Court Rulings Index

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Pallaith

TNPer
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Case Name
Date Decided
Opinion Author, Votes
Result
Further Status
2012
Hileville (9); Belschaft (1)​
1. On the Attorney General Refusing to bring Criminal Complaints to TrialSeptember 15, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Funkadelia (3-0)Established the Attorney General has no right of refusal to prosecute a caseRendered defunct February 15, 2015 by On Recognizing Outdated Rulings
2. On the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly VotingSeptember 25, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Funkadelia (3-0)Defined "Government Authority" and established Delegate right to vote in WA as they see fit; Council of 5 WA voting policy found constitutional and upheldPartially overturned October 22, 2012 by On the Scope of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights
3. On the Scope of Clause 9 of the Bill of RightsOctober 22, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Blue Wolf II, with Justice Funkadelia abstaining (2-0)Defined "Residency" and redefined "Government Authority;" Council of 5 WA voting policy found partly unconstitutional and On the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly Voting partially overturned
4. On the Vice Delegate's Voting Rights within the Security CouncilOctober 28, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Blue Wolf II, with Justice Funkadelia abstaining (2-0)Established voting rights in Security Council for the Vice DelegateOverturned August 9, 2023 by On Resolving Ambiguity in the Absence of Subordinate Rules for Government Bodies
5. On the Jurisdiction of the Criminal CodeOctober 30, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Funkadelia, with Justice Blue Wolf II abstaining (2-0)Established all crimes may be tried against nations even not residing in TNP, and that they may be tried in TNP embassies when those embassies are considered TNP propertyClarified February 28, 2023 by On the Reconsideration of the Jurisdiction of the Criminal Code
6. On the Speaker's Powers to Restrict the Format of VotesNovember 24, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Blue Wolf II, with Justice Belschaft dissenting (2-1)Speaker policy of discounting embellished votes found constitutional and upheld
7. On Leaving a Candidate's Name off the BallotNovember 25, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Belschaft, with Justice Blue Wolf II recused (2-0)Accidental omission of candidate name from ballot found unconstitutional; November 2012 Special Vice Delegate election restarted
8. On the Usage of the Arms, Flag, and Seal of The North PacificNovember 25, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Belschaft and Blue Wolf II (3-0)Established all nations may fly TNP flag without violating restriction on use of coat of arms; restricting use of coat of arms found constitutional and upheld
9. On Delegate Term LimitsNovember 27, 2012Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Belschaft (3-0)Established Delegate terms as elected 4 month periods and excluded partial terms from the constitutional term limitOverturned March 19, 2013 by On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections
10. On Applications to the Security CouncilNovember 28, 2012Justice Belschaft, joined by Chief Justice Hileville and THO Funkadelia, with Justice Blue Wolf II recused (3-0)Established automatic process for Security Council applicants
2013
Hileville (5); Gaspo (5); Sanctaria (3); Abbey (4); r3naissanc3r (2); Punk D (1); Crushing Our Enemies (1)​
11. On the Duty to Disclose Exculpatory EvidenceJanuary 9, 2013Chief Justice Hileville, joined by THO Abbey, with Justice Gaspo abstaining, and Justice Belschaft recused (2-0)Mandated disclosure of exculpatory evidence to Court and Defense Counsel
12. On Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional AssemblyJanuary 10, 2013Chief Justice Hileville, joined by THO Abbey, with Justice Gaspo abstaining, and Justice Belschaft recused (2-0)Established Oath violations for RA members only apply when a nation was a member of the RA during the time of the alleged violation; Justice Belschaft's refusal to revoke JAL's RA membership upheld
13. On WA Nation Disclosure RequirementsJanuary 18, 2013Chief Justice Hileville, joined by THO Abbey, with Justices Gaspo and Belschaft recused (2-0)Established no disqualification for failure to disclose WA nations possible without registrar to track WA membership; WA nation disclosure policy found constitutional and upheld
14. On the Right against Self IncriminationJanuary 18, 2013Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville, with Justice Belschaft abstaining (2-0)Established absolute right against self-incrimination in cases for all parties including witnesses and that refusal to answer on such grounds is not an admission of guilt
15. On the TNP Flag as a National FlagJanuary 18, 2013Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville and Justice Belschaft (3-0)Established that the coat of arms may not be used on a non-government official's national flag
16. On the Speaker's Power to End DebateJanuary 31, 2013Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville, with Justice Belschaft abstaining (2-0)Established that the Speaker has the right to unilaterally end debates as part of broad, virtually unlimited discretion, so long as the discretion is used in the best interest of the region
17. Advisory Opinion on the Role of the Attorney GeneralFebruary 12, 2013Justice Gaspo (uncredited)Advised that the Attorney General acted improperly in refraining from submitting evidence in a criminal caseInvalidated August 9, 2023 by On Advisory Opinions
18. On Prohibiting SeditionFebruary 13, 2013Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Sanctaria and THO Abbey, with Justice Gaspo recused (3-0)Established absolute prohibition on abridging free speech; law prohibiting sedition found unconstitutionalOverturned April 29, 2022 by On the Regulation of the Regional Message Board
19. On the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's PowersFebruary 20, 2013Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville and Justice Sanctaria (3-0)Established the Court is obliged to review its own decisions if cause exists and no other remedy is available, and only if submitted by an affected party, not unilaterally; confirmed overturning previous rulings is possible
20. On Time Limits in TrialsMarch 4, 2013Justice Sanctaria, joined by THOs Abbey Anumia and Jamie, with Chief Justice Hilleville and Justice Gaspo recused (3-0)Established right of defense to have automatic extension to respond to motions made in final 12 hours of the trial phase, but no similar right for prosecution; Court's process in The North Pacific v. Eluvatar found improper, trial returned to plea phase
21. On Vice Delegate Succession to the DelegacyMarch 14, 2013Justice Sanctaria, joined by Chief Justice Hileville, with Justice Gaspo dissenting (2-1)Established that the Vice Delegate does not become the Delegate when a Delegate vacates the office, but only acts as the Delegate until a special election is held to fill the vacancy
22. On the Minor Error ClauseMarch 15, 2013Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Gaspo (3-0)Established all changes to Legal Code, including fixing typos or simple errors, must be done through a majority vote in the RA; RA's minor error clause in preamble of Legal Code found unconstitutional
23. On Delegate Term Limits in Special ElectionsMarch 19, 2013Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Punk D (3-0)Established that no candidate for Delegate may contest an election following the second consecutive 4 month term, whether served entirely or only partially; Eluvatar ruled ineligible as candidate for Delegate in March 2013 Special Delegate election and On Delegate Term Limits overturnedPartially rendered defunct August 9, 2023 by On the Reconsideration of Delegate Term Limits
24. On the Intelligence Exception to the Freedom of Information ActMarch 26, 2013Justice Sanctaria, joined by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia and Justice Punk D (3-0)Established no exemption from transparency for government officials; Freedom of Information Act's intelligence exception found unconstitutional
25. On Standing and the Definition of Affected PartyApril 22, 2013Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Punk D (3-0)Defined "affected party" in requests for review
26. On Justices as Government OfficialsMay 9, 2013Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Punk D (3-0)Established Justices are government officials
27. On the Powers of Election CommissionersMay 14, 2013Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justice Punk D, with Justice Sanctaria abstaining (2-0)Established power of election commissioners to require candidacy declaration in a designated threadRendered defunct March 2, 2024 by On the Reconsideration of the Powers of Election Commissioners
28. On Restarting Voting PeriodsMay 27, 2013THO r3naissanc3r, joined by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia and Justice Punk D, with Justice Sanctaria recused (3-0)Established a single office's election can be restarted separate from others in same election cycle; Decision of election commissioners to restart only the Vice Delegate election in May 2013 General Election found constitutional and upheld
29. On the Definition of Government OfficialsJune 9, 2013Justice Punk D, joined by THOs Gracius Maximus and Hileville (3-0)Defined "government official;" Established members of the Security Council, election commissioners, and temporary hearing officers are government officials
30. On RA Membership Requirements for CandidatesSeptember 3, 2013Chief Justice r3naissanc3r, joined by Justices Funkadelia and Romanoffia (3-0)Decision of election commissioners to remove Mall from September 2013 Vice Delegate election found constitutional and upheld
31. On the Time at Which Oaths Become BindingNovember 24, 2013Chief Justice Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Justices Flemingovia and Romanoffia (3-0)Established the RA oath becomes binding when a nation becomes a member of the RAPartially rendered defunct August 10, 2023 by On the Reconsideration of the Time at Which Oaths Become Binding
2014
SillyString (5); Romanoffia (2); Crushing Our Enemies (1); Severisen (1)​
32. On the Nonparticipation of a Defendant in Civil and Criminal TrialsJanuary 12, 2014Chief Justice Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Justice Romanoffia and THO SillyString, with Justice Flemingovia recused (3-0)Established moderating justice discretion limited to modifying length of trial phases; Court procedures at time of trial must be followed; jeopardy does not apply if no binding verdict has been made; trial cannot be skipped with default ruling in absence of defendant; Verdict in Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer found unconstitutional
33. On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination PeriodsMarch 18, 2014Justice SillyString, joined by Chief Justice Romanoffia and Justice Ator People (3-0)Established option to reopen nominations does not apply to judicial elections; denied injunction for candidate Treize_Dreizehn and ordered reopened race for Attorney General to be ended and a winner certifiedRendered defunct August 9, 2023 by On Defunct Rulings
34. On the Standard of Proof and IntentMarch 28, 2014Chief Justice Romanoffia and Justice SillyString, joined by Justice Ator People (3-0)Established what is needed to prove "election fraud," "fraud," and "deception" in court, and how to determine "intent" when evaluating fact or opinion
35. On Freedom of Information Requests against the JudiciaryApril 28, 2014Chief Justice Romanoffia, joined by Justices SillyString and Ator People (3-0)Established that FOIA law only applies to Executive branch
36. On the Permanence of Rejected Applications for the RAMay 18, 2014Justice SillyString, joined by Chief Justice Romanoffia and Justice Ator People (3-0)Established citizenship rejections on the basis of a failed check by the Vice Delegate are permanent once upheld by the RA until the RA or Court overturns the rejection; ordered Treize_Dreizehn's RA membership not to be revoked, but not to allow future membership in the event it lapses until RA overturns rejection
37. On Content Ownership and Freedom of Information Requests against the Security CouncilJune 27, 2014Chief Justice SillyString, joined by Justices Ator People and Kiwi (3-0)Established the Security Council is not part of the Executive branch, and the Vice Delegate functions both inside and outside of the Executive branch, and that FOIA law does not apply to the Security Council; established authors of posts own the content of their posts, and posts made in the capacity as a government official are owned by the branch in which that government official residesClarified March 1, 2019 by On the Freedom of Information Act and Off-forum Content
38. On the Meaning of Private CitizenJuly 31, 2014THO Severisen, joined by Chief Justice SillyString and Justice Kiwi, with Justice Blue Wolf II recused (3-0)Established posts made during a government official's time in office in their capacity as a government official are always subject to FOIA even after they cease being a government official; established posts made in government-only areas are always governmental in nature; established restrictions on releasing private information about players; established private messages included in posts may be restrictedClarified March 1, 2019 by On the Freedom of Information Act and Off-forum Content
39. On the Use of the Speaker's Power to End DebateAugust 24, 2014Chief Justice SillyString, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Kiwi (3-0)Established criteria to judge merit in Speaker ending debate, that Speaker can refuse a vote and deviate from standing procedures as they see fit, and that Speaker has obligation to end debate if they do not deem it in the best interest of the region; affirmed On the Speaker's Powers to Restrict the Format of Votes and On the Speaker's Power to End Debate
40. On Promptness and the Time at which RA Membership Begins and EndsSeptember 7, 2014Chief Justice SillyString, joined by Justices Kiwi and Blue Wolf II (3-0)Established that RA membership cannot be granted or removed without the Speaker's explicit acknowledgment, and that RA membership cannot be removed if the RA member is in compliance at the time the removal would take place
2015
Severisen (1); Kialga (1); RPI (1); Plembobria (1); Flemingovia (1)​
41. On Recognizing Outdated RulingsFebruary 15, 2015Chief Justice Severisen, joined by Justice Kialga and THO Cormac (3-0)Established that obsolete rulings could be marked to signify they were no longer in force; On the Attorney General Refusing to bring Criminal Complaints to Trial rendered defunct
42. On the Recusal of Justice FunkadeliaApril 4, 2015Justice Kialga, joined by Chief Justice Severisen and THO The Grim Reaper, with Justice Funkadelia recused (3-0)Ordered the recusal of Justice Funkadelia in On the Need for Further Clarification on Restarting Voting Periods
43. On the Need for Further Clarification on Restarting Voting PeriodsApril 21, 2015THO RPI, joined by THOs The Grim Reaper and Lord Ravenclaw, with Chief Justice Severisen and Justices Kialga and Plembobria recused (3-0)Established the option to abstain in an election does not need to be included on a ballot and that the option to abstain is always permitted, and guidelines for election commissioners to follow in the event candidates or an option to abstain are left off a ballot; found that the voting period in the March 2015 Judicial election should not have been restartedPartially rendered defunct December 17, 2023 by On the Reconsideration of the Need for Further Clarification on Restarting Voting Periods
44. On RA Oversight of the North Pacific Armed ForcesMay 27, 2015Justice Plembobria, joined by Chief Justice Severisen and Justice Kialga (3-0)Mandated NPA inform RA of any deployment and details regarding the deployment within 12 hours of the deployment; found the NPA was not in violation of the Legal Code and that RA oversight could be properly exercised
45. On the Suppression of Posts on the Regional Message BoardAugust 22, 2015Justice Flemingovia, joined by Chief Justice Plembobria, with Justice Punk D abstaining (2-0)Found the Delegate violated the petitioner's free speech, but permitted the violation as it was deemed to be banter and harmless in natureOverturned May 19, 2019 by On the Delegate's Authority to Staff the Executive Branch
2016
Eluvatar (2); Crushing Our Enemies (1) Barbarossistan (1)​
46. On Endorsement Count Requirements and the Solicitation of EndorsementsSeptember 18, 2016Chief Justice Eluvatar, joined by Justices Gracius Maximus and Kialga (3-0)Established it is not a crime for the Vice Delegate not to be the nation with the second highest number of endorsements, or for a nation not the Vice Delegate to have the second highest number of endorsements, but that either situation could involve gross misconduct depending on how the individuals are behaving, and that the Delegate can use discretion in responding to nations with higher endorsements than the Vice Delegate without violating the Bill of Rights; the Delegate's decision not to remove nations with more endorsements than the Vice Delegate was constitutional and upheld
47. On the Power of the Court to Compel the Disclosure of InformationOctober 17, 2016Chief Justice Eluvatar, joined by Justices Gracius Maximus and Kialga (3-0)Established the Court may compel disclosure of information from another branch after a request for the information is made and refused by the branch, and that exculpatory evidence may not be withheld, and in the event it is and this is discovered after a trial is over, that would be grounds for invalidating a conviction
48. On the Process for Declassifying Information for Use as Evidence in a Criminal TrialDecember 9, 2016Justice Crushing Our Enemies and THO Barbarossistan, joined by THO Abbey Anumia, with Chief Justice Eluvatar and Justice SillyString recused (3-0)Established guidelines for when and how information may be redacted in evidence for a criminal trial; the Attorney General's involvement in redacting evidence by virtue of Security Council membership in TSronK trial was constitutional and upheld
2017
Crushing Our Enemies (1); SillyString (1); Zyvetskistaahn (1); Abbey (1)​
49. On Regional Officers Banning Nations during NationStates EventsJanuary 9, 2017Justice Crushing Our Enemies, joined by THOs Altmoras and Abbey, with Chief Justice SillyString recused (3-0)Established conditions for reasonable actions during infectious disease emergency, that Legal Code provisions regulating emergency situations constitute consent by the citizens for Delegate and related officials to assume emergency powers, and that involuntary ejections from region do not constitute valid conditions to lose citizenship; ejection of Gracius Maximus unable to be found constitutional or not due to inability of Court to know whether instructions we given by the Delegate for the ejection to occur
50. On Election Commissioners Failing to Take Their OathsMarch 25, 2017Chief Justice SillyString, joined by THOs Bootsie and The Grim Reaper, with Justices Crushing Our Enemies and Abbey recused (3-0)Affirmed On the Definition of Government Officials (election commissioners are government officials), and established actions taken prior to oaths have no legal authority, and it cannot be retroactively granted by a future oath; the appointments of the election commissioners in the March 2017 Judicial election were invalid, and the voting thread they posted was also invalid; mandated the Vice Delegate appoint new election commissioners and a new election be started
51. On the Speaker's Power to Extend Voting PeriodsOctober 22, 2017Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Justices MacSalterson and Yalkan (3-0)Established that the Speaker does not have the discretion to extend the length of votes under the RA rules; mandated the affected RA votes be voided and new votes scheduled
52. On Court Review of Prior Court RulingsDecember 22, 2017THO Abbey, joined by THO Plembobria, with THO Yalkan abstaining, and with Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn and Justices Bootsie and Scorch recused (2-0)Established no review of prior Court decisions permitted until all other appeals pursued by petitioner, and only for "exceptional circumstances;" found On Court Review of RA Proposals would not have been accepted under these standards and declined to consider the matter furtherOverturned March 11, 2018 by On the Reconsideration of Court Review of Prior Court Rulings
2018
Sil Dorsett (1); Crushing Our Enemies (1)​
53. On the Reconsideration of Court Review of Prior Court RulingsMarch 11, 2018THO Sil Dorsett, joined by THOs Cogoria and Sasten, with Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn and Justices Bootsie and Scorch recused (3-0)Established guidelines for when it is appropriate for Court to review its decisions, and rejected "exceptional circumstances" standard; On Court Review of Prior Court Rulings overturned; mandated new review On Court Review of RA Proposals
54. On Court Review of RA ProposalsMarch 22, 2018THO Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Justice Lord Lore and THO Sil Dorsett, with Chief Justice Scorch and Justice Zyvetskistaahn recused (3-0)Established that RA proposals are not government actions, and that the Court may not accept requests for review that are not related to laws, government policies, or government actions; Justice Scorch's acceptance of Lord Ravenclaw's request for review on RA proposal found unconstitutional
2019
SillyString (3); Eluvatar (1)​
55. On the Freedom of Information Act and Off-forum ContentMarch 1, 2019Justice Eluvatar and Chief Justice SillyString, joined by THO Owenstacey (3-0)Established that Freedom of Information Act applies to any platform on which TNP government business is conducted; expanded scope of On Content Ownership and Freedom of Information Requests against the Security Council and On the Meaning of Private Citizen to contemplate any platform, not just forum posts
56. On Alterations to the Citizenship OathMarch 2, 2019Chief Justice SillyString, joined by Justice Eluvatar and THO Owenstacey (3-0)Established requiring oath to be sworn as written is not a violation of the Bill of Rights' protection of setting domestic policy or freedom of speech, that the citizenship oath must be taken exactly as specified and the Speaker must reject any applications that do not take this exact oath, and that no player is released from legal obligations solely by acting under a different name or capacity; rejection of Gracius Maximus's citizenship found constitutional and upheld, and all citizens who took the incorrect oath given 60 days to renounce oath but otherwise are considered legal citizens
57. On the Delegate's Authority to Staff the Executive BranchMay 19, 2019Justice SillyString, joined by Justice Bootsie, with Chief Justice Eluvatar dissenting (2-1)Established executive staff can only be excluded from serving based on misconduct and ability to serve on staff is a right of TNP residents, that government officials' speech does not have the free speech protections held by normal residents, and that free speech protections for TNP residents extend to regions or jurisdictions outside of TNP; whether the Delegate violated freedom of speech beyond the scope of the Court's ability to review in this way and On the Suppression of Posts on the Regional Message Board overturnedPartially overturned April 29, 2022 by On the Regulation of the Regional Message Board
2020
Zyvetskistaahn (5); Artemis (1)​
58. On the Authentication of Images in Criminal TrialsFebruary 5, 2020THO Artemis, joined by THOs SillyString and Dreadton, with Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn and Justices Lord Lore and Lady Raven Wing recused (3-0)Established guilty plea prior to authentication of images in criminal trial does not render images valid to consider in sentencing, and that moderating justice inquiries during trial cannot substitute proper questioning and authentication process; sentence in The North Pacific v. Whole India vacated, and during resentencing no sentence greater than the original sentence can be given and the images presented may not be considered
59. On the Regional Ban of KiranaMarch 15, 2020Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Justices Lady Raven Wing and Wonderess (3-0)Ban of Kirana found constitutional and upheld
60. On the Form of the Delegate's OathApril 7, 2020Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Justices Wonderess and Lady Raven Wing (3-0)Established the proper office to be referenced in the Delegate's oath is "Delegate;" Delegate McMasterdonia's oath was improperly sworn, but his extensive service and reliance on the oath and intention to abide by it, and the reliance of citizens and foreign officials on it being valid render it binding and legally recognized
61. On the Speaker's Power to Schedule VotesJune 23, 2020Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Justices Wonderess and Lady Raven Wing (3-0)Established the Speaker may begin votes immediately without scheduling them in advance, or may schedule them to start immediately, without providing time for objections under standing procedures; affirmed On the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate
62. On Vague Laws and Responsible ActionJuly 9, 2020Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn, joined by Justices Wonderess and Lady Raven Wing (3-0)Established that laws can be so vague that they are unconstitutional, defined "responsible action," and established that "responsible action" is not so vague as to be unconstitutional; crime of Gross Misconduct committed by violation of the pledge of "responsible action" is constitutional and upheld
63. On the Power of the Speaker to Direct Deputy SpeakersNovember 6, 2020Chief Justice Zyvetskistaahn, joined by THOs Oracle and Goyanes with Justice Vivanco recused (3-0)Established the Speaker may delegate or refrain from delegating any of their powers to deputies; Speaker's direction of deputy speakers not to process a specific citizen's application found constitutional and upheld; whether the Speaker violated law in making such a direction not relevant to this question
2021
Lord Lore (2)​
64. On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding OperationsJanuary 26, 2021Justice Lord Lore, joined by Chief Justice Vivanco and Justice saintpeter (3-0)Established that NPA cannot participate in operations where other militaries are engaging in acts the NPA is prohibited from doing by Legal Code
65. On the Restriction of Citizenship Due to Illegal AffiliationAugust 16, 2021Justice Lord Lore, joined by Justice Dreadton and THO Oracle, with Chief Justice Pallaith recused (3-0)Established that affiliation with a group and actions that promote the group are not protected by the Bill of Rights, and that laws cannot violate Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights but that unfair application of laws would violate that clause; Reject Fascism Act found constitutional and upheldPartially overturned December 13, 2022 by On the Definition of Treaties and the Delegate's Authority to Sanction Residents
2022
Pallaith (2); Kronos (1); Dreadton (1)​
66. On the Regulation of the Regional Message BoardApril 29, 2022Chief Justice Pallaith, joined by Justices Kronos and Sil Dorsett (3-0)Established that Delegate has broad authority to regulate Regional Message Board and that suppression is not inherently a violation of free speech rights, that Delegate has role as on-site moderator in absence of NS moderation action, and guidelines for determining if posts require extralegal moderation; suppression of petitioner's posts found constitutional and upheld, and On the Delegate's Authority to Staff the Executive Branch partially overturned and On Prohibiting Sedition overturned
67. On the Definition of a CandidateMay 10, 2022Chief Justice Pallaith, joined by Justice Kronos and THO TlomzKrano, with Justice Sil Dorsett recused (3-0)Defined "candidate;" election commissioner was erroneously determined to be absent in May 2022 General election and ordered to be reinstated access as active election commissioner
68. On the Ability of the Speaker to Retract CitizenshipJune 7, 2022Chief Justice Kronos, joined by Justices Sil Dorsett and Lord Dominator (3-0)Established Speaker does not have ability to retract citizenship once given unless it is one of the explicit provisions for removing citizenship in Legal Code; granting of citizenship to The Land of Broken Dreams and subsequent retraction of that citizenship found illegal, and retraction of The Land of Broken Dreams's citizenship reversed and then citizenship revoked and Speaker ordered to inform nation and have them reapply
69. On the Definition of Treaties and the Delegate's Authority to Sanction ResidentsDecember 13, 2022Chief Justice Dreadton, joined by Justice Attempted Socialism and THO Kronos, with Justice Lord Dominator recused (3-0)Defined "treaty;" established affiliation with a group is protected by Bill of Rights assembly protection; Delegate's sanctions are enforcement of existing treaty, therefore not a treaty themselves, On the Restriction of Citizenship Due to Illegal Affiliation partially overturned, and sanctions' targeting of residents found unconstitutional
2023
Pallaith (3); Attempted Socialism (2); Lord Dominator (2); Eluvatar (2)​
70. On the Reconsideration of the Jurisdiction of the Criminal CodeFebruary 28, 2023Chief Justice Attempted Socialism, joined by Justices St George and Lord Dominator (3-0)Established jurisdiction of criminal code extends to former residents who were charged for crimes committed while a resident, and to any TNP platform; expanded scope of On the Jurisdiction of the Criminal Code to include the aforementioned principles
71. On the Regional Ban of Siberia UnionApril 10, 2023Justice Lord Dominator, joined by Chief Justice Attempted Socialism and Justice Pallaith (3-0)Ban of Siberia Union found constitutional and upheld
72. On Defunct RulingsAugust 9, 2023Chief Justice Attempted Socialism, joined by Justices Pallaith and Eluvatar (3-0)Established guidelines for rendering prior rulings defunct; rendered defunct On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination Periods
73. On the Reconsideration of Delegate Term LimitsAugust 9, 2023Justice Pallaith, joined by Chief Justice Attempted Socialism and Justice Eluvatar (3-0)Defined "election cycle;" affirmed and partially rendered defunct On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections
74. On Advisory OpinionsAugust 9, 2023Justice Pallaith, joined by Chief Justice Attempted Socialism and Justice Eluvatar (3-0)Established advisory opinions in the absence of formal requests for review are unconstitutional; invalidated Advisory Opinion on the Role of the Attorney General
75. On Resolving Ambiguity in the Absence of Subordinate Rules for Government BodiesAugust 9, 2023Justice Pallaith, joined by Chief Justice Attempted Socialism and Justice Eluvatar (3-0)Established guidelines for creating judicial guidelines for resolving ambiguous government rules, and affirmed Security Council right to establish its own rules of governance in absence of further legal restrictions; On the Vice Delegate's Voting Rights within the Security Council found unconstitutional and overturned
76. On the Reconsideration of the Time at Which Oaths Become BindingAugust 10, 2023Justice Eluvatar, joined by Chief Justice Attempted Socialism and Justice Pallaith (3-0)Partially rendered defunct On the Time at Which Oaths Become Binding
77. On the Proper Timing of the Phases of a TrialNovember 11, 2023Justice Eluvatar, joined by Justice Wymondham and THO Just a Lore, with Chief Justice Attempted Socialism recused (3-0)Established alleged dishonest motions by litigants must be regulated by Court rules, and that no ruling could be made on such posts as they must be split from trial thread; established no clear rule on the timing of motions, which must also be regulated by Court rules; returned trial to evidence submission stage
78. On the Reconsideration of the Need for Further Clarification on Restarting Voting PeriodsDecember 17, 2023Justice Lord Dominator, joined by Chief Justice Wymondham and Justice Eluvatar (3-0)Partially rendered defunct On the Need for Further Clarification on Restarting Voting Periods
2024
Lord Dominator (1)​
79. On the Reconsideration of the Powers of Election CommissionersMarch 2, 2024Justice Lord Dominator, joined by Chief Justice Wymondham and Justice Eluvatar (3-0)Rendered defunct On the Powers of Election Commissioners
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Attorney General Refusing to bring Criminal Complaints to Trial
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Funkadelia

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 3.1: The Attorney General
2. The Attorney General will be elected during Judicial Elections.
3. The Attorney General must not have been convicted of any crime in the North Pacific.
4. The Attorney General will serve as Chief Prosecutor in all cases brought before the Court of the North Pacific.
5. It is the duty of the Attorney General to see to completion any proceeding they are prosecuting.
6. If the original Attorney General is unable to complete a pending case, the successor Attorney General will take over as prosecutor and complete the pending proceedings.
7. The Attorney General may request expedited judicial review of any executive action by any official.

The Court took into consideration the Oath of Office for all Government Officials of the North Pacific:

I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.

The Court opines the following:

As per the Legal Code it is the duty of the Attorney General to serve as the Chief Prosecutor in all cases brought before the Court of the North Pacific. Currently all cases are brought to the Attorney General in order for their office to bring the charges directly to the Court. The refusal of bringing a case to Trial is not a duty given to the Attorney General in any legal document of the North Pacific including but not limited to the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights. It is the belief of the Court that there is a fundamental issue with how the process currently works. Currently it is the belief of the Court that the Attorney General in refusing to take a case to trial is acting as a higher authority then what they are. While the Attorney General may not feel there is enough evidence to merit a trial it is still the belief of the Court that the decision on whether there is enough evidence should reside with said Court and not the Office of the Attorney General.

The Court suggests the following procedures be adopted for all trial proceedings:

1. The accuser files a complaint with the Attorney General.
2. The Attorney General Notifies the Defendant that a complaint has been filed against them.
3. Within 72 hours from the time the complaint is filed with the office of the Attorney General the Court shall be notified of the investigation into the matter by the Attorney General.
4. The investigation shall last no more than 5 days in which the Attorney General must ask for an indictment and present all evidence to the Court.
5. Within 72 hours for the request for an indictment the Court will determine if a Trial is merited based on the evidence alone.
6. Normal trial proceedings will begin at this point in time.


Case thread
Ruling delivered on September 15, 2012.
Ruling rendered defunct on February 15, 2015.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly Voting
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Funkadelia

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mahaj.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

3. Participation in the governmental authorities of the region is voluntary. Participation in the World Assembly shall not be a condition of participation in the governmental authorities of the region.

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

10. Each Nation entitled to a vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region is entitled to the equal treatment and protection of that Nation's right to vote.

The Court took the following into consideration:

The Bill of Rights allows for equal and fair protection of any nation of the North Pacific under the terms and provisions of the Constitution as well as stipulating that World Assembly participation shall not be a condition for participation in the government authorities of the region. The Bill of Rights also protects a nations right to vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region.

Before making a decision the Court had to answer the following questions:

  1. Is the Delegate voting in the World Assembly a "government authority"?
  2. Is voting in the World Assembly protected under the "fundamental laws" of the region?

In response to the above questions the Court has determined the following:

As to the first question, The Delegate and all elected or appointed officials are Government Authorities however the Delegate's vote in the World Assembly is not and shall not be considered a "government authority". It is the belief of the Court that Clause 3 of the Bill of Rights was meant to allow a nation to serve in the Government without having a World Assembly nation in the Region and does not protect a nations right to determine the Delegate's World Assembly Vote.

As to the second question, The Court reviewed the Constitution and Legal Code and came to a conclusion there is no law whatsoever dictating how the Delegate must vote in World Assembly matters.

The Court therefore opines the following:

The law enacted by the Council of 5 does not break a nations rights or any law as set out by the Bill of Rights, Constitution and/or Legal Code. The right to vote in World Assembly matters is not protected under any provision in the Bill of Rights, Constitution, or Legal Code. Therefore the Council of 5 was not in violation of a nations rights under the legal documents of the North Pacific.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on September 25, 2012.
Ruling partially overturned October 22, 2012.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Scope of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Blue Wolf II, with Justice Funkadelia abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Unibot.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court took into consideration the Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration:
The Bill of Rights, by its terms, protects those who are "resident" in The North Pacific. Not every nation present within TNP at Nationstates is a "resident," and not every "resident" is always within TNP.

Who is a "resident" in terms of TNP law? Primarily those Nations who choose to be here and be a part of the regional society; who conduct their in-game activity as a part of TNP, and who identify with TNP as their home region.

A Nation that is born (or created) in TNP does not automatically have residency. Residency requires both presence and some act consistent with that Nation’s intent to remain and become part of TNP (as opposed to any other region). Thus, acts such as voting or making a proposal in the World Assembly, making or seeking "endorsements" in-game with other Nations within TNP, or modifying their National profile at Nationstates.net while that Nation is within TNP are indications of that intent to be a "resident."

A Nation that enters TNP as a representative or agent of some other region at Nationstates does not become a "resident", because they lack that intention that is necessary for residency. Likewise, a Nation that departs TNP at Nationstates.net with the intention to return and resume residency and is acting for or at the request of TNP authorities retains their residency here, as that Nation has not abandoned its residency.

Absent some legislative action that leads to a broader view of residency, then, a Nation which has not been a "resident" of TNP is not protected under our Bill of Rights until and unless they become a "resident" here. The answer to the first question, therefore, is "None."

Turning to the second issue, that is, the authority of Admins, Global Mods, and mods within the official forums as compared to the authority of government officials, requires one to precisely state what that authority is. The Admin have primary responsibility for enforcement of the "terms of service," the "terms of use," and the supplemental forum rules that govern the forums. The forum moderation team has primary authority to enforce that body of rules, while many government officials have a limited amount of authority as forum moderators to assist in their enforcement.

A forum administrator’s primary obligation is to protect the integrity of the designated official forums on behalf of the regional community. If the constitutional process so permit, the members of the forum administration team not otherwise holding a government office, may exercise a very limited form of government power within the Bill of Rights, the Constitution, and the Legal Code, and subject to the protections and limitations provided by the three central documents of TNP law.

Thus, in response to this question:
Specifically, if I as Admin were to preemptively IP ban a player who has no nation in TNP, and presently no account on this forum, what would be the legality of my actions under TNP law?
the answer depends on whether the grounds for such an action are based upon a perceived threat of violation of the body of forum rules, or a threat of violation of TNP law. If it is the former, then the Admin is acting within the Admin’s proper authority to protect the forums; if it is the latter, then the Admin should secure from an appropriate government official approval under paragraphs 8, 9, and 11 of the Bill of Rights [4] before imposing such a ban from the forums. Inasmuch as there are distinct review processes for these decisions under the Constitution and Bill of Rights as to government decisions, and by the moderation review process put in place by the forum moderation team for the team’s non-governmental decisions, the requirements of due process are met so long as the review processes are followed in good faith. Thus, where the reason for the imposition of an IP ban is based on protecting the integrity of the forums, then the Admin is exercising their core responsibility to the forums and the community. If the IP ban is to further any other governmental policy or purpose, approval by the appropriate "governmental authorities of the region" under paragraphs 8 and 11 of the Bill of Rights is required.
The Court took into consideration the ruling on the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly Voting:
As to the first question, The Delegate and all elected or appointed officials are Government Authorities however the Delegate's vote in the World Assembly is not and shall not be considered a "government authority". It is the belief of the Court that Clause 3 of the Bill of Rights was meant to allow a nation to serve in the Government without having a World Assembly nation in the Region.

As to the second question, The Court reviewed the Constitution and Legal Code and came to a conclusion there is no law whatsoever dictating how the Delegate must vote in World Assembly matters.

The Court therefore opines the following:

The law enacted by the Council of State does not break a nations rights or any law as set out by the Bill of Rights, Constitution and/or Legal Code. The right to vote in World Assembly matters is not protected under any provision in the Bill of Rights, Constitution, or Legal Code.

In review of the above the Court has determined the following:

The previous rulings of the Court of the North Pacific are inaccurate. The Courts ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as delivered on 6 August 2010 introduced a definition of "residency" in which no document including the Bill of Rights, Legal Code, or Constitution mentions. After a through review of all the aforementioned documents the Court has no choice but to overturn the previous ruling. The Court also reviewed its most recent decision on World Assembly Voting and has come to a conclusion it is slightly flawed. The Court introduced an incorrect definition of "Government Authorities" in this ruling.

The Court therefore opines the following:

The Court hereby establishes that under the Bill of Rights all nations in the North Pacific with the exception of those who are performing regional recruitment on the regional message board of the North Pacific are afforded protection under said document. The Court reverses the previous ruling of the Court which created a flawed definition of "residency".

The Court in reviewing the term "Government Authorities" hereby establishes a "Government Authority" is any elected or appointed office of the North Pacific and not the individual being elected as the Court eluded to in our first ruling on the matter. The Court in this matter also re-evaluated whether or not the Council of 5 World Assembly Voting Policy was illegal. It is the determination of the Court that the policy does violate part of the Bill of Rights but is not completely illegal.

The Court establishes the following answers to the questions posed by Unibot.

Does this provision require "equal and fair treatment" of Nations in The North Pacific in every government affair?

The answer would be simply no. This provision requires "equal and fair treatment" to all nations of the North Pacific in relation to the provisions as laid out in the Constitution. This does not include every government affair.

Does this provision require "equal and fair" protection of the provisions of the Constitution for every citizen?

This provision in Clause 9 does require "equal and fair" protection of the provisions of the Constitution for every citizen as well as all other nations covered under the Bill of Rights.

Therefore after further review the policy regarding World Assembly Voting violates the provision requiring all nations to have the right to be "heard". The Court wants to be clear here that this clause in the Bill of Rights does not set requirements on the Delegate to vote a certain way in the World Assembly. There is also no current provision in the Constitution that sets this requirement.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on October 22, 2012.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Vice Delegate's Voting Rights within the Security Council
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Blue Wolf II, with Justice Funkadelia abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Tim.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

6. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.

The Court opines the following:

The only mention of the Vice Delegate in regards to the Security Council as the quoted section of the Constitution above. This section of the Constitution does not stipulate the Vice Delegate does not have voting powers in the Security Council. This establishes the Vice Delegate will serve as the Chair of the Security Council. The Court has no choice but to assume the drafters of the Constitution intended for the Vice Delegate to have voting powers within the Security Council body.


Case thread
Ruling delivered on October 28, 2012.
Ruling overturned on August 9, 2023.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Jurisdiction of the Criminal Code
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Funkadelia, with Justice Blue Wolf II abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Abbey.

The Court opines the following in response to the quests posed:

1. Can a nation be prosecuted for anything other than Treason (as specified in http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/single/?p=8055484&t=6927180 ) if they are no longer residing in the region? This specifically relates to -T-h-o-r- and treetar.

Yes any nation may be prosecuted for crimes other than Treason. The Courts ruling that was linked was specifically speaking of just Treason while other crimes may be tried as well. If the nation committed a crime or is expected of committing a crime in the North Pacific they may be tired even if their nation no longer resides in the North Pacific.

2. On a similar vein, can a nation be prosecuted for anything other than Treason for offences which were not commited within property of TNP or an ally, such as a forum embassy of ours located on a different region’s offsite forums?

This depends on the region in which the crime was committed in. If the region we hold an embassy with considers said Embassy as our property the answer would be yes they can be tried here. Whether or not the North Pacific considers all Embassies property of the North Pacific is not determined and the Court directs you towards the Assembly for discussion of that matter.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on October 30, 2012.
Ruling clarified on February 28, 2023.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Speaker's Powers to Restrict the Format of Votes
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Blue Wolf II, with Justice Belschaft dissenting

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Iro.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 2.6 of the Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Bill of Rights:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

10. Each Nation entitled to a vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region is entitled to the equal treatment and protection of that Nation's right to vote.

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.

The Court opines the following:

The Speaker by making these policies was within their powers as laid out by the Constitution and not in violation of the Bill of Rights. The Court looked extensively at the Section 10 of the Bill of Rights and determined that the rules that were adopted still allowed the protection of each nations right to vote. We are aware the Speaker discounted votes that were not in line with the adopted polices but again the voters that lodged an invalid vote were still given the right to vote in the matter. It is our belief that once these rules were adopted they were enforced evenly and fairly.

The Court thanks all those involved for their patience while we made a determination in this matter.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on November 24, 2012.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Belschaft, with Justice Blue Wolf II recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by King Durk the Awesome.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 4.5: Special Elections
16. A special election will be held in the event of a vacancy in any elected office or position.
17. The Delegate, or if the Delegate is not available, the Speaker, or if the Delegate and Speaker are not available, any Court Justice, will serve as Election Commissioner for the special election.
18. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy in the special election will last for five days, beginning within two days after the vacancy is noticed.
19. Voting will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Bill of Rights:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court opines the following:

It is the belief of the Court that the accidental omittance of a Candidate from the Ballot does in fact violate that Candidates Rights under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore ordered that the voting period for the Special Election of Vice Delegate is restarted immediately. The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Court recognizes mcmasterdonia's immediate attempt to rectify the situation by adding the missing candidates name back to the ballot as soon as being made aware of the situation. The Court does appreciate when an official in the Government attempts to correct a mistake however this specific rectification was not enough to satisfy the Bill of Rights.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on November 25, 2012.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Usage of the Arms, Flag, and Seal of The North Pacific
Opinion drated by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Belschaft and Blue Wolf II

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Iro.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 7.1: Arms, Flag, and Seal
2. The following arms as designed by ThelDRan and revised by Eluvatar and Gulliver is adopted as the coat of arms of the North Pacific:
[ image link removed: http://www.thenorthpacific.org/images/arms.png ]
3. Each institution in the North Pacific's government may establish for itself a seal which uses the arms of the North Pacific.
4. The arms of the North Pacific may not be used except to represent the North Pacific or an official regional entity.
5. The following flag, as designed by ThelDRan and revised by Eluvatar and Gulliver is adopted as the official flag of the North Pacific:
[ image link removed: http://www.thenorthpacific.org/images/flag.png ]

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Bill of Rights:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

The Court opines the following:

As to the first question posed to the Court: "1. Does Section 7.1, #4 of the Legal Code contradict the following clause from paragraph #2 of the Bill of Rights."

The answer to this question would be no. The Legal Code does not infringe on a nations right to the Freedom of Press, speech, and free expression of religion.

As to the second questions posed to the Court: "2. Does Section 7.1, #4 of the Legal Code prohibit anyone who is not "an official regional entity" from flying the flag simply because it contains the coat of arms, despite the Legal Code containing no explicit prohibition against flying the flag?"

No it does not. The Legal Code specifically lists both the Coat of Arms and the Flag of the North Pacific as separate items. It is the belief of the Court that just because the flag contains an image of the Coat of Arms does not make the flag THE Coat of Arms. Therefore to be quite clear nations may fly the Flag of the North Pacific but may not fly the Coat of Arms of the North Pacific.

As to the third question posed to the Court: "3. Can nations of The North Pacific who are not "an official regional entity" legally fly the flag of The North Pacific?"

Yes the requirement established in the Legal Code only states that the Coat of Arms may not be used unless by "an official regional entity". As the Court has stated above the Flag and Coat of Arms are two separate items and not one and the same.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on November 25, 2012.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Delegate Term Limits
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Belschaft

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Eluvatar.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 3.9 of the Constitution:
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.
The Court opines the following:

It is the belief of the Court that the Article 3.9 of the Constitution was intended to mean one elected 4 month period was equal to one full term. To elaborate further the restriction laid out in Article 3.9 for no more than two consecutive terms means two consecutive elected four month periods. With that being said the Court also would like to make clear that this does not allow for a Delegate to resign during their second term and then run again for another term in the following election. If the individual was elected to Delegate Seat for two complete 4 month periods they are not eligible to run for a third term even if they are recalled, resign, or abandon the office of Delegate in any way during the second term.


Case thread
Ruling delivered on November 27, 2012.
Ruling overturned on March 19, 2013.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Applications to the Security Council
Opinion drafted by Justice Belschaft, joined by Chief Justice Hileville and THO Funkadelia, with Justice Blue Wolf II recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kingborough.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:


Article 5 of the Constitution:
Article 5. The Security Council

1. Any person who is a member of the Regional Assembly and meets any endorsement and influence requirements determined by law may apply to become a member of the Security Council.
2. The Regional Assembly may exempt a person from Regional Assembly membership or any requirements by a two-thirds majority vote, and may terminate an exemption by a two-thirds majority vote.
3. The Security Council may approve applicants by a majority vote. The Regional Assembly may admit an approved applicant by a majority vote. If the Security Council does not approve an applicant or does not act on them within thirty days, the Regional Assembly may admit the applicant by a two-thirds majority vote.
4. The Security Council will monitor the region’s security and report on it to the public, and enforce decisions of the Regional Assembly to remove the Delegate.
5. The Regional Assembly may establish a line of succession beyond the Vice Delegate among the members of the Security Council by a majority vote. If a new member is admitted to the Security Council, they will be added at the end of the current line of succession. If a member is removed from the Security Council, they will be removed from the line of succession.
The Court opines the following:

It is the belief of the Court that any person wishing to become a member of the Security Council must first apply to the Security Council, and that as part of this process their application will later be placed before the Regional Assembly. Whilst the wording of Article 5.1 does not explicitly state who the applicant is applying to, it is the belief of the court that it is made clear in Article 5.3 that the application is directed to the Security Council itself and not the Regional Assembly. Based upon this and on the wording of Article 5.3 - specifically the order in which the process is laid out within Article 5.3 - the court is of the opinion that the following procedure must be followed for applications to the Security Council;
  1. Application to the Security Council.
  2. Security Council vote on the application
  3. Regardless of the result of the Security Councils vote on the application - or if such does not occur within thirty days - the application is moved to the Regional Assembly to be voted upon.
  4. Regional Assembly vote on the application. Depending on the preceding stages, either a simple or a a two thirds majority will be required for the application to be approved.

In answer to the specific questions of the petitioner;

Do these clauses make the Regional Assembly able to vote a member into the SC without an application to the Security Council?

No. The exemptions detailed in Article 5.2 apply only to the requirements for membership set out in Article 5.1, not the application procedure established in Article 5.3.

If the above is no, do these clauses make the Regional Assembly able to vote a reject application into the Security Council?

Yes, the Regional Assembly is able to admit an applicant rejected by the Security Council to said body under the terms identified in Article 5.3, namely a two-thirds majority vote in favor.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on November 28, 2012.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by THO Abbey, with Justice Gaspo abstaining, and Justice Belschaft recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:


Sections 5:
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region.

7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer.

9. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution

The Court opines the following:

The Court had determined that in order for a nation to have equal and fair treatment and protection of law and due process of said law a duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence is in fact created by the Bill of Rights. The Court reviewed the Bill of Rights and the Request filed by Gaspo on this matter. The Court is in unanimous agreement that a duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence does in fact exist under the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Court also notes that if in such a case the prosecution unknowingly posses exculpatory evidence when they are made aware of such evidence it must be disclosed to the Court and the Defense Council immediately.

The Court thanks everyone for their patience during this review.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on January 9, 2013.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Oath Violations by Former Members of the Regional Assembly
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by THO Abbey, with Justice Gaspo abstaining, and Justice Belschaft recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Eluvatar.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Legal Code, Consitution, and Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:


Section 6.1: Regional Assembly Membership Act
2. The Speaker will work with forum administration to process Regional Assembly applicants.
3. Assembly members must maintain a nation in the North Pacific.
4. Applicants must swear an oath, as follows:
Code:
[nation]TNP Nation[/nation]
[nation]WA Nation[/nation]

I, [forum user name], leader of The North Pacific nation of (your TNP nation's name), pledge loyalty to the region, to abide by its laws, and to act as a responsible member of its society. I pledge to only register one Nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may immediately lose my voting privileges, permanently. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for membership in the Regional Assembly of the North Pacific.
5. New forum members may who register as citizens or join the Regional Assembly must be made aware of the Criminal Code they are pledging to respect..
6. The Speaker will accept applicants with valid applications who are verified by forum administration not to be using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty.
7. The Speaker will process applications within 14 days. If the applicant is not rejected within 14 days, they will be automatically accepted to the Regional Assembly.
8. Regional Assembly members may not vote in any vote which began before they were last admitted.
9. The Speaker's office will maintain a publicly viewable roster of Regional Assembly members.
10. The Speaker's office will promptly remove any members whose removal is ordered by the Court, whose North Pacific nation leaves or ceases to exist, who fail to log in to the North Pacific forum for over 30 days.
The Court opines the following:

The Court in reviewing the matter as brought forth by Eluvatar reviewed the Constitution, Legal Code, and the Bill of Rights.

The Court had determined that the matter is twofold. If the violation occurs after the time in which the nation is no longer a member of the Regional Assembly then they are not violating their oath as they are not bound to that oath at the current moment. Whereas if the violation occurs during the time in which the nation was a member of the Regional Assembly and was bound by that oath they may be tried for an Oath Violation.

The Court reviewed the particluar matter that prompted this Judicial Inquiry and has determined that Justice Belschaft did in fact by not accepting the removal of JAL's RA membership follow the ruling that is being made today. For the record JAL's RA membership periods from the Court removal in March to his re-acceptance in August are listed below. The periods show that JAL was not a member of the Regional Assembly during the time of the alleged telegram campaign and could not have violated a regional assembly membership oath.

Removed on 3/21/12 by the Court
Restrictions removed when acquitted on 5/3/12
Reapplied on 5/5/12 - Admitted on 5/8/12
Removed on 6/20/12
Reapplied on 8/11/12 - Admitted on 8/12/12

Case thread
Ruling delivered on January 10, 2013.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On WA Nation Disclosure Requirements
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by THO Abbey, with Justices Gaspo and Belschaft recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Cormac Stark.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Legal Code, Constitution, and Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

The Court opines the following:


The Court in this matter faces three questions:
1.Does the requirement for WA disclosures when voting stem from any legal duty established through the Constitution and other Laws of The North Pacific?
2.In the absence of an appointed registrar to whom disclosures may be made, is failure to disclose grounds for disqualification of a vote?
3.Are the WA disclosures required by Section 6.2 in conflict with the Bill of Rights’ Equal Protection Claus (Clause 10)?

To put those anxiously awaiting simplified answers at ease, The Court has answered these questions as follows:
1.No.
2.No.
3.No.

Regarding the first point, a simple search of the text of the law finds no disclosure requirement specifically related to elections; only the overarching requirement which must be met in an ongoing fashion to maintain Regional Assembly membership.

The second issue, regarding vote disqualification, is similarly simple. The Court can find no basis in the law which requires that votes be discarded if disclosure requirements are not met in the absence of a registrar. In criminal law, the impossibility of avoiding an offense (provided one has not exercised volition in leading to the inevitability) is a complete defense to criminal liability. The same is true here; the impossibility of reporting which would result from the absence of a duly appointed registrar is not a reasonable barrier to the voting rights of citizens.

On the third point, the Court must examine the law in its entirety to determine whether or not WA Membership is a requirement, or a choice. At no point, under the Constitution or any element of the Legal Code, is World Assembly membership a requirement to participate. Membership alone is a choice. Choices come with consequences; some choices ease burdens, others impose them. The protections in the Bill of Rights are intended to protect all Nations of the North Pacific from unfair burdens imposed by their government. WA membership, however, is a choice, not an obligation.

Participation in activities which require WA membership is a choice, not an obligation. As such, any duty to report WA nations is, in effect, willingly shouldered by those players who choose to participate in such activities. The reporting requirements are imposed fairly, on all nations. That some nations choose to join the WA, thereby triggering this reporting requirement, is not a choice made for those players; it is a choice made by them. As such, the burden of reporting is willingly shouldered, and is not an unfair burden.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on January 18, 2013.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Right against Self Incrimination
Opinion drafted by Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville, with Justice Belschaft abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Eluvatar.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Article 6 of the Bill of Rights:
6. No Nation shall be held to answer for a crime in a manner not prescribed by the Constitution or the Legal Code. No Nation shall be subjected to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. No Nation shall ever be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against itself.
The Court opines the following:

The Court has two questions before it. First, does the right against self-incrimination apply only to parties in the case at hand, or to all individuals testifying as witnesses? Second, does the refusal to answer on self-incrimination grounds constitute evidence against the individual, which may be used to assert guilt related to the matter at hand?

As to the first question, the wording of the law indicates no limitation on this right against self-incrimination. It may be invoked by any witness or party when questioned, and the refusal to answer may not be circumvented by any legal action in the future. This is a fundamental legal principle, and is essential to ensuring the fairness of the justice system.

The second question is similarly simple. The answer is no. The refusal to answer is simply a refusal to answer, nothing more. If it were usable as evidence of guilt, the entire right against self-incrimination would be undermined and become irrelevant. In order to preserve this right, the refusal to answer cannot be used as evidence of guilty, in the proceeding at hand or in any future proceeding.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on January 18, 2013.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the TNP Flag as a National Flag
Opinion drafted by Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville and Justice Belschaft

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Unibot.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Bill of Rights and Legal Code of the North Pacific:


Article 1 of the Bill of Rights:
1. All Nations of The North Pacific are sovereign. Each Nation has the right of self-determination in that Nation's domestic policies, including, but not limited to, issue selection and WA membership.
Section 7.1.4 of the Legal Code:
4. The arms of the North Pacific may not be used except to represent the North Pacific or an official regional entity.
The Court opines the following:

The Court has before it a question examining a potential conflict between Article 1 of the Bill of Rights, and Legal Code Chapter 7.1.4. The question specifically addresses national flags. The Court finds that there is no conflict, and finds that Legal Code Chapter 7.1.4 does not violate the Constitution or Bill of Rights, in spirit or in letter.

The Bill of Rights’ protections of national sovereignty state, and are intended to clarify, that the Government of The North Pacific may not direct the management of the nations in a proactive way. The law at hand restricts use of the Coat of Arms to use by government officials or the government as a whole. The Court does not believe that a conflict exists here, and draws on a number of analogies to explain this position:

  • It is perfectly reasonable for a government to restrict the use of official letterhead, because its appearance conveys significance and meaning indicating that the document conveyed on that letterhead is an official communication. The letterhead bestows formality and legitimacy, In effect, and as such must be restricted. While free expression is important, that free expression would undermine the very purpose and utility of the letterhead, and as such must be restrained.
  • Diplomatic license plates are issued only to diplomats, and confer special privileges upon those who possess them. As such, their use is restricted to a small subset of individuals. This is perfectly reasonable, as those plates convey additional authority and certain distinctions, and as such must be controlled.
  • Governments often restrict access to police uniforms, because the uniform is a de facto symbol of power and authority. Symbols or icons which convey authority or are held to indicate some official status must be controlled, or they lose all validity as an official symbol.
Many other examples are available, such as military uniforms, symbols of authority (legislative gavels, for example), and unique titles of position. The Arms of The North Pacific are the only means which the government has reserved to allow it to convey a degree of official recognition upon statements, posts, and other documents, to separate them from ordinary documents. This is far from an unreasonable or illegal action for a government to take.

As a side note, if any nation is truly enamored with the Arms, and simply must have the Arms as a part of its flag, The Court directs that nation to Legal Code Chapter 7.1.5, which establishes the official Flag of The North Pacific, a flag whose use is not restricted in the same way as the Arms.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on January 18, 2013.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Speaker's Power to End Debate
Opinion drafted by Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville, with Justice Belschaft abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Blue Wolf II.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Constitution of the North Pacific:


Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.

The Court opines the following:

The court has before it the seemingly simple question of whether the Speaker is within his rights to end debate on proposal unilaterally, potentially barring motions to vote, without giving cause. The Court confines its opinion on this matter to the facts of this case in particular, in which the proposal which was closed was highly controversial and prompted not-insignificant Moderation actions. The court will, however, clarify its understanding and opinion of the Speaker's discretion with regard to closing discussions, so that future Speakers will have some guidance going forward.

Looking first to the case at hand, we find a thread seeking to amend the Bill of Rights to legalize extrajudicial action against a particular citizen. This proposal would not have passed Constitutional muster, and would have been in direct conflict with the very document it sought to amend. It could never have become law. As such, it is reasonable to say that the discussion in question lacked merit, viability, and legality. This finding will have bearing on our final ruling.

The Constitution grants discretion to the Speaker as follows:
Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
The Constitution, Legal Code, and RA Rules are all completely devoid of any additional reference to the Speaker's discretionary powers. Nor are there any rules outlining how the Regional Assembly's business is to be conducted, which have bearing on this matter. As such, the Constitution's grant of discretion to the Speaker in administering the Regional Assembly is the only binding law on this issue.

The question is raised, however, as to whether or not the actions taken using this discretionary power violate the Bill of Rights. This Court believes that they do not. Nations do possess a right to freedom of speech, and the government may not impede that right, but this restriction must be balanced against the demands of a civilized society, which encourages equal treatment of all its citizens. Regardless of the personal feelings of any Regional Assembly member, the proposal in question was a targeted attempt to discriminate against a member of the region. In fact, the proposal would have violated several elements of the Bill of Rights and Legal Code. Furthermore, the target of this proposal had repeatedly asked for the harassment he felt he was experiencing to cease. Under these circumstances, the Speaker's actions are not a violation of the Bill of Rights for one simple reason:
Bill of Rights:
. . . The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.
The Speaker's actions were permitted under his discretion, and using his judgment he acted in the best interests of the region. If any Nation feels that the actions of a government official are in violation of these laws, the proper recourse is a recall proceeding, not a Court proceeding. Particularly not in circumstances such as these.

With that decided, the Court would take this opportunity to comment more broadly on the powers of the Speaker. Under the aforementioned Constitutional clause, the Speaker is granted broad discretion, where no rules exist, to administer the Regional Assembly as he or she sees fit. Under the Bill of Rights segment also mentioned previously, the Court believes that all government officials are obligated by law to act in good faith in discharging their duties. The Court believes that the Speaker does possess the right to unilaterally table proposals, if their continued debate is not reasonably in the best interests of the region. The Constitution grants this discretion, and the Bill of Rights in effect obligates the Speaker to exercise said discretion if he or she feels it is appropriate. If the Nations of The North Pacific disagree, the procedure for Recall is quite clear, and as has been demonstrated over the past few months, is quite accessible. Legal review of the Speaker's discretionary decisions is not, generally speaking, necessary.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on January 31, 2013.
 
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Advisory Opinion of the Court of the North Pacific
Advisory Opinion on the Role of the Attorney General

Given recent actions taken by the Attorney General, which sought to bypass the judicial fact-finding process and undermine the authority conferred upon this Court by the Constitution and Legal Code, the Justices of the Court feel compelled to issue this Advisory Opinion. It will have three main elements: it will clearly define what the responsibilities of the Attorney General are under the law (as there seems to be some lack of understanding within the current AG's office on this point), it will identify what the Court believes to be the unacceptable actions taken by Attorney General Punk D, and it will convey a strong recommendation to the Delegate for actions to be taken in response.

Looking first to the role of the Attorney General, the Law is quite clear.

Legal Code:
4. The Attorney General will serve as Chief Prosecutor in all cases brought before the Court of the North Pacific.
5. It is the duty of the Attorney General to see to completion any proceeding they are prosecuting.
Oath of Office:
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear ... I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office ... within the restraints of my legally granted power ...
Bill of Rights:
11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code.
These elements of the law quite clearly establish that, in accordance with the decisions of this Court, the Attorney General must bring to before the Court all criminal complaints filed with the AG's office. The Justices then make findings of plausibility based on the evidence associated with the complaint. The basic theory is that, if the evidence contained in the complaint were proven to be true, then the person would be guilty of the charged crime. If it's plausible, the indictment proceeds to court, at which point Legal Code 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 govern the AG's actions. He is to serve as Chief Prosecutor (though he is generally allowed to appoint Deputies and supervise their work), and is to see to completion any proceeding they are doing. It is of note that in all of these proceedings, the AG represents the Region; he effectively represents the region's laws in criminal matters, seeking to enforce them where the justices have seen cause for a trial.

So, the Attorney General must prosecute all criminal trials, and see them through to their completion. But how? Can he simply choose how aggressively or competently, or to what extent, he will prosecute each case? No, he cannot. He is bound by his Oath to do exercise his powers and rights in a way that avoids "misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance". This requires the Attorney General to execute his duties to the fullest of his abilities, lest he commit nonfeasance. He must do so regardless of his personal opinions, lest he commit misfeasance. And he must do so in accordance, at all times, with the law, lest he commit malfeasance.

One final note, before we move on to a discussion of the current Attorney General's actions. The Constitution expressly reserves for the Courts, the power to decide all questions of law, or questions of fact as examined through legal proceeding. No other governmental entity is granted such power. This express reservation, under current law and Court rulings, does not grant the Attorney General discretion in either which cases he prosecutes, or the degree of professionalism and zeal with which he prosecutes those cases. The Attorney General is an advocate; a Prosecutor. He speaks for the People and the Region of the North Pacific, in defense of their laws and their government's policies. He ought not judge, nor act based on personal opinion; that is not his prerogative.

This brings us to Punk D. It is the opinion of this Court that he has failed to meet these requirements as outlined by law, and by the Oath he willingly took. In TNP v. Unibot, Punk D indicated a clear intention to willfully abstain from submitting any evidence, effectively foregoing his duty to represent The North Pacific, based on his personal opinion. He explicitly stated his intention to exercise discretion he does not lawfully possess, and to purposefully cause the failure of a case which he is duty-bound to see to completion, to the fullest of his abilities. When confronted regarding these issues, the Attorney General remained defiant, and went so far as to submit one piece of evidence. This was done in response to the Court's stated intent to dismiss the case without the attachment of jeopardy. The Attorney General responded by attempting to force the Court to attach jeopardy at the 11th hour. Ironically enough, the Attorney General's attempt to out-maneuver the Court was foiled by a basic arithmetic error, as he failed to take this action until 23 hours after the close of discovery.

The Court is deeply concerned by the Attorney General's actions in this case. He attempted to force the Court to dismiss this case and bar it from ever being brought, based on no finding of fact, and instead his own opinion. This is not permissible under his own Oath, under the Legal Code, or under the Constitution. As a government official, Punk D may not disregard any of those documents; he has quite clearly done so here. It is not within the power of this court to compel action except as a result of a trial proceeding, however. We find no substantive law, however, which bars us from issuing a condemnation of a government official's actions, and strongly urging the Delegate to immediately request the resignation of the Attorney General, in conjunction with launching an investigation into the extent of this type of behavior within the Attorney General's office. The Court's ability to effectively apply the laws of The North Pacific is deeply undermined if the Attorney General cannot be relied upon to steadfastly carry out his duties; this Court has no faith in this Attorney General's ability or willingness to complete said duties.


Case thread
Advisory Opinion delivered on February 12, 2013.
Advisory Opinion invalidated on August 9, 2023.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Prohibiting Sedition
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justice Sanctaria and THO Abbey, with Justice Gaspo recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 1.3: Sedition:
8. "Sedition" is defined as an intentional attempt to incite the Nations of The North Pacific to revolt in a manner not sanctioned by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
Section 2 and 11 of the Bill of Rights:
2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region shall act only in the best interests of the Region, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

11. No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.
The Court also took into consideration the Constitution of the North Pacific.

The Court opines the following:


The Sedition Law defines Sedition as "an intentional attempt to incite the Nations of The North Pacific to revolt in a manner not sanctioned by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights".

The Bill of Rights establishes that each Nation has the right to free speech and that that right cannot be infringed upon. The Bill of Rights also establishes that in the event of an actual emergency, governmental authorities with the consent of the Nations of the North Pacific may act in any reasonable manner consistent with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution does not provide for the ability to infringe on Free Speech in any of its provisions.

The only provision that allows for infringement on the right to free speech is Section 11 of the Bill of rights when there is an emergency situation, governmental authorities may act in a reasonable manner with the permission of the Nations of the North Pacific.

Therefore the Court after reviewing the above has reached a unanimous agreement that the Sedition Law is unconstitutional and is therefore stricken from the Legal Code of the North Pacific.


Case thread
Ruling delivered on February 13, 2013.
Ruling overturned on April 29, 2022.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Nature of Precedent and the Scope of the Court's Powers
Opinion drafted by Justice Gaspo, joined by Chief Justice Hileville and Justice Sanctaria

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r, and the follow-up posted by Crushing Our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration the following elements of Article 4 of the Constitution of the North Pacific:


1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
. . .
4. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.

The Court opines the following:

The Court has before it two issues, tangentially related but submitted loosely together. The Court will first address Crushing Our Enemies' inquiry regarding the ability of this Court to review the policies of other elements of the government.
Crushing Our Enemies:
I would ask that the court take into consideration Article 4, clause 1:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
It would be preposterous to opine that the court has the power to "resolve conflicts and ambiguities" and "review the legality" in and of every law or policy except the ones the court itself has created.
This request has two interpretations: depending upon where one places the emphasis, and whether or not one comprehends sarcasm, it may either be taken on its face, as suggesting that the Court cannot review anything other than its own opinions. We first address this interpretation.

The Court finds no merit in this position as stated. The Court has been specifically charged with reviewing government policies, and no reason has been given in support of the assertion that this Court cannot review other the policies and actions of other elements of the government, upon request. The Courts are granted this power to provide a balance against abuses of power, and to provide recourse to allow citizens to have their grievances addressed by a neutral party.

Under COE's proposed interpretation, the Court would have no purpose, as it would only be permitted to conduct criminal and civil trials, and clarify ambiguity. It would not be able to hold elected officials accountable for their actions, or determine whether or not policies are in accordance with the Constitution; these powers of judicial review are essential to the operation of the court and the balanced structure of democracy within a 3-branch system.

The Court rejects COE's assertion, and maintains that, subject to the request of an affected party, it may review and offer its legal opinion on any action, policy, law, rule, or decision made by any government official.

If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.

Turning to r3naissanc3r's request for review, the Court recognizes that r3n's proposed interpretation is the most literal, most restrictive view which may be taken of this Court's freedom regarding past decisions. While this Court places strong importance on precedent, and is exceedingly hesitant to overturn it even in part, the interests of justice and the evolution of the law require that the Court be able to overturn precedent where appropriate. At one point, for example, FALCONKATS as Special Assistant Attorney General refused to bring any civil case before the Court, asserting (in direct contradiction with the Constitution) that the Court was exclusively able to hear criminal matters. Let's say that were appealed, and the Court erroneously upheld his decision. Under r3n's proposal, that would stand forever. The only means of bypassing it, would be for the Regional Assembly to pass a law saying that the Constitution says something that it already said in the first place. Inescapable binding in Court decisions would not advance the interests of Justice.

Let's look at another example to illustrate this. Suppose a Counsel submits an Affidavit as evidence in a current trial. Affidavits are neither permitted nor barred, currently - they are not discussed in the current Court Rules. Let's say that this Affidavit was submitted, and objected to, and the objection was upheld. It was then appealed, and the Court opined that Affidavits were not permissible. That would be binding forever. Ah, you say, but the legislature could legislate around that, thus restoring balance! You would be wrong. The RA would not be able to change the rules, because evidentiary concerns are addressed in the Court Rules, which only the Court can change. And the Courts would not be able to contradict binding precedent, thus permanently barring Affidavits from ever being used in TNP Courts. The law must be allowed to evolve to match society, and conclusively binding decisions carry with them the potential to greatly restrict the ability of the law, and the Court, to adjust with the times.

The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court's discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.

In other words, the Court must explain itself fully when overturning precedent. The Court must try, wherever possible, to act in accordance with precedent, so long as that precedent does not conflict with new law, or the fundamental principles of justice established by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

To specifically answer r3n's questions, the binding effect prescribed by the Constitution applies to the Court to the extent that it does not bring the Court's precedent into conflict with the Constitution or with subsequent substantive law. The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to "look again"), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on February 20, 2013.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Time Limits in Trials
Opinion drafted by Justice Sanctaria, joined by THOs Abbey Anumia and Jamie, with Chief Justice Hilleville and Justice Gaspo recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration Article 7 of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:


When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer.

The Court opines the following:

The issue the Court has before it is whether or not the the scheduling of trials, as they currently stand, infringes on one's right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. In particular, the Court is asked whether or not the denying the Defence's right to respond to motions due to those time limits, specifically in the case of The North Pacific v. Eluvatar, limited that Defendant's right to a fair trial.

It is the opinion of the Court that the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed to those charged with criminal acts by the Bill of Rights, includes an inherent right of response to the Defendant and/or his/her team. It is the Court's opinion that denying the Defence an opportunity to respond to the Prosecution, in both a pre-trial period and beyond, would pose a danger to a Defendant's enumerated right, especially in a situation where an over-zealous Prosecution intentionally waited until immediately prior to the end of specific phase to make a motion, thereby depriving the Defence of any opportunity to respond.

This Court believes that in order to protect the constitutional rights of the Defendant, should the Prosecution file any motion(s) in the 12 hour period immediately prior to the ending of a phase, the Defence be granted an automatic time extension to respond to that motion(s) if they fail to do so in that 12 hour period before the phase ends. This Court tasks the Court will updating its ruleset to reflect this opinion and to clarify the automatic extension as outlined.

Further, the Court does not recognise that the aforementioned right to respond should apply to the Prosecution also, as although the Bill of Rights guarantees equality for each nation in the operations of governmental authorities, the right to a fair trial (from which this right to respond is found) is explicitly given by the Bill of Rights only to those charged with a criminal offence.

It is also the considered opinion of the Court that this right of response is just and only that; a right to respond to motions made, and not extra time to file motions of their own.

With specific attention to the case of The North Pacific v. Eluvatar, the Court acknowledges its own erring and agrees with the Defence that pre-trial motions should not have begun as pleas for all charges were not filed; motions to dismiss belong only in the pre-trial period and should not have been accepted as it had not yet begun. It is the belief of this Court that the trial in question should return to the plea phase.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on March 4, 2013.
 
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Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Vice Delegate Succession to the Delegacy
Opinion drafted by Justice Sanctaria, joined by Chief Justice Hileville, with Justice Gaspo dissenting

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Cormac Stark.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 3: The Delegate and Vice Delegate:
1. The Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate.
2. The Delegate may eject and ban nations from the region as permitted by law, and will eject or ban nations from the region when required by law.
3. The Delegate may negotiate treaties with foreign powers. No treaty will come into effect unless approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the Regional Assembly.
4. The Delegate may veto a proposal of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal a law within one week of its passage. The Regional Assembly may override such a veto by a two-thirds majority vote.
5. The Delegate may appoint executive officers to assist them and may dismiss these officers freely. Executive offices may be regulated by law.
6. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.
7. The Vice Delegate will hold the second most endorsements in the region. The Delegate may eject or ban any nation which exceeds the Vice Delegate’s endorsement count.
8. If the Delegate is removed or unable to serve, the Vice Delegate will assume the duties of the Delegate. If the Vice Delegate is also unable to serve, the first available person in the line of succession will assume the duties of the Delegate.
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.
Article 6. General Provisions:
1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.
2. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
3. No person may simultaneously hold more than one elected office or simultaneously hold offices in more than one judicial, legislative or executive category.
4. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.
5. No law or government policy may contradict this constitution.
6. Procedures to fill vacancies in elected offices may be established by law.
The Court took into consideration the Relevant Section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
Section 4.2: Election Law Definitions:
4. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.
5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle.
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
7. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The dates for the Election Cycle will be designated at least 30 days in advance by the Delegate .
8. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it. An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election unless a it cannot be completed prior to the beginning of the appropriate scheduled election cycle. Pending an election, however, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body. Vacancies of appointed positions may be filled in accordance with proper appointment procedures.
The Court opines the following:

The issues before the Court are: whether or not Article 6.6 of the Constitution covers the procedure when a Delegate vacates his office, or if it does not and the procedures for the situation when a Delegate vacate his office is covered by Article 3.8 of the Constitution; whether or not being "unable to serve", as said by the Constitution, includes a resignation; does the Vice Delegate succeed the Delegate for the remainder of the Delegate's term, or just until a special election for the office can be concluded. The Court shall take address each issue separately in this opinion.

On the first issue, it is the opinion of the Court that both Articles, 3.8 and 6.6, need not be exclusive and can indeed be complimentary. The Court shall expand on this in the last issue.

It is the further opinion of the Court that a resignation should be taken as being "unable to serve". A resignation is and of itself a severe and serious impediment on the ability for the Delegate to serve; indeed, it should be understood as not wanting to serve. The Court finds such to be implicitly included in Article 3.8 of the Constitution, specifically where it reads "unable to serve".

Finally, and more importantly as the Court has found this to be the major crux of the issues at hand, it is the opinion of the Court that where Article 3.8 of the Constitution refers to the Vice Delegate assuming the duties of the Delegate where he is removed or unable to serve, that clause mandates the Vice Delegate exercise the duties of the office but not the office itself. The Court further finds that Article 6.6 includes the elected office of the Delegate in its remit.

The Court reasons this due to the Constitution referring to "offices" in other provisions of the Constitution (2.3; 3.5; 6.3), however when referring to the situations where the Vice Delegate succeeds the Delegate, it specifies "duties" only. The Court believes that this is a conscious reference and should be read as different to the "office" mentioned in other articles of the Constitution.

It is the opinion of this Court that upon the removal or resignation of the Delegate, and indeed when he is unable to serve as written, that the Vice Delegate should assume the duties of the Delegate, but only the duties, and only until a special election electing a new Delegate has concluded and the new Delegate installed.

To clarify, a Vice Delegate does not succeed the Delegate in office, only his duties for a temporary period of time until a new Delegate elected, currently covered by Section 4.2.8 of the Legal Code which is allowed for by Article 6.6 of the Constitution.

Anticipating questions wherein it is asked "does not the Vice Delegate assume the office by virtue of his assuming the in-game office", the Court advises the following:

Article 3.1 of the Constitutions stipulates that "the Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate". It is the opinion of the Court that the Delegate must hold all positions in order to fulfill what the Constitution defines as the office. That is, the Delegate must be both the Head of State and Government, and hold the in-game position of Delegate. While the Vice Delegate may occupy the latter position, he does not occupy the former, and therefore this Court dismisses the opinion that he holds the office of Delegate just because he sits in the in-game Delegacy.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on March 14, 2013.
 
Last edited:
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Minor Error Clause
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Hileville, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Gaspo

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 2. The Regional Assembly:
1. Requirements for membership in the Regional Assembly will be determined by law.
2. The Regional Assembly may enact, amend or repeal laws by a majority vote.
3. The Regional Assembly may remove a government official from office by a two-thirds majority vote.
4. The quorum for any vote of the Regional Assembly except elections will be a third of its membership.
5. The Regional Assembly will elect a Speaker every four months by a plurality vote.
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
7. Abstentions cast in the Regional Assembly will not be used to determine the result of any vote, but may be used for quorum and all other purposes.
Article 3. The Delegate and Vice Delegate:
1. The Delegate will be the head of state and government of The North Pacific and hold the in-game position of delegate.
2. The Delegate may eject and ban nations from the region as permitted by law, and will eject or ban nations from the region when required by law.
3. The Delegate may negotiate treaties with foreign powers. No treaty will come into effect unless approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the Regional Assembly.
4. The Delegate may veto a proposal of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal a law within one week of its passage. The Regional Assembly may override such a veto by a two-thirds majority vote.
5. The Delegate may appoint executive officers to assist them and may dismiss these officers freely. Executive offices may be regulated by law.
6. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.
7. The Vice Delegate will hold the second most endorsements in the region. The Delegate may eject or ban any nation which exceeds the Vice Delegate’s endorsement count.
8. If the Delegate is removed or unable to serve, the Vice Delegate will assume the duties of the Delegate. If the Vice Delegate is also unable to serve, the first available person in the line of succession will assume the duties of the Delegate.
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.

The Court took into consideration the Preamble of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
Preamble:
In order to present a clearer and more comprehensible legal system, the Regional Assembly undertakes to keep the law of the North Pacific organized and clear. If a minor error is found in this Legal Code, the Speaker will update it on the published instructions of the Court, unless a Regional Assembly member objects within five days. This Code will be divided into several Chapters, which may contain Sections. Every operative sentence must be a numbered clause, numbered within a Chapter. Clauses may be referenced by chapter and clause number..
The Court opines the following:

The Court reviewed the the sections of the Constitution as listed above as well as the Preamble of the Legal Code. The Court notes that the Constitution specifically grants power to amend a Law to the Regional Assembly which requires a majority vote. The Constitution also grants the Delegate the ability to veto said Amendment.

The Court is in unanimous agreement that the Constitution grants Amendment power to the Regional Assembly and also places the restriction of requiring a majority vote on said power. The Court reads the requirement of a "majority vote" as a vote in accordance with Regional Assembly Policy for holding votes. This specifically means that just giving a period of time to object to an amendment does not constitute a "majority vote".

Therefore the Court is in unanimous agreement that the section in the Legal Code's Preamble which gives the Speaker the power to amend a minor error on the published instructions of the Court is unconstitutional.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on March 15, 2013.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Blue Wolf II.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Legal Code and Constitution of the North Pacific:


Constitution:
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.

Legal Code:
13. The election cycle for the terms of the Delegate and Vice Delegate, and of the Speaker, will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.

The Court opines the following:

1) What period of time constitutes a legal term for Delegate, if at all possible, put in terms of specific months of the year (ex. January to May)?

The legal terms for Delegate are set as 4 month periods, starting in January, May and September.

2) Is it legal for a Delegate who just served two consecutive and elected terms as Delegate to run in a special election for the term he/she was legally barred from running for during the General Elections?

No. The Delegate has still served in 2 consecutive terms - it is irrelevant whether they served the whole term, the first half or the second half.

Having established the set terms, the Court believes that it is not legal for a Delegate to contest any Delegate election, be it general or special, in the term immediately following his second consecutive term.
Although this ruling established that finishing out the term did not constitute serving a term, this Court believes that there is no distinction in the Constitution or the Legal Code which would allow for discrimination based on when in a term the special election is held and the new Delegate elected. The Court can therefore not hold with that previous ruling.

3) Is Eluvatar, at this present time, a legal candidate for Delegate in either this Special Election or any other Special Delegate election this term?

No. He has served in the two terms immediately preceding the term in which this Special Election is held, therefore he is not eligible.

4) If Eluvatar is ruled to be a legal candidate and were to win the Special Elections, would he be legally allowed to seek re-election in the following May and September General Elections?

As the Court has ruled that Eluvatar is not a legal candidate, this question is moot.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on March 19, 2013.
Ruling partially rendered defunct on August 9, 2023.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Intelligence Exception to the Freedom of Information Act
Opinion drafted by Justice Sanctaria, joined by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia and Justice Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Gaspo.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:

Article 1:
1. All nations are guaranteed the rights defined by the Bill of Rights.
Article 6:
5. No law or government policy may contradict this constitution.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:

Section 9:
Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
Section 11:
No governmental authority of the region has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region, with the express consent of the Nations of the region or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 6.3: Freedom of Information Act:
15. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
16. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
17. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
18. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
19. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
20. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.
21. All activities by the designated regional intelligence services are exempt from this law.

The Court opines the following:

The issue before the Court is simple: Whether or not Section 6.3.21 of the Legal Code is unconstitutional due to the Bill of Rights guaranteeing the transparent and accountable operations of its governmental authorities.

The first thing the Court looks at is the principle of constitutional supremacy. That is, that no legal document or law may contradict the Constitution. The Court finds that this principle is indeed in force in The North Pacific due to Article 6.5 of the Constitution and also section 11 of the Bill of Rights. At this point, the Court also wishes to confirm that under Article 1 of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights stands a part of that Constitution.

Having established that no part of the legal code may contradict or supersede the Constitution, which we have also established includes the Bill of Rights, we now look to the question as to whether or not Section 6.3.21 of the Legal Code contradicts the Constitution.

The piece of statute in question exempts regional intelligence services from the remit of Section 6.3 of the Legal Code, hereafter referred to as the Freedom of Information Act. It is the opinion of this Court that although Section 9 of the Bill of Rights guarantees the transparent operations of the government, it is only through the Freedom of Information Act in the Legal Code that nations may access undisclosed information; that is, the Freedom of Information Act governs the transparency of the governmental authorities, and specifies procedures on how to access undisclosed information.

Nations in The North Pacific are guaranteed transparency, and it is forbidden for governmental authorities to disregard the Constitution, and it is also forbidden to contradict the Constitution. This Court finds that the Bill of Rights does not create an exemption from transparency for any governmental authority, and similarly this Court finds that the Constitution and Bill of Rights do not create an exemption from constitutional supremacy for any law regarding government authorities.

As such, it is the opinion of this Court that Section 6.3.21 of the Legal Code is unconstitutional and consequently directs the Speaker of the Regional Assembly to strike it from the Legal Code.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on March 26, 2013.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Standing and the Definition of Affected Party
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant Law of the North Pacific:


Constitution:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.

Bill of Rights:
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region. Any Nation of The North Pacific has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.

The Court opines the following:

With regards to “affected party” in general:

The Court opines that an affected party, with respect to one’s the ability to request judicial review, is someone who reasonably perceives that their rights have been infringed through action or inaction undertaken by a governmental body or bodies. An affected party also include those affected, adversely or otherwise, by laws passed by the regional assembly and policies enacted by the executive and judicial branches of government.

The affected party must detail in their review request the rights they perceive have been violated and/or the laws put asunder showing a clear connection between the law and how they are personally affected in the situation.

With regards to flemingovia's specific enquiry:

The Court finds that flemingovia was entitled to request a review of the Election Commisioner's refusal to list Astarial on the ballot. While Flemingovia was not a candidate in the election, the Court is charged with “resolving conflicts or ambiguities” in the law. Flemingovia was unclear how to interpret the law surrounding legal candidates and wanted to ensure that the Elections Commission’s interpretation with respect to Astarial’s candidacy was indeed the correct interpretation. As a voter in the election in question, the choice of candidates directly affected Flemingovia, as well as all voters in the election, and thus Flemingovia met the requirement defined in the Constitution.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on April 22, 2013.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Justices as Government Officials
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justices Sanctaria and Punk D

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant parts of the Constitution and Legal Code of the North Pacific:


Constitution:
Article 4. The Court

5. Justices will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a plurality vote every four months.

Constitution:
Article 6. General Provisions
1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.
2. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
3. No person may simultaneously hold more than one elected office or simultaneously hold offices in more than one judicial, legislative or executive category.
4. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.

Legal Code:
Section 3.2: Appointment of Hearing Officers
8. If there is a vacancy on the Court, or any Justice is unavailable or has a conflict of interest the remaining Justices will promptly appoint a hearing officer to participate as temporary Justices.
9. If no Justices are available or all Justices have a conflict of interest, the Delegate will promptly appoint the needed hearing officers with the agreement of the Speaker.
10. In implementing the previous clause, any person who has a conflict of interest will be treated as absent.
11. Any hearing officer appointed under this Section must not have a conflict of interest and may not hold any other office while serving as a judicial hearing officer.

Legal Code:
Section 3.3: Criminal Trial Procedure
12. When seeking an indictment to eject or ban, or expel from the RA due to oath violation, pending a trial, the Government must inform all the Justices.
13. Any Justice may approve or deny an indictment, and their decision will be final.
14. Once an ejection is performed, the Government must notify the ejected nation of their rights within one hour, and publicly submit a criminal proceeding to the court within six hours.
15. Once a criminal proceeding is presented, the defendant will have 48 hours to enter a plea, or a plea of "Not Guilty" may be entered for them.
16. Once a plea is entered, a period of time set by the Court for the discovery of evidence and witness testimony will begin. This period is normally 7 days.
17. Once discovery ends a period of time for arguments on the evidence and law will begin, its duration set by the Court. This period is normally 5 days.
18. During discovery and arguments, either side may make objections or requests publicly on the forum.
19. Once arguments end, the Court will have 72 hours to decide on a verdict and, if necessary, sentence.

Legal Code:
Chapter 4: Election and Appointment Procedure
Section 4.1: Oath of Office

1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
I, [forum username], do hereby solemnly swear that during my term as [government position], I will uphold the ideals of Democracy, Freedom, and Justice of The Region of The North Pacific. I will use the powers and rights granted to me through The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code in a legal, responsible, and unbiased manner, not abusing my power, committing misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office, in any gross or excessive manner. I will act only in the best interests of The North Pacific, not influenced by personal gain or any outside force, and within the restraints of my legally granted power. As such, I hereby take up the office of [government position], with all the powers, rights, and responsibilities held therein.
2. All government officials will be required to take the Oath of Office within one week of the certification of election results by the Election Commissioner, or if appointed, within one week of their appointment being announced. The taking of the Oath constitutes assumption of the office. Failure to post the oath within the allotted time will result in the office being considered vacant, to be filled in accordance with all laws governing elections or appointments, as is appropriate for the office in question.
3. This Oath will be binding and violations are grounds for a recall.

Section 4.2: Election Law Definitions
4. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.
5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle.
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
7. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The dates for the Election Cycle will be designated at least 30 days in advance by the Delegate .
8. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it . An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election unless a it cannot be completed prior to the beginning of the appropriate scheduled election cycle. Pending an election, however, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body. Vacancies of appointed positions may be filled in accordance with proper appointment procedures.

Section 4.3: Overall Election Law
9. In General and Judicial elections, Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the nomination and election processes at least one week before the month in which the election begins. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Chief Justice shall promptly make the appointment within 48 hours.
10. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy shall last for seven days.
11. Voting will begin three days after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for seven days.
12. If a run-off vote is required it will begin within two days of the first vote ending and it shall last for five days.

Section 4.4: General Elections
13. The election cycle for the terms of the Delegate and Vice Delegate, and of the Speaker, will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.
14. Non-incumbent candidates for Delegate or Vice Delegate may not obtain an endorsement level during the election cycle greater than the level authorized for members of the Security Council under Chapter 5.

Section 4.5: Judicial Elections
15. The election cycle for the terms of Justices, and the Attorney General will begin on the first days of the months of March, July, and November.
16. Whenever the position is vacant, the Justices shall elect a Chief Justice from among themselves by a majority vote.
17. In the event that seven days after the conclusion of a Judicial election, including the conclusion of any required run-off votes, a Chief Justice has not been elected, the Justice that received the highest number of votes in said election, and in the event of a tie for highest number of votes the Justice among those tied with the largest amount of elapsed time since that Justice's most recent admission to the Regional Assembly without an interruption, shall become Chief Justice.

Section 4.6: Special Elections
18. A special election will be held in the event of a vacancy in any elected office or position.
19. The Delegate, or if the Delegate is not available, the Speaker, or if the Delegate and Speaker are not available, any Court Justice, will serve as Election Commissioner for the special election.
20. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy in the special election will last for five days, beginning within two days after the vacancy is noticed.
21. Voting will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately.

Legal Code Chapter 2:
Section 1.5: Proxying
16. "Proxying" is defined as use of a proxy server to render a forum user anonymous or any practice which allows a member multiple accounts.
17. Forum administrators will inform the Government and Court of Proxying they observe.

The Court opines the following:

The question before the Court is to determine if Justices are government officials. This question is most directly answered by looking at Article 6 of the Constitution. This notes that “government officials” must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly, and that any election candidate must be a Regional Assembly member for 15 days before the opening of nominations. Because these requirements are included within the same clause, this Court believes that they should be considered together and linked. Justices are elected positions, as is made clear in Article 4 of the Constitution and in Chapter 4 of the Legal Code. Article 6.1 also makes clear that government officials are positions above and beyond just an RA member. In other places in the Constitution and Legal Code (namely, Article 6.3 of the Constitution, and during various parts of Article 4 in the Legal Code, as well as possibly others), Justices and other Judicial posts are included with but also defined separately from the other branches of governance. Specifically, Article 7.3 separates government officials into three categories: legislative, executive and judicial. To this end, the Court finds that all members that have elected extra-Regional Assembly offices are government officials.

With respect to flemingovia's direct question around Astarial's candidacy, the Court opines that at first glance these two clauses could intimate that “government officials” do not include Court Justices. However, within the context of the Legal Code there does not appear to be such an inconsistency. With regards to Legal Code Section 2, Clause 12, the distinction is clearly more of a practical nature, as the Justices will not be the party filing and indictment – the indictment is filed by the 'executive' office. Further, with regards to Section 1, Clause 17, this is a combination of a clarification of the different branches of government, as well as a practical consideration. In this case, the two separate branches are Government and Court.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on May 9, 2013.
 
Last edited:
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Powers of Election Commissioners
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia, joined by Justice Punk D, with Justice Sanctaria abstaining

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Funkadelia.

The Court took into consideration the Relevant parts of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:


5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
9. In General and Judicial elections, Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the nomination and election processes at least one week before the month in which the election begins. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Chief Justice shall promptly make the appointment within 48 hours.

The Court opines the following:

The Legal question before the Court is whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place. The Court was presented with two potential interpretations of the relevant law in this case. One potential interpretation was that the Election Commissioners do not have this power, and that candidates simply have to declare themselves as such. The second interpretation was that they do have this power, and that Candidates must post their declarations in the relevant thread.

In order to make a decision, the Court considered the first of these possible rulings, and found that it would lead to absurdity when all of the relevant Law is considered together. If the Election Commissioners do not have the power to require candidacy declarations to be in their designated threads, then there would be no requirement for Candidates to post their declarations anywhere obvious, or even publicly. This would impact on the Election Commissioners ability to supervise and oversee elections, as set out by the Legal Code. Thus, the Court rejected this interpretation.

To this end, the Court finds that requiring Candidates to post their declaration in a thread designated for such a purpose is a reasonable manifestation of the Election Commissioners' ability to oversee an election. This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned.


Case thread
Ruling delivered on May 14, 2013.
Rendered defunct on March 2, 2024.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Restarting Voting Periods
Opinion drafted by THO r3naissanc3r, joined by Chief Justice Abbey Anumia and Justice Punk D, with Justice Sanctaria recused

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mall.

The Court took into consideration the following Articles of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:


9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

10. Each Nation entitled to a vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region is entitled to the equal treatment and protection of that Nation's right to vote.

The Court took into consideration the following Clause of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 3
9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person shall be elected Delegate to a full or partial term in three consecutive election cycles.

The Court took into consideration the following Sections of the Codified Law of The North Pacific:

Section 4.2: Election Law Definitions


4. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.

5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle.

6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.

7. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The dates for the Election Cycle will be designated at least 30 days in advance by the Delegate .

8. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it . An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election unless a it cannot be completed prior to the beginning of the appropriate scheduled election cycle. Pending an election, however, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body. Vacancies of appointed positions may be filled in accordance with proper appointment procedures.

Section 4.3: Overall Election Law

9. In General and Judicial elections, Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the nomination and election processes at least one week before the month in which the election begins. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Chief Justice shall promptly make the appointment within 48 hours.

10. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy shall last for seven days.

11. Voting will begin three days after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for seven days.

12. If a run-off vote is required it will begin within two days of the first vote ending and it shall last for five days.

Section 4.4: General Elections

13. The election cycle for the terms of the Delegate and Vice Delegate, and of the Speaker, will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.

14. Non-incumbent candidates for Delegate or Vice Delegate may not obtain an endorsement level during the election cycle greater than the level authorized for members of the Security Council under Chapter 5.

Section 4.6: Special Elections

18. A special election will be held in the event of a vacancy in any elected office or position.

19. The Delegate, or if the Delegate is not available, the Speaker, or if the Delegate and Speaker are not available, any Court Justice, will serve as Election Commissioner for the special election.

20. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy in the special election will last for five days, beginning within two days after the vacancy is noticed.

21. Voting will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately.

The Court took into consideration its previous rulings:

It is the belief of the Court that the accidental omittance of a Candidate from the Ballot does in fact violate that Candidates Rights under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore ordered that the voting period for the Special Election of Vice Delegate is restarted immediately. The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Court recognizes mcmasterdonia's immediate attempt to rectify the situation by adding the missing candidates name back to the ballot as soon as being made aware of the situation. The Court does appreciate when an official in the Government attempts to correct a mistake however this specific rectification was not enough to satisfy the Bill of Rights.

The Court has before it two issues, tangentially related but submitted loosely together. The Court will first address Crushing Our Enemies' inquiry regarding the ability of this Court to review the policies of other elements of the government.

Crushing Our Enemies:
I would ask that the court take into consideration Article 4, clause 1:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
It would be preposterous to opine that the court has the power to "resolve conflicts and ambiguities" and "review the legality" in and of every law or policy except the ones the court itself has created.

This request has two interpretations: depending upon where one places the emphasis, and whether or not one comprehends sarcasm, it may either be taken on its face, as suggesting that the Court cannot review anything other than its own opinions. We first address this interpretation.

The Court finds no merit in this position as stated. The Court has been specifically charged with reviewing government policies, and no reason has been given in support of the assertion that this Court cannot review other the policies and actions of other elements of the government, upon request. The Courts are granted this power to provide a balance against abuses of power, and to provide recourse to allow citizens to have their grievances addressed by a neutral party.

Under COE's proposed interpretation, the Court would have no purpose, as it would only be permitted to conduct criminal and civil trials, and clarify ambiguity. It would not be able to hold elected officials accountable for their actions, or determine whether or not policies are in accordance with the Constitution; these powers of judicial review are essential to the operation of the court and the balanced structure of democracy within a 3-branch system.

The Court rejects COE's assertion, and maintains that, subject to the request of an affected party, it may review and offer its legal opinion on any action, policy, law, rule, or decision made by any government official.

If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.

Turning to r3naissanc3r's request for review, the Court recognizes that r3n's proposed interpretation is the most literal, most restrictive view which may be taken of this Court's freedom regarding past decisions. While this Court places strong importance on precedent, and is exceedingly hesitant to overturn it even in part, the interests of justice and the evolution of the law require that the Court be able to overturn precedent where appropriate. At one point, for example, FALCONKATS as Special Assistant Attorney General refused to bring any civil case before the Court, asserting (in direct contradiction with the Constitution) that the Court was exclusively able to hear criminal matters. Let's say that were appealed, and the Court erroneously upheld his decision. Under r3n's proposal, that would stand forever. The only means of bypassing it, would be for the Regional Assembly to pass a law saying that the Constitution says something that it already said in the first place. Inescapable binding in Court decisions would not advance the interests of Justice.

Let's look at another example to illustrate this. Suppose a Counsel submits an Affidavit as evidence in a current trial. Affidavits are neither permitted nor barred, currently - they are not discussed in the current Court Rules. Let's say that this Affidavit was submitted, and objected to, and the objection was upheld. It was then appealed, and the Court opined that Affidavits were not permissible. That would be binding forever. Ah, you say, but the legislature could legislate around that, thus restoring balance! You would be wrong. The RA would not be able to change the rules, because evidentiary concerns are addressed in the Court Rules, which only the Court can change. And the Courts would not be able to contradict binding precedent, thus permanently barring Affidavits from ever being used in TNP Courts. The law must be allowed to evolve to match society, and conclusively binding decisions carry with them the potential to greatly restrict the ability of the law, and the Court, to adjust with the times.

The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court's discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.

In other words, the Court must explain itself fully when overturning precedent. The Court must try, wherever possible, to act in accordance with precedent, so long as that precedent does not conflict with new law, or the fundamental principles of justice established by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

To specifically answer r3n's questions, the binding effect prescribed by the Constitution applies to the Court to the extent that it does not bring the Court's precedent into conflict with the Constitution or with subsequent substantive law. The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to "look again"), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.
1) What period of time constitutes a legal term for Delegate, if at all possible, put in terms of specific months of the year (ex. January to May)?

The legal terms for Delegate are set as 4 month periods, starting in January, May and September.

2) Is it legal for a Delegate who just served two consecutive and elected terms as Delegate to run in a special election for the term he/she was legally barred from running for during the General Elections?

No. The Delegate has still served in 2 consecutive terms - it is irrelevant whether they served the whole term, the first half or the second half.

Having established the set terms, the Court believes that it is not legal for a Delegate to contest any Delegate election, be it general or special, in the term immediately following his second consecutive term. Although this ruling established that finishing out the term did not constitute serving a term, this Court believes that there is no distinction in the Constitution or the Legal Code which would allow for discrimination based on when in a term the special election is held and the new Delegate elected. The Court can therefore not hold with that previous ruling.

3) Is Eluvatar, at this present time, a legal candidate for Delegate in either this Special Election or any other Special Delegate election this term?

No. He has served in the two terms immediately preceding the term in which this Special Election is held, therefore he is not eligible.

4) If Eluvatar is ruled to be a legal candidate and were to win the Special Elections, would he be legally allowed to seek re-election in the following May and September General Elections?

As the Court has ruled that Eluvatar is not a legal candidate, this question is moot.
The Legal question before the Court is whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place. The Court was presented with two potential interpretations of the relevant law in this case. One potential interpretation was that the Election Commissioners do not have this power, and that candidates simply have to declare themselves as such. The second interpretation was that they do have this power, and that Candidates must post their declarations in the relevant thread.

In order to make a decision, the Court considered the first of these possible rulings, and found that it would lead to absurdity when all of the relevant Law is considered together. If the Election Commissioners do not have the power to require candidacy declarations to be in their designated threads, then there would be no requirement for Candidates to post their declarations anywhere obvious, or even publicly. This would impact on the Election Commissioners ability to supervise and oversee elections, as set out by the Legal Code. Thus, the Court rejected this interpretation.

To this end, the Court finds that requiring Candidates to post their declaration in a thread designated for such a purpose is a reasonable manifestation of the Election Commissioners' ability to oversee an election. This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned.

The Court took into consideration the following Clauses of The North Pacific Legal Code, TNP Law 26:

"Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made, includes all voting periods, and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The exact dates for the Election Cycle shall not include any legal holidays provided in Law 23, and those dates shall be designated at least 30 days in advance by The Delegate so as to encourage the greatest level of participation by eligible voters during the designated month.

The Court took into consideration the following announcements made by the respective Election Commissioners: here; here; here; here; and here.

The Court opines the following:


The court has been requested by Mall to review the decision made on May 15th 2013 by the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election of May 2013 ("the Electoral Commission"), to restart the vote for the Vice Delegate portion of the election cycle ("the Vice Delegate election"). Mall petitioned for the review claiming that his candidacy in the Delegate portion of the election cycle ("the Delegate election") affords him the status of affected party required of those requesting review. In granting the petition, the Court has recognized this claim.

Mall ("the petitioner") presented the Court with four questions pertaining to this decision of the Electoral Commision. The Court will address these questions separately.

Violation of equal treatment and protection right.

The petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the Electoral Commission's decision to restart the Vice Delegate election has violated the equal treatment and protection right provided by Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific ("Bill of Rights"). The petitioner specifically presented the Court with the following argument: i. The Electoral Commission's earlier decision to not include Romanoffia in the ballot for the Vice Delegate election caused anomalies in that election. ii. Because the Delegate and Vice Delegate elections are closely linked, the same anomalies affected the Delegate election. iii. The Electoral Commission took action to relieve those involved in the Vice Delegate election from the negative effects of these anomalies by restarting that election, but took no similar action with regards to the Delegate election. iv. From this discrepancy stems the alleged violation of the equal treatment and protection right, which the petitioner argues would require similar action to be taken to relieve those involved in the Delegate election. As evidence for the anomalies caused in the Vice Delegate election, the petitioner presented the declared protest votes cast for Vice Delegate.

The Court is not convinced by the second proposition in the above argument. The Court rejects the proposition that anomalies in the Vice Delegate election are certain to affect the Delegate election. The Court recognizes that the inherent connection between the two elections makes it reasonably likely that disruptions in one may affect the other. The difference is salient: a proposition only likely to be true still needs to be substantiated by evidence before it is considered true with certainty; and absent this evidence the Court cannot act upon such a proposition by presumptively asserting its validity. The Court also finds the truth of this proposition to be necessary to the entire argument presented by the petitioner.

The petitioner has not presented any evidence of disruptions directly affecting the Delegate election necessary to substantiate the second proposition in his argument. With regards to the particular instance of disruptions the petitioner submitted occurred in the Vice Delegate election, protest votes: in addition to the lack of evidence of their certain occurrence in the Delegate election, the likelihood of their occurrence is further ameliorated by the fact that voters were provided ample time after the Electoral Commission's decision to amend any protest votes. Therefore, the Court concludes that it cannot validate the second proposition in the petitioner's argument, and by the reasoning presented in the previous paragraph the Court rejects the petitioner's argument.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate election did not violate the right to equal treatment and protection granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.

Violation of right to prior notice.

The petitioner requested that the Court examine whether the Electoral Commission's actions in restarting the Vice Delegate election violated the right to prior notice of actions of governmental authorities provided to him by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.

The Court believes that the Electoral Commission constitutes a "governmental authority" for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, thus its actions are subject to the sufficient prior notice standard required by that Article. Therefore, the Court concludes that the request by the petitioner merits investigation.

The Court first needs to determine what constitutes sufficient prior notice. There are three sources the Court can use to inform its decision: statutory legislation, precedent set by this Court's prior decisions, and past practice.

In electoral matters for which the legislator has provided explicit instructions for their administration, sufficient prior notice would be at least as much time as prescribed by those instructions. When such instructions are absent, as in the case under consideration, in the interests of consistent application of law, the Court can seek to draw inferences from: i. legislation on closely related matters; and ii. credible evidence of legislative intent that can be determined from intrinsic aids within the statute and legislative history. In terms of the former, the electoral matter of closest nature regulated by electoral law is run-off votes: run-off votes uniquely share with the vote under examination the defining characteristics of being unexpected until they arise as a consequence of circumstances in a regular vote, and therefore not a-priori scheduled. The relevant provisions in the Codified Law of The North Pacific ("the Legal Code"), found in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, Clause 12, prescribe that run-off votes must be started "within two days" of the end of the vote necessitating them. This provision provides no lower bound on the amount of prior notice that must be given (a vote can be started immediately), and from its phrasing the Court assumes that its intent is to ensure expediency rather than sufficient prior notice. Cues can be taken from provisions for other types of votes, where a few clauses (Section 4.3, Clauses 10 and 11, and Section 4.6, Clause 20 and 21) regulate a specific amount of time before voting commences. Though it is the belief of the Court that this time is provided primarily to allow for candidates to campaign, it can be reasonably expected that the legislator additionally intended for this time to act as a form of prior notification to voters. This expectation is reinforced by taking into consideration legislative history, and in particular the introductory paragraphs to TNP Law 26, from which current electoral legislation is derived. There, it is declared that electoral dates must be declared in advanced "so as to encourage the greatest level of participation", providing credible evidence that the legislator agonized to ensure that the right of voters to sufficient prior notice is observed. The same argument however can be used to infer that the legislator took this into consideration when deciding not to provide for additional prior notification in run-off election.

In terms of case precedent, the Court examined its determinations in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. The circumstances decided there are conspicuously similar to those currently under examination: a vote was started with a candidate's name omitted from the ballot, and when it was determined that the omission was improper, the vote was restarted. In that case, the Court ordered the vote to be restarted immediately. Another Court decision addressing similar circumstances can be found in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Blue Wolf II on whether or not Eluvatar is term-barred from being a candidate in the Special Elections for Delegate; however in that case the Court did not make any determinations related to the question we investigate.

Finally, the Court turns its attention to prior practice. The Court has identified two past situations where a vote had to be restarted, both alluded to in the previous paragraph in the context of respective Court decisions they triggered. The first is the Special Election for Vice Delegate held in November-December 2012; in that case, the vote was restarted immediately, per the order of the Court. The second is the Special Election for Delegate of March 2013, where the vote was also restarted immediately. This however can be assumed to have been compliance with the previous Court order, so does not offer any new information either. Looking at prior practice in a more general context, the Court observes that the general accepted standard for actions by governmental officials is that they are visibly announced in a designated place within the constitutionally designated Regional Forum, with visibility usually achieved through the use of a new thread. This standard also applies to actions of the various Electoral Commissions, which usually provide no additional prior notice besides any legally mandated time interval before commencing a vote.

In order to reach a conclusion, the Court has balanced the various sources of information available to it and the guidance they provide. The Court considers the most pertinent to be the precedent set by the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. The Court has also not identified any irreconcilable conflict between that ruling and the Constitution and substantive law. The Court is also conscious of the boundaries it set upon itself in the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers. Requiring additional prior notice before a vote is restarted would at least partially overturn the precedent set by that decision, which required the respective vote to be restarted immediately. Seeing also that this is consistent with prior practice, and with what weak cues can be drawn from existing related legislation, the Court believes that an announcement of the restarting of a vote made in a new, separate thread in an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Court notes that this is a sufficient, not necessary standard. The Court also finds that the manner in which the Electoral Commission announced the restarting of the Vice Delegate election satisfied this standard.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate election did not violate the right to prior notice granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.

Violation of right to protection of right to vote.

The petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the Electoral Commission's decision to restart the Vice Delegate election has infringed upon his and others' right to vote, as protected by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. The petitioner identified the potential infringement in the discounting of votes, cast in compliance with pertinent law, that occurred as a consequence of the decision to restart the election.

The Court recognizes the fact that restarting an election already in progress results in the discounting of legally cast votes. When this discounting happens without due justification, the Court believes that it constitutes a violation of the rights granted by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. The question then becomes, what is due justification? The Court, in the interests of judicial restraint, will answer, partially at least, a narrower question: what is due justification for restarting an ongoing vote? Once this is answered, the Court will then apply the answer to the specific circumstances of the Vice Delegate election.

This Court has already provided some guidance on how to approach this issue, in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. There, the Court found that

It is the belief of the Court that the accidental omittance of a Candidate from the Ballot does in fact violate that Candidates Rights under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore ordered that the voting period for the Special Election of Vice Delegate is restarted immediately. The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

Parsing this finding, it is first determined that the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is a violation of their rights under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights that can only be remedied by restarting the vote. Importantly, it is further determined that not restarting the vote---or not altering the timetable as otherwise required---would itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.

The Court wishes to elaborate on these findings, and the second determination in particular. The violation of the Bill of Rights in the above set of circumstances is twofold. The omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot, the Court found previously, is in violation of Article 9. The remedy for this violation is to render the vote void. Consequently, votes cast using the erroneous ballot are also invalidated. Their invalidity is not by fault of the voters, but of the Electoral Commission, which failed to provide those entitled to vote with an opportunity to exercise their right in a valid way. This failure is, by itself, a violation of Article 10. The remedy for the second violation is to discount the invalid votes and restart the vote. In the context of our original question, the discounting of the votes resulting by restarting a vote under these circumstances is justified: the mishandling of the original vote was egregious enough to invalidate those votes beyond repair, and thus making their discounting in favor of a new vote the only means available for safeguarding the rights guaranteed under Article 10.

The above argument points to an answer to the question the Court set to investigate. Restarting a vote, and the discounting of votes it implies, is justified and necessary when it is the only remedy appropriate for a transgression---be it with regards to the Constitution and Bill of Rights, electoral law and its interpretation by the Court, or rules set by the Electoral Commission itself---that occurred during the conduct of a vote by fault of the Electoral Commission overseeing it. This answer is not to be interpreted as an exhaustive enumeration of conditions for restarting a vote: the one condition presented is merely sufficient. Furthermore, care must be taken when determining the truth of the first part of the condition, the uniqueness of the remedy. As the petitioner presented, discounting previous votes by restarting a vote runs the danger of voters who already cast their ballot not realizing that they need to recast it, and therefore going against the very rights of Article 10 they set to protect. At the same time, not restarting the vote runs the danger of the same voters not realizing that there has been a change in the circumstances under which they originally cast their vote, again posing hazards for the Article 10 rights. Both risks are remedied to an extent by the requirement for sufficient prior notice for actions of the Electoral Commission placed by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. All these factors must be taken into consideration, and be balanced against the severity of the effects of the transgression, when determining whether restarting a vote is the only available remedy. The fact that, as decided previously by the Court, the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is one case justifying restarting a vote should provide a standard of comparison when making this determination.

Having answered the question of what provides due justification for restarting a vote is justified, the Court will now apply the answer to the specific case at hand. What needs to be determined is whether a valid candidate had been left off the ballot of the original Vice Delegate vote. The petitioner contended that the Court had previously found, in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Funkadelia on the limits of Election Commissioners' powers, that no such incident had occurred. The Court disagrees with this assertion. The Court, in that case, was asked to determine "whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place". All of the findings of the Court in that case must be interpreted in the context of this question; this includes the concluding statement of the ruling: "This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned." The term "legal" in this statement, when interpreted in the context of the question asked, means that it was within the Electoral Commission's power to make a decision to not include a candidate on the ballot based on an alleged violation of rules the Electoral Commission set in place. Whether the decision was correct or not, that is whether a violation had indeed occurred, is a separate determination that the Court was not asked to, and did not make. Analogously, the statement that "those elections should continued as planned", when interpreted in the context of the question asked, means that the election could not be challenged on the grounds that the Electoral Commission made a decision it was not within its prerogative to make. Challenging the election on the grounds that the decision itself was incorrect is, once again, a different issue that the Court presented no opinion on.

The Court is convinced by the arguments presented by the Electoral Commission in their announcement concerning the reasons for restarting the Vice Delegate vote. The Court therefore defers to the Electoral Commission's decision, and accepts their finding that Romanoffia was omitted from the ballot for the Vice Delegate vote while his candidacy was valid. Taken jointly with the determinations in the remaining of this section, the Court concludes that the Electoral Commission's decision to discount votes by restarting the Vice Delegate election was justified.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to discount prior votes by restarting the Vice Delegate election did not infringe upon the right to vote and its protections provided by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights.

Violation of the Legal Code by decision to restart only the Vice Delegate vote.

Finally, the petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the decision of the Electoral Commission to restart only the Vice Delegate vote without restarting the other votes in the general election was in violation of the provisions of the Legal Code covering electoral matters. The petitioner claimed that the intent of the Legal Code is for Delegate and Vice Delegate election to be run simultaneously "so as to provide a more stable campaign atmosphere and to allow for candidates to cooperate and run joint campaigns". To support these claims, the petitioner cited, somewhat confusingly, Article 3, Clause 9 of the Constitution.

The Court has first examined the specific law cited by the petitioner. The Court finds that Article 3, Clause 9 of the Constitution poses no requirement whatsoever that the elections for the offices of Delegate and Vice Delegate be held simultaneously.

As far as the Legal Code is concerned, the Court has identified relevant provisions in Section 4.2, Clause 7; Section 4.3, Clause 12; and Section 4.4, Clause 13. The latter is the only place where a requirement for contemporaneous elections can be found. The clause can be interpreted in two ways: either that the elections for Delegate, Vice Delegate, and Speaker must all take place within the same, single election cycle, starting on the specified days; or that the distinct election cycles for Delegate, Vice Delegate, and Speaker must all start simultaneously on the specified days. An "election cycle" is then defined in Section 4.2, Clause 7, as "as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election." Taking the two clauses together, the first interpretation effectively places no simultaneity constraints: the mandated single election cycle can begin with nominations for, say, Delegate; continue with the vote and results for that office; then continue with nominations for Vice Delegate; and so on. The second interpretation is more restrictive, in that it requires nominations for all three offices to begin simultaneously. Under none of the two possible interpretations the Court has identified are the votes for the three offices, or the announcement of their results, required to take place jointly.

In fact, the Legal Code makes special provision in Section 4.3, Clause 12 for asynchronous voting, in the event of a required run-off vote. In the event that such a vote is necessary, the Legal Code places no requirements for synchronizing any stage, nominations, voting, or announcement of results, of other elections happening at the same time with the election requiring the run-off vote. Therefore, even if the Court were to consider legislative intent, whatever evidence is present indicates that the only likely synchronization requirement on the administration of the three elections is that their nomination stages begin simultaneously. This is also consistent with previous practice, specifically the general election of January 2013: a run-off was necessary to determine the winner of the Vice Delegate election, but the elections for Delegate and Speaker concluded normally, as if the run-off were not required.

Therefore, the Court concludes that neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code create a requirement for the Electoral Commission, when they decide to restart the vote for one office in a general election, to also restart the votes for the remaining two offices.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate vote without restarting the votes for Delegate and Speaker did not violate the Legal Code.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on May 27, 2013.
 
Last edited:
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Definition of Government Officials
Opinion drafted by Justice Punk D, joined by THOs Gracius Maximus and Hileville

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Abstain.

The Court took into consideration the relevant parts of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 3.1:
8. If there is a vacancy on the Court, or any Justice is unavailable or has a conflict of interest the remaining Justices will promptly appoint a hearing officer to participate as temporary Justices.
Section 4.1:
1. All government officials will take the Oath of Office below before assuming their role within the government of The North Pacific.
2. All government officials will be required to take the Oath of Office within one week of the certification of election results by the Election Commissioner, or if appointed, within one week of their appointment being announced. The taking of the Oath constitutes assumption of the office. Failure to post the oath within the allotted time will result in the office being considered vacant, to be filled in accordance with all laws governing elections or appointments, as is appropriate for the office in question.
Section 4.2:
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
Section 6.3:
17. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
The Court took into consideration the relevant parts of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
4. No Nation of The North Pacific holding WA member status in NationStates shall be obligated to endorse any official of a government authority of the region. The right to add an endorsement or withdraw an endorsement is a sovereign right of that Nation as a WA member.
5. All Nations of The North Pacific have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region. Any Nation of The North Pacific has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.
8. No Nation shall be ejected from the region, or banned from any forum, except as expressly authorized by the Constitution or the Legal Code. Should any official of a government authority of the region with authority to act, declare that the immediate ejection or banning of a Nation is an urgent matter of regional security they may order the ejection or banning of the nation. Any ejected or banned nation shall have prompt and immediate recourse to judicial review of the matter. The WA Delegate shall not exercise the power of ejection or banning unless expressly authorized by a specific action of a government authority of the region pursuant to the Constitution or to the Legal Code.
The Court took into consideration the relevant parts of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
Article 2:
3. The Regional Assembly may remove a government official from office by a two-thirds majority vote.
Article 4:
4. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.
Article 5:
4. The Security Council will monitor the region's security and report on it to the public, and enforce decisions of the Regional Assembly to remove the Delegate.
Article 6:
1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.
2. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
The Court took into consideration the ruling on Justices as Government Officials.

The Court took into consideration the ruling on the Powers of the Election Commissioners.

The Court opines the following:


Opinion Part 1: With respect to the Delegate, Vice-Delegate, Speaker, Attorney General, Appointed Ministers, Appointed Deputy Speaker/Ministers, and Appointed Deputy Attorney Generals

The positions of Delegate, Vice-Delegate, Speaker, Attorney General and their applicable deputies all have specific powers outlined by The North Pacific Constitution and Legal Code.

Article 6 of the Constitution notes that all government officials shall swear an oath of office. This oath is the requirement to assume a position giving the officeholder authority and powers beyond the ability to introduce legislation and vote in elections which are conferred to members of the Regional Assembly.

Furthermore, Bill of Rights numbers 4, 5, 8 describe the recourse methods for nations believing they have been aggrieved by government officials. This Court finds that the expressed and implicit intent of these rights are to ensure all named and appointed by named offices within TNP law be subject to the provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Court finds that these positions are government officials and are subject to this provision.

Opinion Part 2: With respect to Security Council members, the court opines that members thereof are government officials as defined by TNP law and also subject to recall

Article 5.4 charges the Security Council with "monitor[ing] the region's security and report on it to the public". Additionally, members of the Security Council are approved by the entire Regional Assembly (Article 5.2) which signifies that the office of Security Council is not merely a designation resulting from length of service, having a nation within TNP, or the like but a position that must be approved by the RA with specific duties performed therein. Therefore, the Court finds that Security Council members are government officials because they are approved by the Regional Assembly, are tasked with monitoring the region's security, and also form a line of succession in an event the delegate and Vice-Delegate positions are vacated.

In Opinion Part 1, the Court found that government officials are subject to the recall provisions described within the Bill of Rights and having concluded that Security Council members are also government officials, the Court finds that Security Council members are also subject to the recall process and upholds any prior, present, or future recall votes administered in accordance with relevant recall guidelines and laws.

Opinion Part 3 - With respect to Election Commissioners, the Court opines that members thereof are government officials and charges all future appointees to take the oath of office taken by all government officials

The Court previously stated:
[T]he Court finds that requiring Candidates to post their declaration in a thread designated for such a purpose is a reasonable manifestation of the Election Commissioners' ability to oversee an election.
In its decision, the Court interpreted the "supervise" provision of the Legal Code (Section 4.2.6) endowed the Election Commissioners with the power to designate where nominations could be legally received. This court affirms the Election Commissioners' authority in this respect and also opines that such authority establishes the members thereof as government officials.

In Opinion Part 1, the Court found that government officials are subject to the recall provisions described within the Bill of Rights and having concluded that Election Commissioners are also government officials, the Court finds that Election Commissioners are also subject to the recall process and upholds any prior, present, or future recall votes administered in accordance with relevant recall guidelines and laws.

Additionally, the Court found that no records existed with the forum thread for oaths of office for Election Commissioners. The Court believes this to be a gross oversight and charges all future commissioners to state the oath in accordance with Legal Code Section 4.1.

Opinion Part 4: With respect to Justices and Temporary Hearing Officers, the Court affirms its previous ruling on Justices that members thereof are government officials

This Court affirms the previous ruling on Justices. Given the authority that is given to Temporary Hearing Officers to perform the duties of a Justice, the Court opines that Temporary Hearing officers are also government officials.

In Opinion Part 1, the Court found that government officials are subject to the recall provisions described within the Bill of Rights and having concluded that Temporary Hearing Officers are also government officials, the Court finds that Temporary Hearing Officers are also subject to the recall process and upholds any prior, present, or future recall votes administered in accordance with relevant recall guidelines and laws.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on June 9, 2013.
 
Last edited:
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On RA Membership Requirements for Candidates
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice r3naissanc3r, joined by Justices Funkadelia and Romanoffia

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mall.

The Court took into consideration Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:


9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

The Court took into consideration Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

1. All government officials must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly. Candidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations.

The Court took into consideration its previous rulings:

Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Outstanding Request for Review
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election

The Court took into consideration the announcement made here on September 1st 2013 by the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election.

The Court took into consideration Section 3, Part 7 of the Constitution of The North Pacific, as it stood immediately before the enactment of the Constitutional Omnibus Act, passed on August 21st:


7. Candidates for these elected officials must be members of the Assembly for 30 days before nominations begin.

The Court took into consideration the Regional Assembly discussion on the Constitutional Omnibus Act that took place here.

The Court opines the following:


The petitioner, Mall, has requested that the Court review the decision made on September 1st 2013 by the "Voting Booth" to invalidate his candidacy for Vice Delegate in the General Election of September 2013 ("the election"). The Court believes that by "Voting Booth" the petitioner is referring to the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election of September 2013 ("the Electoral Commission"), who are in exclusive control of the account "Voting Booth" for the duration of the election. The Court will adopt this assumption for the remaining of this opinion. The Court granted the petition, recognizing that the fact that the petitioner is the same as the person whose candidacy was invalidated affords the petitioner the status of affected party constitutionally required of those requesting review.

The petitioner challenged the decision of the Election Commissioner on two separate grounds. The Court will address them separately.

Fifteen-day constitutional requirement for candidates.

The Electoral Commission, in their announcement on the invalidation of the petitioner's candidacy, provided as justification the constitutional requirement laid down by Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution. This Clause requires that "[c]andidates in any election must maintain membership in the Regional Assembly for the fifteen days before the opening of nominations." The petitioner challenged this justification by making three claims: First, that the above clause does not require membership for the fifteen days immediately preceding the "election". Second, that he fulfilled the requirements of that clause under that interpretation, having been a member of the Regional Assembly for some period of fifteen days before the opening of nominations. Third, that the Electoral Commission incorrect use of the above clause to invalidate his candidacy violated the petitioner's right to equal and fair treatment and protection, as provided by Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific ("Bill of Rights").

The Court will examine the first claim and, depending on its conclusion, proceed to the second and third.

Regarding the interpretation of Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution, mcmasterdonia submitted a brief arguing that the Court has already ruled on this matter in the past. The decision in question was rendered on April 21st 2012, at a time when the Court had not yet adopted its current naming conventions for cases; for convenience it will be referenced as Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific, In regards to the Outstanding Request for Review, and is provided at the beginning of this opinion. The decision related to a clause of the Constitution of The North Pacific ("the Constitution") before it was amended to its current form by the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012. The clause in question survives to an extent in the current Constitution, in the form of Article 6, Clause 1. However, the current form of the clause is considerably different from the old one. One of the most salient amendments is the addition of the definite article "the" before the number of days, whose meaning the Court is asked to determine. Therefore, the old decision is no longer applicable and a new one needs to be made.

The Court believes that the language in Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution, and specifically the presence of the definite article before "fifteen", clearly indicates that the requirement to be examined for potential candidates is whether they have been members of the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. The language is unambiguous, and therefore any other interpretation would be absurd. This interpretation is compatible with the one used by the Electoral Commission, and incompatible with the interpretation proposed by the petitioner.

It is worth also examining the intent of the regional legislative body, the Regional Assembly, while drafting the constitutional clause in question. In the thread in the Regional Assembly discussing the Constitutional Omnibus Act of August 2012, when asked about the meaning of the definite article in Article 6, Clause 1, then Speaker Gulliver stated: "The "the" there is deliberate. It means specifically the 15 days before the election in question, not any random 15 days, so it's not possible to argue that "I was in the assembly 15 days already, even if it wasn't continuous, therefore I'm good to run"."

It should be noted that taking the intention of the Regional Assembly into consideration when interpreting a statute is appropriate only when said statute is ambiguous or absurd. Neither of these is true in this case, as Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution unambiguously indicates that the requirement for candidates is that they have been in the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. However, the legislature's intent here is in agreement with the actual meaning of the clause, and corroborates the interpretation adopted by the Court.

Based on the above, the Court rejects the first claim made by the petitioner. The petitioner's second and third claims were conditional on the validity of the first claim, and therefore are also rejected.

Decision

The Electoral Commission interpreted Article 6, Clause 1 of the Constitution correctly in their decision to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy on the grounds that the petitioner was not a member of the Regional Assembly continuously for the fifteen days immediately preceding the opening of nominations. The decision of the Electoral Commission cannot be overturned on the grounds presented by the petitioner and is upheld.


Right to due process, prior notice, and the opportunity to be heard

The petitioner requested that the Court review whether the way in which the Electoral Commission invalidated his candidacy violated the petitioner's right to due process of law provided by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights says that due process includes "prior notice and the opportunity to be heard". The petitioner argued that the Electoral Commission's execution of their decision to invalidate his candidacy violated both of these elements of due process.

The Court has found in its previous decision Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election that "the Electoral Commission constitutes a "governmental authority" for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights." Thus, its actions are indeed subject to review for violations of the requirement for observance of due process of law laid down by that Article, as the petitioner has requested.

Regarding prior notice, the Court first needs to determine what constitutes sufficient prior notice, and then to determine whether the Electoral Commission has provided it.

For the first consideration, statutory legislation does not provide any cues as to what constitutes sufficient prior notice for the invalidation of a candidacy by the Electoral Commission.

In terms of case precedent, the subject of sufficient notice for actions of the Electoral Commission has been examined to some extent by the Court in its previous decision Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election. The Court determined there that "an announcement of the restarting of a vote made in a new, separate thread in an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights." The Court then also found that "this is a sufficient, not necessary standard." In doing so, the Court provided the necessary flexibility for future determinations on what is sufficient prior notice to adapt to the circumstances of actions of the Electoral Commission of different nature. The current circumstances are indeed different, in that they concern a different action by the Electoral Commission, namely the invalidation of a candidacy instead of the restarting of a vote.

The Court also argued that prior practice needs to be taken into account in such determinations. Such prior practice creates expectations to nations as to how actions by governmental authorities are going to be performed, and how nations may reasonably expect to be notified of such actions. Considering prior practice, the Court in its previous decision noted that "the general accepted standard for actions by governmental officials is that they are visibly announced in a designated place within the constitutionally designated Regional Forum, with visibility usually achieved through the use of a new thread." In the case of the handling of nominations and candidacies, the latter clause is not applicable: decisions regarding such matters have in the past consistently been announced within the a thread specifically designated for nominations and candidacies. It follows that any announcement regarding nominations and candidacies made by the Electoral Commission within such a thread would constitute a "visible announcement" as described above.

Following the above considerations, the Court believes that an announcement on the invalidation of a candidacy constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights if made in the following manner: a new post within a thread whose purpose is the administration of nominations and candidacies and is inside an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes. As before, this is a sufficient, not necessary standard. Concluding the discussion of prior notice, the Court notes that on September 1st the Electoral Commission made here an announcement satisfying this standard.

Turning to the right to be heard, there is no statutory legislation or case precedent elaborating its interpretation. A nation's right to be heard can be interpreted in two ways. First, being able to publicly and visibly, but within reasonable limits, express disagreement with and complain about actions of a governmental authority affecting the nation. Second, being able to seek protection from such actions, through a process where the nation is allowed to argue their position, have their arguments heard and judged impartially, and which after such judgment can, if appropriate, relieve the nation. The Court believes that both of these elements constitute parts of the right to be heard.

In the case at hand, with regards to the first element, the Court notes that the Electoral Commission did not deny the petitioner the opportunity to express his disagreement with or complain about the invalidation of his candidacy. The petitioner could have done so in the designated thread for nominations and candidacies, an action which, for the reasons argued earlier when considering prior notice, would have been both public and visible. With regards to the second element, regional law permits the petitioner to request review of the actions of the Electoral Commission, have his argument heard and judged by the Court, which may then relieve the petitioner. The petitioner has indeed exercised this right, free from interference from the Electoral Commission. Therefore, the Court believes that neither element of the petitioner's right to be heard has been violated by the Electoral Commission's actions in deciding to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy.

Decision.

The Electoral Commission with its actions enacting its decision to invalidate the petitioner's candidacy did not violate the right to due process of law granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The actions of the Electoral Commission cannot be overturned on the grounds presented by the petitioner and are upheld.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on September 3, 2013.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Time at Which Oaths Become Binding
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Justices Flemingovia and Romanoffia

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Punk D.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Codified Law of the North Pacific:

Section 6.1: Regional Assembly Membership Act
2. Any person with an account on the regional forum and a nation in The North Pacific may apply for Regional Assembly membership, using their regional forum account, by providing the name of their nation in The North Pacific, and swearing an oath as follows:
I, the leader of The North Pacific nation of [INSERT YOUR TNP NATION], pledge loyalty to The North Pacific, obedience to her laws, and responsible action as a member of her society. I pledge to only register one nation to vote in The North Pacific. I pledge that no nation under my control will wage war against the North Pacific. I understand that if I break this oath I may permanently lose my voting privileges. In this manner, I petition the Speaker for membership in the Regional Assembly of the North Pacific.
3. A copy of the laws applicants are pledging to obey must be available to them at all times.
4. An application for Regional Assembly membership ceases to be valid if at any time the applicant's declared nation in The North Pacific nation is not located in The North Pacific.
5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty. The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they do not pose a threat to regional security.
6. The Speaker will reject applicants who fail an evaluation by either forum administration or the Vice Delegate.
7. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly will immediately hold a majority vote on whether to uphold the rejection.
8. The Speaker will accept all other applicants with valid applications.
9. The Speaker will process applications within 14 days. If an applicant has not been accepted or rejected within that time, they will be automatically accepted to the Regional Assembly.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the previous ruling of the Court in regards to the judicial inquiry filed by Eluvatar on oath violations by former members of the Regional Assembly:
The Court had determined that the matter is twofold. If the violation occurs after the time in which the nation is no longer a member of the Regional Assembly then they are not violating their oath as they are not bound to that oath at the current moment. Whereas if the violation occurs during the time in which the nation was a member of the Regional Assembly and was bound by that oath they may be tried for an Oath Violation.

The Court opines the following:

The Court has previously ruled that former Regional Assembly members are no longer bound by the Regional Assembly oath when their membership expires, and that they are bound by the oath while they are Regional Assembly members. It is heavily implied by that same ruling that the oath is only binding while a nation is a member of the Regional Assembly. The Court sees no compelling reason to overturn that precedent.

It is the opinion of the Court that the Regional Assembly membership oath found in Section 6 Clause 2 of the Codified Law of the North Pacific becomes legally binding on RA applicants if and when they become members of the Regional Assembly, and remains binding only so long as they remain members. Explicitly, the oath becomes binding when any of the following conditions are met:
  • The Speaker admits the applicant and/or accepts their application;
  • The applicant has neither been accepted nor rejected after 14 days pass from the date of their application;
  • The applicant has been rejected by the Speaker for failing a security check by the Vice Delegate, and the RA has voted not to uphold that rejection.
Those conditions are the same conditions under which an applicant becomes a member of the RA.

Decision
The Regional Assembly oath becomes legally binding upon a nation when they become a member of the Regional Assembly.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on November 24, 2013.
Ruling partially rendered defunct on August 10, 2023.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Nonparticipation of a Defendant in Civil and Criminal Trials
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Crushing Our Enemies, joined by Justice Romanoffia and THO SillyString, with Justice Flemingovia recused

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Flemingovia, as well has his subsequent clarification here.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Flemingovia.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
...
3. The Chief Justice will administer the rules of the Court. Where no rules exist, the Chief Justice may use their discretion.
...
4. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
6. No Nation shall be held to answer for a crime in a manner not prescribed by the Constitution or the Legal Code. No Nation shall be subjected to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. No Nation shall ever be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against itself.
...
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Adopted Court Rules December 2012 (in effect during the trial of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer):
Article 1: Trial Procedures
In accordance with the Legal Code of the North Pacific the Court establishes the following rules for Trial Proceedings:
  1. All charges that are brought in front of the Court of the North Pacific shall be filed in the form of an Indictment.
  2. After an Indictment is filed any Justice of the Court may approve the Indictment and within 24 hours a Trial thread will be opened by the Chief Justice or the Justice appointed as Trial Moderator. Indictments seeking an ejection or banning, or expulsion from the RA due to oath violation, the procedures as set by the Legal Code will be followed exactly as stated. After the acceptance of an Indictment and before the trial thread is opened the Defendant will be notified by a Court Justice of the pending proceedings.
  3. An Indictment may be declined by the Court if said indictment lacks substantial evidence to merit a trial.
  4. The Defendant will have 48 hours to enter a plea. If no plea is entered a default plea of Not Guilty will be entered.
  5. Once a plea is entered the period for pretrial motions will begin and last for 72 hours. After the conclusion of the pretrial motion phase a period lasting for 4 days will begin for evidence discovery and witness testimony. An extension of up to 72 hours may be granted upon the request of either the Attorney General or the Defense.
  6. Once discovery ends a period of time for arguments on the evidence and law will begin. This period will normally be 5 days unless otherwise stated by the Trial Moderator.
  7. During discovery and arguments, either side may make objections or requests publicly on the forum.
  8. Once arguments end, the Court will have 72 hours to decide on a verdict and, if necessary, sentence.
  9. This timetable may be altered by the Moderating Justice as required.
The Court took into consideration the trial of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer: HERE.

The Court opines the following:

On January 15th, 2013, the civil trial of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer began. Within 48 hours of the trial opening, it was postponed because the defendant was unable to appear in court. On February 26th, the court ruled in favor of Flemingovia, citing Grosseschauzer's failure to respond to the charges as the only reason for ruling as they did. No further action was taken by the court.

The court rules in effect for the duration of the incident did not distinguish between procedures for civil trials and criminal trials, as the adopted court rules do at present. There is nothing in the rules at the time that specified that they were inapplicable to civil trials. Thus, it is the judgment of this court that those procedures did apply to civil trials and that they ought to have been followed in the matter of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer.

Decision
The discretion of the moderating justice only extends to modifying the length of the various stages. It does not allow them to skip stages or proceed through them out of order.


The court turns now to the question of whether Grosseschnauzer's right to due process was violated. The court finds that in order to satisfy the right to due process, all adopted court rules must be followed, and those rules must be legal, constitutional, and free of Bill of Rights violations. Thus, the court violated Grosseschnauzer's right to due process by failing to follow its adopted rules. Even if those rules were interpreted as inapplicable to civil trials, that interpretation denied Grosseschnauzer his right to be heard and defend himself. The trial was declared postponed within 48 hours of opening, and did not go into session again until the ruling was delivered. Thus, Grosseschnauzer was not even given a full opportunity to enter a plea.

Decision
The court must follow its adopted rules with regard to trial proceedings to avoid violating the defendant's right to due process. Additionally, those rules must be legal, constitutional, and free of Bill of Rights violations.


With regard to the double jeopardy question, the court does not agree with the premise that Grosseschnauzer was ever in jeopardy to begin with. Jeopardy can only apply to matters where there has been a trial and a verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty. Given the opinion of the court that in the absence of a trial there was never any legal verdict, jeopardy has not attached. Accordingly, the plaintiff is free to refile charges.

Decision
Jeopardy only attaches to a case when an official and binding verdict of Guilty or Not Guilty has been delivered. Verdicts of the court are only official and binding when the trial has been conducted in a legal and constitutional way, without violating any of the defendant's rights.


The court realizes the difficulty of moderating a trial in which the defendant does not participate, but it is not appropriate to issue a default ruling in favor of the plaintiff when that occurs. In cases where the defendant is unable to participate in trial proceedings, or even select their defense attorney, it would be appropriate for the court to delay the trial until the defendant is able to appear. However, if it can be demonstrated to the court that the defendant is able to participate, but chooses not to do so, it would be appropriate for the court to appoint a defense attorney and continue the trial in their absence. There may be other legal and constitutional ways to handle an absentee defendant.

The court apologizes to Grosseschnauzer for violating his rights in the matter of Flemingovia v Grosseschnauzer, and to Flemingovia for mishandling his charges.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on January 14, 2014.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination Periods
Opinion drafted by Justice SillyString, joined by Chief Justice Romanoffia and Justice Ator People


The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Treize Dreizehn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:



12. "Reopen Nominations." Ballots for general and special elections shall include the option to reopen nominations. Should this receive a majority of votes, a further 48 hours will be provided for declarations of candidacy. Candidates whose names appeared on the first ballot will retain their candidacy unless they choose to withdraw. During the second round of voting following this period, the option to reopen nominations shall not appear on the ballot.

The Court opines the following:

The provisions made in the Legal Code for the reopening of nominations apply only to general elections - that is, those for delegate, vice delegate, and speaker - and special elections for any office. As the election referred to by the petitioner is a judicial election, it does not fall under this law.

The request for an injunction is denied.

The Election Commissioners are instructed to tally the results of the Attorney General race from the first round of voting and to either certify them or hold a run-off vote as necessary.


Case thread
Ruling delivered on March 18, 2014.
Ruling rendered defunct on August 9, 2023
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Standard of Proof and Intent
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Romanoffia and Justice SillyString, joined by Justice Ator People

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kiwi.

The Court took into consideration Section 1.3 of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:


Section 1.3: Fraud
11. "Election fraud" is defined as the willful deception of citizens with regards to the candidates running, the time and venue of the elections, or the requirements and methods by which one may be eligible to vote or run for office.
12. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.

The Court also took into consideration the relevant section of the Bill of Rights:

In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence.

The Court opines the following:

What specific elements are required to prove fraud?
In order to prove Election Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court two things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information to, or deliberately withheld true information from, any non-zero number of citizens about certain subjects relating to elections. Second, they must show that this information was "willful deception". It is not required that the deception accomplish, or even aim for, any beneficial or harmful effect.

In order to prove Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court three things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information, or deliberately withheld true information. Second, they must show that this information was "intentional deception". Third, they must show that the provision or withholding of this information either improved the standing of that individual, or damaged that of another.

Both crimes require that the act be one of deception, and thus it is necessary to establish what that term entails.

First, deception must refer to a matter of fact, and not a matter of opinion. Matters of fact have definitive truth values - that is, they can be determined to be true or false. A statement of fact asserts something as truth, as objective reality. A matter of opinion, on the other hand, has a truth value which can vary depending on the individual contemplating the issue at hand, and a statement of opinion asserts subjective truth - something which is only necessarily true for the speaker.

Second, deception must refer to a material fact, that is, one which can reasonably be expected to affect the audience's future actions for some benefit or harm. Third, deception must be plausible, that is, something which can reasonably be expected to be believed by the audience.

Finally, in order to commit deception, an individual must be reasonably expected to know that their statement or omission lacks truth.

What sort of intention is necessary to prove fraud? Is it a high (almost unattainable) level? Is oblique intention enough?
To start, the Court opines that "willful deception" is synonymous with "intentional deception", and that the difference in word choice does not require a different standard of proof between the two crimes.

As for the standard itself, there are two types of intention in the commission of fraud. The first is demonstrable intent, wherein the defendant can be shown, by their own statements or actions relating to the alleged crime, to have engaged in deception as defined previously in this ruling.

The second is reckless intent, wherein intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.

The Court does not find that, together, these types of intent present an unattainable bar to the prosecution, although one or the other may be out of reach for any particular case.

Should the RA perhaps include a mens rea of "recklessness" in its definition?
The Court declines to comment on hypothetical legislation which would differentiate recklessness from intent.

Would a statement of "I believe" be enough to negate any finding of intention?
To reiterate, a statement of opinion is not a statement of fact, and thus statements of opinion do not qualify as fraudulent.

However, simply prefacing a statement of fact with the words "I believe" (or another similar phrase) is not, by itself, sufficient to establish it as a statement of opinion. The critical factor is and remains whether the statement is something which can be determined objectively, or whether it is a matter for subjective judgement.

To provide an example, the statement "Chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry ice cream" is a statement of opinion, as it is a matter of individual tastes not assumed to be universally true. It has no truth value whatsoever except insofar as it is a genuinely held belief, true for the individual asserting it. Prefacing this statement with "I believe" makes that implication more explicit, but the assertion is identical. They are both statements of opinion.

"Chocolate is made from potatoes", on the other hand, is a statement of fact, and can conclusively be demonstrated to be either true or false. Changing that statement to "I believe chocolate is made from potatoes" does not change the statement into one of opinion rather than fact. The belief itself, if it is genuinely believed, nevertheless has a truth value, and is therefore subject to the law.

Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context?If not, does the Court recommend reform?
The Court declines to comment on the appropriateness of constitutional laws. Suggesting legal reform, alterations and additions to the written legal code is not the purview of the Court, and such recommendations would be inappropriate.

Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation (as arguably occurred in TNP v Grosse)?
The measure of appropriateness in prosecution is the extent to which the facts of a particular case match up with elements of the criminal code. The Court declines to comment on terminology.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on March 28, 2014.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Freedom of Information Requests against the Judiciary
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Romanoffia, joined by Justices SillyString and Ator People

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kiwi.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by SillyString.

The Court took into consideration the relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:


Section 6.2: Freedom of Information Act
16. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
17. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
18. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
19. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
20. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
21. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.

The Court opines the following:

The question before the Court is whether the Judicial branch is subject to the FOIA law, or more specifically, whether the private deliberations of the Court are subject to release upon request.

Justices are encumbered with the great responsibility of determining the guilt or innocence of an accused party, and of debating the particulars of points of law, in a way which is as impartial and free from bias as possible. The privacy of court deliberations has always been recognized and protected in The North Pacific, as it is integral to this process.

Should this privacy cease to be protected, and Court decisions be deemed subject to FOIA publication upon request, freedom of judicial deliberation would be curtailed. Knowing that their preliminary thoughts and arguments could be made public, Justices would likely be pressured to tailor their posts to fit with political sensibilities and not ruffle prominent political feathers. There would also be pressure to take into account the opinions of prominent members of the region and render final decisions in accordance with their interests, rather than relying on the opinions of the members of the Court and pursuing the path of justice.

It is clear, therefore, that applying the FOIA law to the Judiciary would be a gross violation of the principles of justice and of the integrity of the judicial process, and another interpretation of the law should be sought.

The brief filed by SillyString takes a careful look at the clause-by-clause language of the bill itself, as well as the context in which that language arose, and presents just such an alternative interpretation. SillyString argues that the FOIA law is intentionally restricted to apply the Executive branch alone, and cannot be used to force private discussions within either the Court or the Regional Assembly into the public eye. The Court agrees with this analysis, and with its conclusions.

It is therefore the decision of the Court that the FOIA law may only be used to request information belonging to the Executive branch. Private deliberations of the Court are exempt from any and all FOIA requests, and publication of such private deliberations is absolutely prohibited under any and all circumstances.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on April 28, 2014.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Permanence of Rejected Applications for the RA
Opinion drafted by Justice SillyString, joined by Chief Justice Romanoffia and Justice Ator People

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Crushing Our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by PaulWallLibertarian42.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Treize_Dreizehn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant clauses of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:


5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty. The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they do not pose a threat to regional security.
6. The Speaker will reject applicants who fail an evaluation by either forum administration or the Vice Delegate.
7. If an applicant is rejected for failing an evaluation by the Vice Delegate, the Regional Assembly will immediately hold a majority vote on whether to uphold the rejection.
8. The Speaker will accept all other applicants with valid applications.

The Court opines the following:

This issue is a difficult one, and there is little legal guidance for the Court to fall back upon. While the law is quite clear on the procedure for rejecting an applicant from the Regional Assembly, it says nothing at all about reversing that decision - whether such is possible, or, if it is, the procedure by which to do so. The Court therefore found itself weighing two potential interpretations, both with elements of validity.[note]The Court considered a third possible interpretation - that, lacking any assignation of the power to reverse a previous decision, it was held by the Vice Delegate, but that that power was lost once it was assigned to the Regional Assembly by recent legislation, as seen in Chapter 6, Section 1, Clause 8 as it currently stands. However, the Court ultimately rejected this as an option. The power to alter a previous decision can, in theory, be held by more than one party. It would not be impossible for both the Vice Delegate and the Regional Assembly to have separate legal paths to overturn an applicant's rejection. It is therefore the opinion of the court that the recent amendment to this law does not affect whether or not the Vice Delegate had and holds the power to admit rejected applicants.[/note]

The first possible interpretation is that, absent any specific permission, the Vice Delegate did not have the power to overturn a previous rejection, and that Treize Dreizehn's admission to the Regional Assembly was never legal.

The second possible interpretation is that, absent any specific prohibition, the Vice Delegate may unilaterally pass previously rejected applicants in the same manner that administrators can, and that Treize Dreizehn's admission to the Regional Assembly was fully legal. Additionally, lacking any specific prohibition, the Vice Delegate may continue to unilaterally allow previously rejected applicants admission to the Regional Assembly under current law.

Ultimately, however, there is a fundamental legal principle underlying this case which the Court must rely on. This principle is as follows: it is against the spirit of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Legal Code for the executive branch to hold unilateral authority to overrule the expressed will of the legislature.

In all cases where this power exists in part, it is tempered by balance. While the executive can veto legislation, that veto can be overridden by the Regional Assembly. While the executive can deny a FOIA request, that denial can be overturned by the Court.

To rule that, in this case, a member of the executive has the discretion to ignore the will of the RA as expressed in a legally binding vote would be to reject the balance of power between the branches.

In answer to Zyvetskistaahn's questions, the Court therefore rules:

If an applicant is rejected by the Vice Delegate and that rejection is upheld, the Speaker is required to deny that applicant at all future points at which they apply, unless the Regional Assembly has voted to overturn their rejection. It is not necessary for each application to be rejected and upheld separately; as noted, the language specifies an "applicant" and a single vote is sufficient. An upheld rejection may only be rescinded by a vote of the Regional Assembly or a ruling from the Court declaring the previous rejection invalid.

As for the specific case of Treize_Dreizehn, the Court rules that his original admission to the Regional Assembly was not lawful. However, over the past four months he has acted in nothing but good faith. He has been a productive member of the RA, has voted on legislation and run in elections, and has served admirably in the Attorney General's office. Should the Court rule that these associated posts, votes, and actions are ex post facto unlawful, legally speaking, it would simultaneously be required to order a recount of all such legislative, non-legislative, and electoral votes, as well as a review of all actions taken as a government official and, potentially, a reopening of voting for any election in which Treize was a candidate. Such alteration of accepted fact is neither practical, possible, nor permitted by the Bill of Rights.

Therefore, Treize_Dreizehn's membership in the Regional Assembly is not revoked. He may continue to serve as a full-fledged member, entitled to all of the rights and privileges afforded to any other member. However, his original rejection by Sanctaria was upheld by the Regional Assembly, and the recent motion to overturn that rejection failed. If Treize's membership in the Regional Assembly is renounced or allowed to lapse through normal channels, he will not be able to rejoin until his rejection is overridden by a majority vote of the RA.

The Court would additionally like to apologize to Treize for the length of time it took for this issue to be resolved, and for the bureaucratic inconvenience we are imposing with this ruling.

Case thread
Ruling delivered May 18, 2014.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On Content Ownership and Freedom of Information Requests against the Security Council
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice SillyString, joined by Justices Ator People and Kiwi

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Grosseschnauzer.

The Court took into consideration the relevant sections of the Constitution of the North Pacific:


Article 3:
9. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.
Article 7:
2. Government officials are the constitutionally-mandated elected officials, any officials appointed by them as permitted by law, and members of the Security Council.
3. The executive category consists of the Delegate, Vice Delegate, Attorney General, and government officials appointed by government officials in the executive category.
The Court took into consideration the relevant sections of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Regional Assembly Membership Act:
5. Forum administration will have 14 days to evaluate Regional Assembly applicants and verify that they are not using a proxy or evading a judicially-imposed penalty. The Vice Delegate will have 3 days to perform a security assessment of the applicant. All security assessments will be performed in consultation with the Security Council, and in accordance with all laws of The North Pacific.
Freedom of Information Act:
16. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
17. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
18. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
19. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
20. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
21. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.

The Court opines the following:

r3naissanc3r has asked the Court to clarify, for the purposes of the FOIA law, what degree of ownership the Executive Branch holds over the Security Council.

Grosseschnauzer's brief argues that the Vice Delegate serves a dual role in the government, sometimes as a member of the Executive branch and other times as a member of the Security Council. This argument is supported by discussion within the Regional Assembly at the time the Vice Delegate's security check was originally devised.

The Court therefore carefully examined the Constitution and the Legal Code to determine if such a duality exists. Unlike the Security Council, the Vice Delegate is unequivocally specified as a member of the Executive branch by the Constitution. This inclusion is relatively recent, following the Vice Delegate's explicit exclusion from the Executive branch, and this is a strong argument against duality.

There are also arguments to the contrary. The changes made to Article 7 of the Constitution which reclassify the Vice Delegate as an Executive Officer are focused on preventing members of TNP from holding multiple, conflicting positions. The Security Council was excluded from classification in order to continue to allow government officials of all types to join its ranks, while the Vice Delegate was included in order to acknowledge the existence of a conflict of interest between serving simultaneously in that position and in another elected role. It is possible for this conflict of interest to exist if the Vice Delegate does hold a dual role, and thus acknowledging it by restricting access to multiple offices is not equivalent to rejecting duality in the position.

As for the actual duties of the Vice Delegate, Grosseschnauzer is correct in asserting that they can be classified into two categories. The first concerns the Vice Delegate's occasional duties, which normally are held by the Delegate but which fall to the Vice Delegate during any absence or vacancy of the former. Examples of this include holding the delegacy, selecting or serving as Election Commissioners, and serving as deputy Attorney General. The second concerns the Vice Delegate's own duties which they always hold, and include administrative functions related to the Security Council's membership and functions as well as doing a security check on Regional Assembly applicants. The question for the Court is whether both aspects of these are executive in nature.

A compelling argument found in the Legal Code is this clause:
18. During any period when serving as acting Delegate, the Vice Delegate will be considered absent from the office of Vice Delegate.
To rephrase in a manner more applicable to this question, according to the law, when the former category of duties moves from potential responsibility to actual responsibility, the Vice Delegate is relieved of responsibility for their stand-alone duties to the Security Council. The law envisions a difference between the nature of these two categories, which can comfortably be accommodated in potentiality but which cannot coexist in actuality.

The Court therefore opines that the Vice Delegate has functions both inside and outside of the Executive Branch.

As for the Security Council itself, its status likewise cannot be determined solely from Article 7 of the Constitution. Given that the Chair of the Security Council holds that power only in the absence of holding executive authority, the Court opines that the Security Council is not categorized under the Executive Branch. Given that, and given that the Delegate has no legal authority over the Security Council with which to compel it to release information, the Court opines that the Security Council is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as written.

As an additional finding, on the matter of ownership, the Court holds that the author of a post owns its content, and posts made while acting in one's capacity as a government official are owned, more broadly, by the respective branch of government within which that capacity falls.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on June 27, 2014.
Ruling clarified on March 1, 2019.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Meaning of Private Citizen
Opinion drafted by THO Severisen, joined by Chief Justice SillyString and Justice Kiwi, with Justice Blue Wolf II recused

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r.

The Court took into consideration the brief filed here by Romanoffia.

The Court took into consideration the relevant sections of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:


Freedom of Information Act:
16. The Delegate and appointed government officials will be delegated the task of informing the Assembly of any governmental action not already disclosed by the respective officers of the Executive.
17. All registered citizens residing in The North Pacific may request information from the Government through the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive.
18. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive will endeavour to retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government, who are obligated to release this information provided it will not and/or does not present a threat to regional security or unduly impinge on the privacy of private citizens, and
19. Citizens which do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information in a regional court, where the Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information impairs Regional security.
20. Information not disclosed because of issues pertaining to Regional security will be classified by the majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.
21. Information whose disclosure is deemed a security threat to the Region will be released by the affirmative vote of a majority of a three-member panel of the Court, no sooner than 2 months after the original request, once the threat no longer exists.

The Court opines the following:

r3naissanc3r has asked the Court to clarify, for the purposes of the FOIA law, the meaning of the term "private citizen" and the protections afforded by Chapter 6, Section 6.2, Clause 18 of the Codified Law of The North Pacific. Specifically, r3naissanc3r has posed three scenaria for the court's consideration.

Scenario One:
First, consider the case where some of the information that is subject to the freedom of information clause pertains to a citizen that held office in the Executive at the time this information was produced, but no longer does so at the time the request for disclosure is made. Is this citizen considered a "private citizen" for the purposes of the freedom of information clause?
In the Court's opinion, the answer to this question is no. Individuals do not cease to be accountable to the region simply because their term has ended, and posts which were governmental in nature when made retain that status. In reverse, posts which are non-governmental in nature do not suddenly become subject to FOIA when their author joins the Executive branch. The sole relevant facts are the status of the post and its author at its creation.

Scenario Two:
Second, consider the case where some of the information subject to the freedom of information clause pertains to a citizen that holds some office in the region, but this office is not part of the Executive. The Court found recently in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Kiwi on the Scope of Freedom of Information Act Requests that the freedom of information clause can only be used for, to quote the decision, "information belonging to the Executive branch". Should this be interpreted that, for the purposes of the freedom of information clause, this citizen is considered a "private citizen"?
In a previous ruling, the Court stated:
As an additional finding, on the matter of ownership, the Court holds that the author of a post owns its content, and posts made while acting in one's capacity as a government official are owned, more broadly, by the respective branch of government within which that capacity falls.
Therefore, the status of an individual discussed within a post is not relevant to the interpretation of this Act. Whether or not that citizen is a private citizen has no effect.

Scenario Three:
Third and last, consider the case where some of the information subject to the freedom of information clause pertains to a citizen that holds office in the Executive, but the information itself is unrelated to this citizen's capacity as an officer in the Executive. Should the citizen in question be treated as a "private citizen" for the purposes of the freedom of information clause?
As in the previous scenario, it is the status of the author and not the topic which determines whether a post is subject to FOIA. So long as the author is speaking in their capacity as an executive official, the law applies.

The Court expands on the above by issuing the following additional rulings:

First, the Court states that all posts made within areas of the forum which normally grant posting privileges only to members of the executive - excluding administrators and moderators from consideration - are inherently made in the author's capacity as an executive official. Such posts cannot be considered non-governmental. Posts which are made in areas of the forum more accessible to the public may be ruled non-governmental if such a determination is merited by their content and context.

Second, the court determines that there are certain types of information where all citizens, including members of the executive, retain a right to privacy, and where the disclosure of this information would unduly impinge upon that right. Specifically, real life information about any NationStates player which has not been willingly disclosed to the public is exempt from disclosure under FOIA. This information includes, but is not limited to, an individual's name, address, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, and anything which represents a reasonable risk of allowing a player's real life identity to be discovered. It also includes sensitive information for which there is a reasonable real life expectation of privacy and/or discretion, including but not limited to health status, both mental and physical, personal tragedies or changes in personal status (such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death), and other similar information. Any such information contained in a thread requested under the Freedom of Information Act must be redacted prior to the thread's release. Any such redaction must be made non-destructively, such that the original is preserved for future review.

Third, the Court rules that when a post contains a private message not authored by the poster, additional scrutiny must be used in determining whether releasing that private message without the permission of the author would unduly impinge on the privacy of a private citizen. Because the content of any such messages can be as variable as the imagination allows, the Court is unable to lay out a rule to be followed in all cases. Suffice it to say, the Court grants that there may be cases where the disclosure of a private message is appropriate, and cases where it is inappropriate. Specific instances where there is some question as to how to proceed may be adjudicated under clause 19 of the Freedom of Information Act.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on July 31, 2014.
Ruling clarified on March 1, 2019.
 
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
On the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice SillyString, joined by Justices Blue Wolf II and Kiwi

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Romanoffia.

The Court took into consideration the briefs filed by Zyvetskistaahn, Treize_Dreizehn, punk d, falapatorius, and Crushing Our Enemies.

The Court took into consideration Article 2, Clause 6 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Constitution:
6. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
The Court took into consideration Article 7, Clause 11 of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
Constitution:
11. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.
The Court took into consideration Section 1 of the Rules of the Regional Assembly of The North Pacific:
Rules of the Regional Assembly:
Section 1. Proposals
1. Any member of the Regional Assembly may bring a proposal for discussion before the Regional Assembly.
2. The Speaker may schedule a vote on any proposal being discussed by the Regional Assembly as permitted by law.
3. If, before a vote on a proposal begins, at least three members of the Regional Assembly object to the decision of the Speaker to schedule it, the Speaker must cancel the scheduled vote.
4. If at least one-tenth of the members of the Regional Assembly, including the member that introduced the proposal to the Regional Assembly, motion that a vote should be held on a proposal before the Regional Assembly, then the Speaker must schedule a vote on that proposal to begin as soon as permitted by law.
The Court took into consideration the Legislative Proposal Procedure section of the Standing Procedures of the Speaker of The North Pacific:
Standing Procedures of the Speaker:
Legislative Proposal Procedure
1. Any member may introduce a proposal to enact, amend or repeal laws by creating a thread in the Regional Assembly forum or Private Halls subforums.
2. The associated text of the proposal will be contained in a single quote tag. The member who introduced the proposal may alter this text at their discretion.
3. The member who introduced the proposal may call for a vote by posting "motion to vote", or a functional equivalent in the thread.
4. During the five days after a vote a called for, the member who introduced the proposal may continue to amend it. This period, hereafter referred to as Formal Debate, may be shortened at the member who introduced the proposal's request. Once Formal Debate has ended, the proposal may no longer be amended, and the Speaker will schedule a vote to begin no fewer than two days hence.
5. No proposal may be introduced that includes changes to more than one document, except by special permission of the Speaker.
The Court took into consideration its ruling on the Speaker's authority to determine the content of votes:
The Speaker by making these policies was within their powers as laid out by the Constitution and not in violation of the Bill of Rights. The Court looked extensively at the Section 10 of the Bill of Rights and determined that the rules that were adopted still allowed the protection of each nations right to vote. We are aware the Speaker discounted votes that were not in line with the adopted polices but again the voters that lodged an invalid vote were still given the right to vote in the matter. It is our belief that once these rules were adopted they were enforced evenly and fairly.
The Court took into consideration its ruling on the Speaker's authority to unilaterally end debate:
With that decided, the Court would take this opportunity to comment more broadly on the powers of the Speaker. Under the aforementioned Constitutional clause, the Speaker is granted broad discretion, where no rules exist, to administer the Regional Assembly as he or she sees fit. Under the Bill of Rights segment also mentioned previously, the Court believes that all government officials are obligated by law to act in good faith in discharging their duties. The Court believes that the Speaker does possess the right to unilaterally table proposals, if their continued debate is not reasonably in the best interests of the region. The Constitution grants this discretion, and the Bill of Rights in effect obligates the Speaker to exercise said discretion if he or she feels it is appropriate. If the Nations of The North Pacific disagree, the procedure for Recall is quite clear, and as has been demonstrated over the past few months, is quite accessible. Legal review of the Speaker's discretionary decisions is not, generally speaking, necessary.
The Court opines the following:

The Constitution establishes that the Regional Assembly has the authority to create the rules for its governance, and that it is the duty of the Speaker to administer those rules. Where there is vagueness as to procedure, or when situations arise which are not covered by those rules, or by superseding ones within the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights, the Speaker is empowered to act as they see fit within the best interests of the region. Previous Courts have interpreted this power broadly, upholding the Speaker's broad authority to maintain an appropriate atmosphere, promote a productive use of the Regional Assembly, and block proposals and votes which they deem harmful. While the relevant law has changed since the previous decision, prompting us to take this case, upon investigation the underlying principles have not.

We uphold the previous rulings in full, and reiterate that disagreements over best interests can be solved via recall motions. The Court is not the appropriate body to resolve such disputes.

As in the review of a Speaker's decision to end debate, we find the Speaker's power broad, but not unlimited. While the Speaker may refuse to tolerate something harmful, it is not a legitimate use of their power to capriciously stifle any and all debate. Two things therefore matter in this instance: the content of the proposal in question, and the severity of the Speaker's crackdown.

The proposal previously reviewed, which attempted to ban an individual legislatively, was determined to be controversial, to have prompted "not-insignificant" responses from the moderation team including multiple warnings (a status which we shall term "flammability"), to lack merit, to lack viability, and to lack legality. This is not a precedential, exhaustive list of instances where a Speaker is well within their rights to block a debate or vote, and the Speaker's Office is not obliged to use or refer to it for any future issue. There are, however, a number of similarities between that case and this one which help clarify our decision.

  • Controversy: The Religious Exclusion Act is one in a series of legislation which have provoked a great deal of uproar about the relationship between religion and government in TNP. Like Chasmanthe's bill, this one was not introduced innocent of any knowledge of the controversy that would accompany it, but rather in full awareness and with the intent to provoke it further. It is, therefore, highly controversial.
  • Flammability: A number of warnings have been handed out for escalating or outrageous behavior during the tangled course of these debates, including one to the author of this bill in a previous thread and one to another participant in the debate on this specific bill. It is, therefore, highly flammable.
  • Merit: The subtitle of this post is "For the sake of silliness and fun", and the author of this bill describes it as "hysterically entertaining", "meaningless", and "unenforceable". Other posters within the thread regard it similarly. The Court is happy to agree with everyone that this proposal lacks merit.
  • Viability: The majority of posters within the thread in question are opposed to the proposal, and several commented on their annoyance. It seems safe to conclude that this proposal has no viability, and would not have attained a majority at vote.
  • Legality: Many of the clauses of this bill are direct violations of the bill of rights, but they are contradicted by a clause which states, essentially, that if made law this bill would not have the force of law. This is unestablished in precedent, and it is not clear that it can legally be done or how it interacts with any sworn oath to obey the law. The legality of this proposal is therefore, at best, questionable.
Based on these five criteria, the Court determines that this proposal is easily one which falls within the reasonable right of the Speaker to shut down.

As for the severity of the Speaker's response and whether any rights have been violated, the Speaker opted not to stop the debate but simply to block the proposal from going to vote. The Court therefore examined the existing voting rules. As established through testimony, current RA procedure is divided into two parts, and the two parts hold different legal weight. That portion of it which is contained within the Rules of the Regional Assembly was established by a majority vote as allowed for under Article 7, Clause 11 of the Constitution, and the Speaker is obligated to apply it as written. However, that which is contained within the Speaker's Standing Policies is entirely discretionary, and the Speaker has the power to alter its application when such is deemed necessary.

Formal debate, the rules surrounding it, and the decision to move a proposal through that stage and into a vote, fall entirely within the Speaker's discretionary procedures. They would be equally as free to put bills to vote based on the flip of a coin or a well-written original sonnet asking them to do so. While there is a written procedure, it is provided as a courtesy to RA members so they know what to expect most of the time - it is not intended or presented as a promise. The Speaker is free to deviate from their written procedures as they wish.

There exists within the Rules of the Regional Assembly a means for RA members to overrule the Speaker's discretionary policies and insist that a piece of legislation go to vote. Because the RA has the power to send something to vote even over the Speaker's objections, the use of this discretionary power does not constitute a violation of a nation's right to speech or right to vote. Procedural options are available - when the Speaker chooses to refuse any discretionary vote, they can be accused of nothing more severe than obstructionism.

Taken together, the Court concludes as follows:

1. The Speaker's option to refuse a discretionary vote is entirely legal and can be used at any time. The Speaker may deviate from the Standing Procedures at any point, provided that the deviation is not a violation of any other law or policy and does not infringe on any rights.

2. If, at any point, the Speaker determines that allowing a debate to continue is not in the best interests of the region, we concur with the previous Court that they have an obligation to put an end to it.


Case thread
Ruling delivered on August 24, 2014.
 
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