[R4R] Gross Misconduct & the vagueness doctrine

saintpeter

Chief Justice
1. What law, government policy, or action (taken by a government official) do you request that the Court review?
Legal Code section 1.9, clause 25:
25. "Gross Misconduct" is defined as the violation of an individual's legally mandated sworn oath, either willfully or through negligence.
Combined with Legal Code section 6.1, clause 2:
2. Any resident may apply for citizenship using their regional forum account, by providing the name of their nation in The North Pacific, and swearing an oath as follows:
I pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.
This request is specifically referring to the enforceability of the requirement for "responsible action as a member of [TNP's] society" under clause 25 of Legal Code section 1.9

2. What portions of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Legal Code, or other legal document do you believe has been violated by the above? How so?
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

This request specifically concerns whether punishing a citizen for not limiting themselves to "responsible action as a member of [TNP's] society" violates that citizen's right to "due process" and "equal and fair treatment" under the Bill of Rights. Under the current reading of the Gross Misconduct statute, a nation has to abide by the oath, which requires that they act responsibly. I find that the Court—in keeping with the vagueness doctrine—should hold that the requirement that nations act responsibly is void for vagueness.

First, let me address the question of what the vagueness doctrine is. In short, the vagueness doctrine is the (very) widely accepted fact in the legal community "that requires criminal laws to state explicitly and definitely what conduct is punishable" (Wex Legal Dictionary/Encyclopedia). It is obvious why this is required; a citizen would otherwise not be able to determine what conduct is and is not unlawful, meaning their right to prior notice is not properly satisfied, in violation of their fundamental right to due process. As Justice Sutherland, from the foreign nation of the United States, so eloquently explained, a vague statute "violates the first essential of due process of law" Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

Then, let's address the specific issue at hand. I do not hold that the Gross Misconduct statute as a whole is void for vagueness, as the promise of "obedience to her laws" is not vague. However, the requirement that citizens act responsibly is vague and this court should hold that this requirement is not enforceable. I would once again point to a ruling made in the foreign jurisdiction of the United States - noting that their precedence does not apply here, but still providing it as a useful guidance - where the Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting three or more people from assembling on a sidewalk and annoying passersby was too vague. The requirement in question is, arguably, much more vague.

Both the law of The North Pacific and the law of the foreign nation of the United States require due process, which is violated by making a law sufficiently vague that the average citizen wouldn't be able to tell what conduct is unlawful.

To further illustrate the point, let's consider why we require prior notice to begin with. We do so, because we recognise that someone needs to be aware of what the law is before the law is valid, as otherwise someone doesn't how to act lawfully, in violation of their due process rights. A vague law does exactly the same: it prevents someone from knowing what conduct is lawful and not, thereby violating their right to due process in the same way failure to provide prior notice would. Is participating in an election that you have no chance to win responsible? Is telegramming another nation a mild swear word responsible? Is filing a R4R that turns out to be moot responsible? Etc. Etc. Etc. This requirement is so vague, you should hold it's void for vagueness.

This requirement is so vague that it per se leads to arbitrary convictions, based on a subjective understanding of responsibility, in violation of citizens' right to due process under the law and "equal and fair treatment".

3. Are there any prior rulings of the Court that support your request for review? Which ones, and how?
N/A

4. Please establish your standing by detailing how you, personally, have been adversely affected. If you are requesting a review of a governmental action, you must include how any rights or freedoms of yours have been violated.
I am representing citizen Pigeonstan, who is being subjected to an arbitrary indictment based in part on this vague requirement. If the Court agrees with me on this matter, the Gross Misconduct charges would be dependent on the charges of Fraud, whereas they now stand as independent charges based on the accusation Pigeonstan did not act responsibly.

5. Is there a compelling regional interest in resolving your request? If so, explain why it is in the interest of the region as whole for your request to be decided now.
This law remains on the book and thereby continuously allows members of this region to be subject to arbitrary prosecution in violation of their right to due process and fair and equal treatment.

6. Do you have any further information you wish to submit to the Court with your request?
N/A
 
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Counsel, the Court is considering this request, to assist those considerations there are some points that it would be helpful for you to address.

The Court held in its decision on Court Review of RA Proposals that prospective reviews are impermissible, as they are made without standing. The Court in hearing the trial related to this matter has not yet made any final determination on the guilt or lack thereof of the Defendant, nor has it heard argument on it. Determinations to accept an indictment are made ex parte, generally drawing inferences in the prosecution’s favour and allowing arguable issues to proceed to trial so that they can be argued. So, at this stage, why do you say this review is not prevented by the Court’s holding on prospective reviews?

Also, the Court in its decision on the Delegate’s Authority to Staff the Executive Branch raised concerns about deciding criminal questions about a specific person in the context of review proceedings. These proceedings do not have the same tools as a trial and findings in these proceedings could bind in the trial, limiting defences that could be put forward. The arguments that could be put forward in this review could, one anticipates, be put forward at trial. The Court would then be able to make a decision having received evidence and full argument and knowing the full factual picture. Why do you say this is the appropriate forum for this to be decided?
 
Your Honour, I thank the court for their consideration of the matter and will be addressing both previous rulings. The first seems primarily about standing, wheras the second considers what the appropriate forum for this discussion is.

Standing
In the decision on Court Review of RA Proposals, the Court held "that justices are prohibited by the Constitution from accepting a request for review of anything that is not a law, government policy, or government action". In this R4R, I request a review of something that is clearly not "not a law", as it is a law. Now, the Court indeed "has not yet made any final determination on the guilt or lack thereof of the Defendant, nor has it heard argument on it", but that is not relevant to the question it is presented with, because the question is a generally applicable constitutional question.

When considering whether a filer has standing, the Court would - in my view - exercise a two-part test:
  1. Does the filer request a review of "a law, government policy, or government action"? The answer to this question must be "yes", if not, for example because it concerns a proposal yet to be voted on by the Regional Assembly, one can per se not be harmed. In this case, I requested a review of something that is unquestionably "a law", and thus it passes this part of the test.
  2. Does the filer (or the person they represent) experience harm from the "law, government policy, or government action"? The person I represent, Pigeonstan, unquestionably is harmed by the "law" in question, because it has enabled an indictment based on the law (that is prima facie too vague). To be put in jeopardy is to be harmed, regardless of whether someone is convicted, because the prosecution (1) serves as a permanent stain on someone's record and (2) requires the defendant to put time and effort into their defence, among other things. So, as my client has been indicted, he is per se harmed by the "law" in question.
In conclusion, my client has standing in this matter.

R4R or Trial
In this Court's decision on the Delegate's Authority to Staff the Executive Branch, it "examined the specific nature of the request for review [and] [it] determined that [it] [was] unable to answer the specific question" (emphasis mine). The Court did not determine that R4Rs that affect current controversies/court cases cannot be accepted, rather it held that the "specific nature" of that request of review did not allow for the Court to answer it. In fact, this Court - in the very same decision - issued a decision on the Delegate's authority to staff the executive branch, while refusing to issue a decision on abc's allegation that his freedom of speech was violated. Now, how can one make sense of this decision? Quite simply, actually, by recognising that the Court - in part implicitly - made a distinction between two types of cases invloving current controversies:
  1. R4Rs that request the Court to examine someone's behaviour based on case-specific facts. The Court held it could not answer to such requests, like the one abc posted, because a decision in favour of the filer "would presume the delegate's guilt, and limit the valid avenues for the defense to pursue when countering the criminal charge" and that "the information it would need in order to make any determination about whether abc's freedom of speech was violated is not of a nature easily obtained during the course of a request for review". The question I issued is not based on case-specific facts, but concerns a generally applicable constitutional question (any citizen could have asked the exact same question and the question would still make sense); no decision by this Court would "presume" anyone's guilt or limit their avenues to counter the charge, nor does this Court need any case-specific information and/or evidence to answer the question issued.
  2. R4Rs that request the Court to examine a generally applicable constitutional question. Despite the Court refusing to comment on whether abc's freedom of speech specifically was violated, it did issue a decision with regards to the Delegate's authority to staff the executive branch, because that question is a generally applicable question. That is clearly the case here, because the question is whether a specific part of the Oath is unenforceable for voidness, something that would apply to every person, not just Pigeonstan.
So, because this Court is asked to examine a generally applicable constitutional question, and not a question that in any way relies on case-specific evidence or information, this court should accept the request in question.

I thank the Court for its time in evaluating this matter and can be reached at any time to answer further questions this Court may have.
 
I accept this request for review.

I set the period for briefs at five days. I am conscious that these proceedings will have the effect of delaying the ongoing criminal trial of Pigeonstan and am considering shortening the period for briefs. To that end, I would ask that counsel in that trial, both prosecution and defence, indicate whether they intend to submit briefs and, if so, when they expect to do so.

It appears to me that this request does not have an appropriate respondent. The Court Rules concerning respondents are predicated on a challenge to an action or policy of an official or officials so that they have the opportunity to defend their conduct or policy, this review relates to the constitutionality of a legal provision and does not appear to me to be the responsibility of any official.
 
Counsel have helpfully indicated to me that they would expect to be able to file briefs in 48 hours. I will allow a bit longer than that to allow for slippage and recognise that others may also wish to submit briefs. The period for briefs will run for 60 hours from this post, ending at (time=1593229500).
 
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A Brief in Opposition to the R4R filed by Saintpeter on behalf of Pigeonstan.

Table of Authorities


Bill of Rights Section 7
Bill of Rights Section 9
Bill of Rights Section 11
Legal Code Chapter 6 Section 6.1.2
Legal Code Chapter 6 Section 6.1.5
Legal Code Chapter 7 Section 7.4.21
Legal Code Chapter 7 Section 7.6.36
Legal Code Chapter 8 Section 8.2.5
Legal Code Chapter 8 Section 8.3.12
On WA Nation Disclosure Requirements
On the TNP Flag as a National Flag
On the Speaker's Power to End Debate
On the Constitutionality of Prohibiting Sedition
On the Constitutionality of the Intelligence Exception to the Freedom of Information Act
On the Powers of Election Commissioners
On the Definition of Government Officials
On RA Membership Requirements for Candidates
On the Standard of Proof and Intent
On the Meaning of Private Citizen
On the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate
On Regional Assembly Oversight of the North Pacific Armed Forces
On Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of Endorsements
On the Process for Declassifying Information for Use as Evidence in a Criminal Trial
On a Regional Officer Banning Nations during NationStates Events
On the sentence issued by the Court in the case of The North Pacific v. Whole India
The Oath Amendment Reform Bill of April 2013


Standing

Although Court Procedures, Chapter 2 Section 5 allows anyone to submit a brief in a request for review, we note that we hold specific standing to submit this brief in this matter. Legal Code Chapter 3, Section 3.3.20 grants the Prosecutor the authority to represent the region in any matter arising from the criminal trial in which they are assigned.

Since this matter directly relates to the charges brought against Pigeonstan in his criminal trial and can affect the prosecution of said case, we ask the court to note our specific standing in this matter.

Background

The petitioner is an indicted citizen charged with various crimes including the charge of Gross Misconduct for violating his oath as a citizen to be responsible in action

The petitioner, through his counsel, submits that the charge of Gross Misconduct cannot be used to enforce the Citizen Oath Clause requiring a citizen to be “responsible action” because there is no established standard for which the defendant can use as a responsible action. The petitioner argues that since there is no standard to reference, he cannot be charged with Gross Misconduct as the clause is too vague for him to determine what actions are responsible. He further argues that the lack of a standard for this clause violates his “right to due process” and “equal and fair treatment.”

Responsible Action: Meaning as Defined by The Regional Assembly

The Petitioner claims that it is not possible for a person to determine what is a responsible action. This shows a misunderstanding of the term and how it is used in the oath. Responsible action means to act as a responsible member of the region. This meaning is clearly outlined in the Oath Reform Bill of April 2013, when the terminology of the citizens oath was changed. (Which can be found here:https://forum.thenorthpacific.org/topic/7044688/ ) Furthermore, this very situation in which a citizen is held accountable for their failure to be responsible in action was discussed. Gaspo specifically talks about the use of the Reasonableness Doctrine to enforce Responsibility. “Even if the oath were clarified, there's actually a very clear legal standard for responsibility, through reasonableness doctrine. It wouldn't present a problem. As an example, if I as AG chose to question and challenge every single government action, just because I could, that would be *irresponsible*, objectively. Reasonableness, legally, is an objective standard, not subjective, so it wouldn't be a problem.” Responsible action, therefore, is encapsulated and enforced in the Reasonable Doctrine.

There are Multiple Requirements for Reasonable Action in the Bill of Rights and Legal Code

Since the current Constitution's ratification back in 2012, there have been multiple requirements built into it that require all subjected to the laws of TNP to act in a reasonable manner. The Bill of Rights has two places in which reasonableness is used. The first is in Section 7 that state “a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact-finder by reasonably certain evidence (emphasis added.)” Bill of Rights Section 7 Reasonable is again used in Section 11, which requires all government officials to act in any reasonable manner during an actual emergency. Bill of Rights Section 11

Our legal code calls on citizens and government officials to be responsible several times. The citizen's oath requires all citizens who voluntarily take the oath to have “responsible action.” Legal Code Chapter 6 Section 6.1.2 It again calls on the Vice Delegate and Security Council to have a “reasonable concern” that there is a security risk when rejecting a citizen application. Legal Code Chapter 6 Section 6.1.5 The Freedom of Information Act requires that the Real Life information of any NationState player must be protected if there exists a “reasonable real-life expectation of privacy.” Legal Code Chapter 7 Section 7.4.21 The North Pacific Army must take all “Reasonable steps to restore” a region subjected to a military operation. Legal Code Section 7 Chapter 7.6.36 The Executive Government is required to act in a reasonable manner when responding to a Disease outbreak. Legal Code Chapter 8 Section 8.2.5. Should the offsite forums go down, government authorities are required to take any reasonable actions they deem appropriate. Legal Code Chapter 8 Section 8.3.12

There is an Established Doctrine Of Reasonable Action

Reasonableness is not defined in the Legal Code. On that point, the petitioner is correct. However, the court has applied the same standard for determining reasonableness since 2012. Nowhere is this more evident than in the court's ruling On the Standard of Proof and Intent. The court states “The second is reckless intent, wherein the intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.” This standard is clear. The harmful or beneficial consequence of action must be something a reasonable person could have expected, or by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. This is not a new standard or an unusual standard that has come about randomly. Does the Petitioner's actions in question violate the reasonable standard required by the Citizen’s Oath? That is a matter for the Trial Court. But the standard is clear and established.

The Reasonable Doctrine is Settled Law

The Court has used this established standard since the current Constitution's ratification in 2012.On WA Nation Disclosure Requirements in which the Court determined that the requirement that Nations disclose their WA status as an unreasonable barrier to the voting rights of citizens. On the TNP Flag as a National Flag the Court used this established standard to determine the government's restriction on the use of the Regional Flag. Overall the Court use this standard in every one of of the following cases:

On the Speaker's Power to End Debate
On the Constitutionality of Prohibiting Sedition
On the Constitutionality of the Intelligence Exception to the Freedom of Information Act
On the Powers of Election Commissioners
On the Definition of Government Officials
On RA Membership Requirements for Candidates
On the Standard of Proof and Intent
On the Meaning of Private Citizen
On the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate
On Regional Assembly Oversight of the North Pacific Armed Forces
On Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of Endorsements
On the Process for Declassifying Information for Use as Evidence in a Criminal Trial
On a Regional Officer Banning Nations during NationStates Events
On the sentence issued by the Court in the case of The North Pacific v. Whole India


The Petitioners Claims of a Lack of Standard do not Withstand Scrutiny and Should be Dismissed

The Petitioner states in their filing that there is no standard in which a citizen can determine if their action is responsible. This is factually untrue. There has been a requirement for members of the region to act in a reasonable and responsible manner since the region was first founded. The early oaths for membership to the Regional Assembly required that all members conduct themselves as a responsible member. When Regional Assembly membership was replaced with citizenship, the requirement remained. Responsibility is an objective standard. A reasonable person can determine if an action is done in a responsible manner. Reasonableness and responsibility have been established doctrine within our region. With there being a clear and established standard, the petitioner's request for relief should be denied.
 
A Brief by the Filer in re Gross Misconduct & the vagueness doctrine
This brief was authored by saintpeter in support of his request for review and submitted to the Court on June 26, 2020 (UTC). These views do not necessarily represent the views of Pigeonstan.

In this brief I will be responding to the comments made by Dreadton and I will be reminding the Court of the nuanced challenge that I brought to the Gross Misconduct statute.

In re Dreadton's brief

I will be structuring my response based on the structure of Dreadton's brief. I do not disagree with Dreadton's comments in the sections "Standing" and "Background".

Responsible Action: Meaning as Defined by The Regional Assembly
Dreadton argues that the legislative intent of the Regional Assembly (hereafter "RA") was clear from the discussions surrounding its passage. It is important to note that his claim must hold true, otherwise his entire argument no longer works, as the rest of the brief assumes this premise to be true.

Dreadton provides little evidence as to the legislative intent of the RA. In fact, he provides only one quote from a citizen at the time to back up his request that this Court ignores that the oath specifically mentions "responsible" and pretends it says "reasonable". So let's actually look at the thread where this new oath was discussed. According to Dreadton, Gaspo's comments proof that the RA felt the reasonableness standard should apply. Yet he ignores the comments by others in the very same thread that tell a completely different story, and he does so for good reasons, because there is no indication that anyone thought this was a reasonable interpretation. Instead, we see comments like these:
I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for membership in the Regional Assembly of the North Pacific.
What I highlighted in red is vague and subjective. Who gets to determine what is 'responsible action'? Someone could interpret "responsible action as a member of her society" and not criticizing the government or anything else. It is not a necessary phrase and to vague to the point of being a perfect political tool in the wrong hands.

That's just my libertarian bent.
Before, it said "to act as a responsible member of it's society" so I fail to see how at the very least, this is not a grammatical improvement. Also, I doubt that phrase could ever be used to prosecute someone, because of its subjective nature, and because of the legal grey area that is oath violations...
I have voted for this bill for the same reason as Romanoffia. [Romanoffia said they voted for "just to see what happens"]
I am not a trial lawyer so maybe my opinion doesn't count, but I think reasonableness cannot be measured and evaluated objectively.
(Of course, my personal POV is from a scientific standpoint as opposed to a legal one)
Why was this portion in the original oath is the question we should have asked ourselves, to decide if it should have been left in or taken out. Oh well, too late.
So, as we can see, three people felt the word was too vague and, in fact, COE, who introduced the new oath, felt it could not be used to prosecute someone because of its vagueness.

Besides this obvious evidence based on which Dreadton's claims should be rejected prima facie, this Court of course also knows that it should be careful when looking at legislative intent - there is no reason why the RA could not have changed the wording to "reasonable" had they wanted the reasonableness standard to apply.

There are Multiple Requirements for Reasonable Action in the Bill of Rights and Legal Code
Dreadton goes on to argue that the word "reasonable - which is not used in the oath - is used in other parts of the Legal Code and Bill of Rights, and therefore it can supposedly not be too vague. Here is the thing about language that Dreadton does not say: words can be clear in one context and unclear in another. Now, I won't address every single mention as Dreadton never explains how they are somewhat similar to the use here (again, assuming "responsible" means "reasonable"), but for example, it is certainly much easier to understand what "reasonably certain evidence" means as opposed to a requirement to act reasonably at all times.

There is an Established Doctrine Of Reasonable Action
Here, Dreadton brings up this Court's definition of the word "reckless intent" and then goes on to assume that the definition also applies to "reasonable", even though the fact that the defintion uses the word "reasonable" in no way proves that it also defines it. Rather, this definition is the definition of "reckless intent", a word (like "reasonable") never used in the oath.

The Reasonable Doctrine is Settled Law
Here, I would say two things:
  1. Like before, context is key. The word "reasonable" can be clear in one context but unclear in another.
  2. The fact that the Court has applied the "reasonableness doctrine" - which again has nothing to do with this oath to begin with - doesn't mean it is settled law. Courts apply laws, doctrines, requirements, etc., all the time while later realising it is unconstitutional, once someone brings the right challenge to the Court. The Court, as far as I am aware, has never ruled on the Gross Misconduct issue and the vagueness doctrine, and thus it is not settled law.
Reminder of my original case
Originally, I brought the Court two arguments that have not properly been rebutted:
  1. Because the word "responsible" is so vague, it cannot be enforced (as COE - the author of the oath argued), as this would interfere with a person's right to due process. Namely, if one cannot know what conduct is unlawful, the law is void for vagueness. This is the exact same logic by which TNP requires prior notice.
  2. Due to its vagueness, the requirement that nations act responsibly is so vague it per se, regardless of the quality of judges, leads to arbitrary indictments and convictions, in violation of one's right to equal and fair treatment.
I hope that this brief will help this Honourable Court in deciding this important matter, and I am convinced it will rule the vague requirement unenforceable. As always, I can be contacted with any questions.
 
Your honor,

The people are inquiring if the court will have a decision soon. As the court is aware, there is a court case being held up due to this R4R.
 
Ask and ye shall receive.





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Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the judicial inquiry filed by saintpeter on behalf of Pigeonstan on the Constitutionality of Vague Laws and Gross Misconduct
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Wonderess and Lady Raven Wing

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by saintpeter.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed by Dreadton and saintpeter.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 4. The Court:
2. Reviews of laws or government policies and actions must be made by request of an affected party unless there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:
Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:
7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer. In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence. A Nation may be represented by any counsel of the Nation's choosing. No Nation convicted of a crime shall be subject to a punishment disproportionate to that crime.

[...]

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 1.9: Gross Misconduct:
25. "Gross Misconduct" is defined as the violation of an individual's legally mandated sworn oath, either willfully or through negligence.
Section 6.1: Citizenship Applications:
2. Any resident may apply for citizenship using their regional forum account, by providing the name of their nation in The North Pacific, and swearing an oath as follows:
I pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Sentence Issued by the Court in The North Pacific v Whole India:
The Court has determined that Deropia does have the standing to bring this request for review on behalf of Whole India. Whole India, as the defendant whose sentence is being challenged, has obvious and unassailable standing to raise concerns about impropriety in their own sentencing. Criminal defendants have the right to be represented by counsel during their trial, and that right to representation must necessarily extend to other issues raised with the court pertaining to that trial, even if they do not occur during the official trial process.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on WA Nation Disclosure Requirements:
On the third point, the Court must examine the law in its entirety to determine whether or not WA Membership is a requirement, or a choice. At no point, under the Constitution or any element of the Legal Code, is World Assembly membership a requirement to participate. Membership alone is a choice. Choices come with consequences; some choices ease burdens, others impose them. The protections in the Bill of Rights are intended to protect all Nations of the North Pacific from unfair burdens imposed by their government. WA membership, however, is a choice, not an obligation.

Participation in activities which require WA membership is a choice, not an obligation. As such, any duty to report WA nations is, in effect, willingly shouldered by those players who choose to participate in such activities. The reporting requirements are imposed fairly, on all nations. That some nations choose to join the WA, thereby triggering this reporting requirement, is not a choice made for those players; it is a choice made by them. As such, the burden of reporting is willingly shouldered, and is not an unfair burden.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional Assembly:
The Court had determined that the matter is twofold. If the violation occurs after the time in which the nation is no longer a member of the Regional Assembly then they are not violating their oath as they are not bound to that oath at the current moment. Whereas if the violation occurs during the time in which the nation was a member of the Regional Assembly and was bound by that oath they may be tried for an Oath Violation.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Time at which Oaths Become Binding:
It is the opinion of the Court that the Regional Assembly membership oath found in Section 6 Clause 2 of the Codified Law of the North Pacific becomes legally binding on RA applicants if and when they become members of the Regional Assembly, and remains binding only so long as they remain members.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on the Standard of Proof and Intent:
To start, the Court opines that "willful deception" is synonymous with "intentional deception", and that the difference in word choice does not require a different standard of proof between the two crimes.

As for the standard itself, there are two types of intention in the commission of fraud. The first is demonstrable intent, wherein the defendant can be shown, by their own statements or actions relating to the alleged crime, to have engaged in deception as defined previously in this ruling.

The second is reckless intent, wherein intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on RA Membership Requirements for Candidates:
It is worth also examining the intent of the regional legislative body, the Regional Assembly, while drafting the constitutional clause in question. In the thread in the Regional Assembly discussing the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012, when asked about the meaning of the definite article in Article 6, Clause 1, then Speaker Gulliver stated: "The "the" there is deliberate. It means specifically the 15 days before the election in question, not any random 15 days, so it's not possible to argue that "I was in the assembly 15 days already, even if it wasn't continuous, therefore I'm good to run"."

It should be noted that taking the intention of the Regional Assembly into consideration when interpreting a statute is appropriate only when said statute is ambiguous or absurd. Neither of these is true in this case, as Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution unambiguously indicates that the requirement for candidates is that they have been in the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. However, the legislature's intent here is in agreement with the actual meaning of the clause, and corroborates the interpretation adopted by the Court.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its decision on Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of Endorsements:
Question Three - Is it a crime for a nation that is not the Vice Delegate to have the second most endorsements in the region?

It's not a crime merely to have more endorsements than the Vice Delegate: crimes are strictly defined in the criminal code (as per clause 1), and that's not one of them. In general, Reckless Endorsement Gathering is not a crime, but is a cause for ejection.

However, a Citizen could conceivably commit Gross Misconduct by violating their oath as citizen in egregious cases of Reckless Endorsement Gathering:

I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for citizenship in The North Pacific.

However, where Reckless Endorsement Gathering is cause for ejection but not a crime, Gross Misconduct is a crime but is not cause for ejection:

8. Gross Misconduct will be punished by removal from office and the suspension of voting rights for whatever finite duration the Court sees fit.

[...]

Question One - Did Vice Delegate Bootsie, Security Counselor Plembobria, or Delegate Lord Ravenclaw break the law when the nation of Plembobria passed Bootsie's nation of Guslantis' endorsement count, or when Cheongji passed Guslantis' endorsement count?

The Court cannot give a criminal verdict in a request for review, nor rule on an indictment sight unseen.

However, the answers to questions two through five suggest that Lord Ravenclaw did not break the law by declining to eject either Cheongji or Plembobria, that as no claim has been made that Guslantis failed to have at least 75% of the serving Delegate's endorsement count there is no basis presented to consider Bootsie to have committed Gross Misconduct, and that as no case has been made that Plembobria acted irresponsibly there is no basis presented to consider Plembobria to have committed the same.
The Court opines the following:

Standing

This is a request for review concerning the crime of Gross Misconduct. It was filed by counsel on behalf of their then client Pigeonstan, Defendant in the trial The North Pacific v Pigeonstan. While the Petitioner has ceased to act for Pigeonstan, the Court does not consider this makes a material difference to standing. A request filed by counsel is not based on their own standing, but their client's standing, which ordinarily would survive a change of counsel.

The request challenges Gross Misconduct committed by violation of the citizenship oath's pledge of "responsible action as a member of [The North Pacific's] society". It is contended that this pledge is so vague that it deprives Pigeonstan of due process of law, including prior notice, and of equal and fair treatment, contrary to Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. Pigeonstan is said to be affected because they face the jeopardy and stigma of a criminal trial.

The Court agrees that a criminal charge is sufficient for Pigeonstan to be an affected party in relation to the crimes they are charged with and there is a clear connection between those laws and an effect on their rights. The Court, therefore, accepts this request, but does so cautiously. Requests for review not the appropriate venue to decide criminal matters that call for decisions on matters of fact or for the exercise of judgement that depends on factual issues; the safeguards of trials are not present in requests for review and such decisions in the absence of those safeguards could risk a fair trial. However, this request poses an abstract question that is not dependent upon the underlying facts of Pigeonstan's case, so does not pose such a risk.

Vagueness in Principle

The first question raised by the review is whether the Bill of Rights restricts crimes from being too vaguely defined.

Article 9 of the Bill of Rights guarantees due process of law, specifically including a right to prior notice, and fair and equal protection of the provisions of the Constitution.

The Court accepts that those protections do render overly vague criminal laws unconstitutional. If a law is so vague a nation cannot tell whether their conduct is criminal, that nation is deprived of prior notice of criminal liability and, thereby, of the opportunity to ensure their conduct is lawful. Moreover, it impacts on their right to due process of law more broadly: a crime with an amorphous boundary infringes on a nation’s ability to know what it is accused of and to mount an effective defence.

Equal and fair protection of the provisions of the Constitution can also be infringed by such laws. An unclear law not only impacts on a nation’s ability to assess its conduct, but also on the Court’s ability to do so. An overly vague criminal law may lead to different defendants receiving different verdicts for the same conduct, due only to differing subjective understandings of the Courts that try them. That would be unfair and unequal.

Assessing Vagueness

This conclusion leads to a second question: how to decide whether a law is too vague.

There will always be some imprecision in laws. There are limits to the precision of language and laws, in particular, aim to apply generally. It is inevitable that there will be hard cases at the margins. Therefore, it is not enough to merely say a law is vague in some respect or in some scenarios.

Further, it is a fact, and many would say a strength, of our constitutional structure that it incorporates a citizen legislature. That is an important factor for the Court to consider. Our laws, unlike those in many other jurisdictions, are not drawn up with precision by lawyers and trained draughtsmen but are hammered out by the citizens themselves. A degree of imprecision may be expected to follow and the constitutional choice of a citizen legislature should not be sanctioned by the adoption of an overly exacting standard in deciding on vagueness.

The Court also considers there may be other factors relevant to assessing particular laws. If a nation can avoid the effect of a law entirely, it may be that they have willingly shouldered its burdens as the Court held in its decision on WA Nation Disclosure Requirements, including, potentially, areas of vagueness in the law. If a law regulates officials, some vagueness may be the price those officials pay to exercise greater power over other nations. These factors are only examples and others may also be relevant.

Set against these points are the rights of nations under article 9. Those rights are just as much part of our constitutional structure and must be protected. The Court considers that, in general, when assessing whether a law is too vague the question is whether the law leaves a reasonable nation unable to say with reasonable certainty whether would risk criminal liability in relation to a substantial range of conduct. As noted, particular circumstances may justify some deviation.

Gross Misconduct

It is useful to set out Gross Misconduct’s elements, to understand the context in which "responsible action" is to be interpreted.

The conduct caught by the crime is that which violates a nation's legally mandated sworn oath. This covers, at least, the three oaths now in the Legal Code: the oath of office; the citizenship oath; and the NPA oath. The citizenship oath, as held in the Court’s decisions on Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional Assembly and on the Time at which Oaths Become Binding, applies only to a nation's conduct while a citizen. A nation cannot be guilty of gross misconduct in relation to conduct before becoming, or after ceasing to be, a citizen.

Further, the conduct is punishable only where it is willful or negligent. The Court, in its decision on the Standard of Proof and Intent, addressed the meaning of willful in the context of Fraud and held it to be equivalent to intentional, which was also considered in that decision.

Responsible Action

It is in that context that the Court must determine what "responsible action" means and whether its meaning is unconstitutionally vague.

The Court has been referred to the discussions of the Regional Assembly when amending the oath. As the Court's decision on RA Membership Requirements for Candidates notes, it can sometimes be appropriate and useful to refer to the Assembly's discussions where a law is ambiguous or absurd. The Court considers that there is ambiguity in "responsible action" sufficient to look at those discussions. However, the statements made in the course of debating the phrase give only limited assistance. While one member put forward a potential meaning, they were not the proposer of the Bill and there were other members who considered the phrase ambiguous and were concerned about a potentially subjective reading of it.

The request, effectively, proceeds on the basis that "responsible action" could be reduced to a subjective question of whether a given nation considers conduct responsible or irresponsible. Examples of what could be covered on this understanding are set out: a nation standing in an election it will lose; a nation telegramming another a mild swear; a nation filing an unmeritorious request for review. The Court agrees that this is a possible meaning of the phrase and that, if it were its proper meaning for the purposes of Gross Misconduct, it would be unconstitutionally vague. Such a subjective meaning would deprive a reasonable nation of any meaningful ability to say whether its conduct is criminal.

However, the Court is of the view that where a law can bear different meanings and some of them would be unconstitutional, the Court should generally look to a meaning compliant with the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Further, the Court finds it unlikely that the Regional Assembly could have meant to pass a law that was so broad as to be unconstitutional, particularly where a number of members expressed concern about criminalising conduct on a subjective basis. These points have their limits: the Court should not adopt a meaning that does not fit plausibly with the particular wording of the law or that would be contrary to its surrounding context.

The Court notes that, in its decision on Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of Endorsements, some consideration was given to Gross Misconduct committed by citizens. The Court stated that "a citizen could conceivably commit Gross Misconduct by violating their oath as citizen in egregious cases of Reckless Endorsement Gathering". This lends credence to a view that Gross Misconduct is not committed merely by some trivial irresponsibility, but that something greater is required. The very name of the crime supports this also, it is Gross Misconduct.

The Court concludes it ought to adopt a narrow interpretation of "responsible action". This would comply with the requirements of the Bill of Rights, it would avoid finding unconstitutional an otherwise viable law, and it would not be contrary to the law's wording or its context. A violation of the pledge of "responsible action", for the purposes of Gross Misconduct, is conduct which a reasonable citizen would find obviously and seriously irresponsible. Further, where the conduct could not be criminalised due to being protected by the Bill of Rights, even if it could fall within the above meaning, it is not a violation of the pledge.

The Court finds that, with this meaning, "responsible action" is not so vague as to be unconstitutional. A reasonable nation would be able to say for most conduct whether it is covered by the crime of Gross Misconduct and, while there may remain areas of some doubt, the Court considers that cases falling at the margins would not be enough to render the meaning unconstitutional. In so finding the Court also has regard to other factors relevant to the issue, particularly: that the crime is not satisfied by conduct alone but the conduct must be willful or negligent; that a nation can guarantee that it is outside of the scope of Gross Misconduct by not seeking or by renouncing citizenship; and that citizens, though not exercising power on the same level as officials, do wield power over their fellow nations, by making laws for them and choosing the officials that administer them, and so have (and in the oath accept) a greater need to act with responsibility.

Conclusion

The Court finds that criminal laws can be so vague that they are unconstitutional, as they can infringe on a nation's rights under Article 9. Whether a criminal law is too vague is generally to be answered by considering whether it leaves reasonable nation unable to say with reasonable certainty whether it would risk criminal liability in relation to a substantial range of conduct, but other factors may also be relevant to considering particular laws.

Gross Misconduct by violation of the pledge of "responsible action" cannot be satisfied only by conduct that could be subjectively thought irresponsible. Such an interpretation would be unconstitutional and the Court considers it improper to adopt it where there are other constitutional interpretations that are open to the Court. Instead, the Court concludes that the pledge is only violated by conduct that a reasonable citizen would find obviously and seriously irresponsible and that conduct protected by the Bill of Rights does not violate the pledge even where it could be characterised as irresponsible.

The Court finds that, applying that meaning and considering other factors relevant to Gross Misconduct, the crime of Gross Misconduct committed by violation of the pledge of "responsible action" is not unconstitutionally vague.
 
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