argument: i. The Electoral Commission's earlier decision to not include Romanoffia in the ballot for the Vice Delegate election caused anomalies in that election. ii. Because the Delegate and Vice Delegate elections are closely linked, the same anomalies affected the Delegate election. iii. The Electoral Commission took action to relieve those involved in the Vice Delegate election from the negative effects of these anomalies by restarting that election, but took no similar action with regards to the Delegate election. iv. From this discrepancy stems the alleged violation of the equal treatment and protection right, which the petitioner argues would require similar action to be taken to relieve those involved in the Delegate election. As evidence for the anomalies caused in the Vice Delegate election, the petitioner presented the declared protest votes cast for Vice Delegate.

The Court is not convinced by the second proposition in the above argument. The Court rejects the proposition that anomalies in the Vice Delegate election are certain to affect the Delegate election. The Court recognizes that the inherent connection between the two elections makes it reasonably likely that disruptions in one may affect the other. The difference is salient: a proposition only likely to be true still needs to be substantiated by evidence before it is considered true with certainty; and absent this evidence the Court cannot act upon such a proposition by presumptively asserting its validity. The Court also finds the truth of this proposition to be necessary to the entire argument presented by the petitioner.

The petitioner has not presented any evidence of disruptions directly affecting the Delegate election necessary to substantiate the second proposition in his argument. With regards to the particular instance of disruptions the petitioner submitted occurred in the Vice Delegate election, protest votes: in addition to the lack of evidence of their certain occurrence in the Delegate election, the likelihood of their occurrence is further ameliorated by the fact that voters were provided ample time after the Electoral Commission's decision to amend any protest votes. Therefore, the Court concludes that it cannot validate the second proposition in the petitioner's argument, and by the reasoning presented in the previous paragraph the Court rejects the petitioner's argument.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate election did not violate the right to equal treatment and protection granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.

Violation of right to prior notice.

The petitioner requested that the Court examine whether the Electoral Commission's actions in restarting the Vice Delegate election violated the right to prior notice of actions of governmental authorities provided to him by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.

The Court believes that the Electoral Commission constitutes a "governmental authority" for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, thus its actions are subject to the sufficient prior notice standard required by that Article. Therefore, the Court concludes that the request by the petitioner merits investigation.

The Court first needs to determine what constitutes sufficient prior notice. There are three sources the Court can use to inform its decision: statutory legislation, precedent set by this Court's prior decisions, and past practice.

In electoral matters for which the legislator has provided explicit instructions for their administration, sufficient prior notice would be at least as much time as prescribed by those instructions. When such instructions are absent, as in the case under consideration, in the interests of consistent application of law, the Court can seek to draw inferences from: i. legislation on closely related matters; and ii. credible evidence of legislative intent that can be determined from intrinsic aids within the statute and legislative history. In terms of the former, the electoral matter of closest nature regulated by electoral law is run-off votes: run-off votes uniquely share with the vote under examination the defining characteristics of being unexpected until they arise as a consequence of circumstances in a regular vote, and therefore not a-priori scheduled. The relevant provisions in the Codified Law of The North Pacific ("the Legal Code"), found in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, Clause 12, prescribe that run-off votes must be started "within two days" of the end of the vote necessitating them. This provision provides no lower bound on the amount of prior notice that must be given (a vote can be started immediately), and from its phrasing the Court assumes that its intent is to ensure expediency rather than sufficient prior notice. Cues can be taken from provisions for other types of votes, where a few clauses (Section 4.3, Clauses 10 and 11, and Section 4.6, Clause 20 and 21) regulate a specific amount of time before voting commences. Though it is the belief of the Court that this time is provided primarily to allow for candidates to campaign, it can be reasonably expected that the legislator additionally intended for this time to act as a form of prior notification to voters. This expectation is reinforced by taking into consideration legislative history, and in particular the introductory paragraphs to TNP Law 26, from which current electoral legislation is derived. There, it is declared that electoral dates must be declared in advanced "so as to encourage the greatest level of participation", providing credible evidence that the legislator agonized to ensure that the right of voters to sufficient prior notice is observed. The same argument however can be used to infer that the legislator took this into consideration when deciding not to provide for additional prior notification in run-off election.

In terms of case precedent, the Court examined its determinations in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. The circumstances decided there are conspicuously similar to those currently under examination: a vote was started with a candidate's name omitted from the ballot, and when it was determined that the omission was improper, the vote was restarted. In that case, the Court ordered the vote to be restarted immediately. Another Court decision addressing similar circumstances can be found in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Blue Wolf II on whether or not Eluvatar is term-barred from being a candidate in the Special Elections for Delegate; however in that case the Court did not make any determinations related to the question we investigate.

Finally, the Court turns its attention to prior practice. The Court has identified two past situations where a vote had to be restarted, both alluded to in the previous paragraph in the context of respective Court decisions they triggered. The first is the Special Election for Vice Delegate held in November-December 2012; in that case, the vote was restarted immediately, per the order of the Court. The second is the Special Election for Delegate of March 2013, where the vote was also restarted immediately. This however can be assumed to have been compliance with the previous Court order, so does not offer any new information either. Looking at prior practice in a more general context, the Court observes that the general accepted standard for actions by governmental officials is that they are visibly announced in a designated place within the constitutionally designated Regional Forum, with visibility usually achieved through the use of a new thread. This standard also applies to actions of the various Electoral Commissions, which usually provide no additional prior notice besides any legally mandated time interval before commencing a vote.

In order to reach a conclusion, the Court has balanced the various sources of information available to it and the guidance they provide. The Court considers the most pertinent to be the precedent set by the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. The Court has also not identified any irreconcilable conflict between that ruling and the Constitution and substantive law. The Court is also conscious of the boundaries it set upon itself in the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers. Requiring additional prior notice before a vote is restarted would at least partially overturn the precedent set by that decision, which required the respective vote to be restarted immediately. Seeing also that this is consistent with prior practice, and with what weak cues can be drawn from existing related legislation, the Court believes that an announcement of the restarting of a vote made in a new, separate thread in an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Court notes that this is a sufficient, not necessary standard. The Court also finds that the manner in which the Electoral Commission announced the restarting of the Vice Delegate election satisfied this standard.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate election did not violate the right to prior notice granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.

Violation of right to protection of right to vote.

The petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the Electoral Commission's decision to restart the Vice Delegate election has infringed upon his and others' right to vote, as protected by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. The petitioner identified the potential infringement in the discounting of votes, cast in compliance with pertinent law, that occurred as a consequence of the decision to restart the election.

The Court recognizes the fact that restarting an election already in progress results in the discounting of legally cast votes. When this discounting happens without due justification, the Court believes that it constitutes a violation of the rights granted by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. The question then becomes, what is due justification? The Court, in the interests of judicial restraint, will answer, partially at least, a narrower question: what is due justification for restarting an ongoing vote? Once this is answered, the Court will then apply the answer to the specific circumstances of the Vice Delegate election.

This Court has already provided some guidance on how to approach this issue, in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. There, the Court found that

It is the belief of the Court that the accidental omittance of a Candidate from the Ballot does in fact violate that Candidates Rights under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore ordered that the voting period for the Special Election of Vice Delegate is restarted immediately. The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

Parsing this finding, it is first determined that the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is a violation of their rights under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights that can only be remedied by restarting the vote. Importantly, it is further determined that not restarting the vote---or not altering the timetable as otherwise required---would itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Court wishes to elaborate on these findings, and the second determination in particular. The violation of the Bill of Rights in the above set of circumstances is twofold. The omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot, the Court found previously, is in violation of Article 9. The remedy for this violation is to render the vote void. Consequently, votes cast using the erroneous ballot are also invalidated. Their invalidity is not by fault of the voters, but of the Electoral Commission, which failed to provide those entitled to vote with an opportunity to exercise their right in a valid way. This failure is, by itself, a violation of Article 10. The remedy for the second violation is to discount the invalid votes and restart the vote. In the context of our original question, the discounting of the votes resulting by restarting a vote under these circumstances is justified: the mishandling of the original vote was egregious enough to invalidate those votes beyond repair, and thus making their discounting in favor of a new vote the only means available for safeguarding the rights guaranteed under Article 10.

The above argument points to an answer to the question the Court set to investigate. Restarting a vote, and the discounting of votes it implies, is justified and necessary when it is the only remedy appropriate for a transgression---be it with regards to the Constitution and Bill of Rights, electoral law and its interpretation by the Court, or rules set by the Electoral Commission itself---that occurred during the conduct of a vote by fault of the Electoral Commission overseeing it. This answer is not to be interpreted as an exhaustive enumeration of conditions for restarting a vote: the one condition presented is merely sufficient. Furthermore, care must be taken when determining the truth of the first part of the condition, the uniqueness of the remedy. As the petitioner presented, discounting previous votes by restarting a vote runs the danger of voters who already cast their ballot not realizing that they need to recast it, and therefore going against the very rights of Article 10 they set to protect. At the same time, not restarting the vote runs the danger of the same voters not realizing that there has been a change in the circumstances under which they originally cast their vote, again posing hazards for the Article 10 rights. Both risks are remedied to an extent by the requirement for sufficient prior notice for actions of the Electoral Commission placed by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. All these factors must be taken into consideration, and be balanced against the severity of the effects of the transgression, when determining whether restarting a vote is the only available remedy. The fact that, as decided previously by the Court, the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is one case justifying restarting a vote should provide a standard of comparison when making this determination.

Having answered the question of what provides due justification for restarting a vote is justified, the Court will now apply the answer to the specific case at hand. What needs to be determined is whether a valid candidate had been left off the ballot of the original Vice Delegate vote. The petitioner contended that the Court had previously found, in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Funkadelia on the limits of Election Commissioners' powers, that no such incident had occurred. The Court disagrees with this assertion. The Court, in that case, was asked to determine "whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place". All of the findings of the Court in that case must be interpreted in the context of this question; this includes the concluding statement of the ruling: "This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned." The term "legal" in this statement, when interpreted in the context of the question asked, means that it was within the Electoral Commission's power to make a decision to not include a candidate on the ballot based on an alleged violation of rules the Electoral Commission set in place. Whether the decision was correct or not, that is whether a violation had indeed occurred, is a separate determination that the Court was not asked to, and did not make. Analogously, the statement that "those elections should continued as planned", when interpreted in the context of the question asked, means that the election could not be challenged on the grounds that the Electoral Commission made a decision it was not within its prerogative to make. Challenging the election on the grounds that the decision itself was incorrect is, once again, a different issue that the Court presented no opinion on.

The Court is convinced by the arguments presented by the Electoral Commission in their announcement concerning the reasons for restarting the Vice Delegate vote. The Court therefore defers to the Electoral Commission's decision, and accepts their finding that Romanoffia was omitted from the ballot for the Vice Delegate vote while his candidacy was valid. Taken jointly with the determinations in the remaining of this section, the Court concludes that the Electoral Commission's decision to discount votes by restarting the Vice Delegate election was justified.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to discount prior votes by restarting the Vice Delegate election did not infringe upon the right to vote and its protections provided by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights.

Violation of the Legal Code by decision to restart only the Vice Delegate vote.

Finally, the petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the decision of the Electoral Commission to restart only the Vice Delegate vote without restarting the other votes in the general election was in violation of the provisions of the Legal Code covering electoral matters. The petitioner claimed that the intent of the Legal Code is for Delegate and Vice Delegate election to be run simultaneously "so as to provide a more stable campaign atmosphere and to allow for candidates to cooperate and run joint campaigns". To support these claims, the petitioner cited, somewhat confusingly, Article 3, Clause 9 of the Constitution.

The Court has first examined the specific law cited by the petitioner. The Court finds that Article 3, Clause 9 of the Constitution poses no requirement whatsoever that the elections for the offices of Delegate and Vice Delegate be held simultaneously.

As far as the Legal Code is concerned, the Court has identified relevant provisions in Section 4.2, Clause 7; Section 4.3, Clause 12; and Section 4.4, Clause 13. The latter is the only place where a requirement for contemporaneous elections can be found. The clause can be interpreted in two ways: either that the elections for Delegate, Vice Delegate, and Speaker must all take place within the same, single election cycle, starting on the specified days; or that the distinct election cycles for Delegate, Vice Delegate, and Speaker must all start simultaneously on the specified days. An "election cycle" is then defined in Section 4.2, Clause 7, as "as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election." Taking the two clauses together, the first interpretation effectively places no simultaneity constraints: the mandated single election cycle can begin with nominations for, say, Delegate; continue with the vote and results for that office; then continue with nominations for Vice Delegate; and so on. The second interpretation is more restrictive, in that it requires nominations for all three offices to begin simultaneously. Under none of the two possible interpretations the Court has identified are the votes for the three offices, or the announcement of their results, required to take place jointly.

In fact, the Legal Code makes special provision in Section 4.3, Clause 12 for asynchronous voting, in the event of a required run-off vote. In the event that such a vote is necessary, the Legal Code places no requirements for synchronizing any stage, nominations, voting, or announcement of results, of other elections happening at the same time with the election requiring the run-off vote. Therefore, even if the Court were to consider legislative intent, whatever evidence is present indicates that the only likely synchronization requirement on the administration of the three elections is that their nomination stages begin simultaneously. This is also consistent with previous practice, specifically the general election of January 2013: a run-off was necessary to determine the winner of the Vice Delegate election, but the elections for Delegate and Speaker concluded normally, as if the run-off were not required.

Therefore, the Court concludes that neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code create a requirement for the Electoral Commission, when they decide to restart the vote for one office in a general election, to also restart the votes for the remaining two offices.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate vote without restarting the votes for Delegate and Speaker did not violate the Legal Code.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7054582/.
Ruling delivered on May 27th 2013.
 



Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Definition of Government Officials
Opinion drafted by Punk D, joined by Gracius Maximus and Hileville

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Abstain.

The Court took into consideration the relevant parts of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
Section 3.1:
8. If there is a vacancy on the Court, or any Justice is unavailable or has a conflict of interest the remaining Justices will promptly appoint a hearing officer to participate as temporary Justices.
Section 4.1:
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
2. All government officials will be required to take the Oath of Office within one week of the certification of election results by the Election Commissioner, or if appointed, within one week of their appointment being announced. The taking of the Oath constitutes assumption of the office. Failure to post the oath within the allotted time will result in the office being considered vacant, to be filled in accordance with all laws governing elections or appointments, as is appropriate for the office in question.
Section 4.2:
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
Section 6.3:
17. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
The Court took into consideration the relevant parts of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
4. No Nation of The North Pacific holding WA member status in NationStates shall be obligated to endorse any official of a government authority of the region. The right to add an endorsement or withdraw an endorsement is a sovereign right of that Nation as a WA member.
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region. Any Nation of The North Pacific has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.
8. No Nation shall be ejected from the region, or banned from any forum, except as expressly authorized by the Constitution or the Legal Code. Should any official of a government authority of the region with authority to act, declare that the immediate ejection or banning of a Nation is an urgent matter of regional security they may order the ejection or banning of the nation. Any ejected or banned nation shall have prompt and immediate recourse to judicial review of the matter. The WA Delegate shall not exercise the power of ejection or banning unless expressly authorized by a specific action of a government authority of the region pursuant to the Constitution or to the Legal Code.
The Court took into consideration the relevant parts of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
Article 2:
3. The Regional Assembly may remove a government official from office by a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 4:
4. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.
Article 5:
4. The Security Council will monitor the region's security and report on it to the public, and enforce decisions of the Regional Assembly to remove the Delegate.
Article 6:
1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.
2. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
The Court took into consideration the ruling on Justices as Government Officials.

The Court took into consideration the ruling on the Powers of the Election Commissioners.

The Court opines the following:

Opinion Part 1: With respect to the Delegate, Vice-Delegate, Speaker, Attorney General, Appointed Ministers, Appointed Deputy Speaker/Ministers, and Appointed Deputy Attorney Generals

The positions of Delegate, Vice-Delegate, Speaker, Attorney General and their applicable deputies all have specific powers outlined by The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code.

Article 6 of the Constitution notes that all government officials shall swear an oath of office. This oath is the requirement to assume a position giving the officeholder authority and powers beyond the ability to introduce legislation and vote in elections which are conferred to members of the Regional Assembly.

Furthermore, Bill of Rights numbers 4, 5, 8 describe the recourse methods for nations believing they have been aggrieved by government officials. This Court finds that the expressed and implicit intent of these rights are to ensure all named and appointed by named offices within TNP law be subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Court finds that these positions are government officials and are subject to this provision.

Opinion Part 2: With respect to Security Council members, the court opines that members thereof are government officials as defined by TNP law and also subject to recall

Article 5.4 charges the Security Council with "monitor[ing] the region's security and report on it to the public". Additionally, members of the Security Council are approved by the entire Regional Assembly (Article 5.2) which signifies that the office of Security Council is not merely a designation resulting from length of service, having a nation within TNP, or the like but a position that must be approved by the RA with specific duties performed therein. Therefore, the Court finds that Security Council members are government officials because they are approved by the Regional Assembly, are tasked with monitoring the region's security, and also form a line of succession in an event the delegate and Vice-Delegate positions are vacated.

In Opinion Part 1, the Court found that government officials are subject to the recall provisions described within the Bill of Rights and having concluded that Security Council members are also government officials, the Court finds that Security Council members are also subject to the recall process and upholds any prior, present, or future recall votes administered in accordance with relevant recall guidelines and laws.

Opinion Part 3 - With respect to Election Commissioners, the Court opines that members thereof are government officials and charges all future appointees to take the oath of office taken by all government officials

The Court previously stated:
[T]he Court finds that requiring Candidates to post their declaration in a thread designated for such a purpose is a reasonable manifestation of the Election Commissioners' ability to oversee an election.
In its decision, the Court interpreted the "supervise" provision of the Legal Code (Section 4.2.6) endowed the Election Commissioners with the power to designate where nominations could be legally received. This court affirms the Election Commissioners' authority in this respect and also opines that such authority establishes the members thereof as government officials.

In Opinion Part 1, the Court found that government officials are subject to the recall provisions described within the Bill of Rights and having concluded that Election Commissioners are also government officials, the Court finds that Election Commissioners are also subject to the recall process and upholds any prior, present, or future recall votes administered in accordance with relevant recall guidelines and laws.

Additionally, the Court found that no records existed with the forum thread for oaths of office for Election Commissioners. The Court believes this to be a gross oversight and charges all future commissioners to state the oath in accordance with Legal Code Section 4.1.

Opinion Part 4: With respect to Justices and Temporary Hearing Officers, the Court affirms its previous ruling on Justices that members thereof are government officials

This Court affirms the previous ruling on Justices. Given the authority that is given to Temporary Hearing Officers to perform the duties of a Justice, the Court opines that Temporary Hearing officers are also government officials.

In Opinion Part 1, the Court found that government officials are subject to the recall provisions described within the Bill of Rights and having concluded that Temporary Hearing Officers are also government officials, the Court finds that Temporary Hearing Officers are also subject to the recall process and upholds any prior, present, or future recall votes administered in accordance with relevant recall guidelines and laws.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7057305/
Ruling delivered on June 9, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On RA Membership Requirements for Candidates
Opinion drafted by r3naissanc3r, joined by Funkadelia and Romanoffia

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mall.

The Court took into consideration Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court took into consideration Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.

The Court took into consideration its previous rulings:

Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Outstanding Request for Review
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election

The Court took into consideration the announcement made here on September 1st 2013 by the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election.

The Court took into consideration Section 3, Part 7 of the Constitution of The North Pacific, as it stood immediately before the enactment of the Constitutional Omnibus Act, passed on August 21st:

7. Candidates for these elected officials must be members of the Assembly for 30 days before nominations begin.

The Court took into consideration the Regional Assembly discussion on the Constitutional Omnibus Act that took place here.

The Court opines the following:

The petitioner, Mall, has requested that the Court review the decision made on September 1st 2013 by the "Voting Booth" to invalidate his candidacy for Vice Delegate in the General Election of September 2013 ("the election"). The Court believes that by "Voting Booth" the petitioner is referring to the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election of September 2013 ("the Electoral Commission"), who are in exclusive control of the account "Voting Booth" for the duration of the election. The Court will adopt this assumption for the remaining of this opinion. The Court granted the petition, recognizing that the fact that the petitioner is the same as the person whose candidacy was invalidated affords the petitioner the status of affected party constitutionally required of those requesting review.

The petitioner challenged the decision of the Election Commissioner on two separate grounds. The Court will address them separately.

Fifteen-day constitutional requirement for candidates.

The Electoral Commission, in their announcement on the invalidation of the petitioner's candidacy, provided as justification the constitutional requirement laid down by Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution. This Clause requires that "[c]andidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations." The petitioner challenged this justification by making three claims: First, that the above clause does not require membership for the fifteen days immediately preceding the "election". Second, that he fulfilled the requirements of that clause under that interpretation, having been a member of the Regional Assembly for some period of fifteen days before the opening of nominations. Third, that the Electoral Commission incorrect use of the above clause to invalidate his candidacy violated the petitioner's right to equal and fair treatment and protection, as provided by Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific ("Bill of Rights").

The Court will examine the first claim and, depending on its conclusion, proceed to the second and third.

Regarding the interpretation of Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution, mcmasterdonia submitted a brief arguing that the Court has already ruled on this matter in the past. The decision in question was rendered on April 21st 2012, at a time when the Court had not yet adopted its current naming conventions for cases; for convenience it will be referenced as Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific, In regards to the Outstanding Request for Review, and is provided at the beginning of this opinion. The decision related to a clause of the Constitution of The North Pacific ("the Constitution") before it was amended to its current form by the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012. The clause in question survives to an extent in the current Constitution, in the form of Article 6, Clause 1. However, the current form of the clause is considerably different from the old one. One of the most salient amendments is the addition of the definite article "the" before the number of days, whose meaning the Court is asked to determine. Therefore, the old decision is no longer applicable and a new one needs to be made.

The Court believes that the language in Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution, and specifically the presence of the definite article before "fifteen", clearly indicates that the requirement to be examined for potential candidates is whether they have been members of the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. The language is unambiguous, and therefore any other interpretation would be absurd. This interpretation is compatible with the one used by the Electoral Commission, and incompatible with the interpretation proposed by the petitioner.

It is worth also examining the intent of the regional legislative body, the Regional Assembly, while drafting the constitutional clause in question. In the thread in the Regional Assembly discussing the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012, when asked about the meaning of the definite article in Article 6, Clause 1, then Speaker Gulliver stated: "The "the" there is deliberate. It means specifically the 15 days before the election in question, not any random 15 days, so it's not possible to argue that "I was in the assembly 15 days already, even if it wasn't continuous, therefore I'm good to run"."

It should be noted that taking the intention of the Regional Assembly into consideration when interpreting a statute is appropriate only when said statute is ambiguous or absurd. Neither of these is true in this case, as Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution unambiguously indicates that the requirement for candidates is that they have been in the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. However, the legislature's intent here is in agreement with the actual meaning of the clause, and corroborates the interpretation adopted by the Court.

Based on the above, the Court rejects the first claim made by the petitioner. The petitioner's second and third claims were conditional on the validity of the first claim, and therefore are also rejected.

Decision

The Electoral Commission interpreted Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution correctly in their decision to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy on the grounds that the petitioner was not a member of the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. The decision of the Electoral Commission cannot be overturned on the grounds presented by the petitioner and is upheld.


Right to due process, prior notice, and the opportunity to be heard

The petitioner requested that the Court review whether the way in which the Electoral Commission invalidated his candidacy violated the petitioner's right to due process of law provided by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights says that due process includes "prior notice and the opportunity to be heard". The petitioner argued that the Electoral Commission's execution of their decision to invalidate his candidacy violated both of these elements of due process.

The Court has found in its previous decision Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election that "the Electoral Commission constitutes a "governmental authority" for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights." Thus, its actions are indeed subject to review for violations of the requirement for observance of due process of law laid down by that Article, as the petitioner has requested.

Regarding prior notice, the Court first needs to determine what constitutes sufficient prior notice, and then to determine whether the Electoral Commission has provided it.

For the first consideration, statutory legislation does not provide any cues as to what constitutes sufficient prior notice for the invalidation of a candidacy by the Electoral Commission.

In terms of case precedent, the subject of sufficient notice for actions of the Electoral Commission has been examined to some extent by the Court in its previous decision Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election. The Court determined there that "an announcement of the restarting of a vote made in a new, separate thread in an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights." The Court then also found that "this is a sufficient, not necessary standard." In doing so, the Court provided the necessary flexibility for future determinations on what is sufficient prior notice to adapt to the circumstances of actions of the Electoral Commission of different nature. The current circumstances are indeed different, in that they concern a different action by the Electoral Commission, namely the invalidation of a candidacy instead of the restarting of a vote.

The Court also argued that prior practice needs to be taken into account in such determinations. Such prior practice creates expectations to nations as to how actions by governmental authorities are going to be performed, and how nations may reasonably expect to be notified of such actions. Considering prior practice, the Court in its previous decision noted that "the general accepted standard for actions by governmental officials is that they are visibly announced in a designated place within the constitutionally designated Regional Forum, with visibility usually achieved through the use of a new thread." In the case of the handling of nominations and candidacies, the latter clause is not applicable: decisions regarding such matters have in the past consistently been announced within the a thread specifically designated for nominations and candidacies. It follows that any announcement regarding nominations and candidacies made by the Electoral Commission within such a thread would constitute a "visible announcement" as described above.

Following the above considerations, the Court believes that an announcement on the invalidation of a candidacy constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights if made in the following manner: a new post within a thread whose purpose is the administration of nominations and candidacies and is inside an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes. As before, this is a sufficient, not necessary standard. Concluding the discussion of prior notice, the Court notes that on September 1st the Electoral Commission made here an announcement satisfying this standard.

Turning to the right to be heard, there is no statutory legislation or case precedent elaborating its interpretation. A nation's right to be heard can be interpreted in two ways. First, being able to publicly and visibly, but within reasonable limits, express disagreement with and complain about actions of a governmental authority affecting the nation. Second, being able to seek protection from such actions, through a process where the nation is allowed to argue their position, have their arguments heard and judged impartially, and which after such judgment can, if appropriate, relieve the nation. The Court believes that both of these elements constitute parts of the right to be heard.

In the case at hand, with regards to the first element, the Court notes that the Electoral Commission did not deny the petitioner the opportunity to express his disagreement with or complain about the invalidation of his candidacy. The petitioner could have done so in the designated thread for nominations and candidacies, an action which, for the reasons argued earlier when considering prior notice, would have been both public and visible. With regards to the second element, regional law permits the petitioner to request review of the actions of the Electoral Commission, have his argument heard and judged by the Court, which may then relieve the petitioner. The petitioner has indeed exercised this right, free from interference from the Electoral Commission. Therefore, the Court believes that neither element of the petitioner's right to be heard has been violated by the Electoral Commission's actions in deciding to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission with its actions enacting its decision to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy did not violate the right to due process of law granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The actions of the Electoral Commission cannot be overturned on the grounds presented by the petitioner and are upheld.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7097834/
Ruling delivered on September 3, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Time at Which Oaths Become Binding
Opinion drafted by COE, joined by Flemingovia and Romanoffia

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Punk D.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Codified Law of the North Pacific:
Section 6.1: Regional Assembly Membership Act
2. Any person with an account on the regional forum and a nation in The North Pacific may apply for Regional Assembly membership, using their regional forum account, by providing the name of their nation in The North Pacific, and swearing an oath as follows:
I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for membership in the Regional Assembly of the North Pacific.
3. A copy of the laws applicants are pledging to obey must be available to them at all times.
4. An application for Regional Assembly membership ceases to be valid if at any time the applicant's declared nation in The North Pacific nation is not located in The North Pacific.
5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty. The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they do not pose a threat to regional security.
6. The Speaker will reject applicants who fail an evaluation by either forum administration or the Vice Delegate.
7. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly will immediately hold a majority vote on whether to uphold the rejection.
8. The Speaker will accept all other applicants with valid applications.
9. The Speaker will process applications within 14 days. If an applicant has not been accepted or rejected within that time, they will be automatically accepted to the Regional Assembly.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the previous ruling of the Court in regards to the judicial inquiry filed by Eluvatar on oath violations by former members of the Regional Assembly:
The Court had determined that the matter is twofold. If the violation occurs after the time in which the nation is no longer a member of the Regional Assembly then they are not violating their oath as they are not bound to that oath at the current moment. Whereas if the violation occurs during the time in which the nation was a member of the Regional Assembly and was bound by that oath they may be tried for an Oath Violation.

The Court opines the following:

The Court has previously ruled that former Regional Assembly members are no longer bound by the Regional Assembly oath when their membership expires, and that they are bound by the oath while they are Regional Assembly members. It is heavily implied by that same ruling that the oath is only binding while a nation is a member of the Regional Assembly. The Court sees no compelling reason to overturn that precedent.

It is the opinion of the Court that the Regional Assembly membership oath found in Section 6 Clause 2 of the Codified Law of the North Pacific becomes legally binding on RA applicants if and when they become members of the Regional Assembly, and remains binding only so long as they remain members. Explicitly, the oath becomes binding when any of the following conditions are met:
  • The Speaker admits the applicant and/or accepts their application;
  • The applicant has neither been accepted nor rejected after 14 days pass from the date of their application;
  • The applicant has been rejected by the Speaker for failing a security check by the Vice Delegate, and the RA has voted not to uphold that rejection.
Those conditions are the same conditions under which an applicant becomes a member of the RA.

Decision
The Regional Assembly oath becomes legally binding upon a nation when they become a member of the Regional Assembly.


Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7103606/
Ruling delivered on November 24, 2013.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Nonparticipation of a Defendant in Civil and Criminal Trials
Opinion drafted by Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Romanoffia & SillyString

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Flemingovia, as well has his subsequent clarification here.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
...
3. The Chief Justice will administer the rules of the Court. Where no rules exist, the Chief Justice may use their discretion.
...
4. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
6. No Nation shall be held to answer for a crime in a manner not prescribed by the Constitution or the Legal Code. No Nation shall be subjected to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. No Nation shall ever be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against itself.
...
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Adopted Court Rules December 2012 (in effect during the trial of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer):
Article 1: Trial Procedures
In accordance with the Legal Code of the North Pacific the Court establishes the following rules for Trial Proceedings:
  1. All charges that are brought in front of the Court of the North Pacific shall be filed in the form of an Indictment.
  2. After an Indictment is filed any Justice of the Court may approve the Indictment and within 24 hours a Trial thread will be opened by the Chief Justice or the Justice appointed as Trial Moderator. Indictments seeking an ejection or banning, or expulsion from the RA due to oath violation, the procedures as set by the Legal Code will be followed exactly as stated. After the acceptance of an Indictment and before the trial thread is opened the Defendant will be notified by a Court Justice of the pending proceedings.
  3. An Indictment may be declined by the Court if said indictment lacks substantial evidence to merit a trial.
  4. The Defendant will have 48 hours to enter a plea. If no plea is entered a default plea of Not Guilty will be entered.
  5. Once a plea is entered the period for pretrial motions will begin and last for 72 hours. After the conclusion of the pretrial motion phase a period lasting for 4 days will begin for evidence discovery and witness testimony. An extension of up to 72 hours may be granted upon the request of either the Attorney General or the Defense.
  6. Once discovery ends a period of time for arguments on the evidence and law will begin. This period will normally be 5 days unless otherwise stated by the Trial Moderator.
  7. During discovery and arguments, either side may make objections or requests publicly on the forum.
  8. Once arguments end, the Court will have 72 hours to decide on a verdict and, if necessary, sentence.
  9. This timetable may be altered by the Moderating Justice as required.
The Court took into consideration the trial of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer: HERE.

The Court opines the following:

On January 15th, 2013, the civil trial of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer began. Within 48 hours of the trial opening, it was postponed because the defendant was unable to appear in court. On February 26th, the court ruled in favor of Flemingovia, citing Grosseschauzer's failure to respond to the charges as the only reason for ruling as they did. No further action was taken by the court.

The court rules in effect for the duration of the incident did not distinguish between procedures for civil trials and criminal trials, as the adopted court rules do at present. There is nothing in the rules at the time that specified that they were inapplicable to civil trials. Thus, it is the judgment of this court that those procedures did apply to civil trials and that they ought to have been followed in the matter of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer.

Decision
The discretion of the moderating justice only extends to modifying the length of the various stages. It does not allow them to skip stages or proceed through them out of order.


The court turns now to the question of whether Grosseschnauzer's right to due process was violated. The court finds that in order to satisfy the right to due process, all adopted court rules must be followed, and those rules must be legal, constitutional, and free of Bill of Rights violations. Thus, the court violated Grosseschnauzer's right to due process by failing to follow its adopted rules. Even if those rules were interpreted as inapplicable to civil trials, that interpretation denied Grosseschnauzer his right to be heard and defend himself. The trial was declared postponed within 48 hours of opening, and did not go into session again until the ruling was delivered. Thus, Grosseschnauzer was not even given a full opportunity to enter a plea.

Decision
The court must follow its adopted rules with regard to trial proceedings to avoid violating the defendant's right to due process. Additionally, those rules must be legal, constitutional, and free of Bill of Rights violations.


With regard to the double jeopardy question, the court does not agree with the premise that Grosseschnauzer was ever in jeopardy to begin with. Jeopardy can only apply to matters where there has been a trial and a verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty. Given the opinion of the court that in the absence of a trial there was never any legal verdict, jeopardy has not attached. Accordingly, the plaintiff is free to refile charges.

Decision
Jeopardy only attaches to a case when an official and binding verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty has been delivered. Verdicts of the court are only official and binding when the trial has been conducted in a legal and constitutional way, without violating any of the defendant's rights.


The court realizes the difficulty of moderating a trial in which the defendant does not participate, but it is not appropriate to issue a default ruling in favor of the plaintiff when that occurs. In cases where the defendant is unable to participate in trial proceedings, or even select their defense attorney, it would be appropriate for the court to delay the trial until the defendant is able to appear. However, if it can be demonstrated to the court that the defendant is able to participate, but chooses not to do so, it would be appropriate for the court to appoint a defense attorney and continue the trial in their absence. There may be other legal and constitutional ways to handle an absentee defendant.

The court apologizes to Grosseschnauzer for violating his rights in the matter of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer, and to Flemingovia for mishandling his charges.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7137083/
Ruling delivered on January 14, 2014.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination Periods
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Romanoffia and Ator People


The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Treize Dreizehn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

12. "Reopen Nominations." Ballots for general and special elections shall include the option to reopen nominations. Should this receive a majority of votes, a further 48 hours will be provided for declarations of candidacy. Candidates whose names appeared on the first ballot will retain their candidacy unless they choose to withdraw. During the second round of voting following this period, the option to reopen nominations shall not appear on the ballot.

The Court opines the following:

The provisions made in the Legal Code for the reopening of nominations apply only to general elections - that is, those for delegate, vice delegate, and speaker - and special elections for any office. As the election referred to by the petitioner is a judicial election, it does not fall under this law.

The request for an injunction is denied.

The Election Commissioners are instructed to tally the results of the Attorney General race from the first round of voting and to either certify them or hold a run-off vote as necessary.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7170566/
Ruling delivered on March 18, 2014.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Standard of Proof and Intent
Opinion drafted by Romanoffia and SillyString, joined by Ator People

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kiwi.

The Court took into consideration Section 1.3 of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 1.3: Fraud
11. "Election fraud" is defined as the willful deception of citizens with regards to the candidates running, the time and venue of the elections, or the requirements and methods by which one may be eligible to vote or run for office.
12. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.

The Court also took into consideration the relevant section of the Bill of Rights:

In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence.

The Court opines the following:

What specific elements are required to prove fraud?
In order to prove Election Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court two things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information to, or deliberately withheld true information from, any non-zero number of citizens about certain subjects relating to elections. Second, they must show that this information was "willful deception". It is not required that the deception accomplish, or even aim for, any beneficial or harmful effect.

In order to prove Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court three things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information, or deliberately withheld true information. Second, they must show that this information was "intentional deception". Third, they must show that the provision or withholding of this information either improved the standing of that individual, or damaged that of another.

Both crimes require that the act be one of deception, and thus it is necessary to establish what that term entails.

First, deception must refer to a matter of fact, and not a matter of opinion. Matters of fact have definitive truth values - that is, they can be determined to be true or false. A statement of fact asserts something as truth, as objective reality. A matter of opinion, on the other hand, has a truth value which can vary depending on the individual contemplating the issue at hand, and a statement of opinion asserts subjective truth - something which is only necessarily true for the speaker.

Second, deception must refer to a material fact, that is, one which can reasonably be expected to affect the audience's future actions for some benefit or harm. Third, deception must be plausible, that is, something which can reasonably be expected to be believed by the audience.

Finally, in order to commit deception, an individual must be reasonably expected to know that their statement or omission lacks truth.

What sort of intention is necessary to prove fraud? Is it a high (almost unattainable) level? Is oblique intention enough?
To start, the Court opines that "willful deception" is synonymous with "intentional deception", and that the difference in word choice does not require a different standard of proof between the two crimes.

As for the standard itself, there are two types of intention in the commission of fraud. The first is demonstrable intent, wherein the defendant can be shown, by their own statements or actions relating to the alleged crime, to have engaged in deception as defined previously in this ruling.

The second is reckless intent, wherein intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.

The Court does not find that, together, these types of intent present an unattainable bar to the prosecution, although one or the other may be out of reach for any particular case.

Should the RA perhaps include a mens rea of "recklessness" in its definition?
The Court declines to comment on hypothetical legislation which would differentiate recklessness from intent.

Would a statement of "I believe" be enough to negate any finding of intention?
To reiterate, a statement of opinion is not a statement of fact, and thus statements of opinion do not qualify as fraudulent.

However, simply prefacing a statement of fact with the words "I believe" (or another similar phrase) is not, by itself, sufficient to establish it as a statement of opinion. The critical factor is and remains whether the statement is something which can be determined objectively, or whether it is a matter for subjective judgement.

To provide an example, the statement "Chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry ice cream" is a statement of opinion, as it is a matter of individual tastes not assumed to be universally true. It has no truth value whatsoever except insofar as it is a genuinely held belief, true for the individual asserting it. Prefacing this statement with "I believe" makes that implication more explicit, but the assertion is identical. They are both statements of opinion.

"Chocolate is made from potatoes", on the other hand, is a statement of fact, and can conclusively be demonstrated to be either true or false. Changing that statement to "I believe chocolate is made from potatoes" does not change the statement into one of opinion rather than fact. The belief itself, if it is genuinely believed, nevertheless has a truth value, and is therefore subject to the law.

Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context?If not, does the Court recommend reform?
The Court declines to comment on the appropriateness of constitutional laws. Suggesting legal reform, alterations and additions to the written legal code is not the purview of the Court, and such recommendations would be inappropriate.

Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation (as arguably occurred in TNP v Grosse)?
The measure of appropriateness in prosecution is the extent to which the facts of a particular case match up with elements of the criminal code. The Court declines to comment on terminology.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7141063/
Ruling delivered on March 28, 2014.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Freedom of Information Requests against the Judiciary
Opinion drafted by Romanoffia and SillyString, joined by Ator People

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kiwi.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 6.2: Freedom of Information Act
16. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
17. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
18. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
19. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
20. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
21. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.

The Court opines the following:

The question before the Court is whether the Judicial branch is subject to the FOIA law, or more specifically, whether the private deliberations of the Court are subject to release upon request.

Justices are encumbered with the great responsibility of determining the guilt or innocence of an accused party, and of debating the particulars of points of law, in a way which is as impartial and free from bias as possible. The privacy of court deliberations has always been recognized and protected in The North Pacific, as it is integral to this process.

Should this privacy cease to be protected, and Court decisions be deemed subject to FOIA publication upon request, freedom of judicial deliberation would be curtailed. Knowing that their preliminary thoughts and arguments could be made public, Justices would likely be pressured to tailor their posts to fit with political sensibilities and not ruffle prominent political feathers. There would also be pressure to take into account the opinions of prominent members of the region and render final decisions in accordance with their interests, rather than relying on the opinions of the members of the Court and pursuing the path of justice.

It is clear, therefore, that applying the FOIA law to the Judiciary would be a gross violation of the principles of justice and of the integrity of the judicial process, and another interpretation of the law should be sought.

The brief filed by SillyString takes a careful look at the clause-by-clause language of the bill itself, as well as the context in which that language arose, and presents just such an alternative interpretation. SillyString argues that the FOIA law is intentionally restricted to apply the Executive branch alone, and cannot be used to force private discussions within either the Court or the Regional Assembly into the public eye. The Court agrees with this analysis, and with its conclusions.

It is therefore the decision of the Court that the FOIA law may only be used to request information belonging to the Executive branch. Private deliberations of the Court are exempt from any and all FOIA requests, and publication of such private deliberations is absolutely prohibited under any and all circumstances.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7141064/
Ruling delivered on April 28, 2014.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Permanence of Rejected Applications for the Regional Assembly
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Romanoffia and Ator People

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Crushing Our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by PaulWallLibertarian42.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Treize_Dreizehn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant clauses of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty. The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they do not pose a threat to regional security.
6. The Speaker will reject applicants who fail an evaluation by either forum administration or the Vice Delegate.
7. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly will immediately hold a majority vote on whether to uphold the rejection.
8. The Speaker will accept all other applicants with valid applications.

The Court opines the following:

This issue is a difficult one, and there is little legal guidance for the Court to fall back upon. While the law is quite clear on the procedure for rejecting an applicant from the Regional Assembly, it says nothing at all about reversing that decision - whether such is possible, or, if it is, the procedure by which to do so. The Court therefore found itself weighing two potential interpretations, both with elements of validity.[note]The Court considered a third possible interpretation - that, lacking any assignation of the power to reverse a previous decision, it was held by the Vice Delegate, but that that power was lost once it was assigned to the Regional Assembly by recent legislation, as seen in Chapter 6, Section 1, Clause 8 as it currently stands. However, the Court ultimately rejected this as an option. The power to alter a previous decision can, in theory, be held by more than one party. It would not be impossible for both the Vice Delegate and the Regional Assembly to have separate legal paths to overturn an applicant's rejection. It is therefore the opinion of the court that the recent amendment to this law does not affect whether or not the Vice Delegate had and holds the power to admit rejected applicants.[/note]

The first possible interpretation is that, absent any specific permission, the Vice Delegate did not have the power to overturn a previous rejection, and that Treize Dreizehn's admission to the Regional Assembly was never legal.

The second possible interpretation is that, absent any specific prohibition, the Vice Delegate may unilaterally pass previously rejected applicants in the same manner that administrators can, and that Treize Dreizehn's admission to the Regional Assembly was fully legal. Additionally, lacking any specific prohibition, the Vice Delegate may continue to unilaterally allow previously rejected applicants admission to the Regional Assembly under current law.

Ultimately, however, there is a fundamental legal principle underlying this case which the Court must rely on. This principle is as follows: it is against the spirit of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Legal Code for the executive branch to hold unilateral authority to overrule the expressed will of the legislature.

In all cases where this power exists in part, it is tempered by balance. While the executive can veto legislation, that veto can be overridden by the Regional Assembly. While the executive can deny a FOIA request, that denial can be overturned by the Court.

To rule that, in this case, a member of the executive has the discretion to ignore the will of the RA as expressed in a legally binding vote would be to reject the balance of power between the branches.

In answer to Zyvetskistaahn's questions, the Court therefore rules:

If an applicant is rejected by the Vice Delegate and that rejection is upheld, the Speaker is required to deny that applicant at all future points at which they apply, unless the Regional Assembly has voted to overturn their rejection. It is not necessary for each application to be rejected and upheld separately; as noted, the language specifies an "applicant" and a single vote is sufficient. An upheld rejection may only be rescinded by a vote of the Regional Assembly or a ruling from the Court declaring the previous rejection invalid.

As for the specific case of Treize_Dreizehn, the Court rules that his original admission to the Regional Assembly was not lawful. However, over the past four months he has acted in nothing but good faith. He has been a productive member of the RA, has voted on legislation and run in elections, and has served admirably in the Attorney General's office. Should the Court rule that these associated posts, votes, and actions are ex post facto unlawful, legally speaking, it would simultaneously be required to order a recount of all such legislative, non-legislative, and electoral votes, as well as a review of all actions taken as a government official and, potentially, a reopening of voting for any election in which Treize was a candidate. Such alteration of accepted fact is neither practical, possible, nor permitted by the Bill of Rights.

Therefore, Treize_Dreizehn's membership in the Regional Assembly is not revoked. He may continue to serve as a full-fledged member, entitled to all of the rights and privileges afforded to any other member. However, his original rejection by Sanctaria was upheld by the Regional Assembly, and the recent motion to overturn that rejection failed. If Treize's membership in the Regional Assembly is renounced or allowed to lapse through normal channels, he will not be able to rejoin until his rejection is overridden by a majority vote of the RA.

The Court would additionally like to apologize to Treize for the length of time it took for this issue to be resolved, and for the bureaucratic inconvenience we are imposing with this ruling.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7152796/
Ruling delivered May 18, 2014.
 



Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Content Ownership and Freedom of Information Requests against the Security Council
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Ator People and Kiwi

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Grosseschnauzer.

The Court took into consideration the relevant sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 3:
9. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.
Article 7:
2. Government officials are the constitutionally-mandated elected officials, any officials appointed by them as permitted by law, and members of the Security Council.
3. The executive category consists of the Delegate, Vice Delegate, Attorney General, and government officials appointed by government officials in the executive category.
The Court took into consideration the relevant sections of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Regional Assembly Membership Act:
5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty.The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to perform a security assessment of the applicant. All security assessments will be performed in consultation with the Security Council, and in accordance with all laws of The North Pacific.
Freedom of Information Act:
16. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
17. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
18. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
19. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
20. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
21. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.

The Court opines the following:

r3naissanc3r has asked the Court to clarify, for the purposes of the FOIA law, what degree of ownership the Executive Branch holds over the Security Council.

Grosseschnauzer's brief argues that the Vice Delegate serves a dual role in the government, sometimes as a member of the Executive branch and other times as a member of the Security Council. This argument is supported by discussion within the Regional Assembly at the time the Vice Delegate's security check was originally devised.

The Court therefore carefully examined the Constitution and the Legal Code to determine if such a duality exists. Unlike the Security Council, the Vice Delegate is unequivocally specified as a member of the Executive branch by the Constitution. This inclusion is relatively recent, following the Vice Delegate's explicit exclusion from the Executive branch, and this is a strong argument against duality.

There are also arguments to the contrary. The changes made to Article 7 of the Constitution which reclassify the Vice Delegate as an Executive Officer are focused on preventing members of TNP from holding multiple, conflicting positions. The Security Council was excluded from classification in order to continue to allow government officials of all types to join its ranks, while the Vice Delegate was included in order to acknowledge the existence of a conflict of interest between serving simultaneously in that position and in another elected role. It is possible for this conflict of interest to exist if the Vice Delegate does hold a dual role, and thus acknowledging it by restricting access to multiple offices is not equivalent to rejecting duality in the position.

As for the actual duties of the Vice Delegate, Grosseschnauzer is correct in asserting that they can be classified into two categories. The first concerns the Vice Delegate's occasional duties, which normally are held by the Delegate but which fall to the Vice Delegate during any absence or vacancy of the former. Examples of this include holding the delegacy, selecting or serving as Election Commissioners, and serving as deputy Attorney General. The second concerns the Vice Delegate's own duties which they always hold, and include administrative functions related to the Security Council's membership and functions as well as doing a security check on Regional Assembly applicants. The question for the Court is whether both aspects of these are executive in nature.

A compelling argument found in the Legal Code is this clause:
18. During any period when serving as acting Delegate, the Vice Delegate will be considered absent from the office of Vice Delegate.
To rephrase in a manner more applicable to this question, according to the law, when the former category of duties moves from potential responsibility to actual responsibility, the Vice Delegate is relieved of responsibility for their stand-alone duties to the Security Council. The law envisions a difference between the nature of these two categories, which can comfortably be accommodated in potentiality but which cannot coexist in actuality.

The Court therefore opines that the Vice Delegate has functions both inside and outside of the Executive Branch.

As for the Security Council itself, its status likewise cannot be determined solely from Article 7 of the Constitution. Given that the Chair of the Security Council holds that power only in the absence of holding executive authority, the Court opines that the Security Council is not categorized under the Executive Branch. Given that, and given that the Delegate has no legal authority over the Security Council with which to compel it to release information, the Court opines that the Security Council is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as written.

As an additional finding, on the matter of ownership, the Court holds that the author of a post owns its content, and posts made while acting in one's capacity as a government official are owned, more broadly, by the respective branch of government within which that capacity falls.

Ruling delivered on June 27, 2014.




Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Meaning of Private Citizen
Opinion drafted by Severisen, joined by SillyString and Kiwi

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Romanoffia.

The Court took into consideration the relevant sections of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Freedom of Information Act:
16. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
17. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
18. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
19. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
20. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
21. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.

The Court opines the following:

r3naissanc3r has asked the Court to clarify, for the purposes of the FOIA law, the meaning of the term "private citizen" and the protections afforded by Chapter 6, Section 6.2, Clause 18 of the Codified Law of The North Pacific. Specifically, r3naissanc3r has posed three scenaria for the court's consideration.

Scenario One:
First, consider the case where some of the information that is subject to the freedom of information clause pertains to a citizen that held office in the Executive at the time this information was produced, but no longer does so at the time the request for disclosure is made. Is this citizen considered a "private citizen" for the purposes of the freedom of information clause?
In the Court's opinion, the answer to this question is no. Individuals do not cease to be accountable to the region simply because their term has ended, and posts which were governmental in nature when made retain that status. In reverse, posts which are non-governmental in nature do not suddenly become subject to FOIA when their author joins the Executive branch. The sole relevant facts are the status of the post and its author at its creation.

Scenario Two:
Second, consider the case where some of the information subject to the freedom of information clause pertains to a citizen that holds some office in the region, but this office is not part of the Executive. The Court found recently in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Kiwi on the Scope of Freedom of Information Act Requests that the freedom of information clause can only be used for, to quote the decision, "information belonging to the Executive branch". Should this be interpreted that, for the purposes of the freedom of information clause, this citizen is considered a "private citizen"?
In a previous ruling, the Court stated:
As an additional finding, on the matter of ownership, the Court holds that the author of a post owns its content, and posts made while acting in one's capacity as a government official are owned, more broadly, by the respective branch of government within which that capacity falls.
Therefore, the status of an individual discussed within a post is not relevant to the interpretation of this Act. Whether or not that citizen is a private citizen has no effect.

Scenario Three:
Third and last, consider the case where some of the information subject to the freedom of information clause pertains to a citizen that holds office in the Executive, but the information itself is unrelated to this citizen's capacity as an officer in the Executive. Should the citizen in question be treated as a "private citizen" for the purposes of the freedom of information clause?
As in the previous scenario, it is the status of the author and not the topic which determines whether a post is subject to FOIA. So long as the author is speaking in their capacity as an executive official, the law applies.

The Court expands on the above by issuing the following additional rulings:

First, the Court states that all posts made within areas of the forum which normally grant posting privileges only to members of the executive - excluding administrators and moderators from consideration - are inherently made in the author's capacity as an executive official. Such posts cannot be considered non-governmental. Posts which are made in areas of the forum more accessible to the public may be ruled non-governmental if such a determination is merited by their content and context.

Second, the court determines that there are certain types of information where all citizens, including members of the executive, retain a right to privacy, and where the disclosure of this information would unduly impinge upon that right. Specifically, real life information about any NationStates player which has not been willingly disclosed to the public is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. This information includes, but is not limited to, an individual's name, address, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, and anything which represents a reasonable risk of allowing a player's real life identity to be discovered. It also includes sensitive information for which there is a reasonable real life expectation of privacy and/or discretion, including but not limited to health status, both mental and physical, personal tragedies or changes in personal status (such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death), and other similar information. Any such information contained in a thread requested under the Freedom of Information Act must be redacted prior to the thread's release. Any such redaction must be made non-destructively, such that the original is preserved for future review.

Third, the Court rules that when a post contains a private message not authored by the poster, additional scrutiny must be used in determining whether releasing that private message without the permission of the author would unduly impinge on the privacy of a private citizen. Because the content of any such messages can be as variable as the imagination allows, the Court is unable to lay out a rule to be followed in all cases. Suffice it to say, the Court grants that there may be cases where the disclosure of a private message is appropriate, and cases where it is inappropriate. Specific instances where there is some question as to how to proceed may be adjudicated under clause 19 of the Freedom of Information Act.

Ruling delivered on July 31, 2014.




Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Blue Wolf II and Kiwi

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Romanoffia.

The Court took into consideration the briefs filed by Zyvetskistaahn, Treize_Dreizehn, punk d, falapatorius, and Crushing Our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration Article 2, Clause 6 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
The Court took into consideration Article 7, Clause 11 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
Constitution:
11. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.
The Court took into consideration Section 1 of the Rules of the Regional Assembly of The North Pacific:
Rules of the Regional Assembly:
Section 1. Proposals
1. Any member of the Regional Assembly may bring a proposal for discussion before the Regional Assembly.
2. The Speaker may schedule a vote on any proposal being discussed by the Regional Assembly as permitted by law.
3. If, before a vote on a proposal begins, at least three members of the Regional Assembly object to the decision of the Speaker to schedule it, the Speaker must cancel the scheduled vote.
4. If at least one-tenth of the members of the Regional Assembly, including the member that introduced the proposal to the Regional Assembly, motion that a vote should be held on a proposal before the Regional Assembly, then the Speaker must schedule a vote on that proposal to begin as soon as permitted by law.
The Court took into consideration the Legislative Proposal Procedure section of the Standing Procedures of the Speaker of The North Pacific:
Standing Procedures of the Speaker:
Legislative Proposal Procedure
1. Any member may introduce a proposal to enact, amend or repeal laws by creating a thread in the Regional Assembly forum or Private Halls subforums.
2. The associated text of the proposal will be contained in a single quote tag. The member who introduced the proposal may alter this text at their discretion.
3. The member who introduced the proposal may call for a vote by posting "motion to vote", or a functional equivalent in the thread.
4. During the five days after a vote a called for, the member who introduced the proposal may continue to amend it. This period, hereafter referred to as Formal Debate, may be shortened at the member who introduced the proposal's request. Once Formal Debate has ended, the proposal may no longer be amended, and the Speaker will schedule a vote to begin no fewer than two days hence.
5. No proposal may be introduced that includes changes to more than one document, except by special permission of the Speaker.
The Court took into consideration its ruling on the Speaker's authority to determine the content of votes:
The Speaker by making these policies was within their powers as laid out by the Constitution and not in violation of the Bill of Rights. The Court looked extensively at the Section 10 of the Bill of Rights and determined that the rules that were adopted still allowed the protection of each nations right to vote. We are aware the Speaker discounted votes that were not in line with the adopted polices but again the voters that lodged an invalid vote were still given the right to vote in the matter. It is our belief that once these rules were adopted they were enforced evenly and fairly.
The Court took into consideration its ruling on the Speaker's authority to unilaterally end debate:
With that decided, the Court would take this opportunity to comment more broadly on the powers of the Speaker. Under the aforementioned Constitutional clause, the Speaker is granted broad discretion, where no rules exist, to administer the Regional Assembly as he or she sees fit. Under the Bill of Rights segment also mentioned previously, the Court believes that all government officials are obligated by law to act in good faith in discharging their duties. The Court believes that the Speaker does possess the right to unilaterally table proposals, if their continued debate is not reasonably in the best interests of the region. The Constitution grants this discretion, and the Bill of Rights in effect obligates the Speaker to exercise said discretion if he or she feels it is appropriate. If the Nations of The North Pacific disagree, the procedure for Recall is quite clear, and as has been demonstrated over the past few months, is quite accessible. Legal review of the Speaker's discretionary decisions is not, generally speaking, necessary.
The Court opines the following:

The Constitution establishes that the Regional Assembly has the authority to create the rules for its governance, and that it is the duty of the Speaker to administer those rules. Where there is vagueness as to procedure, or when situations arise which are not covered by those rules, or by superseding ones within the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights, the Speaker is empowered to act as they see fit within the best interests of the region. Previous Courts have interpreted this power broadly, upholding the Speaker's broad authority to maintain an appropriate atmosphere, promote a productive use of the Regional Assembly, and block proposals and votes which they deem harmful. While the relevant law has changed since the previous decision, prompting us to take this case, upon investigation the underlying principles have not.

We uphold the previous rulings in full, and reiterate that disagreements over best interests can be solved via recall motions. The Court is not the appropriate body to resolve such disputes.

As in the review of a Speaker's decision to end debate, we find the Speaker's power broad, but not unlimited. While the Speaker may refuse to tolerate something harmful, it is not a legitimate use of their power to capriciously stifle any and all debate. Two things therefore matter in this instance: the content of the proposal in question, and the severity of the Speaker's crackdown.

The proposal previously reviewed, which attempted to ban an individual legislatively, was determined to be controversial, to have prompted "not-insignificant" responses from the moderation team including multiple warnings (a status which we shall term "flammability"), to lack merit, to lack viability, and to lack legality. This is not a precedential, exhaustive list of instances where a Speaker is well within their rights to block a debate or vote, and the Speaker's Office is not obliged to use or refer to it for any future issue. There are, however, a number of similarities between that case and this one which help clarify our decision.

  • Controversy: The Religious Exclusion Act is one in a series of legislation which have provoked a great deal of uproar about the relationship between religion and government in TNP. Like Chasmanthe's bill, this one was not introduced innocent of any knowledge of the controversy that would accompany it, but rather in full awareness and with the intent to provoke it further. It is, therefore, highly controversial.
  • Flammability: A number of warnings have been handed out for escalating or outrageous behavior during the tangled course of these debates, including one to the author of this bill in a previous thread and one to another participant in the debate on this specific bill. It is, therefore, highly flammable.
  • Merit: The subtitle of this post is "For the sake of silliness and fun", and the author of this bill describes it as "hysterically entertaining", "meaningless", and "unenforceable". Other posters within the thread regard it similarly. The Court is happy to agree with everyone that this proposal lacks merit.
  • Viability: The majority of posters within the thread in question are opposed to the proposal, and several commented on their annoyance. It seems safe to conclude that this proposal has no viability, and would not have attained a majority at vote.
  • Legality: Many of the clauses of this bill are direct violations of the bill of rights, but they are contradicted by a clause which states, essentially, that if made law this bill would not have the force of law. This is unestablished in precedent, and it is not clear that it can legally be done or how it interacts with any sworn oath to obey the law. The legality of this proposal is therefore, at best, questionable.
Based on these five criteria, the Court determines that this proposal is easily one which falls within the reasonable right of the Speaker to shut down.

As for the severity of the Speaker's response and whether any rights have been violated, the Speaker opted not to stop the debate but simply to block the proposal from going to vote. The Court therefore examined the existing voting rules. As established through testimony, current RA procedure is divided into two parts, and the two parts hold different legal weight. That portion of it which is contained within the Rules of the Regional Assembly was established by a majority vote as allowed for under Article 7, Clause 11 of the Constitution, and the Speaker is obligated to apply it as written. However, that which is contained within the Speaker's Standing Policies is entirely discretionary, and the Speaker has the power to alter its application when such is deemed necessary.

Formal debate, the rules surrounding it, and the decision to move a proposal through that stage and into a vote, fall entirely within the Speaker's discretionary procedures. They would be equally as free to put bills to vote based on the flip of a coin or a well-written original sonnet asking them to do so. While there is a written procedure, it is provided as a courtesy to RA members so they know what to expect most of the time - it is not intended or presented as a promise. The Speaker is free to deviate from their written procedures as they wish.

There exists within the Rules of the Regional Assembly a means for RA members to overrule the Speaker's discretionary policies and insist that a piece of legislation go to vote. Because the RA has the power to send something to vote even over the Speaker's objections, the use of this discretionary power does not constitute a violation of a nation's right to speech or right to vote. Procedural options are available - when the Speaker chooses to refuse any discretionary vote, they can be accused of nothing more severe than obstructionism.

Taken together, the Court concludes as follows:

1. The Speaker's option to refuse a discretionary vote is entirely legal and can be used at any time. The Speaker may deviate from the Standing Procedures at any point, provided that the deviation is not a violation of any other law or policy and does not infringe on any rights.

2. If, at any point, the Speaker determines that allowing a debate to continue is not in the best interests of the region, we concur with the previous Court that they have an obligation to put an end to it.


Ruling delivered on August 24, 2014.




Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Promptness and the Time at which Regional Assembly Membership Begins and Ends
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Kiwi and Blue Wolf II

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Mall.

The Court took into consideration the briefs filed by PaulWallLibertarian42, Hileville, flemingovia, and Great Bights Mum, as well as two statements from Zyvetskistaahn and one from Crushing Our Enemies in response to Court questioning.

The Court took into consideration portions of Chapter 6.1, Section 6 of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
4. An application for Regional Assembly membership ceases to be valid if at any time the applicant's declared nation in The North Pacific nation is not located in The North Pacific.
5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty.The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to perform a security assessment of the applicant. All security assessments will be performed in consultation with the Security Council, and in accordance with all laws of The North Pacific.
6. The Speaker will reject applicants who fail an evaluation by either forum administration or the Vice Delegate.
7. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly will immediately hold a majority vote on whether to uphold the rejection.
8. The Regional Assembly may overturn a previous decision to uphold the rejection of an applicant by majority vote.
9. The Speaker will accept all other applicants with valid applications.
10. The Speaker will process applications within 14 days. If an applicant has not been accepted or rejected within that time, they will be automatically accepted to the Regional Assembly.
11. Regional Assembly members may not vote in any vote which began before they were last admitted.
12. The Speaker will maintain a publicly viewable roster of Regional Assembly members.
13. The Speaker will promptly remove any Regional Assembly members whose removal is ordered by the Court, or whose nation in The North Pacific leaves or ceases to exist.
14. The Speaker's office will promptly remove any Regional Assembly members who fail to log in to the North Pacific forum for over 30 consecutive days; or who have not voted for 20 consecutive days and have missed four consecutive Regional Assembly votes to enact, amend or repeal laws, as determined by the time they closed.
15. Regional Assembly members that have submitted a notice of absence, in accordance with any regulations set by the Speaker, shall be exempt from the provisions of the above clause for the stated duration of their absence.

The Court opines the following:

The Court has two questions under its consideration. The first, dealing with the nature of RA membership, asks when that membership is lost - is it at the exact moment a violation occurs, or is it once that violation is noticed by the Speaker's Office?

When considering this question, the Court weighed four factors. The first is the language of the section in question, which states:
13. The Speaker will promptly remove any Regional Assembly members whose removal is ordered by the Court, or whose nation in The North Pacific leaves or ceases to exist.
14. The Speaker's office will promptly remove any Regional Assembly members who fail to log in to the North Pacific forum for over 30 consecutive days; or who have not voted for 20 consecutive days and have missed four consecutive Regional Assembly votes to enact, amend or repeal laws, as determined by the time they closed.
The wording of these clauses does not definitively answer the question, but it does lean toward one side. They are blunt, assigning direct responsibility for their duties to the Speaker, and declaring that the Speaker's actions are a necessary component - and not an afterthought - of ensuring the law is followed. Because these clauses are phrased as they are, focusing on the Speaker's duties rather than simply declaring that Regional Assembly membership is lost under certain criteria, the Court finds tentative support for the latter position.

As admission and removal are two sides of the same coin, the Court also notes the wording of the RA admission clauses:
6. The Speaker will reject applicants who fail an evaluation by either forum administration or the Vice Delegate.
7. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly will immediately hold a majority vote on whether to uphold the rejection.
8. The Regional Assembly may overturn a previous decision to uphold the rejection of an applicant by majority vote.
9. The Speaker will accept all other applicants with valid applications.
10. The Speaker will process applications within 14 days. If an applicant has not been accepted or rejected within that time, they will be automatically accepted to the Regional Assembly.
Despite the fact that the Speaker has very strict limits on when an applicant is to be denied and when they are to be accepted, under these clauses the Speaker still possesses the final duty of action. An applicant is not accepted after passing the security checks, nor rejected after failing them, until the Speaker declares that such is so. Despite the Speaker's lack of discretion in the decision, their statements on the matter are explicitly performative - in contrast with the passive change of status allowed for by 6.1.10.

Second, the Court took into consideration the existing practice of the Speaker's Office. According to the testimony of the previous two Speakers, Zyvetskistaahn and Crushing Our Enemies, as well as a former Deputy Speaker, PaulWallLibertarian42, it has been the practice of the Speaker's office for over a year and a half to follow the latter interpretation. That the Speaker's Office has, for such a significant period of time, held a consistent position on the matter lends weight to the Court's tentative reading of the Legal Code. We are loathe to interfere with that practice without considerable legal justification.

Third, the Court considered each interpretation's potential for abuse, should any individual with the inclination to do so ever take office as Speaker. As a number of briefs mentioned, there is risk in declaring that membership depends on the Speaker's Office noticing a violation. It is possible for a Speaker to use such an interpretation to immediately remove members they dislike, while quietly alerting members they prefer and allowing them to rectify the problem.

However, the opposite interpretation is similarly open for abuse. A Speaker could pretend not to notice a violation, just to keep someone in the RA. They could get away with this easily in many cases, particularly with less prominent members, whose national events are unlikely to attract public notice. This is true even if the Speaker genuinely does not notice a violation - TNPers are far more likely to notice a well-known nation CTE and resurrect than a relatively unknown, new RA member. Moreover, this interpretation opens up a much more serious possibility for abuse, and it is this: The Speaker could use prior noncompliance as a weapon to disrupt a political opponent - for example, by unveiling the fact that a candidate in an election temporarily was out of compliance with the requirements months prior, thus invalidating their candidacy without sufficient time for them to rejoin and be eligible again. Or, alternatively, the Speaker could use this as a blackmail tool, threatening to remove someone's membership at a critical juncture based on prior noncompliance unless they act a certain way.

Both of these options are open to some abuse, but the largest risk of it comes from allowing the Speaker to impose penalties on RA members for noncompliance despite them being in compliance at the time of the punishment. This gives the Speaker the inappropriate ability to determine the setting and circumstances of a member's removal from the Regional Assembly. The Bill of Rights prohibits ex post facto laws; it is in this same spirit that the removal of Regional Assembly members who are in compliance with all membership requirements is and ought to be illegal.

Finally, the Court considered what is and is not possible for the Speaker's Office, taking into account the law and the tools at their disposal. We note that the wording of 6.1.13 and 6.1.14 is identical with respect to the operative clause, and that therefore the Speaker's obligations under each must be interpreted to be identical - that is, we must rule that membership is lost at the same point under each clause.

The former interpretation runs into trouble here. Although it is possible, using NationStates tools, to determine a nation's existence and movement history, it is not possible to do the same with a member's activity history on this forum. The Speaker's office is enjoined to remove RA members who fail to log in for more than 30 days, and yet, if they do not see this occur and the member in question logs in before they do see it, there is no way for this to be discovered. Indeed, if the nation in question was not themselves aware of exactly how long they had been away, they cannot even be called to task in one's imagination for failing to acknowledge their loss of membership and resign. To rule that their membership was lost, and should be removed, is to issue an unenforceable ruling.

As for the relevant tools, the Court notes that the Speaker's Office owns a script which regularly checks each RA member's most recent activity and the location of its nation. While this script catches violations that exist at the time it is run, it cannot look back in time and see what a nation or member did earlier. This script greatly enhances the functioning of the Office, and is what allows it to carry out its duties under the law. Should the Court rule in favor of the former interpretation, this Script would become useless, and the Speaker's Office would be obligated to manually check the nation and forum account of every RA member - a tedious and time consuming task that is quite likely to go undone.

Drawing on all of the above factors, the Court rules that statements from the Speaker's Office on the state of an individual's membership in the RA are explicitly performative. That is, membership is neither gained nor lost until the Speaker's Office acknowledges that fact, with the sole exception of the two week limit on the waiting period for RA applicants.

Additionally, the Court rules that when RA members are removed from the Regional Assembly for failing to meet at least one of the requirements laid out in 6.1.13 and 6.1.14, they must be failing to meet those requirements at the time of their removal.

Second, the Court considered whether the Speaker met the requirements to act "promptly" to remove members of the RA not in compliance with the requirements.

"Promptly" is an interesting word. It is distinct from "immediately", in that it allows some time to pass between an event and its response, but it is also distinct from any particular stated time period, in that it is unspecific as to how much time is permitted.

Since the law is deliberately unspecific, the Court would grossly overstep itself to provide a specific time period within which the Speaker - or any other government official bound by a "promptly" clause (of which nine are scattered throughout all three governing documents) - must act. Additionally, there is no time period within which a member could not come out of compliance and then back into it again before being noticed - thus, in this case, promptness has no bearing on the overarching legal question.

The Court therefore rules that whether a government official is carrying out their duties "promptly" is a matter for the Regional Assembly to judge. There are any number of options open to RA members who feel that laxness has occurred, from writing a petition to the official in question, to drafting legislation to change those clauses, to outright recall.

Ruling delivered on September 7, 2014.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Physical Representation of Outdated Rulings on Requests for Review
Opinion drafted by Severisen, joined by Kialga and Cormac

The Court took into consideration the Request for Review filed here by Silly String.

The Court took into consideration the following:

Bill of Rights:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
Legal Code:
Any person ("the complainant") may submit a criminal complaint to the office of the Attorney General, requesting that a criminal case be brought before the Court.
38. The Attorney General may, at their discretion, manage the prosecution of any criminal case requested.
39. In the event that the Attorney General is a defendant, the defence attorney, or a witness in a criminal case, the Delegate shall appoint an existing deputy Attorney General who is not similarly party to that case. The appointed deputy Attorney General may, at their discretion, manage the prosecution of the case.
40. Failing the existence of a deputy Attorney General who is able to manage the prosecution of a case, the Delegate may act as such a deputy Attorney General for the duration of the case. If the Delegate is a defendant, the defence attorney, or a witness in the case, then the Vice Delegate may act as such a deputy Attorney General for the duration of the case.
41. It is the duty of the Attorney General, and their deputies, to see to completion of any case the management of which they have undertaken.
42. If the original Attorney General, and their deputies, are unable to see to completion a pending case before the end of their term, the successor Attorney General will take over the managing of the prosecution.
43. If the Attorney General, and their deputies, decline to manage the prosecution of a requested criminal case, then the complainant may, at their discretion, manage themselves the prosecution of the criminal case. Otherwise, they may withdraw the complaint.
44. If the complainant has not stated their intent to either manage the prosecution of the case or withdraw the complaint within 30 days of the Attorney General and their deputies declining the case, the complaint will be considered withdrawn.
45. For the purposes of this section, "managing the prosecution of a case" includes but is not limited to: submitting an indictment to the Court for the relevant charges; arguing on the acceptance or rejection of the indictment; acting as the prosecutor for the duration of all stages of the criminal trial heard for the case; representing the prosecution in any separate judicial review hearings arising from the criminal trial; and appointing, directing, and removing an attorney to act in the above capacity in their place.
Adopted Court Rules:
1. Anyone may submit a request to the Court for a review of government policy or law.
2. Any Justice may accept or deny a request for review, at their discretion. The Justice who accepts a request for review will become its Moderating Justice.
3. During the five days after a request for review has been accepted, anyone may offer information that is relevant to the case and/or advise the Court on how to rule in the form of a brief.
4. Briefs must be submitted in private to the Moderating Justice, who is responsible for posting all received briefs in the public thread after the period for submitting briefs has ended.
5. The period for submitting briefs may be altered at the discretion of the Moderating Justice.
6. The Court will endeavor to deliver an opinion answering the request for review within seven days after the end of the period for submitting briefs.
Adopted Court Rules:
Section 1: Precedent
1. All official Court decisions are legally binding on the Court as a whole as well as each individual Justice.
2. Prior decisions made by the Court, regardless of its composition at the time, must continue to be obeyed by the Court and by each individual Justice until and unless their validity is formally overturned in a new request for review.
3. The Court is a reactive body. Without any such request, the Court may not proactively overturn previous rulings.
4. No Justice may act contrary to the opinions and decisions of the Court as a whole.

Section 2: Appeals

1. The petitioner in a rejected request for review, as well as any of the participating parties in a criminal trial, may appeal a decision made by an individual Justice to the Court as a whole for consideration.
2. The petitioner in an accepted request for review, as well as any of the participating parties in a criminal trial, may file a request asking the Court to order the recusal of any Justice from hearing or ruling on a particular case.
3. During the proceedings of a matter before the Court, substantive appeals and requests which relate to that matter must be addressed before the proceedings can continue.
The Court finds the following:

1. Does the petitioner have "standing" to bring this request for review?

The petitioner bases their right to bring this request for review on the language contained in Clause 37 of Section 6.7 of the Legal Code. ("The Attorney General shall have standing in all cases of judicial review brought before the Court.").

Accordingly, the court holds that the petitioner has standing to bring this request for review.

2. Should Opinion 1 be modified with strikethrough tags as it has been superseded by the current Legal Code Chapter 6, Section 7?

It seems clear to the court that Opinion 1 was written when the law required the Attorney General's Office to bring all cases to trial. The current law is clear in that, in clause 38 of Chapter 6, Section 7 of the Legal Code, "The Attorney General may, at their discretion, manage the prosecution of any criminal case requested." This allows for the Office of AG to decide not to prosecute. As such Opinion 1 is contrary to, and superseded by, the current Legal Code.

The Court, therefore, opines the following:

Opinion Number 1, In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Tim on the Attorney General Refusing to bring Trials to the Court, is hereby modified with strikethrough tags, acknowledging its obsolescence while preserving it for historical purposes. As such, the Court's Ruling issued on September 15, 2012 no longer has the force of law.

Case thread:http://http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7276072/
Ruling delivered on February 15, 2015.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On Judicial Recusals
Opinion drafted by Kialga, joined by Severisen and The Grim Reaper

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant parts of the Bill of Rights and Adopted Court Rules of the North Pacific:


Bill of Rights:
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region. Any Nation of The North Pacific has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

Adopted Court Rules:
Chapter 3 - Section 1:
3. Justices must endeavor to recuse themselves from matters where they have a conflict of interest.
Chapter 4 - Section 2:
2. The petitioner in an accepted request for review, as well as any of the participating parties in a criminal trial, may file a request asking the Court to order the recusal of any Justice from hearing or ruling on a particular case.

The Court opines the following:

The Request before the Court is on the refusal of a Justice to recuse himself from a Request where the petitioner believes a conflict of interest and lack of transparency in the review. It is to the agreement of the Court that, should Justice Funkadelia continue to be engaged in the Review, there is the potential that Justice Funkadelia will have bias.

The Court, upon reviewing the above, has reached the decision that Justice Funkadelia recuse himself from the Request for Review on Election Commissioner's Conduct.

The currently assigned Temporary Hearing Officers are hereby deemed procedurally invalid. As it stands, with all elected Justices being recused from the case, the Delegate will need to select new Temporary Hearing Officers. The current Temporary Hearing Officers are strictly invalid on a procedural basis, and may be reassigned should the Delegate deem fit, without having an immediate Conflict of Interest due to their initial appointments.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7362484/
Ruling delivered on April 4, 2015.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Need for Further Clarification on Restarting Voting Periods
Opinion drafted by RPI, joined by The Grim Reaper and Lord Ravenclaw

The Court took into consideration the Request for Review filed here by flemingovia. The thread is located here.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the past Court ruling on the powers of Election Commissioners here

The Court took into consideration the relevant Clause of the Constitution:


Constitutioin: Article 2:
6. The number of votes required to achieve quorum for any vote of the Regional Assembly except elections will be determined by law.

The Court took into consideration the relevant Section of the Bill of Rights:

Bill of Rights:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court took into consideration the relevant Clauses of the Legal Code:

Legal Code: Section 4.2:
3. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.
4. "Candidates" are those citizens who, during the period of the Election Cycle designated for candidacy declarations, declare themselves or accept a nomination by another citizen as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that Election Cycle.
5. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No Election Commissioner may run in the election they are overseeing.

The Court opines the following:

The Court finds that in the case of the March 2015 Judicial Election, the voting period should not have been restarted. The terms "abstentions" (a vote to "abstain") and "candidates" have distinct definitions in the Legal Code. The exclusion of a candidate's name on an election ballot infringes upon their rights as defined in Section 9 of the Bill of Rights, as seen in the Court ruling on the powers of Election Commissioners. When the option to "abstain" is excluded from the ballot, there is no such right to inclusion, or a violation of any other law of the North Pacific. The Legal Code specifically defines a vote to "abstain" as a vote that "may not be used to determine the results of any election". Therefore, a vote of 'abstain' cannot legally have any effect on the outcome of an election. There is no quorum requirement that must be achieved for elections, per Clause 6 of Article 2 of the Constitution. As there is no quorum requirement, an election will remain valid regardless of whether or not 'abstain' votes are included or excluded. The citizens of the North Pacific may always vote 'abstain' to meet activity requirements for maintaining citizenship. The Court appreciates the attempts by the Election Commissioners to notify the citizenry of a change in the ballot.


The Court resolves that its decision allows for the following guidelines on the response by Election Commissioners to a ballot where an option on the ballot has been excluded:

Election Guidelines:
In the event that:

I. A candidate is omitted from an official ballot despite having followed appropriate procedure for their candidacy,

The Electoral Commission must:
A. Restart the respective voting period;
B. Notify all eligible voters via Private Message, regardless of their voting status;
C. Publicly recognise the omission in the relevant elections subforum and publicise all relevant dates;
D. Take whatever steps they deem necessary to prevent the omission of candidates in the future.

II. The option to "Abstain" is omitted from an official ballot,
A. If the Electoral Commission have not indicated refusal to accept abstentions from voters during the voting period,

1. The voting period does not need to be restarted;
2. The Election Commission may edit the Ballot to explicitly include the option to "Abstain";
3. The Election Commission must notify all eligible voters of the change in the ballot, using both public and private means.

B. If the Electoral Commission have indicated refusal to accept abstentions from voters during the voting period,

The Electoral Commission must:
1. Restart the respective voting period;
2. Notify all eligible voters via Private Message, regardless of their voting status;
3. Publicly recognise the omission in the relevant elections subforum and publicise all relevant dates;
4. Take whatever steps they deem necessary to prevent the refusal of abstentions in the future.
In all other situations not covered by the law of the North Pacific or by the aforementioned guidelines, the Election Commissioners may use their discretion, in a legal manner, in supervising and overseeing an election cycle as is their duty stated by Clause 5 of Section 4.2 of the Legal Code.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7357706/
Ruling delivered on April 21, 2015.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Regional Assembly Oversight of the North Pacific Armed Forces
Opinion drafted by Plemboria, joined by Severisen and Kialga.

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Great Brigantia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant portion of the legal code of the North Pacific:


4. The NPAF must operate so that:
  • The Delegate can issue a blanket approval for the NPAF to work with a given organisation. The Executive Officer charged with military affairs or the Delegate must still authorize individual missions.
  • Any NPAF member may refuse to take part in any mission which does not directly impact TNP security for any reason that the Executive Officer charged with military affairs or the Delegate determines is reasonable.
  • The Regional Assembly may override by simple majority vote any NPAF deployment not previously approved by the Regional Assembly. The Speaker shall accept motions to override for voting on an expedited basis.

The Court opines the following:

The text of the law here is quite clear that every clause here is understood to begin with the phrase "The NPAF must operate so that..." Therefore, it is the opinion of the Court that, per the text of the law, the NPAF must act in such a manner so that it is actually possible for the Regional Assembly to exercise its right under clause C.

The Court firmly feels that the NPA has not been operating in such a way as to prevent the RA from exercising its right. From what has been seen, the NPA regularly flies the appropriate flags when deployed, generally uses a well known jump point for its missions, and does not hide its involvement in operations. Nothing here is attempting to obfuscate their operations and involvement therein. Were the NPA to have acted in this manner, and a specific instance be pointed to where the involvement in an operation was deliberately hidden from the RA, it would be fair to say that the NPA has violated the law. As such, the court feels it prudent that, going forward, in an effort to facilitate the RA's legal right to overrule a deployment, a representative from the NPA shall make available to the RA, within 12 hours of any deployment, the location and relevant details (what other regions and militaries are involved, why the target was chosen, any other publicly available and non-sensitive details) of any such deployment. The court suggests that this be done either in the NPA forum, or the Private Halls of the RA, but gives the NPA the autonomy to oversee the implementation of this policy.

The court would also note that the way the law is written is ambiguous at best and a revision would be preferable. For instance, were the NPA to deploy for a time period shorter than the RA can legally act on this right, would this be able to be interpreted as the NPA not operating in such a way as to allow the RA to override the deployment? Tag raids come to mind. Detag operations. What legally defines a deployment? Should it include only operations that last longer than __ updates? These issues must be answered, but not by the court in this opinion, and preferably through legislative action in the way of an amendment of the applicable law.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7387845/
Ruling delivered on May 27, 2015.





Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Suppression of Posts on the Regional Message Board
Opinion drafted by Flemingovia, joined by Plembobria, with Punk Daddy abstaining

Nationstates is a game with rules. Some of those are the game rules, some of them are the rules of the various hosting sites etc that we play the game on, and some of them are house rules that we invent ourselves to make the game more fun: kinda like receiving £400 instead of £200 when landing precisely on GO in Monopoly.

We call some of these house rules “laws” and have courts to arbitrate them. There are two reasons for this. The first is that this is a political/legal sim, and roleplaying Perry Mason is part of the fun of it all, and the other reason is because we are pretty sad individuals who have little actual power in real life, and the online fantasy of importance compensates slightly for our impotence in real life.

In this case, it is clear from testimony and reading the suppressed posts in context that technically Eluvatar abridged DD’s right to free speech. It is also clear that this was in the context of banter back and forth, playing the game, shooting the breeze etc.

What bewilders us is quite why the courts were asked to get involved. I mean, I know we are sad individuals living in our parents’ basement who badly need to get laid but instead play NS obsessively, but surely some things are just too trivial even for us?

There was no harm; there was no foul. Now excuse us, we have to go back and polish our medals. Y’all can carry on pontificating about this if you wish, but if you do so please detach a little bit of your mind to listen to yourself as you type, and despair.


Case thread:http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7425240/
Ruling Delivered on August 22, 2015.
Ruling stricken on May 19, 2019.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of Endorsements
Opinion drafted by Eluvatar, joined by Gracius Maximus and Kialga

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Lord Ravenclaw.

The Court took into consideration the relevant parts of The North Pacific Bill of Rights:

2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.
4. No Nation of The North Pacific holding WA member status in NationStates shall be obligated to endorse any official of a government authority of the region. The right to add an endorsement or withdraw an endorsement is a sovereign right of that Nation as a WA member.
8. No Nation shall be ejected from the region, or banned from any forum, except as expressly authorized by the Constitution or the Legal Code. Should any official of a government authority of the region with authority to act, declare that the immediate ejection or banning of a Nation is an urgent matter of regional security they may order the ejection or banning of the nation. Any ejected or banned nation shall have prompt and immediate recourse to judicial review of the matter. The WA Delegate shall not exercise the power of ejection or banning unless expressly authorized by a specific action of a government authority of the region pursuant to the Constitution or to the Legal Code.
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
The Court took into consideration Article 3 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
1. The Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate.
10. The Vice Delegate will hold the second most endorsements in the region. The Delegate may eject or ban any nation which exceeds any legally mandated endorsement limit.
The Court took into consideration Chapter 5 of The North Pacific Legal Code:
5. The minimum endorsement count for members of the Council is defined as 300 endorsements, or 50 per cent of the serving Delegate's endorsement count, whichever is lower.
6. The Vice Delegate must maintain an endorsement level of at least 75 per cent of the Delegates endorsement count.
19. If the Vice Delegate nation ceases to exist, voluntarily departs The North Pacific, resigns from the World Assembly, or fails to maintain an endorsement level within the range required of Council members for more than eight days, the Vice Delegate will be removed from office.
21. The Delegate may eject or ban for reckless endorsement gathering any nation in The North Pacific which exceeds the Vice Delegate's endorsement count.
24. The Security Council Law is to be applied in a reasonable manner.
The Court took into consideration Chapter 1 of The North Pacific Legal Code:
1. No criminal case may be brought before the Court of the North Pacific against any resident for any crime not listed in the Criminal Code.
22. "Conspiracy" is defined as planning, attempting, or helping to commit any crime under this criminal code.
23. "Gross Misconduct" is defined as the violation of an individual's legally mandated sworn oath, either willfully or through negligence.
The Court took into consideration Chapter 2 of The North Pacific Legal Code:
7. Conspiracy will be punished by a sentence strictly less than what would be appropriate for the original crime.
8. Gross Misconduct will be punished by removal from office and the suspension of voting rights for whatever finite duration the Court sees fit.
The Court took into consideration the Chapter 4 of The North Pacific Legal Code:
Section 4.1: Oath of Office
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
2. All government officials will be required to take the Oath of Office within one week of their election, as certified by the Election Commissioner; appointment, as publicly announced; or confirmation, as verified by a member of the Speaker's Office. The taking of the Oath constitutes assumption of the office. Failure to post the oath within the allotted time will result in the office being considered vacant, to be filled in accordance with all laws governing elections, appointments, or confirmations, as is appropriate for the office in question.
The Court took into consideration Chapter 6 of The North Pacific Legal Code:
2. Any resident may apply for citizenship using their regional forum account, by providing the name of their nation in The North Pacific, and swearing an oath as follows:
I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.
The Court opines the following:

The Court understood the request for review to request answers to the following questions:

  1. Question One - Did Vice Delegate Bootsie, Security Counselor Plembobria, or Delegate Lord Ravenclaw break the law when the nation of Plembobria passed Bootsie's nation of Guslantis' endorsement count, or when Cheongji passed Guslantis' endorsement count?
  2. Question Two - When would a Vice Delegate with fewer than the second most endorsements be committing Gross Misconduct?
  3. Question Three - Is it a crime for a nation that is not the Vice Delegate to have the second most endorsements in the region?
  4. Question Four - Is it a crime for a person to do any thing which would cause the Vice Delegate to not have the second most endorsements in the region?
  5. Question Five - Is Clause 21 of Chapter 5 of The North Pacific Legal Code, permitting but not requiring the Delegate to eject or ban nations with more endorsements than the Vice Delegate invalid because it violates the Bill of Rights' guarantee of equal protection?

As an answer to question one is best informed by the answers to questions two, three, and five, it will be addressed last.

Question Two - When does a Vice Delegate not possessing the second most endorsements in the region commit Gross Misconduct?

The constitution states that the Vice Delegate will have the second most endorsements, but the details of how that is to be enforced is left to the legal code. Of specific note are the definition of Gross Misconduct and clauses 5, 6, 19, and 24 of Chapter 5 of the legal code.

23. "Gross Misconduct" is defined as the violation of an individual's legally mandated sworn oath, either willfully or through negligence.
The oath in question is:
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
5. The minimum endorsement count for members of the Council is defined as 300 endorsements, or 50 per cent of the serving Delegate's endorsement count, whichever is lower.
6. The Vice Delegate must maintain an endorsement level of at least 75 per cent of the Delegates endorsement count.

...

19. If the Vice Delegate nation ceases to exist, voluntarily departs The North Pacific, resigns from the World Assembly, or fails to maintain an endorsement level within the range required of Council members for more than eight days, the Vice Delegate will be removed from office.

...

24. The Security Council Law is to be applied in a reasonable manner.

The above statutes would be taken as guidance when considering an accusation of Gross Misconduct against a Vice Delegate.

Specifically, when the Vice Delegate nation were to fail to have more than the smaller of 300 or half the endorsements of the serving Delegate nation for more than 8 days, the Vice Delegate would be removed from office automatically, but when they seek to disregard that or fail to maintain an endorsement level of 75 per cent of the serving Delegate nations' in an "unreasonable" context, they could be committing Gross Misconduct through nonfeasance in office in a gross or excessive manner.

Please note that when clause 24 was added, Chapter 5 was titled "Security Council Law." The chapter has since been retitled as "Regional Security Law". This leaves room for ambiguity for interpreting the scope of clause 24 - does it only apply to those parts of the chapter that explicitly relate to the Security Council? In this ruling, we hold to the understanding that the clause applies to the entirety of the chapter, lacking clear guidance otherwise.

It would help keep the Court's work consistent if the Regional Assembly were to resolve this ambiguity of language, one way or another.

Question Three - Is it a crime for a nation that is not the Vice Delegate to have the second most endorsements in the region?

It's not a crime merely to have more endorsements than the Vice Delegate: crimes are strictly defined in the criminal code (as per clause 1), and that's not one of them. In general, Reckless Endorsement Gathering is not a crime, but is a cause for ejection.

However, a Citizen could conceivably commit Gross Misconduct by violating their oath as citizen in egregious cases of Reckless Endorsement Gathering:

I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.

However, where Reckless Endorsement Gathering is cause for ejection but not a crime, Gross Misconduct is a crime but is not cause for ejection:

8. Gross Misconduct will be punished by removal from office and the suspension of voting rights for whatever finite duration the Court sees fit.

Question Four - Is it a crime for a person to do any thing which would cause the Vice Delegate to not have the second most endorsements in the region?

Endorsing another nation cannot be a crime, as per the bill of rights. "Any thing" is too broad to answer.

Question Five - Is Clause 21 of Chapter 5 of The North Pacific Legal Code, permitting but not requiring the Delegate to eject or ban nations with more endorsements than the Vice Delegate invalid because it violates the Bill of Rights' guarantee of equal protection?

Said clause:
21. The Delegate may eject or ban for reckless endorsement gathering any nation in The North Pacific which exceeds the Vice Delegate's endorsement count.
The use of clause 21 to eject political opponents, nations whose name begins with a particular letter, or in other such ways would violate the bill of rights:

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution.

It would not violate the bill of rights to exercise the granted discretion to only eject nations that pose an actual threat or flagrantly disregard requests to temper their endorsement gathering or otherwise in a manner that serves the interests of the region.

Furthermore, clause 24 requires that 21 be applied in a "reasonable manner". This can be understood as requiring care to be reasonable when exercising that power of ejection, which conventionally includes "being reasonable" toward others - that is to say, it includes a degree of leniency when possible.

The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

If and when the only nation with more endorsements than the Vice Delegate besides the Delegate is not a member of the Security Council, and the Delegate declines to remove them despite advice from the Security Council to do so, there could be concerns regarding equal and fair treatment.

In any case of ejection, nations are entitled to judicial review of their ejection, which can be used to enforce these protections:

8. No Nation shall be ejected from the region, or banned from any forum, except as expressly authorized by the Constitution or the Legal Code. Should any official of a government authority of the region with authority to act, declare that the immediate ejection or banning of a Nation is an urgent matter of regional security they may order the ejection or banning of the nation. Any ejected or banned nation shall have prompt and immediate recourse to judicial review of the matter. The WA Delegate shall not exercise the power of ejection or banning unless expressly authorized by a specific action of a government authority of the region pursuant to the Constitution or to the Legal Code.

Question One - Did Vice Delegate Bootsie, Security Counselor Plembobria, or Delegate Lord Ravenclaw break the law when the nation of Plembobria passed Bootsie's nation of Guslantis' endorsement count, or when Cheongji passed Guslantis' endorsement count?

The Court cannot give a criminal verdict in a request for review, nor rule on an indictment sight unseen.

However, the answers to questions two through five suggest that Lord Ravenclaw did not break the law by declining to eject either Cheongji or Plembobria, that as no claim has been made that Guslantis failed to have at least 75% of the serving Delegate's endorsement count there is no basis presented to consider Bootsie to have committed Gross Misconduct, and that as no case has been made that Plembobria acted irresponsibly there is no basis presented to consider Plembobria to have committed the same.

As the Security law's clause 24 recognizes, achieving exact adherence with the endorsement level mandates is not always practicable. The resolution of such practical questions belongs with the Delegate, Vice Delegate, and Security Council in the first instance. The Court is better placed to review their judgements than to micromanage them in the execution of their core duties. It would be inappropriate to speak further on legality with the actions available for review.

Ruling delivered on September 18, 2016.




Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Power of the Court to Compel the Disclosure of Information
Opinion drafted by Eluvatar, joined by Gracius Maximus and Kialga

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Bill of Rights of the North Pacific, clause 7:

7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer. In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence. A Nation may be represented by any counsel of the Nation's choosing. No Nation convicted of a crime shall be subject to a punishment disproportionate to that crime.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Gaspo on the Existence of a Duty to Disclose:

The Court had determined that in order for a nation to have equal and fair treatment and protection of law and due process of said law a duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence is in fact created by the Bill of Rights. The Court reviewed the Bill of Rights and the Request filed by Gaspo on this matter. The Court is in unanimous agreement that a duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence does in fact exist under the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Court also notes that if in such a case the prosecution unknowingly posses exculpatory evidence when they are made aware of such evidence it must be disclosed to the Court and the Defense Council immediately.

The Court opines the following:

The Court has no statutory or explicit constitutional authority to order disclosure or testimony in general: this has occasionally been cause for concern, such as when Attorney General Gasponia sought to prosecute several members of the United Defenders League in the wake of the Warhammer 40000 incident.

In order for the Court to fulfill its bill-of-right mandated duties to run a fair trial, however, as in the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Gaspo on the Existence of a Duty to Disclose, the Court must and therefore may order the disclosure of information held by any branch of government necessary for a fair trial.

As the Court is best positioned to review the decisions of others rather than issue its own, it is appropriate for the Court not to issue such orders in the first instance. It is after a branch of the government has been presented with a request for information, and has chosen either to release it or to decline, that the Court is best positioned to review such a decision. The Court is entitled to treat a refusal to respond in a timely manner as a refusal of the request.

In general, exculpatory evidence may not be kept secret if a prosecution is to go forward. No nation may be convicted of any crime if exculpatory evidence exists and is not available to the defense. The revelation of such evidence after the fact, which could have been made available but was not, could well invalidate a conviction.

Ruling delivered on October 17, 2016.




Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Process for Declassifying Information for Use as Evidence in a Criminal Trial
Opinion drafted by Crushing Our Enemies and Barbarossistan, joined by Abbey Anumia

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Ash.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:
Bill of Rights:
7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer. In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence. A Nation may be represented by any counsel of the Nation's choosing. No Nation convicted of a crime shall be subject to a punishment disproportionate to that crime.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Codified Law of The North Pacific:
Legal Code:
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
Legal Code:
31. For the purposes of this section, classified information is that which fits any of the below definitions:
  • Real life information about any NationStates player from which there is a risk of inferring that player's real life identity and which has not willingly been disclosed to the public, including, but not limited to, an individual's name, IP address, physical address or location, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, social media accounts, and other knowledge about a player, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Real life information about any NationStates player for which there exists a reasonable real life expectation of privacy or discretion, including, but not limited to, health status, both mental and physical; financial status; personal tragedies; changes in personal status such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death; and other similar information, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize any ongoing military or intelligence operations; or jeopardize the security of units and agents participating in them, or be harmful to the diplomatic interests, military interests, or security of The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the relevant Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by flemingovia on the power of the Court to subpoena evidence:
The Court has no statutory or explicit constitutional authority to order disclosure or testimony in general: this has occasionally been cause for concern, such as when Attorney General Gasponia sought to prosecute several members of the United Defenders League in the wake of the Warhammer 40000 incident.

In order for the Court to fulfill its bill-of-right mandated duties to run a fair trial, however, as in the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Gaspo on the Existence of a Duty to Disclose, the Court must and therefore may order the disclosure of information held by any branch of government necessary for a fair trial.

As the Court is best positioned to review the decisions of others rather than issue its own, it is appropriate for the Court not to issue such orders in the first instance. It is after a branch of the government has been presented with a request for information, and has chosen either to release it or to decline, that the Court is best positioned to review such a decision. The Court is entitled to treat a refusal to respond in a timely manner as a refusal of the request.

In general, exculpatory evidence may not be kept secret if a prosecution is to go forward. No nation may be convicted of any crime if exculpatory evidence exists and is not available to the defense. The revelation of such evidence after the fact, which could have been made available but was not, could well invalidate a conviction.

The Court opines the following:

If a governmental body of The North Pacific is in possession of evidence to be presented in court, they may redact or withhold classified information from the evidence. For purposes of this ruling, classified information is defined as any information that falls into the three categories defined by the Freedom of Information Act as it currently stands:
Freedom of Information Act:
  • Real life information about any NationStates player from which there is a risk of inferring that player's real life identity and which has not willingly been disclosed to the public, including, but not limited to, an individual's name, IP address, physical address or location, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, social media accounts, and other knowledge about a player, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Real life information about any NationStates player for which there exists a reasonable real life expectation of privacy or discretion, including, but not limited to, health status, both mental and physical; financial status; personal tragedies; changes in personal status such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death; and other similar information, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize any ongoing military or intelligence operations; or jeopardize the security of units and agents participating in them, or be harmful to the diplomatic interests, military interests, or security of The North Pacific.
A prosecutor may be involved in this decision due to also serving in a different capacity in the government. A Conflict of Interest may arise when an official has multiple goals, such as a prosecutor wishing to secure a conviction.

In order to protect the right to a fair trial, a full copy of the evidence must be provided by the government to the moderating justice, and only information which falls into the first two categories above may be redacted from this copy. At the moderating justice's discretion, this copy may be provided to both parties in the trial, and each decision to withhold or redact evidence that falls into the third category above may be overturned by the request of either party. Motions to overturn decisions by the government to redact or withhold evidence may be made by either party, even if the moderating justice's copy of the evidence is not provided to them. Unless a motion is granted to overturn the government's decision to redact or withhold evidence, no redacted or withheld evidence may be considered in the court's deliberations on any verdict or sentence.

The court finds that this process is sufficient to ensure a fair and impartial trial regardless of who made the initial decision to redact or withhold evidence or their motivation to do so. As a consequence the court finds that a prosecutor may be involved in the decision to withhold or redact evidence. The court also finds that Sillystring did not violate the Bill of Rights by being involved in the decision to redact evidence in the TSronK trial.

The court wishes to remind officials that deciding to redact or withhold evidence for any reason other than those listed above, particularly in order to improperly influence the outcome of a trial, may result in a violation of their oath of office. If it is found that evidence was improperly redacted or withheld the court may furthermore overturn a conviction influenced by this improper evidence.

Ruling delivered on December 9, 2016.




Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On a Regional Officer Banning Nations during NationStates Events
Opinion drafted by Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Altmoras and Abbey

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gracius Maximus.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Legal Code Chapter 9:
Section 9.2: Disease Control
3. A NationStates event involving an outbreak of an infectious disease shall be considered an actual emergency, and does not require a declaration by the RA.
4. In advance of an outbreak, or promptly after an outbreak begins, the government must present a poll to the public regarding how the government should respond. The poll must contain at least three substantially different options. The government will respond according to the will of the public expressed through that poll.
5. During an outbreak, the delegate is authorized to act in any reasonable manner to pursue the adopted plan. This includes, but is not limited to, ejecting or banning nations from the region who have entered the region during the crisis and imposing restrictions on national movement into the region.
6. Nations ejected or banned because of the outbreak must be promptly unbanned and invited to return once the emergency is over.
7. During an outbreak, no nation may have their status as a resident or citizen removed solely for leaving the region, so long as they return within three days of the end of the emergency.
8. Following an outbreak, the Speaker must promptly contact any resident or citizen who remains outside the region, and inform them that they are at risk of losing their status if they do not return within three days.

Legal Code Chapter 6:
12. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens whose removal is ordered by the Court, or whose nation in The North Pacific leaves or ceases to exist.
13. The Speaker's office will promptly remove any citizens who fail to post in The North Pacific forum for over 30 consecutive days.

The Court opines the following:

There are circumstances under which it is legal for a regional officer to eject a nation during a NationStates event involving the outbreak of an infectious disease.

First, the delegate must take action to authorize the regional officer to eject nations. This need not be done publicly, so long as it is done explicitly by the delegate. Simply granting border control powers would not be sufficient. The delegate would have to make contact with the regional officer and grant them explicit authority to eject nations during the event.

Second, authorizing a regional officer to eject nations must be reasonable under the circumstances. For example, if the delegate appointed a regional officer who was known to be a security risk, that would be illegal because it is unreasonable.

Third, authorizing a regional officer to eject nations must be in pursuit of the regional plan to handle the emergency. For example, if the delegate authorized a regional officer to eject nations that send cure missiles when the regional plan is to cure infected, that would be illegal because it would not be in pursuit of the regional plan.

These three conditions are drawn from Section 9.2 of the legal code. In other areas of the law, the appointment of regional officers and the ejection or banning of a nation are more strictly regulated. However, because the outbreak of an infectious disease is defined in law as an “actual emergency”, clause 11 of the Bill of Rights is invoked, and the governmental authorities of the region, which include the delegate, are “authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is as consistent as practicable” with the constitution. Clause 11 also requires that the government have the consent of the nations of the region to take such actions. It is the opinion of the court that section 9.2 of the legal code, being adopted as law by the citizenry, constitutes the consent of the nations to assume emergency powers. Thus, as long as the conditions specified in section 9.2 (and explicated above) are adhered to, ejections and bans by the delegate during the outbreak of an infectious disease are legal, and so are actions by the delegate to authorize other nations to perform ejections and bans.

Turning specifically to the ejection of Gracius Maximus, it would seem reasonable and in pursuit of the regional plan for plembobria to permit GBM to eject nations that were sending hordes. Thus, the second and third conditions appear to be met. However, it is not known to the court whether plembobria explicitly took action to authorize her to do so, whether GBM was instructed to do so by another party, or whether she took it upon herself to do so. Thus, it is unknown to the court whether the first condition above was met, and the court is unable to definitively rule on whether Gracius Maximus’ rights were violated when he was ejected by Great Bights Mum.

The court notes, however, that for purposes of losing citizenship, ejections do not constitute leaving the region, since the ejected nation was forcibly removed and took no action to leave. Thus, under the law as it currently stands, ejected citizens would remain citizens until they ceased to exist, returned the region and then departed of their own volition, or failed to post on the forum for over 30 consecutive days.

Ruling delivered on January 9, 2017.
 
Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On Election Commissioners Failing to Take Their Oaths
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Bootsie and The Grim Reaper

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Darcania.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Darcania.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Guy.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by falapatorius.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Barbarossistan.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 7: General Provisions:
8. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
3. Participation in the governmental authorities of the region is voluntary. Participation in the World Assembly shall not be a condition of participation in the governmental authorities of the region.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 4.1:
Section 4.1: Oath of Office
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
2. All government officials will be required to take the Oath of Office within one week of their election, as certified by the Election Commissioner; appointment, as publicly announced; or confirmation, as verified by a member of the Speaker's Office. The taking of the Oath constitutes assumption of the office. Failure to post the oath within the allotted time will result in the office being considered vacant, to be filled in accordance with all laws governing elections, appointments, or confirmations, as is appropriate for the office in question.
Section 4.2:
5. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No Election Commissioner may run in the election they are overseeing.
6. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which candidacy declarations can be made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election.
7. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it. An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Pending an election, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body.
Section 4.3:
9. Citizens shall be provided three days to declare their candidacy. Following the closure of candidacy declaration, four days shall be allowed for campaigning, during which no further candidate declarations shall be allowed.
10. Voting will begin immediately after the campaigning period has closed and last for five days.
11. If a run-off vote is required it will begin within one day of the first vote ending and it shall last for five days.
12. Private votes may be sent by private message to a forum account designated for that purpose by the Election Commissioners. In such an event, the Election Commissioners shall promptly announce that a vote has been cast privately and who that vote was cast for. The Election Commissioners may not announce any other details about the vote.
Section 4.4:
18. A minimum of two Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the candidacy declaration and election processes at least one week before the beginning of the month in which the election is to be held. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Vice Delegate shall promptly make the appointment. citizens serving as government officials are not excluded from appointments under this clause.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Leaving a Candidate's Name off the Ballot:
The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional Assembly:
The Court had determined that the matter is twofold. If the violation occurs after the time in which the nation is no longer a member of the Regional Assembly then they are not violating their oath as they are not bound to that oath at the current moment. Whereas if the violation occurs during the time in which the nation was a member of the Regional Assembly and was bound by that oath they may be tried for an Oath Violation.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Restarting Voting Periods:
The Court recognizes the fact that restarting an election already in progress results in the discounting of legally cast votes. When this discounting happens without due justification, the Court believes that it constitutes a violation of the rights granted by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. The question then becomes, what is due justification?
It is first determined that the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is a violation of their rights under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights that can only be remedied by restarting the vote. Importantly, it is further determined that not restarting the vote---or not altering the timetable as otherwise required---would itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Court wishes to elaborate on these findings, and the second determination in particular. The violation of the Bill of Rights in the above set of circumstances is twofold. The omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot, the Court found previously, is in violation of Article 9. The remedy for this violation is to render the vote void. Consequently, votes cast using the erroneous ballot are also invalidated. Their invalidity is not by fault of the voters, but of the Electoral Commission, which failed to provide those entitled to vote with an opportunity to exercise their right in a valid way. This failure is, by itself, a violation of Article 10. The remedy for the second violation is to discount the invalid votes and restart the vote. In the context of our original question, the discounting of the votes resulting by restarting a vote under these circumstances is justified: the mishandling of the original vote was egregious enough to invalidate those votes beyond repair, and thus making their discounting in favor of a new vote the only means available for safeguarding the rights guaranteed under Article 10.

The above argument points to an answer to the question the Court set to investigate. Restarting a vote, and the discounting of votes it implies, is justified and necessary when it is the only remedy appropriate for a transgression---be it with regards to the Constitution and Bill of Rights, electoral law and its interpretation by the Court, or rules set by the Electoral Commission itself---that occurred during the conduct of a vote by fault of the Electoral Commission overseeing it. This answer is not to be interpreted as an exhaustive enumeration of conditions for restarting a vote: the one condition presented is merely sufficient. Furthermore, care must be taken when determining the truth of the first part of the condition, the uniqueness of the remedy. As the petitioner presented, discounting previous votes by restarting a vote runs the danger of voters who already cast their ballot not realizing that they need to recast it, and therefore going against the very rights of Article 10 they set to protect. At the same time, not restarting the vote runs the danger of the same voters not realizing that there has been a change in the circumstances under which they originally cast their vote, again posing hazards for the Article 10 rights. Both risks are remedied to an extent by the requirement for sufficient prior notice for actions of the Electoral Commission placed by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. All these factors must be taken into consideration, and be balanced against the severity of the effects of the transgression, when determining whether restarting a vote is the only available remedy. The fact that, as decided previously by the Court, the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is one case justifying restarting a vote should provide a standard of comparison when making this determination.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Time at which Oaths Become Binding:
The Court has previously ruled that former Regional Assembly members are no longer bound by the Regional Assembly oath when their membership expires, and that they are bound by the oath while they are Regional Assembly members. It is heavily implied by that same ruling that the oath is only binding while a nation is a member of the Regional Assembly. The Court sees no compelling reason to overturn that precedent.

It is the opinion of the Court that the Regional Assembly membership oath found in Section 6 Clause 2 of the Codified Law of the North Pacific becomes legally binding on RA applicants if and when they become members of the Regional Assembly, and remains binding only so long as they remain members. Explicitly, the oath becomes binding when any of the following conditions are met:
  • The Speaker admits the applicant and/or accepts their application;
  • The applicant has neither been accepted nor rejected after 14 days pass from the date of their application;
  • The applicant has been rejected by the Speaker for failing a security check by the Vice Delegate, and the RA has voted not to uphold that rejection.
Those conditions are the same conditions under which an applicant becomes a member of the RA.

Decision

The Regional Assembly oath becomes legally binding upon a nation when they become a member of the Regional Assembly.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Need for Further Clarification on Restarting Voting Periods:
The exclusion of a candidate's name on an election ballot infringes upon their rights as defined in Section 9 of the Bill of Rights, as seen in the Court ruling on the powers of Election Commissioners. When the option to "abstain" is excluded from the ballot, there is no such right to inclusion, or a violation of any other law of the North Pacific.
The Court opines the following:

The election cycle that began on March 1 is null and void in its entirety. At the time it began, Guy and Tomb were not Election Commissioners, and the candidacy declaration thread opened by them at that point was functionally equivalent to one opened by any citizen - it held no legal or electoral weight. The voting thread, opened after they swore oaths, was likewise invalid, as it did not follow a legal candidacy declaration period.

Furthermore, neither their initial appointment (which took place on 2/27) nor their reappointment (which took place on 3/8) by the delegate, plembobria, was valid. The Legal Code states that the delegate must make appointments of Election Commissioners at least one week prior to the scheduled start of an election, and that appointments after that point must be made by the Vice Delegate. The deadline for the delegate to make the initial appointments was 2/22, so it was only the Vice Delegate who had the authority to appoint Election Commissioners either time.

Accordingly, the Court ordered the following on March 17:
1) The Vice Delegate is ordered to appoint at least two Election Commissioners.

2) Once the Election Commissioners take their oaths, they are ordered to open nominations for the March 2017 Judicial Election, and proceed through the entire election cycle.
The Court now turns to additional, more specific questions raised during this review:

Are Election Commissioners government officials?

Yes. Election Commissioners are appointed by constitutionally-mandated elected officials, and thus they qualify as government officials under the law. Like all government officials, they are required to take the oath of office within seven days of their appointment, which constitutes assumption of that office. This holds true in the case of special elections as well, when another official is serving as an election commissioner - or, indeed, anytime a government official assumes a second office.

If the Delegate appoints Election Commissioners at least one week before the start of an election cycle, but they do not take their oaths within seven days, does that power still devolve to the Vice Delegate after the deadline?

Yes. Election Commissioner appointments remain valid for seven days. If the appointees have not sworn their oaths within the allowed seven day period, those appointments expire. At that point, the question of who holds the power to name new Election Commissioners is decided exactly as if no appointments were ever made.

Do actions taken by elected, appointed, or confirmed officials prior to their taking of the oath have legal force?

No. All government officials must take their oath prior to carrying out any actions in an official capacity. Any such actions taken prior to the swearing of the oath are invalid and hold no governmental authority. Depending on the nature of the actions, they could potentially also be illegal. For instance, if the individual banned a nation from the region before taking up an office that gave them the legal authority to do so, they could be subject to criminal charges.

Can an oath of office apply retroactively to actions taken after winning election, or being appointed?

Absolutely not. No oath under TNP law may apply retroactively. The oath of office becomes binding on an individual when they swear it and assume the position relating to that oath, just as it stops being binding when they cease to hold that position. The oath can neither criminalize misconduct, nor legitimize unofficial actions, from before it was sworn.

A government official cannot be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating the oath of office before they took it. And, by the same token, an election commissioner taking their oath after opening candidacy declarations cannot thereby give that thread legal standing.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9045023/
Ruling delivered on March 25, 2017.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Speaker's Power to Extend Voting Periods
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by MacSalterson and Yalkan

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Siwale.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed by Siwale, Owenstacey, and Guy.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 2. The Regional Assembly:
8. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 6.3: Voting:
16. The number of votes required to achieve quorum for any legislative vote is equal to one third of the number of citizens who have voted in at least one of the three most recent legislative votes. A legislative vote is a vote of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal laws.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Rules of the Regional Assembly of The North Pacific:
Section 2. Voting:
3. The Speaker will, at the beginning of a vote of the Regional Assembly, decide its duration as permitted by law.
4. If a number of citizens equal to or exceeding one third of the number of votes required to achieve quorum for any legislative vote object to the duration of a vote of the Regional Assembly decided by the Speaker before the conclusion of the vote, then that vote will last for the maximum duration permitted by law.
5. If at the conclusion of a vote quorum has not been achieved, then the Speaker may extend the duration of the vote to the maximum permitted by law.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its Ruling on the Speaker's Power to End Debate:
With that decided, the Court would take this opportunity to comment more broadly on the powers of the Speaker. Under the aforementioned Constitutional clause, the Speaker is granted broad discretion, where no rules exist, to administer the Regional Assembly as he or she sees fit. Under the Bill of Rights segment also mentioned previously, the Court believes that all government officials are obligated by law to act in good faith in discharging their duties. The Court believes that the Speaker does possess the right to unilaterally table proposals, if their continued debate is not reasonably in the best interests of the region. The Constitution grants this discretion, and the Bill of Rights in effect obligates the Speaker to exercise said discretion if he or she feels it is appropriate. If the Nations of The North Pacific disagree, the procedure for Recall is quite clear, and as has been demonstrated over the past few months, is quite accessible. Legal review of the Speaker's discretionary decisions is not, generally speaking, necessary.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its Ruling on the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate:
The Constitution establishes that the Regional Assembly has the authority to create the rules for its governance, and that it is the duty of the Speaker to administer those rules. Where there is vagueness as to procedure, or when situations arise which are not covered by those rules, or by superseding ones within the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights, the Speaker is empowered to act as they see fit within the best interests of the region. Previous Courts have interpreted this power broadly, upholding the Speaker's broad authority to maintain an appropriate atmosphere, promote a productive use of the Regional Assembly, and block proposals and votes which they deem harmful. While the relevant law has changed since the previous decision, prompting us to take this case, upon investigation the underlying principles have not.
The Court opines the following:

The Constitution provides for the Regional Assembly to make rules dealing with its proceedings. It further empowers the Speaker to take broad discretionary action where no rules exist.

The Regional Assembly has chosen to make rules in relation to the timing of votes. Those rules empower the Speaker to, at the beginning of a vote, decide the length of the vote and, at the end of it, to extend its length if it would be inquorate at the originally scheduled conclusion. They also provide citizens with a mechanism to extend the vote to the maximum duration.

It has not been argued before the Court that the Speaker was using their power under the rules to extend the vote. It has been argued, however, that if such a use was claimed, it would have been without the scope of the power. The Court accepts that this power was not exercised and that, had it been purported to have been exercised, it would have been unlawful. The power under the rules cannot be used prior to the conclusion of the vote and, in any event, the votes in question appear to have been quorate at the time the extension was made.

The Speaker has submitted that there exists a discretionary power under the Constitution to extend the duration of a vote and that the rules do not exclude the existence of such a power. The Court, in considering this proposition, is cognisant of its prior rulings on the nature of the Speaker's discretionary power: that it is a broad one; and that it is not limited strictly to occasions where no rules cover a matter, but extends to addressing vagueness in adopted rules. However, the Court does not agree that the rules permit the existence of a power of the kind the Speaker contends.

Clause 3 of the relevant Section of the rules provides for the Speaker to set the duration of the vote at its beginning, this serves to exclude the discretion of the Speaker in altering the duration of a vote. To hold that there exists a general discretion to extend a voting period during the voting period would rob this rule of a significant part of its force, effectively permitting a different period to be set after the beginning of a vote. Further, Clause 5 of the Section provides reason to think that the discretion is excluded: if Clause 3 was meant to leave intact a discretionary power to extend a vote in any circumstance, there would be no need to include an express discretion in relation to inquorate votes and Clause 5 would be rendered mere surplusage.

Where the rules cover a matter it is not necessary for them to expressly exclude the Speaker's discretion, for the discretion exists only where the rules are absent or sufficiently vague as to leave room for discretionary action. This Section is comprehensive and it does not contain a vagueness within which the Speaker's actions can be said to have fit, thus, its exclusion of a discretion to alter voting periods outside of its terms is total. The Court must conclude, therefore, that the extension was unlawful as there was no power to extend the voting period at the time the extension was made.

Turning to the remedy that the Court is to prescribe, the Court is mindful of the need to impress the importance of adherence to properly established procedure and to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, legal certainty. The delay inherent to the processes of the Court has, unfortunately, led to considerable uncertainty around a number of issues and ordering a count as though the conditions at the originally scheduled close remained true is likely to be of greater logistical difficulty for the Speaker than alternative remedies. Therefore, the Court concludes that the more certain remedy of voiding the impugned votes is the course that ought to be followed.

Accordingly, the votes on the Citizenship Security Evaluations Amendment and the motion to Admit Kasch to the Security Council are voided and the Speaker must commence fresh votes in relation to each of those matters.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9081662/
Ruling delivered on October 22, 2017.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Validity of a Previous Ruling
Opinion drafted by Sil Dorsett, joined by Cogoria and Sasten

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Barbarossistan, and its follow-up here.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Falapatorius.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Goyanes.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by SillyString, and its follow-up here.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Guy.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 5. The Court

1. The Court will try all criminal cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Article 3. Judicial Law

6. If one or more Justice positions are vacant, or any Justice is absent or has recused themselves, the remaining Justices will promptly appoint replacements from among available citizens to participate as temporary Hearing Officers.

8. Any recusal or absence of a Hearing Officer will be treated as a vacancy.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of On the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers:
The Court holds that the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies.
The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court's discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.
The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to "look again"), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.

The Court opines the following:

Regarding the ruling being made sua sponte:
The Court believes that in order to answer the question of whether accepting Lord Ravenclaw's Request for Review was legal, it must have considered the question of whether reviewing the matter and issuing a ruling in the first place would have been proper and in-line with precedent, and therefore the ruling was not issued sua sponte. It may not have answered the petitioner's original question, but it answered an underlying question that the court was required to decide first.

Regarding the ruling being made as a majority decision with an absence:
The Court also acknowledges that there was an additional question on the ability of the Court to issue a ruling when one of its justices or hearing officers is not present during drafting or voting. When the ruling "On the Suppression of Posts on the Regional Message Board" was issued, Flemingovia noted that Punk Daddy had been absent during drafting and did not cast a vote, and was counted as abstaining. Therefore, there was an apparent precedent for Abbey and Plembobria to do the same when Yalkan was absent. With Plembobria joining the decision that is being challenged here, the Court issued the ruling.

This is in conflict with the previously cited clauses of the Legal Code that make it clear that an absent Justice or Hearing Officer must be replaced, and that the remaining Justices must promptly appoint a replacement from available citizens. Abbey and Plembobria failed to do so. There will no doubt be questions as to how long someone should be absent before being declared so, but the Court believes that should an absence be declared when there isn't one, the supposedly absent member should be able to reassert their place on the panel should it be demonstrated that there was in fact no legitimate absence.

However, the Court also recalls instances in 2012 where there were cases in which Justice Hileville issued a ruling shortly after another justice joined the decision, marking the remaining justice as abstaining if there was no prompt reply. For example, In "On the Scope of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights", Hileville posted the ruling two days after Blue Wolf II joined the decision and there was no reply from Funkadelia. Funkadelia had not abandoned the office, and there's no indication that Funkadelia had gone absent; there was just no timely reply. The ruling issued by Abbey and Plembobria could have been issued under the same circumstances had Abbey not confessed that Yalkan had gone absent. Since the definition of an absent justice or hearing officer is unclear and since past decisions have been issued with a majority vote, this Court finds no reason to declare that Court officially did not consist of three members at that time and therefore set aside the decision for that reason.

Regarding "exceptional circumstances":
The Court disagrees with the previous ruling that only under exceptional circumstances can the Court be reviewed. With no clear definition of "exceptional circumstances," the Court would be free to raise such standards to dismiss a case through the use of whatever criteria it felt was necessary to do so. It could also lower the same to accept a case that ordinarily wouldn't be under the concept of "exceptional circumstances." Even the oft-cited ruling on the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers failed to adequately define its own concept of "heightened standards," leaving the definition to be decided by the Court arbitrarily. While this Court agrees that a request to simply "look again" because a petitioner or the Attorney General's office was unhappy with the result should be rejected, whenever there is the possibility that the court was not in compliance with the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Legal Code, overturned precedent without explanation, or if there is new evidence uncovered that might impact a past ruling, a review would be warranted.

Therefore, the ruling in regards to the judicial inquiry filed by SillyString on the ability of the Court to review RA proposals is set aside, and having previously accepted SillyString's inquiry, the Court is ordered to reconsider the matter.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9100005/
Ruling delivered on March 11, 2018.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On Court Review of RA Proposals
Opinion drafted by Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Lord Lore and Sil Dorsett

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Clean Land.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed here and here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Barbarossistan.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Constitution:
1. The Court will try all criminal cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Court ruling "On the Validity of a Previous Ruling":
The Court disagrees with the previous ruling that only under exceptional circumstances can the Court be reviewed. With no clear definition of "exceptional circumstances," the Court would be free to raise such standards to dismiss a case through the use of whatever criteria it felt was necessary to do so. It could also lower the same to accept a case that ordinarily wouldn't be under the concept of "exceptional circumstances." Even the oft-cited ruling on the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers failed to adequately define its own concept of "heightened standards," leaving the definition to be decided by the Court arbitrarily. While this Court agrees that a request to simply "look again" because a petitioner or the Attorney General's office was unhappy with the result should be rejected, whenever there is the possibility that the court was not in compliance with the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Legal Code, overturned precedent without explanation, or if there is new evidence uncovered that might impact a past ruling, a review would be warranted.

Therefore, the ruling in regards to the judicial inquiry filed by SillyString on the ability of the Court to review RA proposals is set aside, and having previously accepted SillyString's inquiry, the Court is ordered to reconsider the matter.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Court ruling "On the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers":
If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Court ruling on Standing and the Definition of Affected Party:
The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.
The Court opines the following:

The Court is in the unusual position of ruling for a second time on a single request for review. In the most recently published court ruling "On the validity of a previous ruling", the Court's original ruling on this request was wholly overturned, and it has been ordered that the request be reconsidered. In the same ruling, it was determined that a review of a court action is warranted "whenever there is the possibility that the court was not in compliance with the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Legal Code." Since, in this situation, the petitioner cites portions of the Consitution and Bill of Rights that may have plausibly been violated by the court action being reviewed, the court must rule on the question.

The Court finds that Justice Scorch's action in accepting the request for review filed by Lord Ravenclaw on November 28, 2017 violates Article 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution, because the object of the request (namely, a proposal before the Regional Assembly) is neither a law, a goverment policy, nor a government action.

The ability to make a proposal to the Regional Assembly is afforded to every citizen in The North Pacific, and thus, when a citizen makes such a proposal, they are not acting as a government official, but as a private citizen. Even if they were to hold a government office at the time they make a proposal, they cannot be considered to be acting in their capacity as a government official. Exceptions may possibly be made for situations in which the ability to make certain proposals is restricted to government officials (e.g. the Delegate proposing a treaty, or the Vice Delegate presenting the Security Council's nomination of a potential new member). In all other cases, however, making a proposal is not considered an action made by a government official.

Furthermore, a proposal before the RA cannot be considered a law or a government policy until it is enacted. The Court is a reactive body, and both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution Article 5, Clause 1 preclude the Court from ruling on something that hasn't actually happened yet, such as potential violation of rights that might be done if a proposal becomes a law.

This decision does not apply solely to requests to review proposals of the Regional Assembly. More broadly, the Court finds that justices are prohibited by the Constitution from accepting a request for review of anything that is not a law, government policy, or government action. When a justice does so, the Court ought to find in their ruling that the object of the request is not within the scope of their review power, and decline to rule on it. To streamline this process, it may be adviseable for the Court to amend the Court Rules and Procedures to allow the Attorney General to appeal decisions of an individual justice to the full Court in a request for review. Currently, only the petitioner has the power to appeal, and they would naturally be disinterested in appealing a decision to accept the request that they themselves have made.

In this particular case, since Lord Ravenclaw has withdrawn their request, no further action by the Court is required to correct the situation.

Case thread: http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9093434/1/
Ruling delivered on March 22, 2018.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Freedom of Information Act and Off-forum Content
Opinion drafted by Eluvatar and SillyString, joined by Owenstacey

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by St George.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Artemis.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:


9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:

Section 7.5: Freedom of Information Act

31. For the purposes of this section "the government" refers to the Delegate and the Executive Officers, including the departments which they oversee.
32. For the purposes of this section, classified information is that which fits any of the below definitions:
  • Real life information about any NationStates player from which there is a risk of inferring that player's real life identity and which has not willingly been disclosed to the public, including, but not limited to, an individual's name, IP address, physical address or location, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, social media accounts, and other knowledge about a player, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Real life information about any NationStates player for which there exists a reasonable real life expectation of privacy or discretion, including, but not limited to, health status, both mental and physical; financial status; personal tragedies; changes in personal status such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death; and other similar information, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize any ongoing military or intelligence operations; or jeopardize the security of units and agents participating in them, or be harmful to the diplomatic interests, military interests, or security of The North Pacific.
33. Notwithstanding any process for publication, any information which meets the criteria to be classified will not be released.
34. Private government records which reach one year of age will be relocated to the appropriate Declassified Archive visible to residents.
35. At any time a resident may request the release of any private record from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
36. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government.
37. Residents who do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information to the court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information meets one or more of the acceptable acceptable criteria for classification.
38. Information appropriately not disclosed will be accepted as classified by a majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.

The Court took into consideration its ruling on the meaning of "private citizen" with respect to the Freedom of Information Act
It is the status of the author and not the topic which determines whether a post is subject to FOIA. So long as the author is speaking in their capacity as an executive official, the law applies.

The Court expands on the above by issuing the following additional rulings:

First, the Court states that all posts made within areas of the forum which normally grant posting privileges only to members of the executive - excluding administrators and moderators from consideration - are inherently made in the author's capacity as an executive official. Such posts cannot be considered non-governmental. Posts which are made in areas of the forum more accessible to the public may be ruled non-governmental if such a determination is merited by their content and context.

The Court opines the following:

On Standing in this Inquiry

The Court has determined that St George does have the standing to bring this request for review. The Freedom of Information Act implements the fundamental principle of transparency as laid out in the bill of rights, and mandates proactive disclosure of non-private information by the executive branch so that the public can scrutinize its doings. By failing to release information as required, the executive prevents the public from performing this critical oversight. Any resident thus has a possible claim that their right to democracy, accountability, and transparency has been violated when they believe a broad failure to release has occurred.

On the Scope of the Freedom of Information Act

The Freedom of Information Act states that “private government records” are subject to release upon reaching a certain age, or upon request from a resident. It does not limit its scope to only content located on the official forum of The North Pacific. The term “private record” is not explicitly defined, but it is implicitly contrasted with declassified archives that are “visible to residents”.

In its prior rulings on the Freedom of Information Act and the ownership of content, the Court made consistent references to “posts” in “areas of the forum”, rather than more generic references to any type of content. At the time the rulings were issued, Discord was not in use by the region, and the vast majority of government business was conducted on the official forum. It was also regular practice by government officials at that time to post transcripts of any official IRC chats that occurred into the relevant areas of the forum to maintain a formal record of proceedings. Additionally, the requests for review that led to these rulings were made in reference to specific topics and posts on the official forum - they were not requests to determine, more broadly, the media to which FOIA applied.

The Court therefore rules that the Freedom of Information Act applies to any platform on which TNP government business is conducted.

On the Ownership of Content

In light of the above decision, the Court has examined its prior rulings on this subject to determine if they still apply, or if any further clarifications are necessary. In its rulings on content ownership and the meaning of “private citizen”, the court stated:

As an additional finding, on the matter of ownership, the Court holds that the author of a post owns its content, and posts made while acting in one's capacity as a government official are owned, more broadly, by the respective branch of government within which that capacity falls.
So long as the author is speaking in their capacity as an executive official, the law applies.
First, the Court states that all posts made within areas of the forum which normally grant posting privileges only to members of the executive - excluding administrators and moderators from consideration - are inherently made in the author's capacity as an executive official. Such posts cannot be considered non-governmental. Posts which are made in areas of the forum more accessible to the public may be ruled non-governmental if such a determination is merited by their content and context.

The Court therefore issues the following clarifications to the above rulings:
  1. The author of any message, not just of a forum post, owns its content, and any messages written while acting in one’s capacity as a government official are owned by the respective branch of government within which that capacity falls.
  2. All messages made within spaces that normally only grant access privileges to members of the executive - excluding administrators and moderators from consideration - are inherently written in the author’s capacity as an executive official. Such messages cannot be considered non-governmental. Messages written in spaces that are more accessible to the public may be ruled non-governmental if such a determination is merited by their content and context.
  3. For the purposes of FOIA, as specified in clause 31, posts made by members of the executive staff within executive spaces are considered to be owned by the executive department they are part of, and therefore by the executive as a whole.
Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9189938/
Ruling delivered March 1, 2019.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On Alterations to the Citizenship Oath
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Eluvatar and OwenStacey

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Gracius Maximus.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Gracius Maximus, and the clarification submitted here.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by bootsie.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Artemis.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Crushing Our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:

1. All Nations of The North Pacific are sovereign. Each Nation has the right of self-determination in that Nation's domestic policies, including, but not limited to, issue selection and WA membership.

2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region. Any Nation of The North Pacific has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 6.1: Citizenship Applications
2. Any resident may apply for citizenship using their regional forum account, by providing the name of their nation in The North Pacific, and swearing an oath as follows:
I pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.
3. A copy of the laws applicants are pledging to obey must be available to them at all times.
4. An application for citizenship ceases to be valid if at any time the applicant's declared nation in The North Pacific is not located in The North Pacific.
5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate the citizenship applicant and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty. The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to perform a security evaluation and pass or fail the applicant. The Vice Delegate must consult the Security Council if there is reasonable concern as to whether an applicant should be admitted.
6. The Speaker will reject applicants who fail an evaluation by either forum administration or the Vice Delegate.
7. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly shall immediately debate the rejection and will hold a majority vote on whether to uphold it. The vote must begin two days after the rejection occurs.
8. The Regional Assembly may overturn a previous decision to uphold the rejection of an applicant by majority vote.
9. The Speaker will accept all other applicants with valid applications.
10. The Speaker will process applications within 14 days. If an applicant has not been approved or rejected within that time, they will be automatically granted citizenship.
The Court took into consideration the previous version of the citizenship oath:
I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for membership in the Regional Assembly of the North Pacific.
The Court opines the following:

On Standing in this Inquiry

The Court has determined that Gracius Maximus does have the standing to bring this request for review. As an individual denied citizenship by the Speaker, Gracius Maximus was unquestionably directly personally affected by the Speaker's actions and this case hinges on the question of whether his rights, specifically, have been violated by these actions. Any person who believes they have been wrongfully denied citizenship by the Speaker would have the standing to request a review of the legality of that denial.

On Violation of the Right to Set Domestic Policy

The petitioner has stated that being required to take the citizenship oath as written and not being permitted to alter the it to include his identifier of choice violates his right under Article 1 of the Bill of Rights to set domestic policy in his nation.

The Court does not agree. Article 1 protects only those decisions and actions taken by a nation on the NationStates website which affect its tracked statistics, or its appearance or description when being viewed. It does not protect interactions between nations or between players, whether that be via in-game telegram, on the Regional Message Board, or on an external platform, as those cease to be "domestic".

On Violation of the Right to Free Speech

The petitioner has also argued that being required to take the citizenship oath as written and not being permitted to alter the it to include his identifier of choice violates his right under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights to free speech.

The Court does not agree. As is stated in the brief submitted by the Speaker, the Petitioner is free to self-identify as he feels proper and necessary within his post applying for citizenship, so long as such identification is done outside the specific text of the oath. The Court does not find that this small restriction on the location of one's identifier constitutes an infringement of a nation's right to free speech, as that speech remains free to occur.

On Alteration of the Citizenship Oath

The fundamental question before the Court is whether the oath of citizenship must be taken exactly as it appears in the Legal Code, or if alterations to its content to allow for personal identification can be permitted.

The section of the Legal Code which deals with citizenship applications defines the specific oath that must be sworn, and does not make any allowance for oaths that are textually distinct but functionally identical. Additionally, in examining the rights granted to all nations by the Bill of Rights, the Court has found nothing which requires an alternate oath to be permitted or accepted by the Speaker.

Therefore, the Court finds that alterations to the oath cannot be permitted, and that they render the oath, and thus the application for citizenship, invalid. The Attorney General's brief lays out a succinct argument for why this must be the case. Permitting applicants to change the text would force the Speaker to adjudicate the fine line of what is and is not a valid identifier, or what qualifies as a change to the content of the oath that alters its meaning. It is also quite likely that, when the holder of the office changes, so too will the Speaker's interpretation of what is permitted. There is too great a risk that permitting the Speaker to make a judgement call on the content of the citizenship oath will result in unequal treatment under the law.

On Violation of Fair and Equal Treatment

Finally, the petitioner has stated that the Speaker has violated his right to fair and equal treatment under the Bill of Rights due to inconsistency in accepting and denying citizenship oaths whose texts have been altered from that which was set out in the law.

In reviewing the evidence presented, the Court firmly agrees with the petitioner. His right to fair and equal treatment has been violated, and so has that of other nations who submitted altered citizenship oaths in their applications. Accepted or denied, they have not been treated equally.

The Attorney General is absolutely correct that the scale of this unequal treatment is beyond the power of the Speaker to remedy. Establishing a policy now and enforcing it consistently going forward would not address prior missteps, and would not change the citizenship status of anyone who has it and should not, or who does not have it and should.

However, the Court does have the power to alleviate some of the iniquity. In accordance with precedent set on the question of continued citizenship of Treize Dreizehn, we find that the citizenship previously granted to individuals who altered the text of their oaths is valid. They may continue to be counted as citizens, entitled to all of the rights and privileges afforded to any other citizen under our laws until and unless they lose citizenship by normal legal processes.

Additionally, we find it necessary to address the validity of the oaths these citizens took. Although the Court has found that alterations to the oath render it invalid, we also believe it would do irreparable harm to rule that altered oaths which have heretofore been taken and accepted are invalid and not legally binding. Such a move would introduce iniquity between citizens who swore the correct oath, and who could therefore be prosecuted for Gross Misconduct, and those who did not and therefore could not.

Based on the evidence the court has reviewed as part of this request, the majority of incorrect oaths appear to be unintentional - likely copied, or based on, an earlier legal version of the current oath. Therefore, we extend the principle of good faith that was established in the ruling on Treize Dreizehn's citizenship. Those citizens who took an incorrect oath are granted the presumption of having acted in good faith, of having intended to swear the correct oath but making a simple mistake. As such, they will also be presumed to be bound by the correct oath as it stood in the law at the time of the citizen's admittance.

However, the court cannot categorically determine that there are no current citizens who specifically intended to swear an incorrect oath and did not intend to be bound by the correct citizenship oath, but who were nevertheless granted citizenship. Accordingly, the court will allow 60 days for any citizen who swore an incorrect oath to reject the presumption of good faith that has been afforded to them, and to petition the Court to release them from the obligations of the citizenship oath. Anybody released from the oath in this fashion will simultaneously forfeit their citizenship. The Speaker, or any individual authorized to act on their behalf, must contact the citizens affected by this ruling and advise them of their right to relinquish citizenship.

On The Speaker's Responsibility and Authority to Determine a Valid Oath

The Speaker and their designees are expected to accept valid applications not rejected by forum administration or the Vice Delegate. This language necessitates they determine the validity of applications, and not blindly grant citizenship to anybody who posts anything in the application thread.

The Speaker is therefore instructed to accept applications only if they contain the citizenship oath exactly as specified under the law. Further, the Speaker is instructed to reject any application which contains text that clearly indicates an intention not to abide by the oath, or by which the applicant makes clear that they are not swearing the oath or applying for citizenship.

On Duality

Lastly, the petitioner has raised the idea of multiple accounts, nations, or identities belonging to a single player being treated differently based on the phrasing used in swearing the citizenship oath. The Court wishes to make clear that the use of “the leader of” in a citizenship application does not mean that the oath applies only to the actions taken by that specific nation. Any player bound by the laws of The North Pacific is not released from their legal obligations solely by acting under another name or capacity.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9189865/
Ruling delivered March 2, 2019.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Delegate's Authority to Staff the Executive Branch
Opinion drafted by SillyString, joined by Bootsie, with Eluvatar dissenting

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by abc.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Crushing our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration the answer to a question from the court filed here by Darcania.

The Court took into consideration the answer to a question from the court filed here by Pallaith.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 3:
1. The Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate.
8. The Delegate may appoint executive officers to assist them and may dismiss these officers freely. Executive officers may be regulated by law.
Article 7:
2. Government officials are the constitutionally-mandated elected officials, any officials appointed by them as permitted by law, and members of the Security Council.
3. The executive category consists of the Delegate, Vice Delegate, Attorney General, and government officials appointed by government officials in the executive category.
8. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Chapter 4 Section 4.1:
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.

I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its ruling on the Suppression of Posts on the Regional Message Board:
In this case, it is clear from testimony and reading the suppressed posts in context that technically Eluvatar abridged DD’s right to free speech. It is also clear that this was in the context of banter back and forth, playing the game, shooting the breeze etc.

What bewilders us is quite why the courts were asked to get involved. I mean, I know we are sad individuals living in our parents’ basement who badly need to get laid but instead play NS obsessively, but surely some things are just too trivial even for us?

There was no harm; there was no foul.

The Court took into consideration its verdict in the case of The North Pacific v. The Democratic Republic of Tomb:
It is the Court's opinion that the Defendant's attempt to curtail the Complainant's criticisms of the NPA as a requirement to join constitutes a violation of the Bill of Rights, and is not justifiable. Having sworn an oath to uphold the Bill of Rights, the Defendant is guilty of violating that oath.
The Court opines the following:

On Standing and Scope in this Inquiry

When it granted this request for review, the Court had made a preliminary determination that abc did have the standing to bring the review. As someone who believes that their right to free speech was violated, abc was unquestionably directly personally affected by the matter. Any nation of TNP who believes their right to free speech was violated would be similarly directly personally affected, and should have the opportunity to seek restoration from the Court.

However, as the Court examined the specific nature of the request for review, we determined that we are unable to answer the specific question that abc posed - namely, whether Pallaith specifically violated abc's freedom of speech. There are two reasons why this is the case.

First, the Court is concerned that a finding that the delegate had violated a nation's right to free speech would unfairly prejudice any potential future criminal trial for misconduct. Such a ruling would presume the delegate's guilt, and limit the valid avenues for the defense to pursue when countering the criminal charge. They would not be able to present evidence or make the case that free speech was not restricted, as that determination had already been set in stone. As the Attorney General quite rightly pointed out, this would be a serious violation of Pallaith's rights to a fair and impartial trial before being convicted of a crime.

Second, the Court has realized that the information it would need in order to make any determination about whether abc's freedom of speech was violated is not of a nature easily obtained during the course of a request for review. For example, he presented screenshots of his conversation with the delegate of 10000 Islands - but there are no procedures for establishing the validity of such submissions in a request for review, nor in determining whether their contents were known to the delegate or played any part in their actions to remove abc from the foreign affairs ministry and as a Gameside Advocate. There are many more examples we could provide, but the ultimate conclusion is that the Court, as a body, is not equipped or empowered to interrogate people or seek out evidence for or against a particular side. Rather, that is the job of the prosecution and the defense in a criminal trial, in which the Court's role is to consider the evidence submitted and come to a determination about whether it is sufficient proof of a crime to convict.

The Court did look at previous requests for review where a violation of rights was found, such as its ruling that the right to fair and equal treatment under the law was violated for Gracius Maximus (and others) when his citizenship application was denied. However, there are some key differences in the situation under review that allowed such a determination to be made in that case. The rights violation in question was determined to be a result of changing policies that were inconsistently enforced over the course of several Speakers' terms, and the Court additionally held that none of the policies themselves were legally problematic - just the end result. Because the rights violation was institutional instead of individual, any attempt to prove criminal misconduct would still have had to establish that the specific Speaker or Deputy Speaker being prosecuted actually violated someone's rights.

Therefore, in this case, the Court has determined that it can provide a ruling of modified scope. Namely, we will not rule on whether Pallaith violated abc's right to free speech. However, we will rule on the extent of the delegate's authority to staff the executive branch and on the permits and limits of free speech as it relates to service in government office. Any specific allegations that the delegate violated someone's rights through exercising this power can, if necessary, be settled via a criminal trial.

On the Authority to Appoint and Dismiss Executive Officers
The Constitution grants extremely broad power to the delegate when it comes to staffing the executive branch. There are no limits placed on the number or types of executive officers, so long as their role is to assist the delegate in the execution of their duties, and it additionally states that the delegate may dismiss such executive officers "freely".

Neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code make any mention of restricting such dismissals to instances that can or need be justified. At no point is the delegate required to prove incompetence, or inactivity, or irreconcilable differences in order to remove an official who, in the delegate's opinion, should no longer continue to serve. Accordingly, it would be inappropriate for the Court to undermine the intent of the Constitution and restrict the delegate's power to appoint or dismiss executive officers, or to require that cause for any dismissal be presented.

The only restriction, implicit in the law, is that the delegate may not exercise this (or any) power in a way which violates the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, or the Legal Code. For example, because the Bill of Rights protects a nation's right to self-determination in membership in the World Assembly, it would not be a legal exercise of their power to dismiss an executive officer simply for not being a member of the WA. Similarly, because the Bill of Rights protects the free expression of religion, the delegate could not make professing the Flemingovian faith a condition for appointment as an executive officer. However, the delegate is free to dismiss an executive officer for saying something that gives the delegate doubts about their competence, judgment, or capacity to do their job.

On the Authority to Control Membership in the Executive Staff
While the law gives broad authority to the Delegate when it comes to appointing and dismissing executive officers, it makes no mention of the executive staff - private individuals who serve in various capacities in the executive ministries, but who do not hold government positions or wield government power. Most often, membership in the executive staff for a particular ministry has been determined by its minister, without specific input from the delegate on a regular basis. However, because the law specifies that the ministers assist the delegate in their duties, the logical conclusion is that the delegate does have the legal authority to make decisions about who can serve in each ministry's executive staff.

Unlike executive officers, the executive staff are not government officials. This is an important distinction: They take no oath of office, and their existence is not legally predicated on assisting the delegate with the execution of their duties. They are, in fact, not established in the law at all - the idea of the executive staff as a body was invented by a prior delegate and retained by all subsequent ones. At this time, it serves as a key pathway for new residents and citizens to become involved in the region, to gain experience, and to rise to prominence. It is, in sum, a vital pipeline for regional and personal growth. It is therefore undeniable that, if someone were barred from participating in any part of the executive staff, their ability to participate fully in the region and to make use of the rights and freedoms they are afforded would be curtailed.

As such, the Court determines that the delegate's power - and, accordingly, the power of their ministers - to determine who may be a member of the executive staff is somewhat more limited than the power to determine who may be an executive officer.To be clear, the delegate can decide that an individual may not be part of any executive staff. However, such determinations should be based on some sort of misconduct by the barred individual (not on personal disagreements, prior inactivity, or other more mundane issues) and should be proportional to the misconduct that occurred.

The delegate is also free to abolish the executive staff, if they were to determine that it no longer best suited the needs of their ministries and of the region as a whole. Nothing in this section should be taken as requiring the existence of the executive staff, until and unless such existence is mandated by law. But insofar as it or any other executive body exists, executive officials may not violate the rights of TNP nations in determining who may and may not participate.

On the Freedom of Speech of Government Officials
The Bill of Rights protects nations' freedom of speech, and the right to question and criticize the regional government, without fear of retribution. This protection includes the right not to be threatened or punished for exercising that right. In TNP v. The Democratic Republic of Tomb, the Court found that as Delegate, Tomb had violated Flemingovia's rights to free speech by making his admission to the NPA conditional on refraining from parody songs mocking that institution. This was a clear attempt to prevent Flemingovia from engaging in public criticism and questioning of the TNP government, something that, as a private citizen, he has the right to do.

However, the situation is less straightforward when it comes to the dual voices of government officials. As nations and citizens of The North Pacific, government officials retain the right to criticize the actions of the government and to demand accountability and transparency in the actions of the various government bodies. And taking retribution against individuals who happen to be government officials for exercising that right is not permitted under the law, and should not be tolerated in an open and democratic society. For example, it would be a violation of the law for the delegate to fire one of their ministers simply because that minister disagreed with a decision made by the Election Commission and challenged it publicly.

But government officials do not speak only with their individual voice. They also, at times, wield governmental power, and speak with the authority of one of the branches of government. The Moderating Justice in a criminal trial speaks with the voice of the Court. The Foreign Affairs Minister, when negotiating a treaty with their counterpart in another region, speaks with the voice of the Executive. When speaking with these voices, government officials do not enjoy the blanket protections of freedom of speech, and their words may be enjoined by law or by someone with authority over them. The Delegate can instruct their Foreign Affairs minister on what provisions may be included in a treaty, or prohibit that minister from bringing up a personal grievance during negotiations - and they can remove the minister from office if their instructions are not followed. If the Court determines that a defendant is not guilty, the Moderating Justice cannot state that they have instead been found guilty - and the remaining Justices can publicly correct and overrule them if they try. A Security Councilor cannot unilaterally decide that a nation in the region is a security threat and threaten to ban them. In sum, government officials are subject to the oversight of their branch and of any superior official within that branch, and have no protections for engaging in official speech or actions that contravene such oversight.

There is an exception to the above ruling: government officials are not required to commit misconduct, no matter what instructions they are given, and they may not be punished for refusing to violate the law or for alerting the Attorney General about illegal activity within any branch of government.

On the Freedom of Speech Abroad
In his initial request, the petitioner stated that he was removed from the Foreign Affairs ministry and as a Gameside Advocate for "for using the RMB to voice my concerns about an embassy region." From what the Court could determine from the request and the briefs that were presented, such concerns were voiced solely on the RMB of the allied region, and none on TNP's RMB. This raises the question of how far a nation's freedom of speech extends outside of TNP, something which the Attorney General's brief also considered.

The freedom of speech is specifically granted to nations of The North Pacific. It therefore follows that nations that are not in The North Pacific are not afforded this protection. This includes embassy posting on the regional message board, forum posting by diplomats from other regions, and other similar types of speech. It also includes, as in the Attorney General's example, interactions outside of TNP between people who also happen to have TNP nations, but where no consequences result within TNP. If a delegate of another region bans someone from that region, or fires them from a role, such actions and speech are outside of the jurisdiction of our laws even when both parties are also members of TNP, and even when such actions would not be permitted if they occurred within TNP.

As for TNP nations speaking outside of the borders of TNP, such nations do not lose the protections of the bill of rights simply because of where their speech happens to take place. However, the Court also notes that free speech is not consequence-free speech; in the same way that citizens might choose not to vote for someone who says things they find objectionable, someone's conduct abroad (or at home) can be considered when the delegate makes decisions about appointing or removing executive officials, or when those executive officials make decisions about adding or removing members of the executive staff. For example, TNP nations have the right, under the bill of rights, to insult our allies (so long as they do not break a platform's rules on flaming), but they may then be reasonably denied a position as an ambassador to those allies. Similarly, as the Attorney General argued, the Delegate can decline to appoint someone as a minister (or can remove them from office) over disagreements about how that ministry should be run. The minister retains the right to speak freely about their concerns and criticisms, both publicly and privately. However, executive officials do ultimately exist in order to carry out the delegate's vision and goals, and the delegate is free to replace a minister who they feel is not able to perform those duties adequately.

On the Court's Prior Ruling on the Suppression of Posts on the Regional Message Board
In 2015, the Court issued a ruling in response to a request for review on the suppression of posts on the RMB. In it, the Court said:

In this case, it is clear from testimony and reading the suppressed posts in context that technically Eluvatar abridged DD’s right to free speech. It is also clear that this was in the context of banter back and forth, playing the game, shooting the breeze etc.
[...]
There was no harm; there was no foul.
We hereby overturn this ruling in its entirety. The protection of free speech is enshrined in our Bill of Rights precisely because its suppression is inherently harmful, and the Court's conclusion that the delegate's actions occurred in the context of friendly banter is belied by the very fact that a request for review was filed at all. Additionally, as laid out above, this ruling risks violating Eluvatar's right to a fair trial by preemptively determining that he committed a rights violation without the chance to testify in his own defense. It also risks violating Democatic Donkeys' right to protection against abuse of power and the right to be heard, by preemptively determining that "no harm" was done in the violation of his rights without a chance for him to provide testimony of his own.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9190212/
Ruling delivered May 19, 2019.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the sentence issued by the Court in the case of The North Pacific v. Whole India
Opinion drafted by Artemis, joined by SillyString and Dreadton

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Deropia.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Vivanco.

The Court took into consideration the indictment filed
here by Dinoium.

The Court took into consideration the verdict issued in The North Pacific v. Whole India, found
here.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:

7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer. In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence. A Nation may be represented by any counsel of the Nation's choosing. No Nation convicted of a crime shall be subject to a punishment disproportionate to that crime.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 1.3: Fraud
12. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.

Chapter 2: Penal Code
1. Criminal acts may be punished by restrictions on basic rights, in a manner proportionate to the crime at the discretion of the Court unless specified in this chapter.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Court Rules and Procedures found here:
Section 3: Evidence
  1. The Court accepts both documentary evidence and witness testimony as valid submissions.
  2. Objections to evidence by either the Prosecution or the Defense must clearly explain why, in accordance with the Court Rules and general legal principles, the evidence in question should not be admitted into the court record.
  3. Relevant evidence may be admitted or excluded at the discretion of the Moderating Justice after hearing from both sides.
  4. Documentary evidence, which includes forum posts or threads, off-site chat logs, screenshots and other evidence of a similar nature, must be authenticated according to the criteria below:
    • Content which does not appear in its original form and location, such as off-site chat logs, screenshots, transcripts, or quotes, must be authenticated through witness testimony regardless of how public it is when it is presented as evidence.
    • Forum posts and threads may be accepted without authentication, as long as the Moderating Justice is provided with a direct link to the posts and threads entered into evidence and is able to view them in their original locations. The Moderating Justice must confirm that the evidence submitted does not contain any content that does not appear in the original location before accepting it without authentication.
    • Witness testimony is always an acceptable way to authenticate evidence.
    • The Moderating Justice may, when appropriate, waive authentication requirements for individual pieces of evidence. They must provide an explanation for doing so.

The Court opines the following:

On Standing in this Inquiry

The Court has determined that Deropia does have the standing to bring this request for review on behalf of Whole India. Whole India, as the defendant whose sentence is being challenged, has obvious and unassailable standing to raise concerns about impropriety in their own sentencing. Criminal defendants have the right to be represented by counsel during their trial, and that right to representation must necessarily extend to other issues raised with the court pertaining to that trial, even if they do not occur during the official trial process.

On the Authentication of Images Provided by Whole India

In the indictment of Whole India, the Deputy Attorney General stated a belief that the defendant had altered a message from Red Back, but did not include a copy of this image in their filing. However, the Deputy Attorney General did include several other pieces of evidence in the indictment, and one was stated to be a screenshot of the complete, unaltered telegram history between the two parties. During the course of the trial, Whole India introduced a separate piece of evidence in their defense - stated to be a screenshot of another telegram with Red Back, one not included by the prosecution.

Under Court Rules and Procedures, both images were required to be authenticated by witness testimony in order to be admitted to the court record. Red Back was deposed and asked to authenticate the prosecution’s image, which he did. He was also asked by the prosecution to authenticate one of the two images provided by the defendant, which he did not do. During the time when Red Back’s deposition was occurring, the Moderating Justice asked several questions of the defendant, apparently in an effort to understand the discrepancies between Red Back’s testimony and Whole India’s image.

However, questions by the Moderating Justice are not an acceptable way of authenticating, or failing to authenticate, any piece of evidence. The Court Rules and Procedures require that witness testimony occur via deposition or statement, and that both must be preceded by an oath from the witness. Moreover, statements must be sent directly to the Moderating Justice, while depositions must occur in a separate thread from the main trial and be conducted via questioning by both the defense and the prosecution. The Moderating Justice is certainly not prevented from asking questions of either party during a trial - however, such questions do not replace the formal process for authenticating evidence as laid out by the Court.

Whole India then pled guilty to the charge of Fraud laid out in the initial indictment, before any further authentication efforts could be undertaken, and before either they or Red Back could be properly questioned about discrepancies. Because Whole India’s images remained unauthenticated at this time, the only conclusion that this Court can draw is that they were never admitted into the trial record. In other words, for the purposes of the Court, the images must be treated as if they do not exist.

On the Materiality of the Unauthenticated Image

In his brief to the Court, Zyvetskistaahn notes, correctly, that the Court is granted wide leeway to determine an appropriate sentence in a criminal conviction. He also argues that although the unauthenticated images were taken into account when making such determination, they were only one factor and, by implication, made only a small contribution to the ultimate severity of the sentence.

However, as the Court has found that the images in question were not properly introduced as evidence and must be treated as nonexistent, it was incorrect for them to have been considered it at all when determining sentencing. Such an error is certainly material to the defendant, who must serve out any extra length on their sentence.

On Indictments and Guilty Pleas

Zyvetskistaahn argues that by pleading guilty, a defendant is granting that the charge laid out against them is true as stated. He goes on to say that when a defendant is accused of committing fraud by lying about receiving threats from another nation, it is illogical for the Court, or any party, to accept that the defendant is guilty of lying and also that such threats are real. The conclusion he draws is that by pleading guilty in this case, Whole India is necessarily admitting that the images introduced as evidence are false.

The Court agrees with Zyvetskistaahn’s arguments, but not with his conclusion. The charge that the defendant pled guilty to ("intentionally deceiving the public into believing a foreign dignitary warned them to suspend their campaign for the upcoming election in January") made no reference to the method in which such deception was attempted, and the evidence introduced by the Deputy Attorney General, as referenced above, likewise did not include any allegedly doctored images.

The Court concludes that while it is reasonable to find the defendant guilty of the acts alleged in the opening indictment, it is not reasonable to extrapolate more information, or more criminality, from a guilty plea than is actually being alleged. If there is any confusion about what acts, specifically, the defendant is confessing to committing, the Court should ask the defendant to clarify.

Conclusion

Due to the issues noted above, the sentence handed down to Whole India is vacated. We remand it back to the adjudicating Court for resentencing, with the stipulation that the Court is barred from exceeding the original sentence given to the defendant. The Court may not consider the veracity of any images that Whole India attempted to present in their defense when determining the defendant’s sentence.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9191613/
Ruling delivered on February 5, 2020.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Regional Ban of Kirana
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Lady Raven Wing and Wonderess

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Kirina.

The Court took into consideration the information filed here by Nessuno.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 3. The Delegate and Vice Delegate:
2. The Delegate may eject and ban nations from the region as permitted by law, and will eject or ban nations from the region when required by law.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
8. The regional power of ejection and banning may not be granted or exercised, nor forum bans imposed, unless expressly authorized pursuant to the Constitution or the Legal Code. Any ejected or banned nation is entitled to prompt judicial review of the matter.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 7.3: Onsite Authority:
11. Violators of NationStates rules, or residents banned offsite by forum administration, may be subject to summary ejection or banning.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of NationStates rules:
Spam and the different types of it:
There are many types of spam, but the general definition is making a post that doesn't have any sort of use. Excessive bumping, tagging, and random posts with irrelevant information are all examples of spam. The same applies to in-game posts on regional message boards and telegrams.

[...]

Regional Message Board Spam: Posting multiple messages on your message board within a short period of time can be considered message board spam. Founders and regional officers they designate may suppress spam (or any other messages) on the regional message board.
The Court opines the following:

Standing

The petitioner brings a request for review seeking for their ban from the region by McMasterdonia, the Delegate, to be overturned.

The Court finds that the petitioner does have standing as an affected party to request this review. They are clearly adversely affected by being banned from the region by the Delegate, which is plainly a government action. Further, the Bill of Rights makes clear that judicial review is guaranteed for nations that are banned from the region.

Lawfulness of the Ban

The Bill of Rights restricts use of the regional power of banning to circumstances that are expressly authorised by the Constitution or the Legal Code. Provision has been made for the use of that power: the Delegate is empowered by the Constitution to eject and ban nations as permitted by law and the Legal Code sets out a range of scenarios in which ejection or banning would be permitted.

One such scenario is dealt with by Section 7.3, clause 11 of the Legal Code, which allows for the summary banning of nations that violate NationStates rules. In this matter, the petitioner states that the ban in question was due, at least in part, to spamming the regional message board, which accords with the public notice of the ban given by the Delegate as required by the Legal Code. The Court notes that the petitioner accepts that they engaged in spamming of the regional message board. The Court also notes that a series of posts on the regional message board have been referred to the Court by Nessuno, the Lead Gameside Advocate (a government official charged with assisting the Delegate in their duties regulating the regional message board), which demonstrates that a number of posts appear to have been made over a short period of time, including three posts in succession.

The Court has had regard to the relevant provisions of the NationStates rules concerning spam and the regional message board. Those rules seem clear that multiple messages over a short period of time can constitute regional message board spam. The Court has not heard argument on the test to utilise when considering alleged violations of NationStates rules and whether it is a matter that the Court should come to its own judgment on or whether some area of discretion should be afforded to the Delegate. In this case, it is not necessary for the Court to decide those issues. It appears to the Court that, whatever standard is used and whether it is for the Court to decide or whether there is a discretion in the Delegate, it is clear from the petitioner's request and the posts shown to the Court that the petitioner was in violation of NationStates rules concerning regional message board spam and, therefore, liable to be summarily banned. That ban was in compliance with the Legal Code and, consequently, authorised by both it and the Constitution, in satisfaction of the requirements of the Bill of Rights.

A second chance

The petitioner asks the Court to give them a second chance. They say that they have corrected their behaviour and will be a repentant and sincere member of the community if the ban is reversed. The Court does not consider that this is a matter that can properly be considered by the Court when deciding, as it must, the lawfulness of the decision to ban when it was made. It appears to the Court that the Delegate has taken a decision to ban the petitioner on grounds which were lawful and it is not for the Court to interfere with lawful decisions. Whether the Delegate would be minded to rescind the ban on the basis of what has been said by the petitioner or on other representations from the petitioner (or for any other reason) is, in the first instance at least, a matter for them.

Conclusion

The Court determines that the petitioner was lawfully banned by the Delegate for the reasons given above. There is no need for any order to be made by the Court.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9191839/
Ruling delivered on March 15, 2020.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Form of the Oath of a Delegate
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Wonderess and Lady Raven Wing

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Siwale.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Dreadton.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 3. The Delegate and Vice Delegate:
1. The Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate.
2. The Delegate may eject and ban nations from the region as permitted by law, and will eject or ban nations from the region when required by law.
3. The Delegate may negotiate treaties with foreign powers. No treaty will come into effect unless approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the Regional Assembly.
4. When a proposal of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal a law is passed, the Speaker shall promptly present it to the Delegate, and it shall take effect immediately upon their signature.
5. The Delegate may veto a proposal of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal a law within one week of its passage.
6. The Regional Assembly may override such a veto by a two-thirds majority vote, which shall cause a proposal to take immediate effect.
7. If a proposal of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal a law has not been signed or vetoed by the Delegate, it shall take effect seven days after being passed.
8. The Delegate may appoint executive officers to assist them and may dismiss these officers freely. Executive officers may be regulated by law.
9. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.
10.. The Vice Delegate will hold the second most endorsements in the region. The Delegate may eject or ban any nation which exceeds any legally mandated endorsement limit.
11. In the case of a vacancy or absence in the office of Delegate or Vice Delegate, the first available person in the line of succession will assume the duties of the vacated position. If a member of the line of succession assumes the duties of either position while serving in, or having assumed the duties of, any other constitutionally-mandated elected office, they will be considered absent from that office.
12. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person shall be elected Delegate to a full or partial term in three consecutive election cycles.
Article 4. The Court:
1. The Court will try all criminal cases and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies and actions.
2. Reviews of laws or government policies and actions must be made by request of an affected party unless there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it.
Article 6. General Provisions:
1. Constitutionally-mandated elected officials are the Delegate, Vice Delegate, Speaker, members of the Security Council, and Justices.
2. Government officials are the constitutionally-mandated elected officials, any officials appointed by them as permitted by law, and members of the Security Council.
3. The executive category consists of the Delegate, Vice Delegate, and government officials appointed by the Delegate or Vice Delegate.
[...]
8. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Chapter 5: Regional Security Law:
3. In this chapter, the serving Delegate means the person holding the constitutionally-mandated elected office of Delegate or, in the case of a vacancy in that office, the person who has assumed the duties of that office.
Section 7.1: Definitions:
4. The Serving Delegate is the person holding the constitutionally-mandated elected office of the Delegate or, in the case of a vacancy in that office, the person that has assumed the duties of that office.
5. The WA Delegate is the nation holding the WA Delegacy of the region The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Standing and the Definition of Affected Party:
The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.

The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Election Commissioners Failing to Take Their Oaths:
Do actions taken by elected, appointed, or confirmed officials prior to their taking of the oath have legal force?

No. All government officials must take their oath prior to carrying out any actions in an official capacity. Any such actions taken prior to the swearing of the oath are invalid and hold no governmental authority. Depending on the nature of the actions, they could potentially also be illegal. For instance, if the individual banned a nation from the region before taking up an office that gave them the legal authority to do so, they could be subject to criminal charges.

Can an oath of office apply retroactively to actions taken after winning election, or being appointed?

Absolutely not. No oath under TNP law may apply retroactively. The oath of office becomes binding on an individual when they swear it and assume the position relating to that oath, just as it stops being binding when they cease to hold that position. The oath can neither criminalize misconduct, nor legitimize unofficial actions, from before it was sworn.

A government official cannot be found guilty of gross misconduct for violating the oath of office before they took it. And, by the same token, an election commissioner taking their oath after opening candidacy declarations cannot thereby give that thread legal standing.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Permanence of Rejected Applications for the Regional Assembly:
As for the specific case of Treize_Dreizehn, the Court rules that his original admission to the Regional Assembly was not lawful. However, over the past four months he has acted in nothing but good faith. He has been a productive member of the RA, has voted on legislation and run in elections, and has served admirably in the Attorney General's office. Should the Court rule that these associated posts, votes, and actions are ex post facto unlawful, legally speaking, it would simultaneously be required to order a recount of all such legislative, non-legislative, and electoral votes, as well as a review of all actions taken as a government official and, potentially, a reopening of voting for any election in which Treize was a candidate. Such alteration of accepted fact is neither practical, possible, nor permitted by the Bill of Rights.

Therefore, Treize_Dreizehn's membership in the Regional Assembly is not revoked. He may continue to serve as a full-fledged member, entitled to all of the rights and privileges afforded to any other member.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Alterations to the Citizenship Oath:
The fundamental question before the Court is whether the oath of citizenship must be taken exactly as it appears in the Legal Code, or if alterations to its content to allow for personal identification can be permitted.

The section of the Legal Code which deals with citizenship applications defines the specific oath that must be sworn, and does not make any allowance for oaths that are textually distinct but functionally identical. Additionally, in examining the rights granted to all nations by the Bill of Rights, the Court has found nothing which requires an alternate oath to be permitted or accepted by the Speaker.

Therefore, the Court finds that alterations to the oath cannot be permitted, and that they render the oath, and thus the application for citizenship, invalid. The Attorney General's brief lays out a succinct argument for why this must be the case. Permitting applicants to change the text would force the Speaker to adjudicate the fine line of what is and is not a valid identifier, or what qualifies as a change to the content of the oath that alters its meaning. It is also quite likely that, when the holder of the office changes, so too will the Speaker's interpretation of what is permitted. There is too great a risk that permitting the Speaker to make a judgement call on the content of the citizenship oath will result in unequal treatment under the law.

[...]

However, the Court does have the power to alleviate some of the iniquity. In accordance with precedent set on the question of continued citizenship of Treize Dreizehn, we find that the citizenship previously granted to individuals who altered the text of their oaths is valid. They may continue to be counted as citizens, entitled to all of the rights and privileges afforded to any other citizen under our laws until and unless they lose citizenship by normal legal processes.

Additionally, we find it necessary to address the validity of the oaths these citizens took. Although the Court has found that alterations to the oath render it invalid, we also believe it would do irreparable harm to rule that altered oaths which have heretofore been taken and accepted are invalid and not legally binding. Such a move would introduce iniquity between citizens who swore the correct oath, and who could therefore be prosecuted for Gross Misconduct, and those who did not and therefore could not.

Based on the evidence the court has reviewed as part of this request, the majority of incorrect oaths appear to be unintentional - likely copied, or based on, an earlier legal version of the current oath. Therefore, we extend the principle of good faith that was established in the ruling on Treize Dreizehn's citizenship. Those citizens who took an incorrect oath are granted the presumption of having acted in good faith, of having intended to swear the correct oath but making a simple mistake. As such, they will also be presumed to be bound by the correct oath as it stood in the law at the time of the citizen's admittance.
The Court opines the following:

Standing

This is a request for review brought by Siwale concerning the oath sworn by McMasterdonia following the September 2019 general election. The question posed is whether that oath was valid, given McMasterdonia stated the position he was taking up as being “WA Delegate”.

Siwale suggests that he has standing on the basis that he is an affected party, as his article 9 right to a government organised on the principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency may have been infringed, given that the swearing of an invalid oath would bring into question the legitimacy of the Delegate during a time when he was resident in the region. The Court does not consider this is sufficient to meet the requirements of standing as an affected party.

The Court has previously held that a petitioner must show that there is a clear connection between the act, policy or law claimed to be illegal or unconstitutional and how they are personally affected. The infringement claimed by the petitioner in this request is not personal in any real sense, but could be claimed by a vast group of residents.

The petitioner argues, alternatively, that they should be allowed to bring the request on the basis that there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it. The Court does allow the request on that basis.

Though the Court is alive to the fact that this request relates to relatively technical point and notes that undue delay in bringing requests will lead to them being subject to scepticism as to whether there is truly a compelling regional interest, the Court is satisfied in this instance. That is because this case, fundamentally, raises questions as to the validity of the actions of the Delegate, the most powerful single official in our constitutional order, and, through them, those they have appointed, for the whole of a term and beyond. Though the petitioner states they do not wish for retrospective impact of the Court’s decision, and so presumably would not wish for the Court to invalidate any action taken, their wish cannot bind the Court, which is, instead, compelled by its constitutional duty to determine the legality of the specific action of swearing the oath, with any consequences that may bring. The result of that is that the gravity of this request, though technical and substantially delayed, is such as to engage the Court’s jurisdiction.

What the oath requires

The first question the Court must ask to determine whether the oath was sworn as required by law is to ask what the law requires.

The Court has held in relation to the citizenship oath that, where the law required that oath to be sworn, it had to be sworn as stated in the law. There was no provision for variation in the law and allowing variation would have placed an onerous burden on the Speaker to determine validity of oaths, given the potential consequences flowing from allowing oaths that subsequently transpired to be invalid.

Here, there is no question as to deviation from the ordinary wording of the oath, rather, the question is as to deviation in swearing a part of the oath that reads “[government position]”. However, similarly, there is no provision for variation in the position and it would be wrong to require citizens subject to government action or other government officials to have to determine whether deviation in the position stated is within a permissible degree. The consequence of this is that where the name of a position is clear in law, be that in the Constitution or the Legal Code, that name must be sworn without deviation and where a position has multiple names in law, any of them will suffice, provided there is no deviation from them. By contrast, for a position that has no set name in law and is generic in its nature, such as that of executive officers appointed by the Delegate whose role and powers the Delegate may determine, the oath, in relation to any given appointee, must swear the name of the position as specified in their appointment, which creates the position they occupy.

Delegate or WA Delegate

The second question, then, is what is the correct name for the position of Delegate.

The Constitution recognises a distinction between the office of Delegate in our constitutional system and the position of Delegate in-game. It is that distinction that is reflected by the provisions of the Legal Code, which draw a distinction between the “serving Delegate” and the “WA Delegate”, the former being stated as holding the office of Delegate provided for by the Constitution.

The Bill of Rights does refer to the “WA Delegate” in article 2 (and formerly did so in article 8). However, the Constitutional language is, otherwise, consistent throughout. In article 2, which defines the office of Delegate, and in article 6, which includes general provisions concerning government officials, the Constitution refers only to the “Delegate” as being a government official and, as noted, draws a line between this and the in-game position.

The difference between the language of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution seems to stem from the former having retained its language from prior to the adoption of the latter and not from any difference in terms of whom it applies to. The reference to "WA Delegate" in the Bill of Rights must therefore carry the same meaning as "Delegate" in the Constitution. However, the term "WA Delegate" is also used as a term with a specific, defined meaning in the Legal Code. In that context, it bears a different meaning and simply means the nation that is World Assembly Delegate in-game.

It is not permissible for the oath to be sworn in a manner that allows this inconsistent dual meaning, particularly set against the otherwise consistent use of "Delegate" in the Constitution. The Court therefore concludes that "Delegate" must be used in swearing the oath required and that the challenged oath was, therefore, improperly sworn.

Validity of the Oath

This necessarily raises questions as to the validity of the oath and of the actions that have been taken during the period covered by it.

The Court has previously held that the effect of failure to take the oath results in the actions taken without the oath being sworn at all invalid. Here, the issue is slightly different, in that the oath was taken with what could be characterised as a minor and, the Court anticipates, inadvertent impropriety. There appears to be no reason to think that McMasterdonia did not intend to be bound by the oath they swore and, in any event, they exercised such considerable government authority for such a long time in reliance on it that the Court must conclude they intended to be bound. Further, others, including the Regional Assembly, parties before this Court, and foreign powers, have relied on the validity of the oath and the authority exercised relying on it.

It would be destructive in the extreme for this Court to take the view, retrospectively, that all of those exercises of authority were invalid. To borrow the words of the Court from on the Permanence of Rejected Applications for the Regional Assembly, such alteration of accepted fact is neither practical, possible, nor permitted by the Bill of Rights.

It is within the power of the Court to remedy this invalidity, as it did in that case and more recently in relation to citizenship oaths. The Court must draw from McMasterdonia’s reliance on the oath the presumption that he took it in good faith and intended to be bound by it, the consequence of that is that he is bound by it. Further, the presumption that the oath was accepted as valid in good faith extends also to other officials and bodies and, indeed, the region at large, with the effect that the authority exercised relying on the oath are valid.

Conclusion

The Court therefore finds that the oath sworn by McMasterdonia was improperly sworn. To be valid, the oath of the Delegate must be sworn stating the government position as being “Delegate”. However, the Court also concludes that the improper oath was sworn in good faith by McMasterdonia and was relied on in good faith by the region, with the consequence that it was binding and that the authority exercised the basis of it was valid.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9191851/
Ruling delivered on April 7, 2020.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Speaker's Power to Schedule Votes
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Wonderess and Lady Raven Wing

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Praetor.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed by Mall, St George, Racoda, and Praetor.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 2. The Regional Assembly:
8. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
[...]
10. The Speaker may appoint deputies to assist them in the execution of any of their powers and duties. Appointment of deputies may be regulated by law and the rules of the Regional Assembly.
Article 4. The Court:
2. Reviews of laws or government policies and actions must be made by request of an affected party unless there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.
[...]
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Rules of the Regional Assembly of The North Pacific:
Section 1. Proposals:
2. The Speaker may schedule a vote on any proposal being discussed by the Regional Assembly as permitted by law.

3. If, before a vote on a proposal begins, at least three citizens object to the decision of the Speaker to schedule it, the Speaker must cancel the scheduled vote.
Section 3. Deputy Speaker and Vacancies:
2. Unless otherwise specified by law, the Speaker may delegate any of their powers and duties to the Deputy Speaker. Delegation under this section does not relieve the Speaker of any of their powers and duties. Any provisions of law related to the powers and duties of the Speaker, when exercised by the Deputy Speaker under the provisions of this clause, shall apply to the Deputy Speaker.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Standing Procedures of the Speaker:
Non-legislative Proposal Procedure:
1. Any citizen may introduce a proposal to exercise a power of the Assembly besides enacting, amending, or repealing laws, or ratifying or revoking the ratification of treaties by creating a thread in the Regional Assembly forum or Private Halls subforum.
2. Any citizen may call for a vote on the proposal by posting "motion to vote", or a functional equivalent in the thread. Any other citizen may second such a motion.
3. Once the proposal has been moved and seconded, the Speaker will schedule a vote.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Standing and the Definition of Affected Party:
The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.

The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Speaker's Powers to Restrict the Format of Votes:
The Speaker by making these policies was within their powers as laid out by the Constitution and not in violation of the Bill of Rights. The Court looked extensively at the Section 10 of the Bill of Rights and determined that the rules that were adopted still allowed the protection of each nations right to vote. We are aware the Speaker discounted votes that were not in line with the adopted polices but again the voters that lodged an invalid vote were still given the right to vote in the matter. It is our belief that once these rules were adopted they were enforced evenly and fairly.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Speaker's Power to End Debate:
The Constitution, Legal Code, and RA Rules are all completely devoid of any additional reference to the Speaker's discretionary powers. Nor are there any rules outlining how the Regional Assembly's business is to be conducted, which have bearing on this matter. As such, the Constitution's grant of discretion to the Speaker in administering the Regional Assembly is the only binding law on this issue.

The question is raised, however, as to whether or not the actions taken using this discretionary power violate the Bill of Rights. This Court believes that they do not. Nations do possess a right to freedom of speech, and the government may not impede that right, but this restriction must be balanced against the demands of a civilized society, which encourages equal treatment of all its citizens. Regardless of the personal feelings of any Regional Assembly member, the proposal in question was a targeted attempt to discriminate against a member of the region. In fact, the proposal would have violated several elements of the Bill of Rights and Legal Code. Furthermore, the target of this proposal had repeatedly asked for the harassment he felt he was experiencing to cease. Under these circumstances, the Speaker's actions are not a violation of the Bill of Rights for one simple reason.

Bill of Rights:
. . . The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

The Speaker's actions were permitted under his discretion, and using his judgment he acted in the best interests of the region. If any Nation feels that the actions of a government official are in violation of these laws, the proper recourse is a recall proceeding, not a Court proceeding. Particularly not in circumstances such as these.

With that decided, the Court would take this opportunity to comment more broadly on the powers of the Speaker. Under the aforementioned Constitutional clause, the Speaker is granted broad discretion, where no rules exist, to administer the Regional Assembly as he or she sees fit. Under the Bill of Rights segment also mentioned previously, the Court believes that all government officials are obligated by law to act in good faith in discharging their duties. The Court believes that the Speaker does possess the right to unilaterally table proposals, if their continued debate is not reasonably in the best interests of the region. The Constitution grants this discretion, and the Bill of Rights in effect obligates the Speaker to exercise said discretion if he or she feels it is appropriate. If the Nations of The North Pacific disagree, the procedure for Recall is quite clear, and as has been demonstrated over the past few months, is quite accessible. Legal review of the Speaker's discretionary decisions is not, generally speaking, necessary.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Use of Speaker's Power to End Debate:
The Constitution establishes that the Regional Assembly has the authority to create the rules for its governance, and that it is the duty of the Speaker to administer those rules. Where there is vagueness as to procedure, or when situations arise which are not covered by those rules, or by superseding ones within the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights, the Speaker is empowered to act as they see fit within the best interests of the region. Previous Courts have interpreted this power broadly, upholding the Speaker's broad authority to maintain an appropriate atmosphere, promote a productive use of the Regional Assembly, and block proposals and votes which they deem harmful. While the relevant law has changed since the previous decision, prompting us to take this case, upon investigation the underlying principles have not.

We uphold the previous rulings in full, and reiterate that disagreements over best interests can be solved via recall motions. The Court is not the appropriate body to resolve such disputes.

As in the review of a Speaker's decision to end debate, we find the Speaker's power broad, but not unlimited. While the Speaker may refuse to tolerate something harmful, it is not a legitimate use of their power to capriciously stifle any and all debate. Two things therefore matter in this instance: the content of the proposal in question, and the severity of the Speaker's crackdown.
[...]
As established through testimony, current RA procedure is divided into two parts, and the two parts hold different legal weight. That portion of it which is contained within the Rules of the Regional Assembly was established by a majority vote as allowed for under Article 7, Clause 11 of the Constitution, and the Speaker is obligated to apply it as written. However, that which is contained within the Speaker's Standing Policies is entirely discretionary, and the Speaker has the power to alter its application when such is deemed necessary.

Formal debate, the rules surrounding it, and the decision to move a proposal through that stage and into a vote, fall entirely within the Speaker's discretionary procedures. They would be equally as free to put bills to vote based on the flip of a coin or a well-written original sonnet asking them to do so. While there is a written procedure, it is provided as a courtesy to RA members so they know what to expect most of the time - it is not intended or presented as a promise. The Speaker is free to deviate from their written procedures as they wish.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Speaker's Power to Extend Voting Periods:
The Speaker has submitted that there exists a discretionary power under the Constitution to extend the duration of a vote and that the rules do not exclude the existence of such a power. The Court, in considering this proposition, is cognisant of its prior rulings on the nature of the Speaker's discretionary power: that it is a broad one; and that it is not limited strictly to occasions where no rules cover a matter, but extends to addressing vagueness in adopted rules. However, the Court does not agree that the rules permit the existence of a power of the kind the Speaker contends.
[...]
Where the rules cover a matter it is not necessary for them to expressly exclude the Speaker's discretion, for the discretion exists only where the rules are absent or sufficiently vague as to leave room for discretionary action. This Section is comprehensive and it does not contain a vagueness within which the Speaker's actions can be said to have fit, thus, its exclusion of a discretion to alter voting periods outside of its terms is total.

The Court opines the following:

Standing

This request for review concerns a decision by a Deputy Speaker to commence a vote on the appointment of a prosecutor for the criminal trial The North Pacific v Pigeonstan. The vote was either commenced without being scheduled or was scheduled to start with no time between the scheduling and the commencement. There is, for the purposes of this decision, little real difference between those possibilities.

The Petitioner contends that this decision infringed on their rights under the Bill of Rights, particularly Article 2, the right to petition for the redress of grievances, and Article 9, the right to an opportunity to be heard. That is because action of the Deputy Speaker effectively prevented objections under Section 1, rule 3 of the Rules of the Regional Assembly being made to a decision to schedule a vote on the proposal.

The Court accepts that the Petitioner was personally affected by the decision and that the Petitioner would, were the decision unlawful, have a reasonable perception that their rights were infringed, particularly in relation to the loss of opportunity protected by Article 9. What is protected by that Article is the opportunity to object, that opportunity has been curtailed by the action of the Deputy Speaker. The Court is therefore satisfied that the Petitioner does have standing to request this review.

The Law on the Speaker

The particular action at issue here was taken by a Deputy Speaker, but that does not have any bearing on the principles to be applied. The Constitution and the Rules of the Regional Assembly allow the Deputy Speaker to be delegated any power or responsibility of the Speaker, with the laws that apply to the Speaker applying in a like manner to their Deputies.

The Speaker is empowered by the Constitution to administer the Rules and, where no rules exist, they may use their discretion. The Court, over several decisions, has recognised that this discretion is broad and extends to resolving ambiguity in rules that have been made.

When some issue is within the bounds of the Speaker’s discretion, it is for the Speaker to decide how to exercise their discretion in the best interests of the region in pursuit of aims such as maintaining an appropriate atmosphere and promoting productive use of the Regional Assembly. In its decision on the Speaker’s Power to End Debate the Court made clear that this was so despite the fact that the exercise of the power contemplated in that case, terminating debate on a proposal unilaterally, would impinge on free speech. The rights of citizens in the Regional Assembly must be balanced against the demands of a civilized society, such as the rights of other citizens or the regional interest in the orderly conduct of the Regional Assembly's business. It is for the Speaker to strike that balance and only in truly exceptional circumstances, such as the capricious stifling of any and all debate as envisaged in the Court's decision on the Use of the Speaker’s Power to End Debate, could the Court interfere.

The Speaker has established policies to govern their decision making, the Standing Procedures. The nature of the Standing Procedures was also considered in the Court's decision on the Use of the Speaker’s Power to End Debate. Their purpose is to provide citizens a guide as to the process that will be followed most of the time, but that which is contained within the Standing Policies is discretionary and may be altered when necessary. That this must be so is supported by that decision and others holding that the Speaker is obligated to use their discretion in the best interests of the region, it would be inconsistent with that obligation if the Speaker could adopt a binding policy limiting their own discretion and preventing deviation which would better serve the region.

Scheduling a Vote

The Petitioner contends that the vote was not scheduled in advance, the Speaker, in response, has submitted that it was scheduled but was scheduled to start immediately. The Court will address both scenarios, beginning with that of the Petitioner.

The Rules on proposals provide that the Speaker may schedule a vote on a proposal being discussed by the Regional Assembly as permitted by law. They also provide that, before a vote begins, citizens can object to the Speaker’s decision, with the Speaker being obligated to cancel a vote that three citizens object to.

The question raised by the Petitioner about these provisions is whether they require votes to be scheduled or whether votes can be started without having been scheduled in advance. The Court held in its decision on the Speaker’s Power to Extend Voting Periods that the Rules need not expressly exclude the Speaker's discretion, where they are comprehensive and lack ambiguity that is sufficient. However, in contrast to the provisions on setting the length of votes at issue in that case, which mandated that the length be set at the beginning of each vote, the provisions the Court is now concerned with are permissive of scheduling; they do not prohibit votes being started without notice, nor do they compel all votes to be scheduled. The Rules could easily specify that the only votes that may be opened are those that have been scheduled, they do not. While the Standing Procedures state that a vote will be scheduled when a motion and a second are made, it is, as the Court held in its decision on the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate, open to the Speaker to depart from them and to do so at their discretion.

It appears to the Court that the Rules, in this regard, are ambiguous. They are permissive rather than prescriptive and leave space for the possibility of votes without notice. That being so, the question of how that ambiguity is resolved is a matter for the Speaker and that they have a broad discretion in how to resolve it.

Time to Object

While the above is sufficient to dispose of the request for review on the basis advanced by the Petitioner, the Court will also consider the point made by the Speaker that the vote was scheduled but with no delay between the decision to schedule and the vote.

The Speaker contends that there is no minimum period specified in the Rules for objections to decisions to schedule, nor is one specified in their Standing Procedures for non-legislative matters, such as the motion this request relates to. That being so, the Speaker says, it is within their discretion to decide to schedule a vote to start immediately and to start that vote. The Court agrees.

Even if the Court considered that there was a requirement for votes to be scheduled in advance, it is evident that there is ambiguity as to how far in advance that must be. No minimum period is prescribed in the Regional Assembly’s Rules, neither is a minimum period set out in the Standing Procedures and, as noted above, even if there were it would be open to the Speaker to depart from it. There is no robust legal principle the Court could use to decide one. Any standard prescribed by the Court would amount either to legislation or would be so vague as to be unmanageable.

It is not the place of this Court to decide how many days, hours or minutes would be needed for objections and, effectively, to make a new rule for the Regional Assembly. It is for the Regional Assembly to do that. Until the Regional Assembly does so, that question, again, is left to the Speaker’s discretion.

Conclusion

The Rules in this area are ambiguous and it is clear from the Constitution and the Court’s previous decisions that it is for the Speaker to decide how to resolve that ambiguity. Whether the vote was started without having been scheduled or whether it was scheduled to start immediately is an arid point. There is no substantive difference between them. Both would have the same effect on the Petitioner, both would be within the Speaker’s discretion and both would be permissible for that reason.

As the Court has endeavoured to make clear on previous occasions, citizens aggrieved by the Speaker’s decisions have means to raise their concerns: they can complain to the Speaker; they can vote against proposals that they think have been put up to soon; they can vote for some other candidate at the next election; ultimately, they can seek to recall the Speaker. If the Regional Assembly thinks its Rules afford the Speaker too much latitude, it can change them. Control of the Speaker's discretion is, barring a truly exceptional scenario, a political and not a legal matter.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9192471/
Ruling delivered on June 23, 2020.





Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Constitutionality of Vague Laws and Gross Misconduct
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Wonderess and Lady Raven Wing
The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by saintpeter.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed by Dreadton and saintpeter.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 4. The Court:
2. Reviews of laws or government policies and actions must be made by request of an affected party unless there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:
7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer. In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence. A Nation may be represented by any counsel of the Nation's choosing. No Nation convicted of a crime shall be subject to a punishment disproportionate to that crime.

[...]

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 1.9: Gross Misconduct:
25. "Gross Misconduct" is defined as the violation of an individual's legally mandated sworn oath, either willfully or through negligence.
Section 6.1: Citizenship Applications:
2. Any resident may apply for citizenship using their regional forum account, by providing the name of their nation in The North Pacific, and swearing an oath as follows:
I pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Sentence Issued by the Court in The North Pacific v Whole India:
The Court has determined that Deropia does have the standing to bring this request for review on behalf of Whole India. Whole India, as the defendant whose sentence is being challenged, has obvious and unassailable standing to raise concerns about impropriety in their own sentencing. Criminal defendants have the right to be represented by counsel during their trial, and that right to representation must necessarily extend to other issues raised with the court pertaining to that trial, even if they do not occur during the official trial process.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on WA Nation Disclosure Requirements:
On the third point, the Court must examine the law in its entirety to determine whether or not WA Membership is a requirement, or a choice. At no point, under the Constitution or any element of the Legal Code, is World Assembly membership a requirement to participate. Membership alone is a choice. Choices come with consequences; some choices ease burdens, others impose them. The protections in the Bill of Rights are intended to protect all Nations of the North Pacific from unfair burdens imposed by their government. WA membership, however, is a choice, not an obligation.

Participation in activities which require WA membership is a choice, not an obligation. As such, any duty to report WA nations is, in effect, willingly shouldered by those players who choose to participate in such activities. The reporting requirements are imposed fairly, on all nations. That some nations choose to join the WA, thereby triggering this reporting requirement, is not a choice made for those players; it is a choice made by them. As such, the burden of reporting is willingly shouldered, and is not an unfair burden.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional Assembly:
The Court had determined that the matter is twofold. If the violation occurs after the time in which the nation is no longer a member of the Regional Assembly then they are not violating their oath as they are not bound to that oath at the current moment. Whereas if the violation occurs during the time in which the nation was a member of the Regional Assembly and was bound by that oath they may be tried for an Oath Violation.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Time at which Oaths Become Binding:
It is the opinion of the Court that the Regional Assembly membership oath found in Section 6 Clause 2 of the Codified Law of the North Pacific becomes legally binding on RA applicants if and when they become members of the Regional Assembly, and remains binding only so long as they remain members.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Standard of Proof and Intent:
To start, the Court opines that "willful deception" is synonymous with "intentional deception", and that the difference in word choice does not require a different standard of proof between the two crimes.

As for the standard itself, there are two types of intention in the commission of fraud. The first is demonstrable intent, wherein the defendant can be shown, by their own statements or actions relating to the alleged crime, to have engaged in deception as defined previously in this ruling.

The second is reckless intent, wherein intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on RA Membership Requirements for Candidates:
It is worth also examining the intent of the regional legislative body, the Regional Assembly, while drafting the constitutional clause in question. In the thread in the Regional Assembly discussing the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012, when asked about the meaning of the definite article in Article 6, Clause 1, then Speaker Gulliver stated: "The "the" there is deliberate. It means specifically the 15 days before the election in question, not any random 15 days, so it's not possible to argue that "I was in the assembly 15 days already, even if it wasn't continuous, therefore I'm good to run"."

It should be noted that taking the intention of the Regional Assembly into consideration when interpreting a statute is appropriate only when said statute is ambiguous or absurd. Neither of these is true in this case, as Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution unambiguously indicates that the requirement for candidates is that they have been in the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. However, the legislature's intent here is in agreement with the actual meaning of the clause, and corroborates the interpretation adopted by the Court.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of Endorsements:
Question Three - Is it a crime for a nation that is not the Vice Delegate to have the second most endorsements in the region?

It's not a crime merely to have more endorsements than the Vice Delegate: crimes are strictly defined in the criminal code (as per clause 1), and that's not one of them. In general, Reckless Endorsement Gathering is not a crime, but is a cause for ejection.

However, a Citizen could conceivably commit Gross Misconduct by violating their oath as citizen in egregious cases of Reckless Endorsement Gathering:

I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.

However, where Reckless Endorsement Gathering is cause for ejection but not a crime, Gross Misconduct is a crime but is not cause for ejection:

8. Gross Misconduct will be punished by removal from office and the suspension of voting rights for whatever finite duration the Court sees fit.

[...]

Question One - Did Vice Delegate Bootsie, Security Counselor Plembobria, or Delegate Lord Ravenclaw break the law when the nation of Plembobria passed Bootsie's nation of Guslantis' endorsement count, or when Cheongji passed Guslantis' endorsement count?

The Court cannot give a criminal verdict in a request for review, nor rule on an indictment sight unseen.

However, the answers to questions two through five suggest that Lord Ravenclaw did not break the law by declining to eject either Cheongji or Plembobria, that as no claim has been made that Guslantis failed to have at least 75% of the serving Delegate's endorsement count there is no basis presented to consider Bootsie to have committed Gross Misconduct, and that as no case has been made that Plembobria acted irresponsibly there is no basis presented to consider Plembobria to have committed the same.
The Court opines the following:

Standing

This is a request for review concerning the crime of Gross Misconduct. It was filed by counsel on behalf of their then client Pigeonstan, Defendant in the trial The North Pacific v Pigeonstan. While the Petitioner has ceased to act for Pigeonstan, the Court does not consider this makes a material difference to standing. A request filed by counsel is not based on their own standing, but their client's standing, which ordinarily would survive a change of counsel.

The request challenges Gross Misconduct committed by violation of the citizenship oath's pledge of "responsible action as a member of [The North Pacific's] society". It is contended that this pledge is so vague that it deprives Pigeonstan of due process of law, including prior notice, and of equal and fair treatment, contrary to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. Pigeonstan is said to be affected because they face the jeopardy and stigma of a criminal trial.

The Court agrees that a criminal charge is sufficient for Pigeonstan to be an affected party in relation to the crimes they are charged with and there is a clear connection between those laws and an effect on their rights. The Court, therefore, accepts this request, but does so cautiously. Requests for review not the appropriate venue to decide criminal matters that call for decisions on matters of fact or for the exercise of judgement that depends on factual issues; the safeguards of trials are not present in requests for review and such decisions in the absence of those safeguards could risk a fair trial. However, this request poses an abstract question that is not dependent upon the underlying facts of Pigeonstan's case, so does not pose such a risk.

Vagueness in Principle

The first question raised by the review is whether the Bill of Rights restricts crimes from being too vaguely defined.

Article 9 of the Bill of Rights guarantees due process of law, specifically including a right to prior notice, and fair and equal protection of the provisions of the Constitution.

The Court accepts that those protections do render overly vague criminal laws unconstitutional. If a law is so vague a nation cannot tell whether their conduct is criminal, that nation is deprived of prior notice of criminal liability and, thereby, of the opportunity to ensure their conduct is lawful. Moreover, it impacts on their right to due process of law more broadly: a crime with an amorphous boundary infringes on a nation’s ability to know what it is accused of and to mount an effective defence.

Equal and fair protection of the provisions of the Constitution can also be infringed by such laws. An unclear law not only impacts on a nation’s ability to assess its conduct, but also on the Court’s ability to do so. An overly vague criminal law may lead to different defendants receiving different verdicts for the same conduct, due only to differing subjective understandings of the Courts that try them. That would be unfair and unequal.

Assessing Vagueness

This conclusion leads to a second question: how to decide whether a law is too vague.

There will always be some imprecision in laws. There are limits to the precision of language and laws, in particular, aim to apply generally. It is inevitable that there will be hard cases at the margins. Therefore, it is not enough to merely say a law is vague in some respect or in some scenarios.

Further, it is a fact, and many would say a strength, of our constitutional structure that it incorporates a citizen legislature. That is an important factor for the Court to consider. Our laws, unlike those in many other jurisdictions, are not drawn up with precision by lawyers and trained draughtsmen but are hammered out by the citizens themselves. A degree of imprecision may be expected to follow and the constitutional choice of a citizen legislature should not be sanctioned by the adoption of an overly exacting standard in deciding on vagueness.

The Court also considers there may be other factors relevant to assessing particular laws. If a nation can avoid the effect of a law entirely, it may be that they have willingly shouldered its burdens as the Court held in its decision on WA Nation Disclosure Requirements, including, potentially, areas of vagueness in the law. If a law regulates officials, some vagueness may be the price those officials pay to exercise greater power over other nations. These factors are only examples and others may also be relevant.

Set against these points are the rights of nations under article 9. Those rights are just as much part of our constitutional structure and must be protected. The Court considers that, in general, when assessing whether a law is too vague the question is whether the law leaves a reasonable nation unable to say with reasonable certainty whether would risk criminal liability in relation to a substantial range of conduct. As noted, particular circumstances may justify some deviation.

Gross Misconduct

It is useful to set out Gross Misconduct’s elements, to understand the context in which "responsible action" is to be interpreted.

The conduct caught by the crime is that which violates a nation's legally mandated sworn oath. This covers, at least, the three oaths now in the Legal Code: the oath of office; the citizenship oath; and the NPA oath. The citizenship oath, as held in the Court’s decisions on Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional Assembly and on the Time at which Oaths Become Binding, applies only to a nation's conduct while a citizen. A nation cannot be guilty of gross misconduct in relation to conduct before becoming, or after ceasing to be, a citizen.

Further, the conduct is punishable only where it is willful or negligent. The Court, in its decision on the Standard of Proof and Intent, addressed the meaning of willful in the context of Fraud and held it to be equivalent to intentional, which was also considered in that decision.

Responsible Action

It is in that context that the Court must determine what "responsible action" means and whether its meaning is unconstitutionally vague.

The Court has been referred to the discussions of the Regional Assembly when amending the oath. As the Court's decision on RA Membership Requirements for Candidates notes, it can sometimes be appropriate and useful to refer to the Assembly's discussions where a law is ambiguous or absurd. The Court considers that there is ambiguity in "responsible action" sufficient to look at those discussions. However, the statements made in the course of debating the phrase give only limited assistance. While one member put forward a potential meaning, they were not the proposer of the Bill and there were other members who considered the phrase ambiguous and were concerned about a potentially subjective reading of it.

The request, effectively, proceeds on the basis that "responsible action" could be reduced to a subjective question of whether a given nation considers conduct responsible or irresponsible. Examples of what could be covered on this understanding are set out: a nation standing in an election it will lose; a nation telegramming another a mild swear; a nation filing an unmeritorious request for review. The Court agrees that this is a possible meaning of the phrase and that, if it were its proper meaning for the purposes of Gross Misconduct, it would be unconstitutionally vague. Such a subjective meaning would deprive a reasonable nation of any meaningful ability to say whether its conduct is criminal.

However, the Court is of the view that where a law can bear different meanings and some of them would be unconstitutional, the Court should generally look to a meaning compliant with the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Further, the Court finds it unlikely that the Regional Assembly could have meant to pass a law that was so broad as to be unconstitutional, particularly where a number of members expressed concern about criminalising conduct on a subjective basis. These points have their limits: the Court should not adopt a meaning that does not fit plausibly with the particular wording of the law or that would be contrary to its surrounding context.

The Court notes that, in its decision on Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of Endorsements, some consideration was given to Gross Misconduct committed by citizens. The Court stated that "a citizen could conceivably commit Gross Misconduct by violating their oath as citizen in egregious cases of Reckless Endorsement Gathering". This lends credence to a view that Gross Misconduct is not committed merely by some trivial irresponsibility, but that something greater is required. The very name of the crime supports this also, it is Gross Misconduct.

The Court concludes it ought to adopt a narrow interpretation of "responsible action". This would comply with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, it would avoid finding unconstitutional an otherwise viable law, and it would not be contrary to the law's wording or its context. A violation of the pledge of "responsible action", for the purposes of Gross Misconduct, is conduct which a reasonable citizen would find obviously and seriously irresponsible. Further, where the conduct could not be criminalised due to being protected by the Bill of Rights, even if it could fall within the above meaning, it is not a violation of the pledge.

The Court finds that, with this meaning, "responsible action" is not so vague as to be unconstitutional. A reasonable nation would be able to say for most conduct whether it is covered by the crime of Gross Misconduct and, while there may remain areas of some doubt, the Court considers that cases falling at the margins would not be enough to render the meaning unconstitutional. In so finding the Court also has regard to other factors relevant to the issue, particularly: that the crime is not satisfied by conduct alone but the conduct must be willful or negligent; that a nation can guarantee that it is outside of the scope of Gross Misconduct by not seeking or by renouncing citizenship; and that citizens, though not exercising power on the same level as officials, do wield power over their fellow nations, by making laws for them and choosing the officials that administer them, and so have (and in the oath accept) a greater need to act with responsibility.

Conclusion

The Court finds that criminal laws can be so vague that they are unconstitutional, as they can infringe on a nation's rights under Article 9. Whether a criminal law is too vague is generally to be answered by considering whether it leaves reasonable nation unable to say with reasonable certainty whether it would risk criminal liability in relation to a substantial range of conduct, but other factors may also be relevant to considering particular laws.

Gross Misconduct by violation of the pledge of "responsible action" cannot be satisfied only by conduct that could be subjectively thought irresponsible. Such an interpretation would be unconstitutional and the Court considers it improper to adopt it where there are other constitutional interpretations that are open to the Court. Instead, the Court concludes that the pledge is only violated by conduct that a reasonable citizen would find obviously and seriously irresponsible and that conduct protected by the Bill of Rights does not violate the pledge even where it could be characterised as irresponsible.

The Court finds that, applying that meaning and considering other factors relevant to Gross Misconduct, the crime of Gross Misconduct committed by violation of the pledge of "responsible action" is not unconstitutionally vague.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9192495/
Ruling delivered on July 9, 2020.



Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Power of the Speaker to Direct Deputy Speakers
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Oracle and Goyanes

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by saintpeter.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed by Dreadton, saintpeter, Lady Raven Wing, and Praetor.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 2. The Regional Assembly:
10. The Speaker may appoint deputies to assist them in the execution of any of their powers and duties. Appointment of deputies may be regulated by law and the rules of the Regional Assembly.
Article 4. The Court:
1. The Court will try all criminal cases and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies and actions.
2. Reviews of laws or government policies and actions must be made by request of an affected party unless there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

[...]

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 4.1: Oath of Office:
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
Section 1.9: Gross Misconduct:
25. "Gross Misconduct" is defined as the violation of an individual's legally mandated sworn oath, either willfully or through negligence.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of Rules of the Regional Assembly:
Section 3. Deputy Speaker and Vacancies:
2. Unless otherwise specified by law, the Speaker may delegate any of their powers and duties to the Deputy Speaker. Delegation under this section does not relieve the Speaker of any of their powers and duties. Any provisions of law related to the powers and duties of the Speaker, when exercised by the Deputy Speaker under the provisions of this clause, shall apply to the Deputy Speaker.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its ruling on Standing and the Definition of Affected Party:
The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.

The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its ruling on Court Review of RA Proposals:
Furthermore, a proposal before the RA cannot be considered a law or a government policy until it is enacted. The Court is a reactive body, and both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution Article 5, Clause 1 preclude the Court from ruling on something that hasn't actually happened yet, such as potential violation of rights that might be done if a proposal becomes a law.

This decision does not apply solely to requests to review proposals of the Regional Assembly. More broadly, the Court finds that justices are prohibited by the Constitution from accepting a request for review of anything that is not a law, government policy, or government action.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its ruling on the Speaker's Power to Schedule Votes:
The particular action at issue here was taken by a Deputy Speaker, but that does not have any bearing on the principles to be applied. The Constitution and the Rules of the Regional Assembly allow the Deputy Speaker to be delegated any power or responsibility of the Speaker, with the laws that apply to the Speaker applying in a like manner to their Deputies.

The Court opines the following:

Standing

This is a request for review by saintpeter and Lady Raven Wing. They are both Deputy Speakers. They have been directed by the Speaker not to take an action, namely not to process an application for citizenship by a resident, Wonderess.

They do not, in terms, contend that that direction is unlawful. Rather, the question their review seeks to answer can be put in this way: if that direction, or another, by the Speaker is unlawful, can they disobey it.

The Court is satisfied that the petitioners do have standing to bring this request for review. Both are personally affected by a government action or policy, namely the Speaker's direction that they do not accept an application for citizenship (whether the direction is better understood as an action or a policy does not make a difference for the purposes of this review). They do reasonably perceive their rights to be infringed, as the Speaker's direction exposes them to a risk of criminal liability if the direction is unlawful (though their liability would not turn solely on that issue), and that effect on their rights is clearly connected to the direction.

Jurisdiction

The Court was concerned, on considering the review, that the issue it was being asked to consider may be without the Court's jurisdiction. The Court in its decision on Court Review of RA Proposals held that the Court's review power is limited to reviewing extant laws, policies or actions. The Court is incapable of considering a review of a hypothetical future action.

The framing of this request for review, as asking whether it would be lawful for a Deputy Speaker to disobey a direction of the Speaker, appeared to the Court to risk straying into answering a hypothetical by asking whether a future action by a Deputy Speaker could be lawful. However, the Court considers that, more properly, this request can be understood as asking whether it is lawful for the Speaker to direct a Deputy Speaker not to take a specific action within a class of actions that a Deputy Speaker is empowered to take. That question is within the scope of the Court's authority to answer.

The Court does not need to answer, and is not asked by the request to answer, the question of whether the Speaker's underlying decision not to accept the application for citizenship made by Wonderess is lawful. Moreover, it is not apparent at this time that the petitioners would have standing to challenge that decision and answering that question could prejudice the Speaker's defence in criminal proceedings, which is of particular concern given a request for indictment has in fact been filed. The Court will, therefore, not answer that question.

The Role of the Deputy Speaker

The Constitution empowers the Speaker to appoint deputies to assist them in the execution of any of their powers and duties. The Constitution allows the role of Deputy Speaker to be regulated by both law and the Regional Assembly's rules.

No particular provision in relation to Deputy Speakers has been made by law, however, the Regional Assembly has exercised its power to regulate them through its Rules. The Rules effectively mirror the Constitution and allow the Speaker to delegate any power or duty to a Deputy Speaker; while the Rules cannot determine the meaning of the Constitution, which is superior law, the Court does find that the Rules correctly state the position under the Constitution, namely that Deputy Speakers exercise the delegated power of the Speaker. They further provide that such a delegation does not relieve the Speaker of their powers or duties and that, when acting under a delegation, the Deputy Speaker is subject to the same constraints as the Speaker.

The conclusion that flows from this is that the Speaker may determine the powers and duties of a Deputy Speaker. Neither the Constitution nor the Rules convey that the Speaker must delegate all of their powers and duties to a Deputy Speaker. Were the position that the Speaker may only delegate the whole of their powers and duties, the far more obvious framing of the provisions would simply be "A Deputy Speaker will have the same powers and duties as the Speaker". The ability to delegate implies the ability to choose which powers to delegate. That position is also consistent with other government officials: the Delegate may appoint executive officers to assist them and that is understood to allow the Delegate to constrain the powers of executive officers to certain tasks or areas.

Nature of Delegation

This raises a question as to the nature of the delegation. Does it have to be by reference to a general power or duty (for instance, the power to administer votes in the Regional Assembly) or can it be more specific (the power to administer a given vote)?

The Court notes, again, that the Constitution and the Rules do not convey that either general or specific delegations are impermissible. However, it does not follow from this that there is no limit: general limits on government power may impose one. It has been argued that a specific non-delegation by the Speaker, in relation to a power that the Speaker generally allows a Deputy Speaker to exercise, could infringe on the right to equal protection. If that were so, the argument goes, specific non-delegation may be unlawful.

However, the Court considers that similar arguments could properly be made for general non-delegations. If the Speaker did not delegate the power to remove citizenship and then failed to exercise that power or chose to do so unequally, that could infringe the right equal protection or breach the Speaker's duty to promptly remove citizens, but it does not follow that such failures by the Speaker mean that the Court can find a Deputy Speaker gains the Speaker's power.

In truth, where the Speaker by action or omission violates a nation's rights, it is the action or omission itself which violates them, not any lack of delegation. The nation does not have any right to have a Deputy Speaker to undertake or refrain from any action, except to the extent that the Deputy Speaker has been delegated the Speaker's power to do so. That this is so follows from the provision of the Rules that "Any provisions of law related to the powers and duties of the Speaker, when exercised by the Deputy Speaker under the provisions of this clause, shall apply to the Deputy Speaker". The answer for such a nation is to challenge the substantive action or omission by the Speaker, not the lack of delegation nor any inaction by the Deputy Speaker.

Moreover, there are circumstances where specific delegation or non-delegation is actively desirable. A Speaker may wish to train a Deputy Speaker and, therefore, allow them to process a particular citizenship application or administer a particular vote, there is no good reason to say that, in doing so, the Speaker thereby allows the Deputy Speaker to admit citizens in general or administer any vote. Conversely, a Speaker may consider that a Deputy Speaker could be perceived as having an interest in a particular proposal before the Regional Assembly and, therefore, remove from them the power to make decisions about it, it is unclear why that should be unlawful or should mean the Deputy Speaker cannot make decision on unrelated proposals.

The Court, therefore, concludes that the Speaker may make either general or specific delegations. Neither is without the scope of the wording of the Constitution or the Rules, nor can a failure to delegate itself infringe on a nation's rights so as to implicitly limit that scope, it is the substantive action or omission of the Speaker that does so. A non-delegation is therefore not unlawful merely because of how the Speaker carries out the substantive, non-delegated duties.

The Direction in this Case

In this case, the Speaker appears to have given to his Deputy Speakers the power and duty, in general, of admitting citizens. Naturally, when doing so Deputy Speakers are bound to obey the law, as the Speaker is. However, he has also directed them not to process the specific application of Wonderess and he has undertaken not do so himself.

The wording of the direction, that Deputy Speakers must "act in accordance with the statement [the Speaker] made saying the Office will not be processing Wonderess' application" is one which clearly varies the general delegation to exclude the processing of Wonderess' application. The Court is satisfied that, properly understood, that is the effect of the direction and that, as a result, the Deputy Speakers have no power or duty to process Wonderess' application.

The Court finds, therefore, that there is no need for the Deputy Speakers to disobey the Speaker's direction in order to comply with their legal obligations, because they are not, in relation to that application, exercising the powers and duties of the Speaker and so are not within the scope of rule 2, section 3 of the Rules and have no obligation to process the application. Indeed, if the Deputy Speakers sought to process the application, they would not be exercising the Speaker's power in doing so and their actions would be of no effect.

Conclusion

The Court finds that the nature of the power of Deputy Speakers is that it is delegated to them by the Speaker. The Constitution and the Rules of the Regional Assembly do not place express limits on the nature of that delegation. While an act or omission of the Speaker can, plainly, infringe on a nation's rights or violate their duty to obey the law, it does not follow that doing so has any effect on the Speaker's decision to delegate. There are also strong reasons to think that specific delegation or non-delegation would be permissible. The Court, therefore, finds that the Speaker may delegate their power either specifically or generally and, if they have delegated it generally, may remove specific matters from the scope of delegation.

The Court is satisfied that the Speaker has, in this case, not delegated to his Deputy Speakers the power to process Wonderess' application. That non-delegation is not unlawful. The Deputy Speakers do not, therefore, have any power or duty to process the application. The Court therefore concludes that it is not contrary to their legal obligations not to act, as their obligations as Deputy Speakers arise only where they have a power and duty to act.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9193210/
Ruling delivered on November 6, 2020.



Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations.
Opinion drafted by Lord Lore, joined by Vivanco and saintpeter

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by BMWSurfer.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here & here by 9003.
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by QuietDad.
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Gladio.
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Praetor.


The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:

32. When deployed in a foreign region, The North Pacific Army will act with respect towards the natives of the region, and refrain from excessive use of force including altering the regions chosen embassy list or password protecting the region. Before leaving, The North Pacific Army must provide natives with the means to restore the region to its original state. Exceptions to this clause must be publicly authorised by the Delegate when it is in the best interests of The North Pacific or its allies.
33. When deployed in a foreign region, The North Pacific Army will refrain from causing permanent harm to the region, including forcibly remove natives or refounding the region. Exceptions to this clause must be publicly authorised by the Delegate when it is in the best interests of The North Pacific or its allies, subject to the approval of the Regional Assembly by a majority vote or pursuant to a declaration of war.
The Court opines the following:

On Standing:

As a member and officer within the North Pacific Army (hereby NPA) the petitioner clearly has standing in regards to policies decisions and the actions of superiors within the NPA as those policies and actions if followed could place the petitioner in violation of The North Pacific's Legal Code.

On the nature of the information provided to the court:

While some information in the request was misstated in its characteristics, the court never-the-less finds the underlying question posted to be valid and even without the acceptance of additional actions of the government the clarification of the policy's legality still stands.

Conclusion:

The Court finds that an NPA Policy that would allow the NPA to support raids that engage in acts prohibited by Section 7.6 of the Legal Code would put the NPA in violation of The North Pacific's Legal Code.

Section 7 Subsection 6 Clauses 32 & 33 are designed specifically to limit the harmful impact that the NPA can have while deployed in foreign regions. As such the Court finds that not being in control of operation does not shield the NPA from the limitations placed on it by the Regional Assembly through The North Pacific's Legal Code.

While The North Pacific's Legal Code can not directly tell foreign military forces, organizations, & regions how to conduct operations, but the NPA clearly falls under the jurisdiction of The North Pacific's Legal Code and if the actions would be a violation of the Legal Code for a member of the NPA to commit then the NPA can not passively or actively support the violations that occur without itself being in violation of 7.6.32 and/or 7.6.33. Clauses 32 and 33 of Section 7.6 have clearly defined exemption requirements set by the Regional Assembly and those must be respected by the NPA.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9194101/
Ruling delivered on January 26, 2021.



Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Constitutionality of the Reject Fascism Act.
Opinion drafted by Lord Lore, joined by Oracle and Dreadton

The Court took into consideration the inquire filed [here] by El Fiji Grande

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed [here] by Pallaith
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed [here] by Praetor

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific.
Article 1. Bill of Rights
1. All nations are guaranteed the rights defined by the Bill of Rights.
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Article 2. The Regional Assembly
3. Requirements for citizenship will be determined by law.
4. The Regional Assembly may enact, amend or repeal laws by a majority vote.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific.
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.
Chapter 6: Regional Assembly Statutes
Section 6.1: Citizenship Applications

6. The Vice Delegate will automatically fail any applicant who identifies as fascist or has engaged in the promotion of fascism.
8. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly shall immediately debate the rejection and will hold a majority vote on whether to uphold it. The vote must begin two days after the rejection occurs.
9. The Regional Assembly may overturn a previous decision to uphold the rejection of an applicant by majority vote.

The Court took into consideration prior ruling by the Court [here], [here], [here], & [here].

The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The Court finds that while the stated standing provided of being a nation protected under the Bill of Rights is a weak claim to standing, none-the-less the compelling interest keeps the Request valid due to the implications of a violations of rights in the application process to attain citizenship.

On Compelling Interest
The Court finds that there is a valid argument to be made about the purported conflict between the Reject Fascism Bill and the Bill of Rights.

On the Conflict between the Reject Fascism Bill (R.F.B.) and Bill of Rights Clauses 2 and 9.
The Court finds that no conflict exists between these because the R.F.B. does not target the speech of those applying for citizenship. The R.F.B. specifically targets applicants for their affiliation with a group (Fascists) and upon the affirmative action of promoting said group. The bill that is now Chapter 6, Section 6.1, Clause 6 in no way bars or punishes the ability of people to speak about anything only requiring a rejection for those who "identifies as" (affiliation) or "engages in the promotion" (action) neither of which are protected by the Bill of Rights or the Constitution.

Clause 2 of the Bill of Rights contains 3 freedom of “speech”, “press” and “expression of religion” none of which protect the above, Clause 9 only refers to “fair and equal treatment and protection” in relation to the actions of members of the government, a law can not violate Clause 9 because it only guarantees that the government will apply the laws to any “nations of The North Pacific” in an “equal and fair” manner, it would only be a violation of Clause 9 to selectively enforce the laws as they are written.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9194925/
Ruling delivered on August 16, 2021.



Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
On the Regulation of the Regional Message Board.
Opinion drafted by Pallaith, joined by Kronos and Sil Dorsett

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by DiamondComodo
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here, and its addendum here by Dreadton

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific.
Article 1. Bill of Rights
1. All nations are guaranteed the rights defined by the Bill of Rights.
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Article 6. General Provisions
17. No law or government policy may contradict this constitution.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific.
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.
Chapter 7: Executive Government
Section 7.3: Onsite Authority

11. Violators of NationStates rules, or residents banned offsite by forum administration, may be subject to summary ejection or banning.
12. Residents banned on the basis of forum bans imposed by forum administration may not be banned for longer than the length of the ban imposed by forum administration.
13. Nations recruiting for other regions may be subject to summary ejection or banning.
14. Nations for which the Court has issued an indictment permitting it may be ejected or banned.
15. Nations that have been so sentenced by the Court will be ejected or banned.
16. The official performing an ejection or ban will promptly inform the region and Government.
17. The Serving Delegate may regulate the Regional Message Board as they see fit.
18. Such regulations may not prohibit speech which is in the context of TNP politics.
19. All actions of the WA Delegate, the Serving Delegate, or of their appointed Regional Officers related to this section will be subject to judicial review.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the NationStates Rules.
Flamebaiting: Posts that are made with the aim of angering someone indirectly. Not outright flame, but still liable to bring angry replies. Flame baiting is a far more subtle and covert action; it is an underhanded tactic that is designed to provoke a response from another player. It's in the same context of trolling but with flamebaiting it's just the one person. Also included under flamebaiting is malicious quote editing, changing the contents of a quoted post without showing the original text, either through color changes or strike-out.
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Trolling/Baiting/Gloating: Trolling is defined as posts that are made with the aim of angering people. (like 'ALL JEWS ARE [insert vile comment here]' for example). Someone disagreeing with you does not equate to trolling. Intent is incredibly important and will be judged by the moderators to the best of their abilities. Honest belief does not excuse trolling. Disagreements are expected and conducting yourself in a civil manner is ideal. Trollbaiting is the action of making posts that attract trolls. A prime example of trollbaiting would be gloating over the results of an election.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the TNP Community Guidelines.
The Community Rules apply to platforms belonging to The North Pacific. This includes the forum (public areas, private areas, and private messages) and all affiliated Discord servers (public channels, private channels, and voice chats). If The North Pacific expands into additional platforms in the future, the Community Rules will also apply to them without first requiring specific enumeration in this document. Anyone who violates this code of conduct may be warned or banned from these spaces by the decision of the moderation team.
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The North Pacific will not tolerate the promotion of hate or bigotry of any kind, nor will we permit any behavior that places other members of our community at risk. Anybody found to be engaging in such behavior may be subject to immediate and permanent removal from all community spaces. The below list of examples is not exhaustive, but provides a baseline picture:
Disparaging comments or slurs related to gender, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, disability, mental illness, neuro(a)typicality, physical appearance, pregnancy status, veteran status, marital status, body size, age, race, national origin, ethnic origin, nationality, immigration status, language, religion or lack thereof, or other identity marker.

The Court took into consideration the RMB Guidelines.

The Court took into consideration the post made by NationStates moderation here.

The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, here, here, here, and here.

The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner was the one directly impacted by the government actions and policies that the Court has been asked to review. The petitioner’s posts were suppressed twice, once by Kastonvia, the Lead Gameside Advocate, and once by MadJack, the Delegate. The petitioner was also informed that subsequent posts of that nature, that is, transphobic posts, would be suppressed as well. There is no question of proper standing in this case.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling on the Delegate’s Authority to Staff the Executive Branch
This is not the first time the Court has been asked to review government action that the petitioner alleges violated their freedom of speech. It previously ruled in On the Delegate’s Authority to Staff the Executive Branch that it could not directly answer the question of whether the delegate violated the petitioner’s freedom of speech, so as not to prejudice any future criminal trial, and because the information needed to determine such a question would be best gathered and considered through the criminal trial process. We appreciate that any potential criminal case would undoubtedly take into account this ruling’s determination that MadJack and Kastonvia engaged in unconstitutional actions – as it should. But we must echo Justice Eluvatar from his dissent in that case. The facts that must be discovered and considered in such a criminal trial would aim to prove more than simply whether or not the actions committed were unconstitutional. Such a trial would be concerned with intent and possible deliberate malfeasance. Gross Misconduct is a very different charge than simply identifying whether or not some act is unconstitutional, as it requires looking beyond case law and prior precedent and how the two are applied to what is readily available to us when examining the question brought by the petitioner.

The Court was right to note that a request for review is not the proper venue to consider evidence intended to prove a case at a criminal trial, or to consider the questions relevant to that trial. But that does not preclude this Court from answering the question posed by DiamondComodo, nor does it preclude this Court from examining evidence relevant to determining strictly whether a constitutional violation occurred. The context in which we view what is provided in briefs, or what is publicly available to us, is very different from the context of a criminal trial. The Constitution charges us with answering his query and determining the legality of the actions of government officials. The possibility of a future criminal trial does not make free speech queries immune from this Court’s consideration. As Justice Eluvatar noted, if this Court believes it cannot consider a question, then it should not answer that question. And the Court erred in not doing so back then. We hereby overturn this portion of the ruling. The ruling’s conclusion, that the Delegate has broad authority to manage the executive staff, and that free speech is more limited for government officials, is still correct, and still useful in navigating the question before us in this review.

On the Authority to Suppress Posts
The Legal Code grants broad authority to the Delegate to “regulate the Regional Message Board as they see fit” in its onsite authority section. The petitioner asks the Court to review the use of the suppression power, which is a function of regional officer permissions to help moderate the Regional Message Board in The North Pacific. This message board is located squarely in space controlled not by The North Pacific, but by NationStates itself, and is what constitutes the core and almost entirety of the region’s gameside community. Suppression is included in what the Legal Code refers to as Regional Powers, which also includes border control, or the ability to eject and ban nations from the region. All of these powers are controlled and assigned by the Delegate and may be utilized in executing the Delegate’s regulation of the Regional Message Board. Suppression is a tool successive delegates have made available to every member of their cabinet since the creation of regional officers, and is the primary method of moderating the Regional Message Board, particularly given the Legal Code’s strict limitations to the use of border control powers. This power is not new, and predates the provisions added to the onsite authority laws for regional officers, but its use has spread dramatically since then. The Court recognizes that the Delegate has explicit authority to use these Regional Powers, including suppression. However, the onsite authority provisions also establish a right for judicial review of this regulation, which suggests that despite having the authority to use these powers, the Delegate may nevertheless use them improperly, and in ways contrary to the Bill of Rights.

On the Constitutionality of Suppression of Posts
The Court has ruled twice on the use of suppression power before. In its ruling in On the Delegate’s Authority to Staff the Executive Branch, the Court overturned a previous ruling, On the Suppression of Posts on the Regional Message Board, as it did not accept the reasoning that because the suppression of posts was a result of friendly banter, there was no harm done. In fact, the Court ruled that suppressing posts is inherently harmful, as suppressing free speech in any way is inherently harmful. But the Court has also ruled, repeatedly, that there are sometimes situations where speech may be restricted. What these rulings have in common is that speech is limited when allowing unfettered free speech would cause greater harm to the community or the proper functioning of the government. Free speech concerns must be balanced against other rights, and residents are not free to say whatever they want regardless of the context. The Court ruled in On the Speaker’s Power to End Debate that ending debate would necessarily restrict the free speech of citizens, but was nevertheless permitted because those free speech rights must be balanced against maintaining order in the Regional Assembly and fostering civilized debate, and reiterated that position in On the Use of the Speaker’s Power to End Debate and On the Speaker’s Power to Schedule Votes. It ruled in On Alterations to the Citizenship Oath that requiring the citizenship oath to be taken as written without permitting an identifier of choice did not violate free speech, and that altering the oath would render it invalid when considering other areas of law that mandated and defined the oath. In every case, the free speech rights of citizens were balanced against continued functional and orderly government. This logic was also present in the ruling in On the Delegate’s Authority to Staff the Executive Branch, which established that a nation’s free speech rights do not allow government officials to act contrary to their oaths, their tasks, or the direction of their superiors if that speech would contradict official government speech and their role as a member of the government. When acting in an official capacity and utilizing the government’s voice, a nation’s own personal voice must be balanced against their official role.

Free speech, then, is not without its limits. However, these rulings were all directly related to government speech or speech that could interfere with proper execution of government business. That is not the case with the petitioner’s situation, which is a resident expressing his opinion in public through two posts on the Regional Message Board and having those posts literally suppressed by two government officials. Given how often suppression is used, and how available it is to a variety of government officials over the years, it is easy to see how this power could have been abused or caused residents to rush to this Court for relief. And yet, for the better part of five years, that has not been the case. Instead, the moderation of the Regional Message Board has grown more sophisticated. Successive delegates have developed and built on the RMB Guidelines, which serve as a kind of equivalent to the more advanced and comprehensive TNP Community Guidelines that exist for The North Pacific’s offsite properties. Customs have developed and expectations have taken root by the residents who frequent the Regional Message Board. To name but one example, many residents, whether officially part of the region’s Gameside Advocates or not, will frequently point out and report instances where residents post more than once on the Regional Message Board successively. The RMB Guidelines specify that such posts may be subject to suppression, as well as any quoting of suppressed posts that violated the guidelines. It is wholly expected by the residents that the suppression will take place, and even that this is a good thing. This aspect of gameside culture is well-known, accepted, and commonplace.

Of course, that does not mean the regular occurrence of suppression is necessarily permissible under this Constitution, but it does underscore that suppression of posts is crucial and essential to the gameside community’s sense of order and how they, like the Regional Assembly on the forum, regulate a civilized place for public discussion that mitigates as much chaos as possible. To say that suppression in all cases is unconstitutional as a violation of free speech would have a similar negative impact on the Regional Message Board as it would on discussions in the Regional Assembly or conversation in the region’s Discord server. This Court looks to its prior rulings to assert that suppression, in general, is not an inherent violation of the Bill of Rights.

On the Constitutionality of Suppressing Specific Forms of Speech
It is not enough to say that suppression of posts is constitutional in the abstract. Prior rulings identify exceptions to what is an otherwise very broad freedom enshrined in our Bill of Rights. While the Delegate and the Lead Gameside Advocate had the authority to suppress the petitioner’s posts and that authority is consistent with the Constitution, the content of the speech is obviously where the line will be drawn. The Delegate would be hard-pressed to get away with this suppression, for instance, if the content of the post was concerned with political speech in the context of regional politics. The very clear exception to the Delegate’s regulation “as they see fit” is prohibiting political speech of this nature. But it is also not enough for the resident doing the posting to claim an otherwise offensive or actionable post is meant to comment on regional politics. The Legal Code has clear provisions permitting the Delegate to eject and ban nations which violate NationStates rules, so simply suppressing such posts is certainly permitted, even if the resident tries to wrap their violative posts in the trappings of “TNP politics.” Admittedly, it is not always easy to determine when this is occurring. Moderation by its nature often involves making judgment calls, and when those calls are challenged, they must be judged on a case by case basis.

While this Court did consider the brief submitted by Dreadton which asserted a Nationstates rule was violated, we believe the asserted offense, flamebaiting, to have been incorrect. Flamebaiting is understood to involve the targeting of a specific player, which the petitioner does not appear to have done. In our opinion, the posts could instead be examples of what NationStates constitutes as trolling. We draw this conclusion based on the nature of the posts themselves, which would invite outrage and disagreement and can clearly be seen to have angered many members of the community, particularly as they were unprompted and do not fit in any proper context that helps make better sense of them. Furthermore, the stated intent of the petitioner in making those posts is also known, as the petitioner admitted that he made the posts out of anger and acknowledges that the posts should not have been made. Naturally there is a great deal of subjective reasoning in determining whether these posts truly violate NationStates rules, but this Court recognizes that in suppressing posts that are deemed to violate NationStates rules, the Delegate would be acting with great restraint, given the Legal Code permits even more drastic action in response. In this particular case, however, neither the Delegate nor the Lead Gameside Advocate asserted the petitioner violated any NationStates rules. In addition, the RMB Guidelines do not contain a list similar to the NationStates rules that the Delegate or his officials could cite as being violated. Any similar list found in the TNP Community Guidelines would also not apply, despite Dreadton’s brief bringing them up, as they are explicitly designed for the region’s offsite properties and enforced by TNP’s administration team.

That being said, in seeking to foster constructive, positive dialogue and keeping the peace in the community, the Delegate has a great deal of leeway in moderating the Regional Message Board. It is not just this Court which believes this. Considering that our laws explicitly allow the Delegate to take action based on perceived violations of NationStates rules, we must also consider the Delegate’s relationship with the typical authority for such moderation of the gameside community, the NationStates moderators themselves. It would be unreasonable to assert that if a NationStates moderator chooses not to respond to a post reported on the Regional Message Board, the post is not actionable. Given the subjective nature of many posts, and the sheer number of them, not to mention the many other regions to moderate outside of The North Pacific, it would be unreasonable to expect every instance of moderation to be handled by NationStates moderators. It is expected for the region itself to pick up the slack, as can be seen in a post made by Sedgistan on the NationStates forum: “Players can manage an element of self-moderation over their RMBs, with the ability to suppress posts and eject/ban troublemakers. That means that minor issues are left to founders/delegates to sort out." We also know this view is still held by moderation all these years later, as was evident by the recent telegram shared with the Court by Dreadton and Bootsie. Moderation held that they only get involved for “egregious” spam, one of the most frequent causes of reports to moderation. Sedgistan goes on to say that "Regions also have certain cultures to them, reflected on their RMBs," and then names specific examples of how what is actionable in one community may not be in another. Much of our culture is in our robust legal culture and our broad freedom of speech. But our laws cannot be consistently applied to every single specific case of questionable posts. Every situation requires its own consideration, and sometimes it comes down to our Delegate and regional officers to make the call that would otherwise be for NationStates moderation.

Finally, there is the subject matter of the posts to consider. Clearly these posts were unrelated to any discussion of regional politics and had nothing to do with the player’s engagement with other players in their capacity as a nation residing in the region or the game of NationStates. The subject spoke to issues outside of the game, the kind of subject that often prompts challenges to moderation in the first place. The posts were transphobic in nature, and deeply offensive to many members of the community. When acting in a capacity as a moderator on the Regional Message Board, the Delegate has the most leeway in terms of our region’s laws, as these laws are stretched to their limits when considering subjects that are strictly outside of the framework of the game in which they were created. This does not mean that any action the Delegate or the regional officers take on speech in this context cannot be reviewed by this Court, as there are any number of benign topics that would not warrant shutting down speech. One could imagine a scenario where the oft-cited debate on whether pineapple can be on a pizza might lead the Delegate to suppress posts he disagrees with. This has nothing to do with regional politics after all, and can be seen as a player speaking in their capacity as a person playing NationStates. But as with the old ruling overturned by the Court, the seemingly harmless nature of the posts and the perceived joking on the part of the Delegate, by pretending to have a heavy hand on the topic, would not be permissible limits to speech.

The petitioner’s posts were deliberately inflammatory and designed to inflict distress, they violated the general good-natured character of the community and defied the inclusive and kind environment the Delegate deliberately intended to foster with his policies and practices. The Delegate has the legal authority to regulate the Regional Message Board and the constitutional authority to restrict some forms of speech in the interest of the greater good of the community. And the Delegate has a secondary role as a moderator for the gameside community in addition to or in the absence of NationStates moderation, particularly in the most subjective or low priority situations as with this one. We find that the petitioner’s rights under the Bill of Rights were not violated by the suppression of his posts.

On Extralegal Moderation
As we have already stated, this Court is not the place to adjudicate the specifics of criminal behavior in the context of the Legal Code, which is best suited for a criminal trial. But we are also cognizant of the difficulty in applying the Legal Code to situations which are properly under the jurisdiction of NationStates itself. Everywhere else in the region, such extralegal moderation concerns are rightfully handled by the administrative team and governed by the TNP Community Guidelines. But in the case of the Regional Message Board, extralegal moderation is handled by NationStates moderation. And when they cannot act, only the Delegate and those with the power to suppress, eject, or ban can. This Court cannot speak to constitutionality or criminal concerns in this context and affirms what is already the understanding of The North Pacific’s government and much of its community: there are some problems and actions way outside the scope of our ability to adjudicate, and outside the scope of the region’s Constitution. Action taken by the Delegate or regional officers in response to these issues is not reviewable by this Court and should never be accepted by this Court if presented in the form of a request for review. The problem is telling the difference, a problem exacerbated by the nature of the Regional Message Board.

This Court does not mean to suggest that officials will “know it when they see it,” though the topic and severity of the content is an important guidepost in determining the nature of legally actionable or extralegally actionable posts. Posts clearly related to regional events, government officials, policies, laws, elections, and in the context of the game of NationStates itself, all would be legally actionable. Posts discussing all of the above outside of the context of NationStates, especially referring to players controlling the nations in a strictly “real life” context, are more likely to be extralegally actionable. Extreme language or emotion, particularly if they rise to a threatening or personally concerning level, would also warrant extralegal review. When considering such posts, NationStates rules should be consulted, and TNP Community Guidelines can also serve as a point of reference. If none of these rules are clearly violated, the posts are likely legally actionable, and the Delegate and regional officers may be subject to judicial review. These are hardly exhaustive examples, but we hope they serve as an aid in determining how to approach handling such posts in the future.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling on the Constitutionality of Prohibiting Sedition
The Court ruled in 2013 that the Bill of Rights established a right to free speech that cannot be infringed, except in emergency situations per Section 11 of the Bill of Rights. This ruling was cited by the petitioner as the primary supporting ruling for his assertion that his freedom of speech rights were violated, and was also addressed by Zyvetskistaahn in his brief. That brief goes on to identify a tension that exists between that ruling and a number of subsequent cases related to free speech. This is an accurate observation. That 2013 ruling was short and to the point, and left absolutely no doubt that freedom of speech could never be abridged. The Court, in properly following the precedent set by this ruling, would have no choice in every subsequent free speech case but to conclude that virtually no limits could be placed on free speech at all. And yet, that is not what happened. In every subsequent ruling on free speech, this Court conveniently forgot that this ruling existed. Instead of an absolute firewall preventing any limitation to speech, we have years of precedent upholding reasonable limits to free speech. Clearly this Court has already effectively overturned this ruling, but it is time to do so properly. We hereby overturn this ruling in its entirety.

The Court arrived at the correct conclusion in that ruling, but did so in an overly broad manner. The law prohibiting sedition was unconstitutional, not because no limits can be placed on free speech at all, but because the limits placed on speech were too great. Such a law would have chilled speech critical of the government, and led residents to doubt what was safe to say publicly. As we noted earlier, the Legal Code clearly protects speech made in the context of TNP politics. Other provisions protect against speech that enters the realm of treason, and the behavior that the sedition law seemed to target can be properly addressed without such an additional provision. With other means available, and an overly broad restriction to political speech that is clearly protected, there was every reason to strike down that law. But there is also every reason to be cautious and deliberate when doing so, in order to avoid being unable to effectively regulate or govern the region when other kinds of harm may be done to the community, and that is what the prior ruling risked doing.

Case thread: https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/9195757/
Ruling delivered on April 29, 2022.


 
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