Court Rulings Index

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:

Article 1.1 All nations are guaranteed the rights defined by the Bill of Rights.

Article 1.4 Requirements for citizenship will be determined by law.

Article 1.5 The Regional Assembly may enact, amend or repeal laws by a majority vote.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:

2. Each Nation's rights to free speech, free press, and the free expression of religion shall not be infringed, and shall be encouraged, by the governmental authorities of the region and its territories. Each Nation has the right to assemble, and to petition the governmental authorities of the region and its territories, including the WA Delegate, for the redress of grievances. The governmental authorities of the region and its territories shall act only in the best interests of the Region and its territories, as permitted and limited under the Constitution.

5. All Nations of The North Pacific and its territories have the right to be protected against the abuse of powers by any official of a government authority of the region and its territories. Any Nation of The North Pacific and its territories has the right to request the recall of any official of a government authority of the region and its territories in accordance with the Constitution, that is deemed to have participated in such acts.

6. No Nation shall be held to answer for a crime in a manner not prescribed by the Constitution or the Legal Code. No Nation shall be subjected to being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. No Nation shall ever be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against itself.

8. The regional power of ejection and banning may not be granted or exercised, nor forum bans imposed, unless expressly authorized pursuant to the Constitution or the Legal Code. Any ejected or banned nation is entitled to prompt judicial review of the matter.

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific and its territories is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region and its territories on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region and its territories shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific and its territories, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific and its territories the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

11. No governmental authority of the region and its territories has the power to suspend or disregard the Constitution or the Legal Code. In the event of an actual emergency, the governmental authorities of the region and its territories, with the express consent of the Nations of the region and its territories or their representatives, is authorized to act in any reasonable manner that is consistent as practicable with the pertinent provisions of the Constitution.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:

Legal Code 2.2:

Treason will be punished by ejection and banning, and removal of any basic rights for whatever duration the Court sees fit.

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Section 3.5: Pre-Sentencing Ejections and Bans:

27. The Delegate may eject and/or ban a particular nation from the region pending criminal charges against them, or prior to the conclusion of an ongoing criminal trial in which they are the defendant, only when that nation poses a clear security threat and their removal is necessary for the protection of the region.
28. The Delegate must seek the approval of the Court for any such ejection or ban. Where possible, this approval must be sought prior to the nation's removal from the region. Otherwise, it must be sought within one day of the action.
29. If the ejection or ban is performed during a criminal trial against that nation, approval will be at the discretion of the justice moderating the trial. Otherwise, any single justice may approve or deny the Delegate's request.
30. Any nation ejected or banned under this section may file an appeal of the decision. These appeals may not be denied, and must be decided by the full court.
31. The Delegate must immediately provide any nation ejected or banned under this section with a link to the Courtroom and inform them of their right to file an appeal.
32. If criminal charges are not brought against a nation ejected or banned under this section, or if the criminal charges are rejected by the Court, or if the nation is not found Guilty at the conclusion of the trial, any ban against that nation which was imposed under this section must be revoked.

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Section 6.2: Administration and Loss of Citizenship:

15. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens whose removal is ordered by the Court, whose registered nations in The North Pacific or one of its territories leave or cease to exist, or whose citizenship is voluntarily renounced by notifying the Speaker.
16. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens who, for over 30 consecutive days, neither post on the regional forum, nor post on the regional message board of The North Pacific or one of its territories with their registered nations.
17. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens whose registered nations in The North Pacific or one of its territories are not in the World Assembly, except as part of an operation with the North Pacific Army, if their citizenship was granted after failing an evaluation by forum administration. This requirement will not apply if the citizens request and then pass another evaluation by forum administration.
18. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens to whom they granted citizenship in error, if the error is discovered within 7 days of granting their citizenship.
19. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens who are banned for maintaining a nation in a region or organization at war with The North Pacific.
21. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens who are confirmed to be using a second forum account or evading a judicially-imposed penalty.
22. The Speaker will promptly remove any citizens who are banned by forum administration.

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Section 7.3: Onsite Authority:

16. Violators of NationStates rules, residents banned offsite by forum administration, or residents who maintain a nation in a region or organization at war with The North Pacific, may be subject to summary ejection or banning.
17. Residents banned on the basis of forum bans imposed by forum administration may not be banned for longer than the length of the ban imposed by forum administration.
18. Nations recruiting for other regions may be subject to summary ejection or banning.
19. Nations for which the Court has issued an indictment permitting it may be ejected or banned.
20. Nations that have been so sentenced by the Court will be ejected or banned.
21. The official performing an ejection or ban will promptly inform the region and Government.

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Section 8.2: Disease Control:

3. A NationStates event involving an outbreak of an infectious disease shall be considered an actual emergency, and does not require a declaration by the RA.
4. In advance of an outbreak, or promptly after an outbreak begins, the government must present a poll to the public regarding how the government should respond. The poll must contain at least three substantially different options. The government will respond according to the will of the public expressed through that poll.
5. During an outbreak, the delegate is authorized to act in any reasonable manner to pursue the adopted plan. This includes, but is not limited to, ejecting or banning nations from the region who have entered the region during the crisis, imposing restrictions on national movement into the region, and granting Border Control to other government officials for the duration of the event.
6. No more than 30 days before the historical start of the event, the Delegate may appoint a Citizen to assist in the regional response to an infectious disease outbreak. The appointee is exempt from constitutional restrictions on holding multiple government offices for purposes of their appointment. The appointee's term shall end at the conclusion of the event.
7. Nations ejected or banned because of the outbreak must be promptly unbanned and invited to return once the emergency is over.
8. During an outbreak, no nation may have their status as a resident or citizen removed solely for leaving the region, so long as they return within three days of the end of the emergency.
9. Following an outbreak, the Speaker must promptly contact any resident or citizen who remains outside the region, and inform them that they are at risk of losing their status if they do not return within three days.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of 2007 TNP LAW 28:

Article III Section 2 :

Assembly members whose nation has CTE'd (Ceased to Exist) or who have moved out of The North Pacific when not on official business shall be removed from membership automatically by the Speaker.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of 2005 Constitution:

Article 1 Section 2 Subsection 6 :

At any time, should sufficient evidence be brought to the Minister of Immigration and Internal Affairs that proves that a registered voter fails to meet the requirements for membership due to the deletion of a Nation from NationStates through inactivity or NationStates Moderator intervention, that Nation's name may be purged from the list of registered voters. Should a Nation, whose voter registration has been purged, later be found to have been resurrected in NationStates, or that the Nation become a member of the Region once again, they may re-apply for voting rights according to the procedures in the preceding clauses of this Section. The act of expulsion or banning of a Nation from the Region prior to a trial or a referendum does not affect its status as a registered voter until and unless a final judgment is entered in a judicial proceeding or a final certification is entered in a referendum, whichever is applicable to the given situation. The North Pacific Legal Code may provide authority to the Minister of Immigration and Internal Affairs for the periodic purging of the names of registered voters who are no longer eligible to vote in the Region, upon due notice because they no longer meet the requirements of this Section.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of On Regional Officers Banning Nations during NationStates Events and its Related Filings


The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner is the Court Examiner, and enjoys universal standing for all questions before this Court. There is no question of proper standing in this case.

On the Court's Prior Ruling
In 2016, during the annual Z-day event, then citizen Gracius Maximus was ejected by a government official as part of the event. He then challenged the action, alleging several errors in law. First, that the Delegate did not delegate ejection authority making the ejection by another regional officer unlawful. Second, that the action violated his freedom to engage his nation as he saw fit. Finally, his ejection could jeopardize his standing as an elected official and member of the Regional Assembly.

The Court, under the law of that period, ruled that the Delegate must explicitly authorize a regional officer to eject nations during the event, that such authorization is subjected to a reasonableness standard, and that such power is inherent to the Governmental authority to address the emergency.

The Court further opined that an ejection in this manner cannot result in the loss of citizenship. In order for a citizen ejected during the event to lose citizenship, they had to return to the region and leave again, cease to exist, or fail to meet the activity requirements. It is this final part that is being challenged in this Request for Review.

The Court discussion thread on this matter was thin on reasoning for this part of the ruling. The Court looked into the earlier version of the regions governing documents for perspective. When looking at the 2005 and 2007 versions, the provisions regarding loss of citizenship revolve around actions of the individuals and protections against rogue government officials. Both the 2005 and 2007 versions outline the burden on the government to support the ejection and removal of a citizen from the region and expressly limit the potential damage that an ejection may cause. It is in this context we view the original ruling.

On the Loss of Citizenship When Ejected
Throughout the Legal Code and our body of jurisprudence, we have held that the Government is subservient to the people. With Citizenship, this subservience places the burden on the Government to prove that the Citizen acted in a willful manner that resulted in the legal removal of their citizenship. Our laws place great emphasis on how and when citizenship can be removed, outlining multiple steps that must be taken to remove a person from our rolls. The Speaker is directed to remove citizenship only as a result of specific events that trigger removal, the Court may only remove citizenship for the Crime of Treason, and the Vice Delegate must present a case to the Regional Assembly for review and a vote before rejecting an application for citizenship. Reviewing the historical context in which the Court held the original case, the laws at the time, and our laws today, a common thread runs through it all. Each clause that addresses the removal of citizenship is preceded by a voluntary action of the Citizen or applicant. Failing to maintain a nation in the region, failing to maintain a nation at all, and conducting acts that are offensive to the community are all voluntary acts, whether the citizens are doing something or choosing to not do something that is required of them. It is with this context we uphold the court's original ruling.

There are well established laws on how an ejection from the region should and must be handled. Section 3.5 of the Legal Code establishes a multi-step process that the Government must follow when ejecting a nation from the region, and that person is entitled to due process. This lends further legal support for the Court's original ruling. In the event that a nation is ejected for being a security risk to the region, the legal code does not provide for the removal of citizenship and does provide for redress to the nation in question. The Court must hold a hearing on the ejection and hold a trial on the underlying criminal activity, a process in which the Government must prove the nation acted in some manner. These protections and steps are well established for good reason. To permit the loss of citizenship based solely on an ejection and without due process opens the door for rogue officials to eject and remove citizenship of its opposition and suppress the rights of the people.

An ejection is not a voluntary act in and of itself. In this case, it is the Government's reaction to an emergency and part of its program to address it. Many on this Court have experience and even led the response to a disease outbreak, and we are aware of the chaos of the event, the good and bad actors involved, and what happens or can happen to those who choose not to participate. Furthermore, nothing in the original briefings nor in the briefings for this review establish a factual rational or legal citation to support an argument that a nation's actions during a disease outbreak are sufficiently voluntary and cause for the removal of citizenship. In the context of a disease outbreak, ejections for the duration of the outbreak is a use of regional authority to control an emergency situation.

Part of the emergency law governing the disease outbreak event regulates the time frame in which nations should return after leaving, and establishes this time frame as 3 days. As part of this process, the Speaker is mandated to contact all ejected nations and inform them of their right to return and the time frame allotted to them to make their return. The Regional Assembly determined this period of time and the amount of grace afforded to impacted nations in making their return. Because of these efforts, we consider it reasonable for citizenship to be at risk if an ejected nation chooses not to return after being contacted and given time to hear of and act on the warning provided by the Speaker. When this grace period elapses, and they have been properly informed, their decision not to return is just as voluntary as any self-directed departure from the region would be under non-emergency situations. Removal of citizenship under these circumstances would be valid and acceptable under the existing framework. However, the burden remains on the Government to establish that all requirements for the removal were met and that the circumstances were reasonable. A person whose citizenship is removed in this manner is still afforded the ability and opportunity to have their ejection judicially reviewed.

On Reasonable Requirements for Return
As has been stated, the Regional Assembly currently provides for 3 days before a nation's citizenship is in jeopardy after departing the region during the disease outbreak. But is this time frame reasonable? The petitioner argued at length about the Assembly's role in determining limits to citizenship, and its broad authority in emergency situations. This Court can imagine circumstances wherein impacted nations may functionally be unable to meet the Assembly's requirements, such as starting or enforcing the 3 day clock when it is mechanically impossible for the ejected nations to return to the region. The Assembly could also forgo fully informing the impacted nations of their ability to return, and rely on their confusion or lack of knowledge to cause them to run out of time. This requirement would not be reasonable under such circumstances. Instead, the Assembly would need to give nations a fair shot to receive and act on their requirements, and every nation would need to have the same opportunity afforded to them without any being treated differently. Considering the law as currently written, with all of its stipulations, this Court considers the disease outbreak's requirements for return to be reasonable.

Holding
We affirm the previous ruling in its entirety. Ejection does not constitute leaving the region, and therefore citizenship cannot be removed when a nation is ejected. However, we clarify that a nation which is ejected during a disease outbreak event or similar emergency situation, and does not voluntarily return under the Assembly's requirements for return, may have its citizenship removed, so long as those requirements and the circumstances surrounding the potential return are reasonable.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on May 15, 2024.

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.

Chapter 6: Regional Assembly Statutes:

Section 6.1: Citizenship Applications
11. The Regional Assembly may overturn a previous decision to uphold the rejection of an applicant by majority vote.

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The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

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The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner is the Court Examiner, and enjoys universal standing for all questions before this Court. There is no question of proper standing in this case.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling
The Court Examiner asks that this Court take another look at its decision related to rejected applicants for the Regional Assembly, which was made while a significant change in the Legal Code was passed by the Regional Assembly that established a mechanism for the Regional Assembly to overturn rejections for applicants allowing them to be admitted as citizens. He asserts that because this provision exists, the Court can render the previous ruling defunct as it is no longer necessary for our ruling to stand given the law and our ruling are in accord. However, the previous ruling was made with this law change already having been done, and our ruling is consistent with the law as it exists today. It may be redundant, but the law has not rendered our decision obsolete, especially as we made this ruling amid the change that prompted the Court Examiner to make this request. Additionally, as Zyvetskistaahn notes in his brief, is also concerned with the Vice Delegate’s role in the matter, and the Legal Code continues not to address this. It is this ruling which eliminates the Vice Delegate’s discretion in whether to reverse a previous rejection, and why it is still not permissible for the Vice Delegate to do so.

The ruling in question also determined that the citizen impacted by this question, Treize_Dreizehn, would maintain his citizenship (then referred to as Regional Assembly membership) despite recognizing that strictly speaking, that status was improperly granted. The Court considered the circumstances surrounding his status, the length of time it had gone on, and his participation in many aspects of regional governance and activity and concluded it would be more destructive to declare all of that illegitimate, and cascade into other areas affecting the community. This reasoning, as Zyvetskistaahn points out, has been utilized in several subsequent cases where it was found that matters had been improperly done and we had to decide whether to negate what had occurred or to explain the error, hold that it was an error and prevent its continuation, while allowing the impact of that error to lie. The fact that Treize_Dreizehn is no longer involved in the community does not render our decision as far as he is concerned defunct. It is very much a living and crucial precedent for resolving ongoing errors that are later discovered and addressed. Our decisions will often require answering specific questions involving individuals or a very narrow issue, and the solutions may not remain fresh or relevant years later after the law changes and our thinking on issues changes as well. But to any extent they provide guidance for resolving other questions and providing solutions utilizing the same logic, they transcend their specific moment in time, and we would not strike them from the record.

As we held in our decision On Defunct Rulings, the principle of recognizing defunct language in our rulings is intended to eliminate scenarios where the controlling law on a matter is this Court’s opinion and it contradicts the law as written. When the law has changed to the extent that it supersedes our decision in whole or in part, even if that decision was correct at the time, that is when we take the step of declaring any part of it to be defunct. The scenarios we intend to guard against in doing so are those where citizens or government officials would be seemingly violating the law simply by acting according to the law as it exists today, if our controlling ruling on the matter says something else. It is not to strike out portions of decisions just because they resolve questions that would not be asked today because the law is formulated differently, and it is not to eliminate a redundant, yet correct, conclusion that is identical to the existing law. Put another way, if the Regional Assembly amends the law to establish a new rule or expand on an existing one that was previously vague or unspecific in order to answer a question differently than this Court, thereby contradicting us, they are creating the scenario where we would rule something as defunct. If they instead codify what this Court already says, or answer the question in an identical fashion, there is obviously no contradiction, just one form of law that will be found to be supreme over the other, and our ruling would not be defunct. Contradictions should be eliminated and when the Regional Assembly answers a question or responds to our rulings by amending the law, that law should take precedence.

Holding
We affirm the ruling On the Permanence of Rejected Applications for the RA in its entirety. Chapter 6 of the Legal Code provides for a mechanism for the Regional Assembly, and the Regional Assembly alone, to reverse rejections of citizenship applications by the Vice Delegate. Our consideration of exceptions to improperly sworn citizens or officials due to unintended errors that are discovered later remains subject to the circumstances of the individuals impacted by such errors, and our decision to allow Treize_Dreizehn to continue to be a citizen despite the process by which his citizenship was obtained being improper will also continue to stand unchanged or removed from our record.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling On the Reconsideration of the Powers of Election Commissioners
In light of the Court’s conclusions in this case, it is necessary to look again at one of our more recent decisions. The Election Commission is outlined in much greater detail than it was at the time of the decision we reconsidered in On the Reconsideration of the Powers of Election Commissioners and in so doing the Regional Assembly defined the powers of the Election Commission in such a way that they codified this Court’s ruling. This does not make our original ruling defunct, but would necessitate our affirming it. This is also true when the ruling answered a specific question about how an election at the time was handled, something that the Court should also not consider to be defunct. We hereby overturn this ruling in its entirety. The ruling On the Powers of Election Commissioners is instead affirmed.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on July 8, 2024.

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed here by Jinkies, here by Comfed, here by SkyTheAquariusOP, and here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific.

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific and its territories is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region and its territories on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region and its territories shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific and its territories, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific and its territories the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.

Chapter 7: Executive Government:

Section 7.4: Freedom of Information Act
27. For the purposes of this section "the government" refers to the Delegate and the Executive Officers, including the departments which they oversee, the Vice Delegate and Security Council, and the Speaker's office.
28. For the purposes of this section, “appropriate officers” are those officers responsible for the types of records being requested or released.
29. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive are responsible for records related to the Executive.
30. The Vice Delegate is responsible for records related to the Security Council.
31. The Speaker is responsible for records related to the Speaker's office.
32. For the purposes of this section, classified information is that which fits any of the below definitions:
• Real life information about any NationStates player from which there is a risk of inferring that player's real life identity and which has not willingly been disclosed to the public, including, but not limited to, an individual's name, IP address, physical address or location, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, social media accounts, and other knowledge about a player, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
• Real life information about any NationStates player for which there exists a reasonable real life expectation of privacy or discretion, including, but not limited to, health status, both mental and physical; financial status; personal tragedies; changes in personal status such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death; and other similar information, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
• Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize any ongoing military or intelligence operations; or jeopardize the security of units and agents participating in them, or be harmful to the diplomatic interests, military interests, or security of The North Pacific.
• Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize Security Council operations in response to threats and attempted coups.
33. Notwithstanding any process for publication, any information which meets the criteria to be classified will not be released.
34. For the purposes of this section, "government records" are those which are kept on any platform utilized by the government and are open to members of the government and anyone assisting them.
35. For the purposes of this section, “private government records” are those which are kept on any platform utilized by the government and are restricted to only the Delegate, the designated officers of the Executive, and any other individuals granted access by the Delegate; only the Speaker, the Deputy Speakers, and any other individuals granted access by the Speaker; or only the Vice Delegate, the Security Council, and any other individuals granted access by the Vice Delegate.
36. Private government records which reach one year of age will be relocated to the appropriate Declassified Archive visible to residents.
37. At any time a resident may request the release of any government record or private government record through the appropriate officers.
38. The appropriate officers will retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government.
39. Residents who do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information to the court, where the appropriate officers may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information meets one or more of the acceptable criteria for classification.
40. Information appropriately not disclosed will be accepted as classified by a majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Court Procedures

Chapter 6: Declassification and Privacy
Section 1: Declassification of Records
1. Private Court records, in either the Justices' private forum or the private archive, which reach one year of age will be relocated to the Declassified Justice Archive.
2. Private Court records which have reached six months of age may be released early in the same manner when requested by a Citizen.
3. Private Court records which are younger than six months but predate the sitting Court may be requested by a Citizen and released if the Court finds a compelling benefit to their publication.
4. Private Court records from within the term of the sitting Court will not be released.
5. Private Court records which pertain to open or ongoing cases will not be released, regardless of their age.
6. Records formerly owned by the Attorney General or by a Prosecutor will not be considered to be private Court records and will not be released.
Section 2: Privacy of Information
1. Information protected as private is defined as follows:
Real life information about any NationStates player from which there is a risk of inferring that player's real life identity and which has not willingly been disclosed to the public, including, but not limited to, an individual's name, IP address, physical address or location, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, social media accounts, and other knowledge about a player, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
Real life information about any NationStates player for which there exists a reasonable real life expectation of privacy or discretion, including, but not limited to, health status, both mental and physical; financial status; personal tragedies; changes in personal status such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death; and other similar information, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize any ongoing military or intelligence operations; or jeopardize the security of units and agents participating in them, or be harmful to the diplomatic interests, military interests, or security of The North Pacific.
2. The Court will not release Private information during its declassification process. This may take the form of withholding a thread in its entirety, or producing a copy of of the original thread with the Private information or posts redacted.

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The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

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The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner is the Court Examiner, and enjoys universal standing for all questions before this Court. There is no question of proper standing in this case.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling
The Court is asked to reconsider a prior ruling which held that the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to the judiciary and only applies to the executive branch, and that private deliberations of the Court are not only exempt from FOIA requests, they are absolutely prohibited from being published. The Court Examiner rightly points out that since this ruling was made, the FOIA has been changed extensively and in fact applies to other government bodies, including the legislative branch and the security council. While it continues not to apply to the judiciary, the Court has as a matter of course made public its private deliberations through its own timeline of releasing records as established by the Court’s own procedure.

We agree that at the time of the ruling, the FOIA law only applied to the executive branch. The FOIA law also did not yet require disclosures after a set period of time, which is the primary way the law is applied in modern times. The Court’s position on this matter was very strongly opposed to applying the law given it was entirely concerned with citizens requesting specific information and a scheduled release of material after the fact was not yet part of the process. The Court was also concerned with balancing constitutional rights related to the proper and fair application of the Court system against the public’s right and expectation to have greater transparency from its government officials. There are legitimate dangers to compelling release of these deliberations, and any form of such disclosure would need to be careful not to risk impacting the integrity of judicial proceedings. An absolute barrier to such disclosures was certainly the most cautious approach, one that placed a high premium on constitutional rights. However, in so doing, the Court tipped the scales too far in one direction.

On Freedom of Information Requests against the Judiciary
While the FOIA still does not apply to the Court, even after its last major overhaul, the Court’s procedures have a substantially similar system for accepting FOIA requests. Regardless of how carefully constructed such a system is, it is plainly obvious that the fact it exists at all is a contradiction with the existing ruling the Court reviews today. That ruling weighed heavily the importance of impartial and well-considered judgment without concern for popular or political consequences. The Court will not pretend such sensibilities are completely absent even with robust barriers to disclosure, but protecting this process from outside prying during a trial is certainly a worthwhile endeavor and will at least spare justices having to fret about such things until long after the trial is over. A period of respite is often enough to cool even the most passionate of observers and allow time and context to solidify and create some form of objectivity. As the Court previously argued that custom always protected privacy in deliberations, so too the Court can recognize that current custom is for there to be a reasonable amount of time prior to private government communications being released as a matter of course.

The Court’s process for handling disclosure of its communications is distinct from the FOIA, and for good reason. The Court has two substantially different types of work: managing criminal trials and responding to requests for review of government actions or legal documents. Criminal trials touch on personal and individual rights more directly, and consistently, than requests for review, and premature attention to its deliberations in the case of criminal trials is far more likely to be destructive to the Court’s work and the defendant. For the Court to properly safeguard the rights of defendants, it needs insulation from FOIA that the other branches do not. The Court’s current procedures provide an absolute prohibition from disclosure for open or ongoing cases, which would be the essence of the Court’s prior prohibition in the challenged ruling. They further control release of records in a time frame that is too soon after a case’s completion, and ultimately call for total disclosure after a year, same as the FOIA.

We feel that the Court set appropriate limits to these requests in its procedures, and its release of records can continue under those principles. And we believe that these procedures, which provide the distinct guardrails that would mitigate the concerns this Court has previously outlined, serve as a strong baseline and model for any future revision of the FOIA that would include the Court. The Court’s procedures also contain similar language regarding privacy of information that the FOIA law employs, which this Court agrees are sufficient, and we would expect that any FOIA amendment incorporating the judiciary would apply the same privacy rules to that body as it does the other branches.
The judicial branch is just as subject to scrutiny and the citizenry’s right to hold its leaders accountable, and that must be balanced against the Court’s need for privacy in handling the important matters under its purview. It simply cannot be the case that disclosure of such deliberations must necessarily always be prohibited.

Holding
We find that the following portion of our prior ruling On Freedom of Information Requests against the Judiciary is now defunct as precedent:

the FOIA law may only be used to request information belonging to the Executive branch.

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Therefore, that portion of the ruling will be modified with strikethrough tags, acknowledging its obsolescence while preserving it for historical purposes. We hereby overturn the parts of that same ruling that asserted applying the FOIA law to the Judiciary would be a gross violation of the principles of justice and of the integrity of the judicial process, and that publication of private deliberations is absolutely prohibited under any and all circumstances. We affirm the Court’s continued disclosure of its deliberations on the schedule as currently constituted in the Court’s rules. Any potential alteration of the FOIA to incorporate the judiciary must take these restrictions into account and provide strong protections for criminal defendants by being deliberate and gradual in providing for when and how private judicial records might be disclosed or requested.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on August 26, 2024.

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed here by Jinkies, here by SkyTheAquariusOP, and here by Zyvetskistaahn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Constitution of The North Pacific.

Article 3. The Delegate and Vice Delegate:

10. The Vice Delegate will chair the Security Council and enforce the continued eligibility of its members as determined by law.

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Article 5. The Security Council:

2. Once an application has been submitted, the Security Council may nominate that applicant by a majority vote. The Regional Assembly may confirm a nominated applicant by a majority vote. If the Security Council does not nominate an applicant or does not act on them within thirty days, the Regional Assembly may appoint the applicant by a two-thirds majority vote.

4. The Security Council will monitor the security of the region and its territories and report on it to the public, and enforce decisions of the Regional Assembly to remove the Delegate.

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Article 6. General Provisions:

15. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.

Chapter 4: Election and Appointment Procedure:

Section 4.5: General Elections
30. The election of the Delegate, the Vice Delegate, and the Speaker will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.

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Chapter 5: Regional Security Law:

Section 5.6: Disclosure of Security Council Information
31. Disclosure of private Security Council records will be regulated in the same chapter regulating disclosure of executive government records.

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Chapter 7: Executive Government:

Section 7.4: Freedom of Information Act
27. For the purposes of this section "the government" refers to the Delegate and the Executive Officers, including the departments which they oversee, the Vice Delegate and Security Council, and the Speaker's office.
28. For the purposes of this section, “appropriate officers” are those officers responsible for the types of records being requested or released.
29. The Delegate and the designated officers of the Executive are responsible for records related to the Executive.
30. The Vice Delegate is responsible for records related to the Security Council.
31. The Speaker is responsible for records related to the Speaker's office.
32. For the purposes of this section, classified information is that which fits any of the below definitions:

• Real life information about any NationStates player from which there is a risk of inferring that player's real life identity and which has not willingly been disclosed to the public, including, but not limited to, an individual's name, IP address, physical address or location, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, social media accounts, and other knowledge about a player, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
• Real life information about any NationStates player for which there exists a reasonable real life expectation of privacy or discretion, including, but not limited to, health status, both mental and physical; financial status; personal tragedies; changes in personal status such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death; and other similar information, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
• Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize any ongoing military or intelligence operations; or jeopardize the security of units and agents participating in them, or be harmful to the diplomatic interests, military interests, or security of The North Pacific.
• Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize Security Council operations in response to threats and attempted coups.

33. Notwithstanding any process for publication, any information which meets the criteria to be classified will not be released.
34. For the purposes of this section, "government records" are those which are kept on any platform utilized by the government and are open to members of the government and anyone assisting them.
35. For the purposes of this section, “private government records” are those which are kept on any platform utilized by the government and are restricted to only the Delegate, the designated officers of the Executive, and any other individuals granted access by the Delegate; only the Speaker, the Deputy Speakers, and any other individuals granted access by the Speaker; or only the Vice Delegate, the Security Council, and any other individuals granted access by the Vice Delegate.
36. Private government records which reach one year of age will be relocated to the appropriate Declassified Archive visible to residents.
37. At any time a resident may request the release of any government record or private government record through the appropriate officers.
38. The appropriate officers will retrieve information requested from the different departments of the government.
39. Residents who do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in appropriate laws or regulations may file a request for the information to the court, where the appropriate officers may present evidence that addresses any claim that release of the information meets one or more of the acceptable criteria for classification.
40. Information appropriately not disclosed will be accepted as classified by a majority vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.

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The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, here, and here,

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The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner is the Court Examiner, and enjoys universal standing for all questions before this Court. There is no question of proper standing in this case.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling
The Court Examiner has requested that this Court reconsider our prior ruling related to the application of FOIA to the Security Council, which held that like the judiciary, the Security Council was also exempted from FOIA requests. As with the other ruling, subsequent changes in the Legal Code have explicitly included the Security Council in this law. When the original ruling was made, the point of contention was defining the Vice Delegate and the Security Council’s relationship to the Executive, and due to its exclusion from that branch, it was excluded from application of the FOIA law. The ruling was also concerned with the ownership of the posts that would be subject to FOIA. We see no reason to reconsider this aspect of the ruling, as no legal changes have taken place that relate to this matter.

The FOIA law now applies to the Security Council. There is no reason that should not be the case from a legal standpoint. Its exclusion in the past was due to the Court’s other ruling that FOIA only applied to the Executive branch, and the fact that the Delegate cannot compel the Security Council to release information. Our other conclusions regarding the Security Council’s relationship with the Executive branch and content ownership are still correct. The Legal Code now explicitly accounts for the Security Council in the FOIA process.

Holding
We find that the following portion of our prior ruling On Content Ownership and Freedom of Information Requests against the Security Council is now altered due to a portion of it being defunct as precedent:

Given that the Chair of the Security Council holds that power only in the absence of holding executive authority, the Court opines that the Security Council is not categorized under the Executive Branch. Given that, and given that the Delegate has no legal authority over the Security Council with which to compel it to release information, the Court opines that the Security Council is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act as written.

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Therefore, the defunct portion of the ruling will be modified with strikethrough tags, acknowledging its obsolescence while preserving it for historical purposes.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on September 5, 2024.

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Jinkies, and here by SkyTheAquariusOP.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.

Chapter 7: Executive Government:

Section 7.6: The North Pacific Army
50. Members of The North Pacific Army holding a Regional Officer position in a foreign region as part of an operation in that region may not use that position to perform restricted actions, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.
51. Members of The North Pacific Army may participate in joint operations with other militaries that perform restricted actions, and may serve as Regional Officers in foreign regions during such joint operations, but may not perform any restricted actions themselves in the joint operation, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.

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The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, here, here.

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The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner is the Court Examiner and enjoys universal standing for all questions before this Court. There is no question of proper standing in this case.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling
The Court now considers a prior ruling related to a matter that has been impacted by changes to the law since the ruling was made, in this case the law related to the region’s military. This Court previously held that the restrictions placed on the North Pacific Army still applied even in joint military operations, and that the fact other regions may carry out the forbidden actions instead of the NPA soldiers deployed on the operation wouldn’t make the participation any less problematic, as the NPA would still be passively supporting the actions the legal code prohibited. Since this ruling, the Legal Code was extensively amended, with the intent of distinguishing this scenario from the restrictions typically placed on the NPA. The Court Examiner asserts that the existing law clearly contradicts this Court’s prior ruling and it is no longer in step with the Regional Assembly’s position on this matter. The Court Examiner is right to observe the Regional Assembly’s position on the matter is not the same as the Court’s conclusion, but is wrong that the law as currently constituted contradicts the ruling.

The Legal Code currently takes pains to set parameters for how members of the NPA may behave in joint raiding operations. It makes clear that restrictions apply to their actions but not to the operation, and that participating in such operations is permissible if they abide by the restrictions themselves. If the Court had been content to state that without explicit allowance for joint operation participation, such participation would violate the law’s prohibition, that would be one thing, and we could safely say this ruling is defunct. However, that was not actually what the Court had concluded. The Court asserted that the intent of the law was to limit the harmful impact of the NPA while deployed in foreign regions, and cited clauses including one stating that the NPA “will act with respect towards the natives of the region, and refrain from excessive use of force…” The language that requires the NPA to act with respect is still in the Legal Code, albeit in a much simpler form. The law still lays out exemptions for these restrictions, and how those exemptions may be granted. The Court relied on this language to conclude that even if the NPA does not actively take part in destructive acts, and even though the legal code cannot mandate how other militaries behave, the NPA’s presence there at all is still passively participating in illegal destructive acts. This principle goes beyond any specific permission for joint operation activity, because it asserts that the law contradicts itself if it restricts the NPA from taking certain action but later allows it to passively participate in an operation where the restricted activity takes place. In other words, despite the fact that the assembly sought to patch the law by explicitly allowing participation in joint operations, the Court declared that any such allowance is incompatible with the law as it exists. Because the law stated certain actions needed to be permitted on a case-by-case basis by the Regional Assembly, and because the NPA was expected not to be unnecessarily destructive and to respect other regions, passive participation in unrestricted destructive acts would not be permissible.

On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations
There is a fundamental question that the Court attempted to answer in a quick and succinct way, doing a great disservice to the region in the process. Without explaining a constitutional or precedential basis for doing so, the Court declared that passive participation in an operation where restricted actions took place, even if done by other militaries and even if their presence in an operation were specifically authorized (in this case by the same legal code the Court is attempting to strictly interpret), still violates the legal code. With that understanding, then, there is no way that the RA’s latest alteration to the legal code could contradict this ruling. With that understanding, in fact, there is no actual way for the regional assembly to get around this pesky principle. Ostensibly participation in a joint raiding operation would require a vote of the assembly to exempt the region targeted in the raid, even though the law says that joint operations are permissible under the circumstances outlined. This Court is not in the habit of creating unbreakable walls that the regional assembly cannot overcome, especially when its intent is clear and it is explicitly attempting to correct the state of things caused by this Court. For a principle to be so strong and fundamental that a simple amendment of the legal code is insufficient, one would expect there to be a constitutional principle, perhaps even an aspect of the bill of rights, that stands in the way. And yet, no such principle exists, or is asserted by the original Court ruling.

The Court was asked, in the absence of the legal code contemplating the scenario, if joint operations where destructive acts took place were operations the NPA could participate in. As the Court said in our prior ruling, and as remains true now, we cannot apply our own restrictions to those of our partners in joint operations. Since that ruling, clear guidelines now exist in the law as it stands for how the NPA can participate in joint operations where restricted actions take place. The scenario is no longer absent from the law, and the Regional Assembly has decided that its restrictions on the NPA are not inherently a barrier to cooperating with other regions. We must read the conditional allowance for joint operations to be as much of a check on NPA action as the restricted acts and means of exempting the NPA from those restrictions. And we must acknowledge that the law providing for exemptions and allowing for joint operations given certain circumstances coexists with the language mandating the treatment of other regions with respect. Our interpretation of how far these provisions extend is not as pivotal as the assembly’s interpretation, and their work on this matter sends as clear a signal as any as to how they want the military to operate and how these clauses should be understood. Without any constitutional principle to back it up, and especially without sufficient elaboration as to why the Court came to its conclusion that a fundamental contradiction existed, the Court’s previous assertion that joint raiding operations could not be supported by the NPA was plain wrong and bad jurisprudence.

This Court deliberated on the matter, and those deliberations are now a matter of public record. There were arguments that could have been advanced in the final decision that was handed down, ones this Court could appropriately and officially reconsider in this case. But those arguments were never outlined or elaborated, and as a result do not hold the force of law and are as incidental as any of the briefs considered by this Court. The Court at the time felt that participation in such raids was inherently disrespectful to the regions impacted by those raids, and that simply having another military do the dirty work was not enough to get around the restriction. Had those conclusions been key to the decision, they would have still lacked the crucial legal underpinning that such rulings must have when this Court considers an ambiguous area. We have ruled previously that this Court must rely on legal logic traced to a constitutional principle or pattern. The Court relied instead on a gap in the law and its own personal preference, essentially ruling the way it did because it said so. We believe there was potentially more to its opinion than that, even if it relied simply on the justices’ own sense of logic and reasoning, but the Court did not show that to the region in its decision. It is important for rulings to be understandable and clear in their application and reasoning, and it can be good for the region when these decisions are short and to the point, and do not mince words. But it can clearly be seen that a lot of crucial context and foundational logic and reasoning can be lost when expedience and simplicity are the only goals considered. The Court erred in how it presented its argument, and it established a principle that unnecessarily restricted the regional assembly from adjusting its own rules for the NPA that had no deeper legal foundation.

Holding
We hereby overturn the ruling On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations in its entirety. We affirm that restrictions placed on the NPA’s actions in its operations apply to all operations it engages in, whether alone or with other militaries, but that this does not mean that participation in joint raiding operations is inherently restricted.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on September 13, 2024.

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Ropanama.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Dreadton, here by St George, here, here, here, here, here, and here by Marcus Antonius, here by Sil Dorsett, and here by Picairn.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific.

8. The regional power of ejection and banning may not be granted or exercised, nor forum bans imposed, unless expressly authorized pursuant to the Constitution or the Legal Code. Any ejected or banned nation is entitled to prompt judicial review of the matter.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Constitution of The North Pacific.

Article 3. The Delegate and Vice Delegate
2. The Delegate may eject and ban nations from the region as permitted by law, and will eject or ban nations from the region when required by law.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.

Section 7.3: Onsite Authority
16. Violators of NationStates rules, residents banned offsite by forum administration, or residents who maintain a nation in a region or organization at war with The North Pacific, may be subject to summary ejection or banning.
17. Residents banned on the basis of forum bans imposed by forum administration may not be banned for longer than the length of the ban imposed by forum administration.
18. Nations recruiting for other regions may be subject to summary ejection or banning.
19. Nations for which the Court has issued an indictment permitting it may be ejected or banned.
20. Nations that have been so sentenced by the Court will be ejected or banned.
21. The official performing an ejection or ban will promptly inform the region and Government.
22. The Serving Delegate may regulate the Regional Message Board as they see fit.
23. Such regulations may not prohibit speech which is in the context of TNP politics.
24. Serving Frontier Delegates may regulate the Regional Message Board in territories of The North Pacific as they see fit, but the Serving Delegate may direct or overrule such regulation as they see fit.
25. Nations that have been banned for any of the above reasons may be subject to summary ejection or banning from any territories of The North Pacific.
26. All actions of the WA Delegate, the Serving Delegate, Frontier WA Delegate, Serving Frontier Delegate, or of their appointed Regional Officers related to this section will be subject to judicial review.

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The Court took into consideration the NationStates Rules.

The Court took into consideration the TNP Community Guidelines.

The Court took into consideration the RMB Guidelines.

The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, and here.

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The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner is the nation subjected to ban under review and has filed this request pursuant to their rights under the Bill of Rights.

On the Regional Ban of Ropanama
The Court is asked to review the ban of a resident conducted by one of the region’s border control officials due to “violation of Community Guidelines.” The petitioner argues that the ban was unlawful due to the fact the legal code does not enumerate the stated reason among the valid causes for a ban. Additional briefs highlight several key areas that the Court agrees should also be considered. The Court in this case will consider the following questions:

1) Whether Community Guidelines can be considered a valid cause for a ban

2) Whether the Court’s allowance for extralegal moderation in On the Regulation of the Regional Message Board makes this particular ban permissible

3) Whether the reason cited for a ban must be properly cited for a ban to be valid, even if under review actionable behavior can be found to warrant a ban

Due to inconsistency in explaining why bans are carried out over the years, and continued dispute over where such authority comes from, the Court feels it necessary to establish common and consistent practices for officials to utilize when exercising the Executive’s authority to eject and ban nations from The North Pacific. The questions we are considering will form the basis of those practices.

1) The official who conducted the ban under review stated that Community Guidelines is deemed to be a “catch all” explanation for banning, and provided evidence going back over a year that the petitioner had a history of problematic posts and actionable behavior that was never deemed to rise to the level of a ban until finally they deemed the full weight of behavior to be worthy of a ban. The Court is cognizant that this is partly true, as a review of the thread where bans are reported shows that in fact Community Guidelines is typically cited alongside NationStates rules violations as a justification for bans. Both lack specificity as to why a ban was conducted, though obviously NationStates rules are found in the legal code as a justification for a ban. Community Guidelines are not. The plain and simple truth is that there is no Legal Code provision that permits a ban on such grounds, and so a ban lacking actionable violations as enumerated under the Legal Code obviously would not ordinarily stand.

That being said, the Court has previously recognized that certain situations call for extralegal moderation, as NationStates moderation is not always able or willing to respond when requested. Our Community Guidelines are not designed for application to the Regional Message Board, but as we have stated previously, they can be used as a point of reference when determining if extralegal moderation is called for. Given its particular purpose and its tangential relation to the use of banning authority as we understand it, the Court feels even in these cases it would be inappropriate for officials to cite Community Guidelines as a reason for a ban. This may give the wrong impression that the guidelines are enforceable in the same way that other enumerated causes are. Instead, officials should cite specifically what the cause of the ban was and explain that it was done extralegally. The cause may be a specific example the community guidelines outline, or they may be particular to the action warranting the ban, but it should be specifically explained and clear that the ban is intended to be extralegal. If a ban encompasses both violations enumerated in the Legal Code and extralegal violations, officials should continue to cite both, and the ban will be reviewable on the grounds of the enumerated violations.

There is fair concern as to how we should guard against potential abuse of this unreviewable type of ban. The Court relies on the scarcity of situations that would fall outside the enumerated causes, and the fact that regular use of extralegal bans would constitute a reasonably suspicious pattern of behavior for officials to engage in. While the bans would not regularly be subject to review, the pattern of extensive use of extralegal bans absolutely would be subject to review, and under this scenario the Court could consider the bans for reference. The conduct of our government officials and those carrying out their orders is always subject to review, whether in this Court or in the Regional Assembly.

2) Broadly speaking, officials are empowered to conduct extralegal bans as laid out in our previous ruling On the Regulation of the Regional Message Board, and we reaffirm that extralegal bans are not reviewable. If the official conducting the ban had cited an extralegal cause for the ban, this Court would not have even taken up this review. However, the parameters of what type of ban it is, and the terms utilized, are murky and we have endeavored to clarify them in the preceding section and the section to follow.

3) The review of bans has no process, like a criminal trial, that must be strictly adhered to. A petitioner asks the Court to consider their ban and whether it was justified. The officials carrying out the bans are mandated to report their bans, but this too lacks any process. Given that, the answer to this question is quite simple. If the petitioner committed acts that warranted a ban, the ban must be upheld. The government provided ample evidence of a pattern of behavior that regularly involved violating NationStates rules, and we can even identify what those violations were. They covered a wide variety of areas, including but not limited to Trolling, Flaming, and Adult Content. Given this, the Court sees clear cause for a ban. Of course, the reason we are here is because the official reporting the ban did not cite NationStates rules either broadly or specifically, but cited Community Guidelines. But legally speaking, it does not matter what the official said in the report. In fact, the official could have stopped at saying the petitioner was banned, with no further detail, and that would have been sufficient under the law. There’s a very good reason why officials explain their bans. The Court can easily imagine a scenario where bans are regularly challenged for lacking any specificity, and we happen to believe that such reports should be as clear and transparent as possible. But a ban does not cease to be valid just because the reason for conducting it was incorrectly or insufficiently reported. A ban ceases to be valid if there is no legal basis for having been carried out. Upon review of this ban, this Court easily identified cause for a ban, and so the ban is upheld. We will not overturn bans that did not conform to red tape that does not exist.

That being said, the Court feels that current practice is in need of correction. All action is subject to judicial review, and all causes for bans are outlined in the Legal Code. Therefore, the current setup for bans and their review adequately provides protection for residents. It is a fair expectation for those being banned to know why it is happening, and if they feel it is necessary, to challenge the assertion of the government. Every ban is recorded with a reason for why it was done, as has been the common practice for years. This should continue. Moving forward, the Executive should avoid “catch-all” justification for conducting bans and be as specific as possible when reporting bans. If the ban is for violations of NationStates rules, those rules that were specifically broken should be cited in the report. As we previously stated, if a ban is intended to be extralegal in nature, the offense should be cited as specifically as possible, and the specifics can be sourced from our Community Guidelines if applicable. If clarity is missing from the report and officials wish to clarify it after it has been made, they are free and even encouraged to do so. As we have stated, a ban is either justified or it is not, no matter what wording the officials use when reporting it, or if they edited it the next day or spelled out their reasoning in greater length after initially being vaguer. If the Regional Assembly feels compelled to outline a process for these reports, and require they be adhered to for bans to be valid; or to mandate this Court’s suggestions as outlined above, they are welcome to do so. This Court does not mean for these suggestions to be binding on officials, as we have already acknowledged that the process requires very little to work. But if our officials adjust their process to err on the side of specifics and to be consistent in their process, it is better for all involved and should resolve conflicts over bans before they even begin.

Holding
The ban of Ropanama is upheld. Community Guidelines are not a valid reason for carrying out an ejection or ban. Bans are not invalidated after review because an official cited the wrong reason when reporting the ban, as long as there is actual legal cause for the ban.

Case thread
Ruling delivered on November 30, 2024.