Here we go.
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Kiwi on the crime of Fraud
The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kiwi.
The Court took into consideration Section 1.3 of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
Section 1.3: Fraud
11. "Election fraud" is defined as the willful deception of citizens with regards to the candidates running, the time and venue of the elections, or the requirements and methods by which one may be eligible to vote or run for office.
12. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.
The Court also took into consideration the relevant section of the Bill of Rights:
In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence.
The Court opines the following:
What specific elements are required to prove fraud?
In order to prove Election Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court two things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information to, or deliberately withheld true information from, any non-zero number of citizens about certain subjects relating to elections. Second, they must show that this information was "willful deception". It is not required that the deception accomplish, or even aim for, any beneficial or harmful effect.
In order to prove Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court three things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information, or deliberately withheld true information. Second, they must show that this information was "intentional deception". Third, they must show that the provision or withholding of this information either improved the standing of that individual, or damaged that of another.
Both crimes require that the act be one of deception, and thus it is necessary to establish what that term entails.
First, deception must refer to a matter of fact, and not a matter of opinion. Matters of fact have definitive truth values - that is, they can be determined to be true or false. A statement of fact asserts something as truth, as objective reality. A matter of opinion, on the other hand, has a truth value which can vary depending on the individual contemplating the issue at hand, and a statement of opinion asserts subjective truth - something which is only necessarily true for the speaker.
Second, deception must refer to a
material fact, that is, one which can reasonably be expected to affect the audience's future actions for some benefit or harm. Third, deception must be plausible, that is, something which can reasonably be expected to be believed by the audience.
Finally, in order to commit deception, an individual must be reasonably expected to know that their statement or omission lacks truth.
What sort of intention is necessary to prove fraud? Is it a high (almost unattainable) level? Is oblique intention enough?
To start, the Court opines that "willful deception" is synonymous with "intentional deception", and that the difference in word choice does not require a different standard of proof between the two crimes.
As for the standard itself, there are two types of intention in the commission of fraud. The first is demonstrable intent, wherein the defendant can be shown, by their own statements or actions relating to the alleged crime, to have engaged in deception as defined previously in this ruling.
The second is reckless intent, wherein intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.
The Court does not find that, together, these types of intent present an unattainable bar to the prosecution, although one or the other may be out of reach for any particular case.
Should the RA perhaps include a mens rea of "recklessness" in its definition?
The Court declines to comment on hypothetical legislation which would differentiate recklessness from intent.
Would a statement of "I believe" be enough to negate any finding of intention?
To reiterate, a statement of opinion is not a statement of fact, and thus statements of opinion do not qualify as fraudulent.
However, simply prefacing a statement of fact with the words "I believe" (or another similar phrase) is not, by itself, sufficient to establish it as a statement of opinion. The critical factor is and remains whether the statement is something which can be determined objectively, or whether it is a matter for subjective judgement.
To provide an example, the statement "Chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry ice cream" is a statement of opinion, as it is a matter of individual tastes not assumed to be universally true. It has no truth value whatsoever except insofar as it is a genuinely held belief, true for the individual asserting it. Prefacing this statement with "I believe" makes that implication more explicit, but the assertion is identical. They are both statements of opinion.
"Chocolate is made from potatoes", on the other hand, is a statement of fact, and can conclusively be demonstrated to be either true or false. Changing that statement to "I believe chocolate is made from potatoes" does not change the statement into one of opinion rather than fact. The belief itself, if it is genuinely believed, nevertheless has a truth value, and is therefore subject to the law.
Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context?If not, does the Court recommend reform?
The Court declines to comment on the appropriateness of constitutional laws. Suggesting legal reform, alterations and additions to the written legal code is not the purview of the Court, and such recommendations would be inappropriate.
Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation (as arguably occurred in TNP v Grosse)?
The measure of appropriateness in prosecution is the extent to which the facts of a particular case match up with elements of the criminal code. The Court declines to comment on terminology.
