Request for Review: The Court's Illegal Review of an RA Proposal

SillyString

TNPer
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1. What law, government policy, or action (taken by a government official) do you request that the Court review?

I would like the Court to review its own action in accepting the request for review filed by Lord Ravenclaw on November 28, 2017.

2. What portions of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Legal Code, or other legal document do you believe has been violated by the above? How so?
Constitution Section 5:
1. The Court will try all criminal cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
Bill of Rights:
11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code.
The above section of the Constitution is extremely clear. The Court may do a specified list of things. It may try criminal cases, it may resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, it may review the constitutionality of laws, or it may review the legality of government policies.

The Court may do nothing that is not laid out above.

A proposal before the RA is explicitly not a criminal case, an ambiguity in the law, a law, or a government policy. As such, any review of an RA proposal by the Court is an overreach of its constitutionally granted authority.

It is also a violation of the Bill of Rights, which prohibits governmental authorities from disregarding the Constitution.

3. Are there any prior rulings of the Court that support your request for review? Which ones, and how?

I would like to cite the prior ruling on Standing and the Meaning of Affected Party.
Ruling 3.3:
The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.

The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.
In this ruling, the Court upholds explicitly the restrictions I laid out above on its power to act, when laying out the requirements for someone to qualify as an affected party. Those guidelines involve only:
  • Action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies;
  • Laws passed by the regional assembly;
  • Policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.
Notably absent from that list are policies up for debate in the Regional Assembly.

4. Please establish your standing by detailing how you, personally, have been adversely affected. If you are requesting a review of a governmental action, you must include how any rights or freedoms of yours have been violated. If you are submitting this request in your capacity as the Attorney General or their designee, please note that here instead.

I am submitting this in my capacity as the Acting Attorney General.

5. Do you have any further information you wish to submit to the Court with your request?

Because Justice Scorch was the one to formally accept Lord Ravenclaw's request for review, the scope of this request necessarily includes their actions, and as such, I request that they recuse themselves from it.

I do not know what additional discussion went on among which justices prior to the request's acceptance, and I cannot guess at what role the other two justices may have played in the decision to accept the request. I would request that if either were involved, they likewise consider recusing themselves.

I would also like to note that, per the Court Rules and Procedures, Lord Ravenclaw's request for review must be put on pause:
Court Rules and Procedures Section 2:
During the proceedings of a matter before the Court, substantive appeals and requests which relate to that matter must be addressed before the proceedings can continue.
 
Given my membership of the Court which made the decisions which this request seeks to review, I recuse myself from this matter. I will bring this matter to my fellow Justices; should they also recuse themselves, I will notify the Delegate and the Speaker of the need to appoint Temporary Hearing Officers as may be necessary.
 
Pursuant to law and with the Speaker's approval, I have appointed Abbey, Plembobria, and Yalkan as Temporary Hearing Officers for the review of this case.
 
Pallaith:
Pursuant to law and with the Speaker's approval, I have appointed Abbey, Plembobria, and Yalkan as Temporary Hearing Officers for the review of this case.
I confirm that I approve of these appointments.
 
This request for review is accepted.

Briefs will be accepted for the next 5 days, ending at (time=1512759600).

As per the rules, progress on the request for review in question will continue to be suspended.

EDIT: Amended confusing timestamp to show the correct end date.
 
I'm really not sure what you're driving at there Mall. Please elaborate for the Court's benefit.
 
Abbey:
I'm really not sure what you're driving at there Mall. Please elaborate for the Court's benefit.
Certainly: the RA vote failed, and thus all requests for review surrounding its legality are moot. That makes any requests for review about those same requests for review moot, etc. The Court can't address this because no one has standing, there's no potential for harm to anyone, and indeed the Court shouldn't address it because it is no longer working with a real fact pattern.
 
I disagree, the ability, or lack thereof, of the court to review RA motions before they become law still has relevance and the (acting) AG has standing to put anything before the court, no specific interest needed.
 
Mall:
Abbey:
I'm really not sure what you're driving at there Mall. Please elaborate for the Court's benefit.
Certainly: the RA vote failed, and thus all requests for review surrounding its legality are moot. That makes any requests for review about those same requests for review moot, etc. The Court can't address this because no one has standing, there's no potential for harm to anyone, and indeed the Court shouldn't address it because it is no longer working with a real fact pattern.
I hope the Court does not mind if I address this concern, since I am the original petitioner and have no intention of withdrawing my request.

First, the request deals with an action of the Court, and not directly with the proposal to which Mall is referring, so whether it passed or not has little bearing on the scope of the request. I would also argue that the Court being willing to accept requests for review on matters which are not law, government policy, or actions by a government official has extreme potential for harm to TNP's fundamental democratic underpinnings[note]I would be happy to prepare a brief for the Court on the risk of harm to TNP's democracy that I see, or to answer any questions the Court may have on the matter. I did not include this line of argument in my initial request as I see the action in question as fundamentally at odds with what the law says, and so felt it appropriate to steer clear of the more theoretical (as opposed to legal) problems. But I do think there is a strong case not just for what the Constitution says, but also for why it should say just that.

I can also offer a brief on the separation of powers, and make an argument - I believe a persuasive one - as to how the action I am requesting be reviewed violates that.

Additionally, I have citations for prior Court rulings regarding the Court as a Governmental Authority and the Court's power to review its prior decisions. I likewise left those out of the initial request as it is my understanding that they are both widely accepted and self-evident - but there is precedent that definitively establishes both.
[/note], and so the Court's behavior in accepting the original request remains very much in question.

Second, per the Court Rules and Procedures, the initial request must be frozen until this request is resolved. Even if TNP had a legal doctrine of mooting - which it does not - that request cannot be mooted until this one is answered.

Third, the Attorney General and their deputies have standing in all matters brought before the Court. This is one of the AG's major functions. It is patently false to state that no one has standing in this review.
 
Mall:
Abbey:
I'm really not sure what you're driving at there Mall. Please elaborate for the Court's benefit.
Certainly: the RA vote failed, and thus all requests for review surrounding its legality are moot. That makes any requests for review about those same requests for review moot, etc. The Court can't address this because no one has standing, there's no potential for harm to anyone, and indeed the Court shouldn't address it because it is no longer working with a real fact pattern.
This request for review is not dependent on the other request for review standing as it is reviewing an action that has happened (note this is not a comment on whether the other review should be considered). The brief period continues unaffected.

SillyString, feel free to sumbit whatever briefs you feel appropriate. All briefs will be fully considered by the Court.
 
Abbey:
Mall:
Abbey:
I'm really not sure what you're driving at there Mall. Please elaborate for the Court's benefit.
Certainly: the RA vote failed, and thus all requests for review surrounding its legality are moot. That makes any requests for review about those same requests for review moot, etc. The Court can't address this because no one has standing, there's no potential for harm to anyone, and indeed the Court shouldn't address it because it is no longer working with a real fact pattern.
This request for review is not dependent on the other request for review standing as it is reviewing an action that has happened (note this is not a comment on whether the other review should be considered). The brief period continues unaffected.

SillyString, feel free to sumbit whatever briefs you feel appropriate. All briefs will be fully considered by the Court.
The action happened, but the action is utterly moot. It's all moot. Nothing the Court can do or say here will have any impact on the action contested since it is all over. The justification for standing fails all the way down the line. When this house of cards collapsed, it collapsed completely, there is no foundation for the Court to review anything.
 
To help the court with its deliberations, I hereby submit my considerations:

Consideration 1:Proposals
I agree with the then Acting Attorney General, Silly String, that ordinary proposals cannot be reviewed by the court.
However, the proposal was already beyond deliberation stage, as a vote had been motioned to be scheduled, which was binding upon the Speaker if the law regarding emergencies was legal. Scheduling a proposal always includes actions by a government official, the Speaker. Thus, every proposal that is at vote, is scheduled to be at vote or is forced to go to vote automatically includes a government action, and the Court can review government actions.

Consideration 2:Inherent mention
The proposal was explicitely referring to - even quoting - Chapter 9 Section 1 of the Legal Code. Thus, the law text which, as a law to review, the court named as reason for its acceptance of the review was actually in the very proposal that was linked by Lord Ravenclaw in the request for review! Thus, contrary to other assertions, the decision of the Court can be linked to the request for review.

To remember:
Court reasoning:
The Court has determined that the review is a proper matter for judicial review as it does not relate solely to the motion in the Regional Assembly, but also raises questions as to the constitutionality of Section 9.1 of the Legal Code which is already in force. The petitioner enjoys standing in relation to the review as there is a connection between the prospective breach of his rights and the provisions of Section 9.1 of the Legal Code.

The proposal that was linked by Lord Ravenclaw:
Per Chapter 9 Section 1 of the Legal Code, I move that this Regional Assembly declare an actual emergency due to a lack of Christmas cheer.

I would like to remind everyone of what the Legal Code says:


1. The Regional Assembly may declare an actual emergency by majority vote. Votes on declaring emergencies must be expedited, and may last no longer than three days.
2. Concurrent with the declaration of an emergency, or anytime afterward while the emergency is ongoing, the Regional Assembly may, by majority vote, make both binding and nonbinding recommendations related to the ongoing emergency to government officials regarding an appropriate course of action, enforcement of regional laws, or other similar matter.


Per subpart 2. as listed above, concurrent with the declaration of emergency, I move that the Regional Assembly issue a binding recommendation to the Delegate of TNP that he change his flag to a picture of Santa Claus and change his nation's pretitle to "Jolly Christmas Elf".

Per subpart 2. as listed above, concurrent with the declaration of emergency, I move that the Regional Assembly issue a binding recommendation to every other government official to change their nations' pretitle to "Singing Loud" since that is the best way to spread Christmas cheer..

Don't give me any shit about Flem's religion or multiculturalism, TNP geographically is in prime Christmas celebrating land.

Consideration 3:Prior court ruling
Court ruling:
The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.
There is a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected: The law is quoted in the proposal that was linked by Lord Ravenclaw, and the relevant rights this law could violate are guranteed in the Bill of Rights. And Lord Ravenclaw as government official was clearly affected, because the motion had been enforced right away, (which could be also very well done under "conflicts in the law") then any refusal could have been criminal(breaking the oath). It is also a conflict of laws situation(specifically the binding resolutions with majority vote versus Constitution 3/4 vote change).
The only possibility to gain clear, binding and relieving help regarding unclear committments, where each action could possibly be a breach of law depending on the interpretation, is to file a request to the court, because the court and only the court can make binding decisions on these matters.
 
If it pleases the Court, I would offer my assistance in resolving this matter through the following brief:

I intend to make submissions focusing on two main points. Firstly, I will address the claim made by the Deputy Attorney General that the Court was reviewing something other than a law or government policy or action; this will itself be split into two areas, the first on policy and action, the second on law. Secondly, I will make submissions with respect to the amenability of the Court, in its judicial review capacity, to judicial review and, particularly, the need for deference when the Court is considering its own decisions. Before I begin my substantial submissions, however, I should note that I gratefully adopt, in the main, the submissions of the Deputy Attorney General in relation to Article 5 of the Constitution and that the review power relates to conflicts and ambiguity in the law, constitutionality of the law, and legality (inclusive of constitutionality) of policies.[note]Constitution of The North Pacific, Article 5, clause 1[/note]

I will start by addressing, together, government policies or actions. The Deputy Attorney General submits that the Court was not reviewing a government policy or action. In making this submission, reference is made to the ruling on Standing[note]Ruling of the Court on Standing and the Definition of Affected Party[/note] noting that matters being debated in the Regional Assembly are not identified in the ruling, which I accept. However, if I may make some careful observations, bearing in mind that the author of the Ruling on Standing is a member of the Court, it is notable that the Ruling is not exhaustive in identifying the areas where judicial review can be engaged, for instance, it identifies policies of the executive and judicial branches of government, not the legislative, and presumably thereby excludes the Speaker's policies from the scope of judicial review, yet the Court has, in fact, reviewed the policies of the Speaker[note]Ruling of the Court on the Speaker's Powers to Restrict the Format of Votes; "The Speaker by making these policies was within their powers as laid out by the Constitution and not in violation of the Bill of Rights"[/note]; and, further, I submit that the analysis that only policies of the executive and judicial organs of government can be reviewed cannot be exhaustive as it would serve to wholly exclude the policies of the Security Council from the scrutiny of the Court, as the Court has held the Security Council to be without the executive branch,[note]Ruling of the Court on Content Ownership and Freedom of Information Requests against the Security Council; "Given that the Chair of the Security Council holds that power only in the absence of holding executive authority, the Court opines that the Security Council is not categorized under the Executive Branch."[/note] which cannot be in line with the guarantee to all nations that "[n]o governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code"[note]The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific, clause 11[/note]. It is also to be noted that, in relation to action or inaction of governmental bodies, the Court did not claim to limit those bodies just to the executive or judicial, nor does the Constitution set any such limit (indeed, the strict words of the Constitution do not include actions at all). Additionally, if I may, I would suggest that, in respect of Section 9.1,[note]Legal Code of The North Pacific, Section 9.1[/note] the ruling of the Court on Standing cannot have been expected to cover policies made by the Assembly under it as Section 9.1 only entered into law in May of 2015[note]Emergency Law Bill passed by the Assembly; presented to the Delegate; signed by the Delegate[/note]

Now, I submit that the motions in question would amount to policies made by the Regional Assembly. Further, I submit that the Regional Assembly is a government body and that, consequently, were it to adopt those policies, those policies would be government policies. I accept that the Assembly is a legislative body, not a judicial or executive one, however, I submit that this does not mean its policies are beyond the scope of judicial review; as I have noted, judicial review can extend to the policies of legislative officials, in the form of the Speaker, and I do suggest that the Court in its ruling on Standing was not exhaustive or else has barred judicial review of the Security Council's policies also. It is suggested by the Deputy Attorney General that the fact that the motion is proposed by someone other than a government official means that it is not government policy, with respect to the Deputy Attorney General, I must disagree, a policy adopted by a government body such as the Regional Assembly is a government policy and reviewable as such.

In the alternative, I would submit that the Regional Assembly, were it to exercise its power under Section 9.1, would be taking a government action. In respect of actions, I note again that there is no differentiation with respect to the nature of the body exercising the power in the Ruling on Standing, so even if the Court disagrees on the point of legislative policy being within scope, there is nothing in the ruling to say that legislative action is without judicial review. Consequently, as an action by a government body the motion is open to review.

I should note, in my submissions to this point I stated that "were" the Assembly to adopt the policies or take the action they would be open to review, this is not to say that because they have not yet been so adopted or taken that they are not reviewable. To accept that proposition would be to accept that the Court is incapable of restraining government bodies or officials from making illegal policies or taking illegal actions, which, I submit, would be an incorrect course for the Court to take. Were a citizen to submit to the Court evidence that the Delegate proposes to and will illegally eject them from the region, the Court ought not simply sit back and accept that such can be done, permitting a violation of the rights of the citizen; it is open to the Court to restrain government officials and bodies from making illegal policies or taking illegal actions in order to better secure the rights guaranteed to nations (particularly in cases where the violation cannot easily been done, in view of the lack of any possibility for restoration through some mechanism such as damages, in contrast to the position one might find RL).

Now, on this point, the Constitution is slightly unclear as to whether the policies which the Court is to review are to be extant policies only or whether they can include prospective policies and the Court in its ruling on Standing appears to have missed the possibility of the need to restrain future policies or action, however, again, I stress my submission that the ruling on Standing is not exhaustive of the scenarios in which judicial review exists and that there are strong policy reasons for holding that prospective policy or action is amenable to review; indeed, I would go further and submit that there is justification in the Bill of Rights for such action in order to vindicate the right of nations to be protected against the abuse of powers[note]The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific, clause 5[/note]. I would submit to the Court that the proper holding is that request regarding prospective policies or actions are permissible and do not, necessarily, fail, but that the requirement identified in the Ruling on Standing that there must be a clear connection with the matter complained of and the affect on them must be stressed and that it must be recognised that prospective events are less certain and therefore less likely to demonstrate a clear connection.

Moving now to the issue of laws passed by the Regional Assembly. It is submitted by the Deputy Attorney General that the Court was not exercising its function in relation to laws in terms of reviewing their Constitutionality or conflicts or ambiguity in them, it is my submission that the Deputy Attorney General is incorrect in this. The request for review that the Court accepted clearly raised issues with respect to the constitutionality of Section 9.1, in relation to the propriety of the majority it requires, on the face of the request, in the portion dealing with prior rulings.[note]Request for Review made by Lord Ravenclaw; "I would argue that in order for this proposal to legally able to force resident nations who happen to meet the specific criteria as stated, it would need to be treated by the Speaker as a law that requires equal standing to the Bill of Rights and would require a 3/4ths Majority of the Regional Assembly to enact (Article 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution). I would note that at the time of writing, this was being pushed as an Emergency Situation and requires a simple majority vote."[/note] Further, I would submit that the view stated by the Deputy Attorney General is overly simplistic in terms of how requests for review must be considered. The Deputy Attorney General submits that the request relates only to the motion and does not request any review of constitutionality or consideration of ambiguity in relation to Section 9.1 (though, as I have noted, the request does, in fact, raise the issue of constitutionality directly); it is my submission that in order to determine the validity of the motion it is absolutely necessary for the Court to consider ancillary questions relating to the constitutional scope of the Section 9.1 power, such as the meaning of "actual emergency" and the nature of what constitutes "express consent", for how else could the Court determine what would be a valid exercise of the power, and that where the Court is requested to answer a question which has, ancillary to it, such questions of constitutionality and interpretation, it is proper for the Court to regard the question put to it as encompassing those ancillary questions which need to be answered to resolve the main question. I would further submit, on this point, that the Court ought not, for practical reasons, follow the restrictive course of the Deputy Attorney General, as in TNP we cannot expect particular legal knowledge as to how a person ought correctly state their questons so as to encompass all they wish to encompass; knowledge of TNP's legal system is often lacking, particularly so in newer residents, and, unlike in other legal systems, we do not enjoy formal provision of legal advice or representation to make up for that lack of knowledge, and residents should not be punished for that, rather, the Court should be able to put its knowledge to use so as to support residents seeking to vindicate their rights.

In respect of answering questions as to the constitutionality and interpretation of the scope of a law, I would repeat my submissions in respect of prospective breach and put to the Court that, where there is a prospective breach capable of demonstrating a clear connection between it and the extant law, there is no principled reason why the Court should require a nation to have their rights injured, rather the Court should and can seek to restrain such breaches from occurring.

Now, for the second substantive portion of my submissions, I will address the question of how the Court should approach requests for review targeting the Court in its review capacity.

I will begin by noting that I accept, as the Court has previously held, that the Court is not immune to judicial review.[note]Ruling of the Court on the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers; "The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies." (emphasis in original)[/note] However, it is informative, I submit, to consider the comments that the Court made when it made that holding in respect of how the Court should proceed when it is considering the matter of a request for review of its own actions. First, it is to be noted that a request must be a "proper" one and not of an "arbitrary" nature, simply seeking to get a different answer through a differently composed Court; with respect to the Acting Attorney General, I must submit that this request appears to be straying dangerously close to engaging in an "arbitrary" request, having failed to get the answer sought from the original request's Court, an alternate Court of THOs has been sought to produce the desired result. Second, it is to be noted that the Court, in its ruling on Precedent, also stated that when engaged in a request for review in relation to the Court, that there must be a "heightened standard of review" and that it must be in response to "some factual evolution (not simply a request to look again)". I do accept that this was in relation to precedent and that the decision of a Court to accept a review and the final decision on the review are qualitatively different, however, I would suggest to the Court that in relation to each that there is the same interest in finality and in preventing litigants shopping for the Justices or THOs they want. It is not in the interests of the region to have all decisions of the Court in a review be open to challenge on the same basis as an ordinary request for review, it would severely impede the ability of the Court to function effectively and have a substantial negative impact on the rights of nations seeking vindication through the Court. It must be the case that the Court, in its conduct of a request for review, is accorded some deference, to hold otherwise would open the Court up to a potentially endless chain of requests for review, each seeking to overturn the decision as to whether the one before it was a proper matter for judicial review.

That is not to say, however, that the Court in its conduct of a request for review is wholly unimpeachable. I readily accept that there are circumstances in which it would be proper for a request for review against the Court in exercise of that function to be granted, however, I would submit that they are unusual and would require the court to be acting substantially outside of its proper jurisdiction or for there to be a real possibility of bias resulting from a conflict of interest (the latter being a point that has been ruled on, though not in particular detail).[note]Ruling of the Court on Judicial Recusals[/note] Now, I say that the Court was, in fact, wholly and properly within its jurisdiction, so much of my submissions on this point are not strictly necessary to resolve this point. However, should the Court disagree with me and decide that there is some argument as to whether or not the matter in question is a proper one for judicial review, my submission is that, nonetheless, the Court ought to dismiss the objections made by the Acting Attorney General and accept that where there is reasonable argument in the question of the propriety of a matter for judicial review, the decision of the Court reviewing the matter ought to be upheld, lest the matter become one of simply asking the Court to look again to gain a different result by arbitrary variation in the membership of the panel; put simply, it is not sufficient that the panel of the Court in this review disagrees with the panel in the original review, the Court in the original review must be substantially outside of the range of proper decisions open to it for the interest in the finality of judicial decisions to be disturbed.

In view of my submissions, therefore, I would submit that the proper disposal for this request is to declare that the Court was acting properly and lawfully in reviewing the lawfully of what was either a prospective government policy or action and the ambiguity and constitutionality in the law dealing with emergencies; and that the Court, when conducting a request for review, must be accorded the benefit of deference as to whether a matter is proper for judicial review. Beyond that, I submit, no order is necessary.

I should also like to apologise to the Court that this brief has been entered so late in the day, I had been intending on entering a brief after the Deputy Attorney General, so as to more directly tailor my points to the matters that the Deputy Attorney General sought to argue, however, the Court does not yet have the benefit of a brief from the Deputy Attorney General and I do not think that I would be of much assistance if one is entered now and I seek to redraft this in a hurry, so I have entered my brief now.
 
Your honors,

I offer the following brief for the consideration of the court in this matter.

The remit of the court is detailed in article 5 of the the constitution, clause 1:

1. The Court will try all criminal cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.

The question is then if this covers the submission of a motion in the RA. Note that the request for review by Lord Ravenclaw requests review of the motion itself, not the speakers action to table a vote or anything else, the motion.

This is clearly not a criminal case.

The motion is not a law, it can only become so if passed by the RA in a vote as a law. There can then be no resolution of a conflict or ambiguity then as there is no law. Neither can there be a review of the constitutionality of a law.

The motion cannot be a policy as it is not in any way in effect. A proposed but not enacted policy is not a policy (yet)

This leaves us with the possibillity that there is a government action that can be reviewed for legality. Note that previous writers all assume the court may review such an action but the constitution does not in fact specify this, it speaks only of policies. A single acion is not a policy, as a policy implies a deliberate continuity and consistency of conduct that a single action does not. The case law seems to assume this power for the court as well but my quick overview did not find a ruling to determine this. I believe the court should make a preliminary ruling on its ability to review the legality of single actions by government officials. I also think it would be best to clarify that the court may indeed do so as it seems standing practice and would otherwise put much government action outside the scope of review.


The motion is filed by a common citizen in his capacity as RA member, I do not think he can qualify as (an official of) the government. To claim that every citizen is automatically a government official and his actions thus open to court review seems to excessively expand the definition of the government. So, this leaves us with no basis for a review of the motion as requested by Lord Ravenclaw. The request should have been denied.

Some writers before proposed that the decision of the speaker to schedule a vote constitutes a reviewable government action. This is not what Lord Ravenclaw requested however and I do not think the court should start unilaterally expanding requests for review into territory they do not themselves cover. Moreover, the speakers decision itself is so obviously legal, indeed legally required with no discretionary power, that there is nothing there to review.

I think considering RA motions unfit for review is not only in accordance with the constitution but also just and proper as well as practical. Just and proper since a mere motion cannot impact anything or anyone and where there can be no harm the court should not seek a remedy. Practical as the court should not wish to become involved in RA shenanigans with different factions among the citizenry seeking to prevent votes on proposals they dont like. Last but not least, if any citizen believes he is negatively impacted by a motion that was passed into law or policy he may at that time request a review of its constitutionality and request an injunction** as well.

My recommendation then is that the court will decide to decline the request for review submitted by Lord Ravenclaw.

Thank you for your attention.

**At least, the power of the court to issue an injunction seems settled law even though the constitution and court rules specify no such power
 
The deadline for briefs has passed. However the court will consider in its deliberations whether to accept the final brief.
 
Abbey:
The deadline for briefs has passed. However the court will consider in its deliberations whether to accept the final brief.
Just to be clear, has the Court ruled that it has jurisdiction and competence over this specific matter already? I am uncertain as to whether briefs addressing this issue were meant to be submitted here, or if they are more appropriately discussed in the form of a collateral attack on the Court's future ruling on this matter.
 
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Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the judicial inquiry filed by SillyString on on the ability of the Court to review RA proposals
Opinion drafted by Abbey, joined by Plembobria

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Clean Land.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Barbarossistan.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
Article 5. The Court

1. The Court will try all criminal cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region. Any Nation of The North Pacific has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.

---

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the ruling on Standing and the Definition of Affected Party:
The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one's the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.

The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the ruling on the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers:
If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the ruling on Judicial Recusals:
The Request before the Court is on the refusal of a Justice to recuse himself from a Request where the petitioner believes a conflict of interest and lack of transparency in the review. It is to the agreement of the Court that, should Justice Funkadelia continue to be engaged in the Review, there is the potential that Justice Funkadelia will have bias.

The Court, upon reviewing the above, has reached the decision that Justice Funkadelia recuse himself from the Request for Review on Election Commissioner's Conduct.

The currently assigned Temporary Hearing Officers are hereby deemed procedurally invalid. As it stands, with all elected Justices being recused from the case, the Delegate will need to select new Temporary Hearing Officers. The current Temporary Hearing Officers are strictly invalid on a procedural basis, and may be reassigned should the Delegate deem fit, without having an immediate Conflict of Interest due to their initial appointments.

The Court opines the following:

It is the opinion of the Court that the Court's actions in this case are not reviewable. This is because the Court believes that only in exceptional circumstances, in the case of a particularly severe breach, can the Court's actions be reviewed. This is in order to protect the Court, which is necessary due to the fact that TNP has only a single court and no sophisticated appeals system. As happened here, reviews of Court actions hold up other requests - and it is conceivable that a particularly litigious AG, or group of citizens that can contrive standing in all the matters brought up, could lead you to have a deep "stack" of Court reviews, with the first only being reviewed after many weeks of supplementary reviews being resolved. This would be a bad thing, and is the reason why this Court will not rule that all Court actions are reviewable. The Court's time cannot afford to be held up with overly litigious requests for reviews of its own actions, necessitating the recruitment of THOs and eventually, the pool of people willing and able to serve as a THO will dry up.

Considering the precedent, for instance the ruling on Judicial Recusals as well as the ruling on the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers, these both make clear (either through actions or words) that the Court is reviewable. This ruling does not change that, it simply re-affirms the high standard for that review being possible.

Therefore, this court determines that requests for review can only be reviewed themselves in exceptional circumstances when all routes of appeal have been exhausted. This ruling does not apply to criminal cases.

Given the above determination, this request for review would not have been accepted had it been made after this ruling. Therefore the Court has not continued to consider the matter of the ability of the Court to rule on RA matters.
 
So the Court (despite asking me to explain the issue) did not consider the issue of mootness in deciding this? How is that even possible? Did y'all forget that you asked me to clarify the concern? Or did you consider it and dismiss it under the banner of "we really want an excuse to make a ruling saying our rulings are beyond contention even if there is no legal justification for processing a request for review in the first place"?

EDIT: Did you also decide to do away with the requirement that 3 people constitute the Court?
 
(speaking for myself, not Plemby here)

The issue of mootness was irrelevant for the reasons I articulated earlier in this thread. That was the decision of the Court.

And me and Plemby made a majority ruling due to Yalkan disappearing on us.
 
How is it that the court ACCEPTED a request for review, and then declined to rule on it? No one asked whether the actions taken by the court were reviewable - the request is that they be reviewed! This appears to be a completely sua sponte ruling, which is not allowed by the constitution. The court can only rule on questions that are brought to it by an affected party. Amazingly, the court has responded to a challenge of its illegal action by taking another illegal action, and in the process forbidding anyone from challenging the latter!

I'm not sure there is any recourse for the public in this matter - even recall is off the table, because the ruling was created by slate of THOs.

What a mess.
 
Abbey:
(speaking for myself, not Plemby here)

The issue of mootness was irrelevant for the reasons I articulated earlier in this thread. That was the decision of the Court.

And me and Plemby made a majority ruling due to Yalkan disappearing on us.
So ignoring the valid points raised above, two THO's decided that the Court need not rule on this matter, but rather their two opinions alone were sufficient to decide a matter which the Constitution clearly requires the entire Court (read: three people) to weigh in on?
 
TNP is going to need a court of appeals badly to sort out this kind of mess

Is it really the courts opinion that its own actions are entirely beyond review?

And is it also the courts opinion that unilateral and unconstitutional expansions of its power are not a serious matter that warrants review by the full court?

And last but not least, is it the courts opinion that it can sua sponte rule on the basis of arguments nobody presented before the court?
 
I must echo the concerns raised by COE and Barbarossistan. Speaking as a member of the public, and not in my capacity as a Deputy AG, I find it concerning that the Court would summarily dismiss a Request for Review pertaining to the authority of the Court while simultaneously issuing an unsolicited ruling on wither or not the Courts actions are able to be reviewed. This is troubling indeed.
 
It appears to me this decision is severely in need of review itself and while the Matrioshka effect of reviewing decisions on a decision to review something is regrettable I have filed a request for review to that end, the court really needs to reconsider its positions here.

I cordially invite the AG's office to join the request or refile for itself in case the court wants to dodge the issue by denying me standing.
 
I knew that the Court had the power to declare itself above the law... but I never thought I'd see it do so.

I will consider what steps are appropriate and necessary to confront this new threat to our democracy.

I apologize for my rudeness, but I do not thank the Court for its ruling.
 
It is the opinion of the Court that the Court's actions in this case are not reviewable. This is because the Court believes that only in exceptional circumstances, in the case of a particularly severe breach, can the Court's actions be reviewed.
The Court is a constitutionally mandated elected position. Of course it's actions are reviewable, by virtue of them being government officials. How can the Court (or THOs) review a government policy or Law that hasn't been enacted yet? The original R4R asking for such a review should have been rejected outright on those grounds alone (regardless of standing claimed by the petitioner).
 
Since I have no Conflict of Interest in the original case this is reviewing I shall be taking over this case as Moderating Justice.

Please indulge me a few days to get my barrings, review the actions taken so far, replace THOs, to figure out the path forward on this review.

Abbey, and Plembobria in between the injunction against the last ruling and the reopening of this Request for Review had lost and regained citizenship thereby abandoning the office of THO.

I would further like to request that Yalakn who has maintained validity as a THO recuse himself going forward due to their involvement in the prior ruling.
 
If it pleases the Court, I would ask that the Court give consideration to permitting the filing of further, supplemental briefs in view of the decision of the recent request for review which, in my respectful submission, has bearing on the issues this Court is asked to consider and which was, for self-evident reasons, not addressed in the briefs so far filed.

Additionally, and for the avoidance of confusion, I should state also that I remain recused from consideration of this matter for the reasons I stated earlier in announcing my recusal.
 
The Court has decided that the period for submitting briefs shall be reopened for a period of 4 days until March 18th, 2018 @
(time=1521393300)

Edit: Changed the time I typed out to the time code since the original message was typed on my phone
 
If it pleases the Court, I offer my assistance in this matter through the following supplemental brief:

I will make submissions in relation to the decision of the Court in the recent request for review,[note]Ruling on the Validity of a Previous Ruling[/note] particularly, I will focus on the two respects in which I submit the decision has lasting implications for this decision. Namely, I will address the points made in the decision dealing with the claim that the previous ruling of this Court was sua sponte and the deficiencies in the previous ruling which the decision found sufficient to require it be set aside. I do not propose to make submissions on the point of a majority decision, as it does not, in my submission, have particular relevance for this decision beyond that which it does for all decisions.

Firstly, on the point of the previous decision being made sua sponte, the review found that the suggestion that this was so was incorrect. The Court held that in reviewing a matter and ruling on it, the Court must consider the question of whether to do so would be proper and in-line with precedent; this was, in the Court's view, an underlying question which the Court was required to decide. That question must now be answered again by this Court.

In doing so, in addition to the matters I addressed in my previous submissions, I submit also that the Court ought to have regard to the fact that the duty to consider the question of whether or not it is proper to consider the original request for review also rests on the original Court. That Court, before concluding on the questions put to it, must also consider whether it would be proper and in-line with precedent to do so. In my respectful submission, it would be improper for this Court to decide that question in pre-emption of the original Court. If the original Court does decide in a manner which is mistaken, then, and only then, will it be proper for that decision to be challenged; this Court should not permit a pre-emptive challenge on the basis of supposition that the original Court may decide incorrectly.

Further, in my submission, the Court should not allow such a pre-emptive challenge where there is a difference in the test that would be applied before the decision and the test that would be applied after. That is to say, presuming that the Ruling on the Nature of Precedent can still properly be said to be authority, it should not be possible (as it would be grossly improper), as I submitted in my original brief, for the heightened standard it prescribed to be evaded by a pre-emptory challenge. I have couched this submission in conditional terms as the Court in the Ruling on the Validity of a Previous Ruling described both the previous decision in this review and the Ruling on the Nature of Precedent[note]Ruling on the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Courts Powers[/note] in the same terms (that is, as prescribing insufficiently defined and, thus, "arbitrary" standards) and may, more broadly, be taken to have overturned them both. If I may, with respect to the Court in the most recent review, I would suggest that the Court was mistaken to have done so (not least because the Ruling on the Nature of Precedent is clear as to the level of the heightened standard, being that there must be no legal alternative to overruling a decision) and, in relation to the Ruling on the Nature of Precedent, cannot be regarded as having met the requirements of transparency and fullness of explanation necessary to have overturned it. It is on that basis that I have made this further submission, however, if I am incorrect then, naturally, insofar as my submissions do rely on that decision, they ought be disregarded.

For those reasons, together with those advanced in my earlier submissions, I submit that this Court ought to find that concluding on the matters put to it would be improper, as they are properly and correctly before the original Court and not yet there decided, and, therefore, ought to decline to rule on this matter. In the alternative, I would submit that the proper disposal of this matter is as I earlier advanced.
 
The second period to submit briefs is now closed.


In regards to the withdrawing of the original Request for Review that this is based on. Since this was brought up by the office of the Attorney General and the withdraw does not negate the question posed by this Request for Review, the court shall proceed as scheduled.
 
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Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the judicial inquiry filed by SillyString on Court Review of RA Proposals
Opinion drafted by Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Lord Lore and Sil Dorsett

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Clean Land.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed here and here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Barbarossistan.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
Constitution:
1. The Court will try all criminal cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Court ruling "On the Validity of a Previous Ruling":
The Court disagrees with the previous ruling that only under exceptional circumstances can the Court be reviewed. With no clear definition of "exceptional circumstances," the Court would be free to raise such standards to dismiss a case through the use of whatever criteria it felt was necessary to do so. It could also lower the same to accept a case that ordinarily wouldn't be under the concept of "exceptional circumstances." Even the oft-cited ruling on the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers failed to adequately define its own concept of "heightened standards," leaving the definition to be decided by the Court arbitrarily. While this Court agrees that a request to simply "look again" because a petitioner or the Attorney General's office was unhappy with the result should be rejected, whenever there is the possibility that the court was not in compliance with the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Legal Code, overturned precedent without explanation, or if there is new evidence uncovered that might impact a past ruling, a review would be warranted.

Therefore, the ruling in regards to the judicial inquiry filed by SillyString on the ability of the Court to review RA proposals is set aside, and having previously accepted SillyString's inquiry, the Court is ordered to reconsider the matter.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Court ruling "On the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers":
If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Court ruling on Standing and the Definition of Affected Party:
The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.
The Court opines the following:

The Court is in the unusual position of ruling for a second time on a single request for review. In the most recently published court ruling "On the validity of a previous ruling", the Court's original ruling on this request was wholly overturned, and it has been ordered that the request be reconsidered. In the same ruling, it was determined that a review of a court action is warranted "whenever there is the possibility that the court was not in compliance with the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Legal Code." Since, in this situation, the petitioner cites portions of the Consitution and Bill of Rights that may have plausibly been violated by the court action being reviewed, the court must rule on the question.

The Court finds that Justice Scorch's action in accepting the request for review filed by Lord Ravenclaw on November 28, 2017 violates Article 5, Clause 1 of the Constitution, because the object of the request (namely, a proposal before the Regional Assembly) is neither a law, a goverment policy, nor a government action.

The ability to make a proposal to the Regional Assembly is afforded to every citizen in The North Pacific, and thus, when a citizen makes such a proposal, they are not acting as a government official, but as a private citizen. Even if they were to hold a government office at the time they make a proposal, they cannot be considered to be acting in their capacity as a government official. Exceptions may possibly be made for situations in which the ability to make certain proposals is restricted to government officials (e.g. the Delegate proposing a treaty, or the Vice Delegate presenting the Security Council's nomination of a potential new member). In all other cases, however, making a proposal is not considered an action made by a government official.

Furthermore, a proposal before the RA cannot be considered a law or a government policy until it is enacted. The Court is a reactive body, and both the spirit and the letter of the Constitution Article 5, Clause 1 preclude the Court from ruling on something that hasn't actually happened yet, such as potential violation of rights that might be done if a proposal becomes a law.

This decision does not apply solely to requests to review proposals of the Regional Assembly. More broadly, the Court finds that justices are prohibited by the Constitution from accepting a request for review of anything that is not a law, government policy, or government action. When a justice does so, the Court ought to find in their ruling that the object of the request is not within the scope of their review power, and decline to rule on it. To streamline this process, it may be adviseable for the Court to amend the Court Rules and Procedures to allow the Attorney General to appeal decisions of an individual justice to the full Court in a request for review. Currently, only the petitioner has the power to appeal, and they would naturally be disinterested in appealing a decision to accept the request that they themselves have made.

In this particular case, since Lord Ravenclaw has withdrawn their request, no further action by the Court is required to correct the situation.
 
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