Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the invalidation of his candidacy for the Delegate election
Opinion drafted by r3naissanc3r, joined by Funkadelia and Romanoffia
The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mall.
The Court took into consideration Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
The Court took into consideration Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.
The Court took into consideration its previous rulings:
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Outstanding Request for Review
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election
The Court took into consideration the announcement made here on September 1st 2013 by the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election.
The Court took into consideration Section 3, Part 7 of the Constitution of The North Pacific, as it stood immediately before the enactment of the Constitutional Omnibus Act, passed on August 21st:
7. Candidates for these elected officials must be members of the Assembly for 30 days before nominations begin.
The Court took into consideration the Regional Assembly discussion on the Constitutional Omnibus Act that took place here.
The Court opines the following:
The petitioner, Mall, has requested that the Court review the decision made on September 1
st 2013 by the "Voting Booth" to invalidate his candidacy for Vice Delegate in the General Election of September 2013 ("the election"). The Court believes that by "Voting Booth" the petitioner is referring to the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election of September 2013 ("the Electoral Commission"), who are in exclusive control of the account "Voting Booth" for the duration of the election. The Court will adopt this assumption for the remaining of this opinion. The Court granted the petition, recognizing that the fact that the petitioner is the same as the person whose candidacy was invalidated affords the petitioner the status of
affected party constitutionally required of those requesting review.
The petitioner challenged the decision of the Election Commissioner on two separate grounds. The Court will address them separately.
Fifteen-day constitutional requirement for candidates.
The Electoral Commission, in their announcement on the invalidation of the petitioner's candidacy, provided as justification the constitutional requirement laid down by Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution. This Clause requires that "[c]andidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations." The petitioner challenged this justification by making three claims: First, that the above clause does not require membership for the fifteen days immediately preceding the "election". Second, that he fulfilled the requirements of that clause under that interpretation, having been a member of the Regional Assembly for some period of fifteen days before the opening of nominations. Third, that the Electoral Commission incorrect use of the above clause to invalidate his candidacy violated the petitioner's right to equal and fair treatment and protection, as provided by Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific ("Bill of Rights").
The Court will examine the first claim and, depending on its conclusion, proceed to the second and third.
Regarding the interpretation of Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution, mcmasterdonia submitted a brief arguing that the Court has already ruled on this matter in the past. The decision in question was rendered on April 21
st 2012, at a time when the Court had not yet adopted its current naming conventions for cases; for convenience it will be referenced as
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific, In regards to the Outstanding Request for Review, and is provided at the beginning of this opinion. The decision related to a clause of the Constitution of The North Pacific ("the Constitution") before it was amended to its current form by the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012. The clause in question survives to an extent in the current Constitution, in the form of Article 6, Clause 1. However, the current form of the clause is considerably different from the old one. One of the most salient amendments is the addition of the definite article "the" before the number of days, whose meaning the Court is asked to determine. Therefore, the old decision is no longer applicable and a new one needs to be made.
The Court believes that the language in Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution, and specifically the presence of the definite article before "fifteen", clearly indicates that the requirement to be examined for potential candidates is whether they have been members of the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. The language is unambiguous, and therefore any other interpretation would be absurd. This interpretation is compatible with the one used by the Electoral Commission, and incompatible with the interpretation proposed by the petitioner.
It is worth also examining the intent of the regional legislative body, the Regional Assembly, while drafting the constitutional clause in question. In the thread in the Regional Assembly discussing the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012, when asked about the meaning of the definite article in Article 6, Clause 1, then Speaker Gulliver
stated: "The "the" there is deliberate. It means specifically the 15 days before the election in question, not any random 15 days, so it's not possible to argue that "I was in the assembly 15 days already, even if it wasn't continuous, therefore I'm good to run"."
It should be noted that taking the intention of the Regional Assembly into consideration when interpreting a statute is appropriate only when said statute is ambiguous or absurd. Neither of these is true in this case, as Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution unambiguously indicates that the requirement for candidates is that they have been in the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. However, the legislature's intent here is in agreement with the actual meaning of the clause, and corroborates the interpretation adopted by the Court.
Based on the above, the Court rejects the first claim made by the petitioner. The petitioner's second and third claims were conditional on the validity of the first claim, and therefore are also rejected.
Decision
The Electoral Commission interpreted Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution correctly in their decision to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy on the grounds that the petitioner was not a member of the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. The decision of the Electoral Commission cannot be overturned on the grounds presented by the petitioner and is upheld.
Right to due process, prior notice, and the opportunity to be heard
The petitioner requested that the Court review whether the way in which the Electoral Commission invalidated his candidacy violated the petitioner's right to due process of law provided by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights says that due process includes "prior notice and the opportunity to be heard". The petitioner argued that the Electoral Commission's execution of their decision to invalidate his candidacy violated both of these elements of due process.
The Court has found in its previous decision
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election that "the Electoral Commission constitutes a "governmental authority" for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights." Thus, its actions are indeed subject to review for violations of the requirement for observance of due process of law laid down by that Article, as the petitioner has requested.
Regarding prior notice, the Court first needs to determine what constitutes sufficient prior notice, and then to determine whether the Electoral Commission has provided it.
For the first consideration, statutory legislation does not provide any cues as to what constitutes sufficient prior notice for the invalidation of a candidacy by the Electoral Commission.
In terms of case precedent, the subject of sufficient notice for actions of the Electoral Commission has been examined to some extent by the Court in its previous decision
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election. The Court determined there that "an announcement of the restarting of a vote made in a new, separate thread in an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights." The Court then also found that "this is a
sufficient, not
necessary standard." In doing so, the Court provided the necessary flexibility for future determinations on what is sufficient prior notice to adapt to the circumstances of actions of the Electoral Commission of different nature. The current circumstances are indeed different, in that they concern a different action by the Electoral Commission, namely the invalidation of a candidacy instead of the restarting of a vote.
The Court also argued that prior practice needs to be taken into account in such determinations. Such prior practice creates expectations to nations as to how actions by governmental authorities are going to be performed, and how nations may reasonably expect to be notified of such actions. Considering prior practice, the Court in its previous decision noted that "the general accepted standard for actions by governmental officials is that they are visibly announced in a designated place within the constitutionally designated Regional Forum, with visibility usually achieved through the use of a new thread." In the case of the handling of nominations and candidacies, the latter clause is not applicable: decisions regarding such matters have in the past consistently been announced within the a thread specifically designated for nominations and candidacies. It follows that any announcement regarding nominations and candidacies made by the Electoral Commission within such a thread would constitute a "visible announcement" as described above.
Following the above considerations, the Court believes that an announcement on the invalidation of a candidacy constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights if made in the following manner: a new post within a thread whose purpose is the administration of nominations and candidacies and is inside an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes. As before, this is a
sufficient, not
necessary standard. Concluding the discussion of prior notice, the Court notes that on September 1
st the Electoral Commission made
here an announcement satisfying this standard.
Turning to the right to be heard, there is no statutory legislation or case precedent elaborating its interpretation. A nation's right to be heard can be interpreted in two ways. First, being able to publicly and visibly, but within reasonable limits, express disagreement with and complain about actions of a governmental authority affecting the nation. Second, being able to seek protection from such actions, through a process where the nation is allowed to argue their position, have their arguments heard and judged impartially, and which after such judgment can, if appropriate, relieve the nation. The Court believes that both of these elements constitute parts of the right to be heard.
In the case at hand, with regards to the first element, the Court notes that the Electoral Commission did not deny the petitioner the opportunity to express his disagreement with or complain about the invalidation of his candidacy. The petitioner could have done so in the designated thread for nominations and candidacies, an action which, for the reasons argued earlier when considering prior notice, would have been both public and visible. With regards to the second element, regional law permits the petitioner to request review of the actions of the Electoral Commission, have his argument heard and judged by the Court, which may then relieve the petitioner. The petitioner has indeed exercised this right, free from interference from the Electoral Commission. Therefore, the Court believes that neither element of the petitioner's right to be heard has been violated by the Electoral Commission's actions in deciding to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy.
Decision.
The Electoral Commission with its actions enacting its decision to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy did not violate the right to due process of law granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The actions of the Electoral Commission cannot be overturned on the grounds presented by the petitioner and are upheld.
