Marcus' Model Railway Journey

We're getting somewhere...........

I still wasn't sure about the 'E' in Ethnon

He still needed to create a Bee.

The Bee has been created...........

I wanted the bee to be, on a red background and angled away from the speed stripes........

Finished!

So, here it is in all it's glory............

Transparent background white text

Black lettering.

ETHNON RAIL LOGO
Monochrome

31st July 2023

Steam locomotive to haul Fellsman train to Carlisle via Lancashire and Yorkshire​

A Locomotive Services Ltd steam locomotive will haul ‘The Fellsman' from Crewe to Carlisle, via Blackburn and Settle this Wednesday, 18th May 2022.

We believe that this tour will be hauled by 45231 The Sherwood Forester, but we have yet to have this confirmed.

Departing Crewe at 07:02, the train will be first hauled by a diesel, with the steam loco on the back.

The tour will head through Beeston Castle (07:20) to Chester, arriving at 07:32.

From Chester, the tour is hauled by the steam locomotive.

Departing at 07:40, the train will pass through Frodsham (07:54) and Runcorn East (08:01) to get to the WCML at Warrington Bank Quay – arriving at 08:09.

From Warrington Bank Quay, the train will pass through Wigan North Western (08:25), Euxton Balshaw Lane (08:38), Blackburn (09:13), Clitheroe (09:40), Hellifield (10:35), Ribblehead (10:58), Garsdale (11:13), Appleby (11:39), Lazonby & Kirkoswald (12:26) and Carlisle at 12:48.

After two-and-a-half hours in Carlisle, the locomotive will go back on the same path as the outbound journey.

Departing Carlisle at 15:25, the train will pass through Appleby (16:11), Blea Moor (16:52), Settle (17:08), Hellifield (17:45), Clitheroe (18:37), Blackburn (19:03), Euxton Balshaw Lane (19:46), Wigan North Western (20:01), Warrington Bank Quay (20:23), Frodsham (20:42), Chester (21:04 – diesel hauled from here) and finally Crewe at 21:50.

31st July 2023

Popular steam locomotive set for visit to North Wales this Tuesday​

LMS Black 5 No. 44932 will be visiting North Wales this Tuesday (1st August 2023) as it hauls The Welsh Mountaineer to Blaenau Ffestiniog.

Departing Preston at 08:04, the tour will pass through Wigan North Western (08:22), Warrington Bank Quay (08:36), Frodsham (08:55), Chester (09:34), Rhyl (10:49), Llandudno Junction (11:06), Tal-y-Cafn (12:00), North Llanrwst (12:10), and Blaenau Ffestiniog at 13:05.

After time in Blaenau Ffestiniog, 44932 will depart at 16:15, tender first, and will pass through North Llanrwst (16:48) and Tal-y-Cafn at 17:05 before arriving into Llandudno Junction at 17:15.

Here, 44932 will run round its train.

Now facing smokebox first, the Black 5 will pass through Prestatyn (18:25), Chester (18:57), Helsby (19:08), Frodsham (19:27), Warrington Bank Quay (19:40) and Preston at 20:09.

NOTE: 44932 is expected to be tender first between Chester and Llandudno Junction on the outbound journey.

31st July 2023

Steam locomotive 45596 Bahamas set to visit Dorset this Wednesday​

45596 Bahamas will be on the mainline this Wednesday, 2nd July 2023, as it hauls a London to Weymouth tour.

Departing London Victoria at 08:45, Bahamas will pass through Clapham Junction (09:03), Brentford (09:13), Staines (09:32), Woking (10:03), Winchfield (10:24), Basingstoke (10:46), Eastleigh (11:36), Southampton Central (11:47), Beaulieu Road (12:21), Bournemouth (12:54), Wareham (13:15) and Weymouth at 13:43.

The return journey will depart Weymouth at 16:36, the train will pass through Wareham (17:10), Bournemouth (17:47), Southampton Central (18:25), Basingstoke (19:52), Woking (20:47), Staines (21:20), Clapham Junction (22:02), and London Victoria at 22:19.

31st July 2023


TRANSPORT FOR WALES

Wales’ First Tram Trains​

Brand-new electric tram trains that will revolutionise transport across the South Wales valleys have been unveiled at their new £100 million depot at Taff’s Well.


Brand-new electric tram trains that will revolutionise transport across the South Wales valleys have been unveiled at their new £100 million depot at Taff’s Well.

As part of the South Wales Metro project being delivered by Transport for Wales, the light rail vehicles are the first to be introduced in Wales, operating on both electric lines and battery power.

Travelling up to 100 km/h on rail they will also be able to run on tram lines and at 40 metres long will hold up to 252 passengers.

The new £100 million Taff’s Well depot is progressing and will become the home of the South Wales Metro providing electrical controls and signalling for the network as well as a maintenance depot for the new tram trains.

The control centre is now operational and providing signalling for trains on the Treherbert, Aberdare and Merthyr railway lines.

The transformation of the Core Valley Lines for the Metro has been part-funded by the European Regional Development Fund through Welsh Government, and will enable faster, more frequent services between Cardiff and the heads of the valleys. 

Karl Gilmore, Rail Infrastructure Director at TfW said:

“We’re making huge progress at our depot at Taff’s Well and everything is now becoming very visual. The maintenance depot and control centre buildings are both erected and can be clearly seen and the railway tracks connecting the depot to the mainline have been laid.

“Our new tram trains are here and are currently being tested at the depot and on our valley lines. We’ve already electrified our first phase of lines in the valleys and will continue to do so over the coming months.

“It’s a really exciting time for South Wales as this depot and these tram trains will revolutionise transport in the region.”

Alexia Course, Chief Commercial Officer added:

“Our Citylink Class 398 Tram Trains that have been manufactured by Stadler are now on test in South Wales and this signifies another step closer to delivering the South Wales Metro.

“We have ordered 36 of these 3 car tram trains and they are spacious and bright with multifunctional areas for bicycles, seats for people with reduced mobility and wheelchair passenger spaces.

“The light rail vehicles are designed to connect city centres with outlying areas and we’re excited to add them to our network in the coming months.”

WATCH:

Wales' first tram trains​

31st July 2023

Inside The Train Shed

Having a tidy up.

2nd August 2023


TRANSPORT FOR WALES

New interactive map launched for rail travellers​

A brand new live digital map has been launched showing customers exactly where their train is at any given time.


A brand new live digital map has been launched showing customers exactly where their train is at any given time.

The map shows the location of every train on the TfW network, allowing customers to view their journey in real time and see the expected arrival time at each station on its route.

Transport for Wales have partnered with rail technology innovator, Signalbox to offer the interactive map which can detect the train smartphone users are on, share your live arrival time with friends and family or search for any other train.

Customer Information Strategy Manager for TfW, Teleri Evans, said the rail operator is “passionate” about using new technology to improve customer experience.

She said: “We know our customers want the latest information made available to them while travelling to feel confident that they know what’s going on.

“Whether you’re sat on a train and want to get your bearings or are waiting at a station and wondering where your train is, the right information really can give you peace of mind.

“This fantastic live digital map shows exactly where you are and also any other trains you might be looking to connect to.”

Signalbox uses live data to estimate the location of trains as they pass key points on the tracks.

And later this year the technology will incorporate GPS data from trains to provide an even more accurate picture of where the train is.

Each train is colour coded depending on whether it is running on time, slightly delayed or delayed by more than 10 minutes.

You can also see what that delay might mean for arrival times at stations further down the line.

Toby Webb, Founder of Signalbox said: “We know that travellers are reassured by seeing the progress of their journey in real time on a map, and find it useful to share with friends and family.

"Until now, rail has lagged behind other industries in offering interactive live maps for its passengers. So it’s been exciting to work with Transport for Wales to deliver this new tool that incorporates the best bits of Signalbox technology to detect, map and share trains in Wales."

3rd August 2023

Independent report:​

Report 08/2023: Collision between two freight trains at Loversall Carr Junction

Published: 3rd August 2023

RAIB has today released its report into a collision between two freight trains at Loversall Carr Junction, Doncaster, 5 July 2022.

Summary

At around 06:21 hrs on Tuesday 5 July 2022, freight train 4E11 passed a signal at danger and collided with the rear of a stationary freight train.

Train 4E11 was travelling from Felixstowe to Masborough (a freight terminal near Rotherham) and comprised a diesel-electric locomotive and 35 wagons.

Train 4E11 had left the East Coast Main Line at Loversall Carr Junction near Doncaster and was travelling at 48 mph (77 km/h) when it passed D197 signal.

D197 was at red (danger)to protect a second freight train, 4E82, which was standing in the section ahead.

Train 4E11 struck 4E82 while travelling at approximately 28 mph (45 km/h).

The driver of 4E11 was taken to hospital as a precaution and was discharged later that same day.

The driver of 4E82 did not sustain any injuries.

The collision caused significant damage to the infrastructure, the leading locomotive and wagons of 4E11and the rear wagons of 4E82.

The route remained closed for 26 days for recovery and track repair work.

The accident occurred because the driver did not control the speed of train 4E11to enable it to stop at signal D197.

This was because the driver had experienced a loss of awareness of the driving task, probably due to the effects of fatigue.

It is also possible that the driver’s awareness was affected by their low workload before the train approached Loversall Carr Junction, and by their expectation, based on previous experience, of the aspect which signal D197 would be showing.

RAIB found that the driver’s working pattern was likely to cause fatigue, and they had experienced a low quality of rest, primarily caused by an undiagnosed sleep condition.

The management systems of their employer, the freight operating company GBRailfreight (GBRf), had not detected that the driver was at risk of fatigue.

RAIB also found that the engineered systems in place on the railway infrastructure and on the train did not mitigate the driver’s loss of awareness.

Underlying factors to the accident were the management of fatigue by GBRf which did not follow current industry good practice.

GBRf’s risk assessment processes also did not identify the hazards created by a driver driving while being fatigued.

RAIB has made two recommendations.

The first is addressed to GBRf to reduce the risk of train driver fatigue, including improving risk assessments, processes and following industry good practice.

The second is addressed to the Rail Safety and Standards Board, working in conjunction with freight and other train operators, to include the identification of sleep disorder indicators in current standards for safety critical medical assessments.

A recommendation on the detection of driver attention loss has not been made because a previous recommendation on this issue made as a result of the Kirkby investigation (RAIB report 07/2022) is less than a year old and is still being considered by the rail industry.

RAIB has also identified a learning point to remind train drivers of the importance and meaning of flashing yellow signals.

The accident

Summary of the accident

At around 06:21 hrs on Tuesday 5 July 2022, a freight train, reporting number 4E11, passed signal D197 at red (danger).

Train 4E11 then collided with the rear of another freight train (train 4E82), which was standing stationary ahead with its locomotive brake applied.

Train 4E11, which was travelling north, had diverged from the East Coast Main Line (ECML) at Loversall Carr Junction near Doncaster.

It was travelling at 48 mph (77 km/h) when it passed the signal at red.

The rear of train 4E82 was approximately 231 metres beyond signal D197.

The driver of 4E11 applied the train’s emergency brakes 82 metres beyond signal D197 but there was insufficient distance remaining to prevent the collision.

Train 4E11 collided with the rear of 4E82 while travelling at 28 mph (45 km/h).

The driver of 4E11 was taken to hospital as a precaution and was discharged later that same day.

The driver of 4E82 did not sustain any injuries.

The collision caused significant damage to the infrastructure, the leading locomotive and wagons of 4E11 and the rear wagons of 4E82.

The route remained closed for recovery and repair work until 31 July 2022.

Context
Location

The accident occurred between Loversall Carr Junction and Flyover West Junction near Doncaster.

The Down Slow/Up West Slow single line diverges from the Down Fast line of the ECML at Loversall Carr Junction and meets the line from Lincoln at Flyover West Junction.

The Down Slow/Up West Slow line is a section of bi-directional single track(meaning trains can travel in either direction on the same track), with overhead electrification.

The ECML Down Fast line has a permissible speed of 125 mph(201 km/h) on the approach to the junction.

Trains diverging from the ECML at Loversall Carr Junction have a reduced maximum permitted speed of 70 mph(112 km/h) when routed onto the Down Slow/Up West Slow line.

There is a further reduction in maximum permitted speed to 50 mph (80 km/h) before signal D207.

The Down Slow/Up West Slow line is level after diverging from the ECML until signal D197, after which it has a rising gradient of 1:170.

The track is straight from the junction until the approach to signal D197 which is on a slight left-hand curve (in the direction of travel of train 4E11).

After signal D197, the track is again straight until it reaches Flyover West Junction.

D207 is the next signal beyond D197.

It protects trains on the Flyover lines from trains converging from the Down Slow/Up West Slow line at Flyover West Junction.

The Down Slow/Up West Slow line is mainly used by freight trains accessing Doncaster Decoy and Belmont yards (which are groups of sidings to the south of Doncaster) but is also occasionally used by passenger services running into Doncaster station.

The yards are additionally used for stabling freight trains and as a location where freight train driver changes can take place without causing congestion on the ECML.

A train approaching and diverging from the ECML at Loversall Carr Junction from the south (as was train 4E11) will encounter the following signals:

• D187 exhibiting double flashing yellow aspects. The flashing yellow (cautionary)aspects notify the driver that they are going to be diverted from their current route at the next junction, and that they need to control the train’s speed accordingly.
• D189 exhibiting a single flashing yellow aspect.
• D191 exhibiting a single yellow aspect with a route indicator. This confirms that the train is being diverted from its current route, and to proceed and be required to stop at the next signal (D197). As the approaching train is detected on approach to D191, this signal can change to exhibit two yellow aspects and a route indicator provided that the next signal (D197) is not showing a red (danger) aspect. If D197 is showing a red aspect (as at the time of the accident), D191 will continue to exhibit a single yellow aspect (and route indicator) to inform the driver to be prepared to stop at D197 signal.
• D197 which will exhibit an aspect which is determined by the occupancy of the track section ahead. At the time of the accident, D197 was at red as the section ahead was occupied by train 4E82. D197 was the signal passed at red by train 4E11 before the collision.
• D207, the signal immediately before Flyover West Junction. Train 4E82 was standing at this signal, which was displaying a red aspect when the collision occurred.

All signals in the area are four-aspect signals controlled from Doncaster power signal box (PSB).

All signals are fitted with Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment while signals D187, D189, D191 and D207 are fitted with Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) equipment.

Signal D197is not fitted with TPWS.

Signal D197 was visible in forward‑facing closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage from train 4E11 for around nine seconds before reaching the signal.

This complies with Network Rail’s required reading distance of the signal when the train is travelling at the speed permitted for that line.

The approach to D197 is on a slight curve with the Down Slow/Up West Slow line running alongside the ECML but separated by vegetation.

Signal D197 is parallel to signal D195 on the ECML, but there is clear and distinct separation between the two signals, minimising any risk of a driver reading across to D195 in error.

Signal D195 was exhibiting a double yellow aspect at the time of the accident.

No faults were found regarding the functioning of the signalling equipment following the accident and there was no allegation of improper function.

No evidence was found of any issues with the sighting of any of the signals involved in the accident.

Organisations involved

GB Railfreight (GBRf) operated train 4E11 and employed the driver.

GBRf leases the locomotive from Porterbrook Leasing Company Limited.

Train 4E82 was operated by Freightliner, who employed the driver of that train.

Network Rail is the infrastructure manager of the railway where the accident occurred.

This area lies within the East Coast route of Network Rail’s Eastern region.

Network Rail owns, operates, and maintains the infrastructure, and employed the signallers on duty at the time of the accident.

All of the organisations involved freely co-operated with the investigation.

Trains involved

Train 4E11 was a freight train, carrying shipping containers from the port at Felixstowe to Masborough (a freight terminal near Rotherham).

The train was composed of a class 66 diesel-electric locomotive (number 66729) and a mixed rake of 35 intermodal wagons of types FEA (13 wagons), FIA (one wagon), and FWA (21 wagons).

The total train weight was 2112 tonnes, and its maximum permitted speed was 75 mph (120 km/h).

Train 4E82, operated by Freightliner, was another freight train travelling from Felixstowe port to a terminal at Tinsley (near Sheffield).

This train was formed of a class 66 locomotive (66420) and 29 intermodal wagons.

Maintenance records show that there were no defects on the locomotives or wagons forming either train which could have contributed to the accident.

66729 'Derby County', Tonbridge, Arriving and then awaiting reversal into the yard on 6O71 Neasden to Tonbridge West Yard on April 13, 2022

Freightliner Class 66/4 No.66420 at Lincoln Central on 17th August 2022 working 4L85 11:18 Tinsley-Felixstowe North.

Staff involved

The driver of 4E11 had been working on the railway for over 40 years and had been qualified as a train driver since 1988.

At the time of the accident, the driver had been working for GBRf for four years and was originally contracted to work based at Immingham.

When GBRf’s freight traffic from Immingham ceased, the driver's signing-on point was relocated to Doncaster.

This increased the driver's journey to work by road from six minutes to close to an hour.

GBRf drivers commute to a location, stated in their contract of employment, where they use an electronic sign-on system to register the start of a shift.

Train drivers are regularly assessed to verify their knowledge of the traction types that they drive, and the routes over which they operate trains.

The driver’s traction and route knowledge assessments were up to date, with the most recent GBRf certificate of competency issued in January 2022.

The driver’s next assessment was due in September 2022 and rules theory assessment in 2025 in line with the GBRf three-year competence assessment cycle.

The driver had extensive route knowledge and was very familiar with the route taken by train 4E11.

The medical fitness of train drivers is assessed regularly.

The driver of 4E11 was up to date on their routine medicals.

The driver of 4E82 was employed by Freightliner.

They were assessed as fully competent to drive that train on that route by Freightliner.

The signaller, whose competencies were up to date, was based at Doncaster PSB and employed by Network Rail.

External circumstances

The accident took place during daylight (sunrise was at 04:42 hrs) and the weather was dry and cloudy, with a temperature around 13°C recorded at Doncaster Sheffield Airport weather station (5 km from the accident location).

The sun direction did not affect the readability of the signals nor create glare for the driver within the cab.

There is no evidence that external circumstances played any part in the accident.

The sequence of events
Events preceding the accident

On Monday 4 July 2022, the driver of train 4E11 signed on for work at 20:09 hrs.

This was the fifth consecutive shift that the driver had worked since their last rest day, and as part of the signing-on process that day, the driver was required to contact the GBRf control office.

This was not usually part of the signing-on process, but the call was triggered so that the control staff could confirm the driver's understanding of the work to be carried out during the upcoming shift.

The driver first operated train 6L84, which departed from Doncaster Decoy yard on time at 21:41 hrs and arrived at Whitemoor (Cambridgeshire) at 23:35 hrs.

The driver then returned to Peterborough, arriving at approximately 02:00 hrs(Tuesday 5 July 2022), in the locomotive cab of another freight train, driven by a different driver.

The driver then had a period of around three hours at Peterborough, waiting for train 4E11 to arrive from Felixstowe.

Train 4E11 was scheduled to leave Felixstowe at 00:46 hrs on Tuesday 5 July but departed 13 minutes early.

During this time, the driver read and had refreshments, but did not sleep.

At around 04:30 hrs, the driver took a taxi to meet train 4E11 at Peterborough station.

Upon taking control of a train, a driver is required to enter their personal details into the locomotive’s on-train data recorder (OTDR).

The OTDR recorded the driver entering their details at 04:59 hrs.

Train 4E11 was scheduled to depart from Peterborough at 05:46 hrs, to arrive at Doncaster Decoy North Junction at 07:17 hrs, where another driver was due to take charge of the train for the final part of the journey.

Train 4E11 departed at 05:00 hrs, 46 minutes early.

Soon after leaving Peterborough, the driver was required by GBRf’s operating rules to carry out a running brake test.

The OTDR shows that the driver did not undertake this test.

After leaving Peterborough, the train travelled north along the ECML.

At Peascliffe Tunnel (north of Grantham), the locomotive OTDR recorded 4E11 travelling at a speed that exceeded the speed restriction applicable to trains carrying ‘highcube’ containers (such as train 4E11).

Travelling north on the ECML, train 4E11received green aspects at every signal until encountering the flashing yellow signal sequence for Loversall Carr Junction, at approximately 06:17 hrs.

Train 4E82 had preceded 4E11 along the ECML and was also running early.

It was scheduled to arrive at Loversall Carr Junction at 06:49 hrs, but had arrived at 06:08 hrs.

Train 4E82 was due to change drivers at Decoy yard.

However, because 4E82 was running early the replacement driver had yet to arrive.

To avoid congestion within Decoy yard, the Doncaster signaller chose to hold 4E82 at signal D207.

The use of the Down Slow/Up West Slow to hold trains outside Decoy yard is not a common operation, but is permitted by the signaller and signalling system.

The rear of 4E82 was protected by signal D197 being at red.

A standard overlap of 200 yards (183 metres) existed beyond signal D197.

The rear of train 4E82 was approximately 253 yards (231 metres) beyond D197, so 53 yards (49 metres) beyond the end of the overlap.

As the overlap was unoccupied, the signaller was able to route train 4E11 past signal D191 and towards signal D197.

Events during the accident

The driver of train 4E11 expected to be routed off the ECML at Loversall Carr Junction as they were being relieved by another driver at Decoy yard.

The route via the junction and the Down Slow/Up West Slow provided the normal route for this train to reach Decoy yard and the driver was prepared to be routed this way.

The driver was also expecting to see flashing aspects at signals D187 and D189.

As the train approached these signals, signal D187was displaying a double flashing yellow aspect, followed by D189 displaying a single yellow flashing aspect.

These warned the driver that the diverging route at Loversall Carr Junction had been set for the train.

The driver acknowledged the AWS warning for signal D187 in 0.3 seconds, and the warning for D189 in 1.2 seconds.

OTDR data shows that, during this time, the driver was reducing the locomotive power setting, with the power handle reaching the ‘OFF’ position after the train passed signal D189.

Train 4E11 was traveling at 68 mph (110 km/h) when the power handle was moved to 'OFF’ and the driver made an initial brake application, the normal minimum train brake application.

As the train approached signal D191, it was displaying a single steady yellow aspect and the junction indicator informing the driver that they should be prepared to stop at the next signal and for leaving the ECML at Loversall Carr Junction.

The driver acknowledged the AWS warning for D191 in 1.1 seconds.

The driver made two further train brake applications, which had reduced the train's speed to 54 mph (86 km/h) at the point they acknowledged the AWS warning for signal D197 (in 0.5 seconds).

Witness evidence, forward-facing CCTV and OTDR data show that the driver made a full train brake application at a point when both signal D197 and the flashing taillight on the rear of 4E82 were visible.

This was insufficient to prevent the train passing D197 at danger but had reduced the speed of 4E11 to 48 mph (78 km/h) as it passed the signal, 13 seconds before the collision.

Four seconds after passing signal D197, the driver used the locomotive's emergency brake plunger.

Train 4E11 collided with the rear of train 4E82 at 06:21 hrs, while travelling at 28 mph (45 km/h).

Timeline of events, from the approach of 4E11 to signal D197 to the collision

The impact from train 4E11 moved train 4E82 forwards, with the front of 4E82almost passing signal D207.

OTDR fitted to the locomotive of 4E82 recorded a forward movement of approximately 10 metres during the collision.

Damage was caused to the locomotive of 4E11 and to multiple wagons in the train.

The wagon damage was mainly related to compression and overriding at the couplers.

Train 4E82 also sustained damage to the rear four wagons and their containers.

A total of nine wagons and one locomotive were derailed.

Railway infrastructure was also damaged in the collision.

Events following the accident

The driver of 4E11 remained in the cab of the locomotive during the accident and was very shaken but not physically injured.

The driver of 4E11 made an emergency call to the signaller to report the accident using the locomotive’s radio system.

The signaller blocked the Down Slow/Up West Slow line from the ECML to signal D207 where 4E82 was standing.

The signaller asked the drivers of trains 4E82 and 4E11 to check that the vehicles involved in the accident were not fouling the ECML.

Both drivers had to work together to open the cab door of the locomotive of 4E11 as its driver was unable to either open this door or egress through the locomotive engine room due to the damage it had sustained.

The two drivers then walked to the rear of 4E11 and confirmed that the back of the train was not fouling the ECML.

After the accident, GBRf tested the driver of train 4E11 for the presence of non-medical drugs and/or alcohol.

The driver tested clear for both.

As a precaution, the driver went to hospital after the accident and was released later that day.

The line was closed for 26 days to enable recovery and infrastructure repair work and was reopened on 31 July 2022.

Analysis

Identification of the immediate cause

Train 4E11 passed signal D197 at danger and did not stop before the collision.

Signal D197 was displaying a red signal to protect train 4E82, which was standing in the section of track ahead.

Train 4E11 did not stop at the signal, passing it when it was at red.

The driver fully applied the train’s brakes but there was, by this point, insufficient time for the train to stop and for the collision to be avoided.

This is evidenced by forward-facing CCTV, signalling records, OTDR and witness evidence.