Marcus' Model Railway Journey

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Identification of causal factors

The accident occurred due to a combination of the following causal factors:

a. The driver did not control the speed of train 4E11 on approach to signal D197 to enable it to stop before passing the signal at red.

This was due to the driver losing awareness of the driving task.

b. The engineered systems in place did not mitigate the loss of driver awareness.

Each of these factors is now considered in turn.

The actions of the driver

The driver did not control the speed of train 4E11 on approach to signal D197 to enable it to stop before passing the signal at red.

This was due to the driver losing awareness of the driving task.

Train 4E11 was travelling at 65 mph (104 km/h) when the driver acknowledged the AWS warning for signal D197 (which was displaying a red aspect).

The AWS magnet is located at the same position where signal D197 first comes into the driver's view.

GBRf requires drivers to control the speed of trains so that they are travelling at no more than 10 mph (16 km/h) when the train passes over an AWS magnet on the approach to a signal displaying a red aspect.

GBRf were unable to provide RAIB with OTDR records for any other GBRf trains which had approached D197 while it was showing a red aspect.

RAIB analysed OTDR records from other GBRf trains which were approaching signal D197 displaying a green (proceed) or double yellow or yellow (preliminary caution and caution) aspect.

This analysis showed that the speed of approach of train 4E11 to D197 was comparable to other trains approaching this signal when it was displaying a proceed or cautionary aspect.
 
Comparison of speed of approach to signal D197 between train 4E11 and other freight services

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Class 66 locomotives are fitted with several means of controlling the air brake system on the locomotive and on the train.

They are:

• The locomotive brake, also known as the direct brake controller or straight airbrake, which controls the brakes only on the locomotive – it has no effect on the brakes fitted to the rest of the train. It is normally used for holding the locomotive once stationary and when the driver needs to control smaller movements such as during shunting and coupling.

• The train brake, also referred to as the automatic air brake, which controls air brakes on both the locomotive and the train. It is normally controlled using a joystick. The train brake is used to manage the speed of the train while in motion and is frequently used during a journey. It is also used to hold the train when stationary. The joystick control is located closest to the driver on the driver's side desk within the cab.

• An emergency brake plunger, which provides a means of making a rapid application of the automatic air brake. It applies the brakes on the locomotive and train and is the quickest way to stop a moving train. On class 66 locomotives (and therefore trains hauled by such locomotives), the use of the emergency brake plunger effects a rapid application of the automatic airbrake. There is no difference between the brake force generated by means of the automatic air brake or the emergency brake plunger, although use of the plunger will lead to that force being generated more rapidly.

The forward-facing CCTV shows that D197 signal (at red) became visible to the driver approximately 200 metres before the train reached it.

The flashing taillight of train 4E82 was visible approximately 116 metres before the signal, and347 metres before the collision.

Desk within the drivers cab of a class 66 locomotive showing location of brake controllers
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OTDR data from the locomotive hauling train 4E11 showed that a number of brake applications were made before and after the point where both signal D197 and the taillights of train 4E82 became visible.

Analysis showed that:

• Around 86 seconds and approximately 2200 metres before the collision, the driver made an initial automatic air brake application.

• Around 44 seconds and approximately 980 metres before the collision, the driver slightly increased the existing brake application.

• Around 21 seconds and approximately 400 metres before the collision, the driver made a full service application of the automatic air brake. This was around 1.2 seconds after signal D197 was first visible on forward-facing CCTV.

• Around 17 seconds and approximately 300 metres before the collision, the driver applied the locomotive brake. This was around 86 metres before signal D197.

• About 9 seconds and approximately 140 metres before the collision, the driver made an emergency brake application using the emergency brake plunger.

The latter two actions had a minimal effect on the train’s deceleration since the driver had already made a full service application of the train’s brakes.
 
The engineered systems in place did not mitigate the loss of driver awareness.

The railway infrastructure in the area of the accident and the class 66 locomotive involved were fitted with a number of safety systems.

These included:

• Driver’s Safety Device (DSD); this incorporates a vigilance feature

• Automatic Warning System (AWS)

• Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS).

AWS and DSD system and driver awareness

The DSD system is intended to apply the train’s emergency brakes should the driver become incapacitated.

The driver must maintain downward pressure on a foot pedal while driving.

A periodic audible vigilance alarm requires the driver to release and reapply the DSD pedal at set time intervals.

If the driver does not respond then an emergency brake demand is triggered.

The locomotive OTDR does not specifically record the operation of the DSD system but it will record any brake demands which result from it.

The AWS system provides an audible and visual warning to a driver on the approach to certain infrastructure features, such as signals and selected speed restriction changes.

It uses track-mounted magnets which are detected by receivers fitted to trains.

The system on the train sounds a bell (or electronic equivalent) when approaching a signal displaying a green aspect, and a horn when approaching a signal displaying any other aspect, or a change in permissible speed.

This warning is intended to alert the driver to the upcoming signal or speed change.

When receiving a warning, a driver must acknowledge this by pressing the ‘AWS Reset’ button on the driving desk.

If the driver does not acknowledge the warning within 2.5 seconds, the train’s emergency brakes will be applied.

The driver’s acknowledgement causes the AWS visual indicator in the cab to show a yellow and black ‘sunflower’ indication as a reminder of the warning.
 
During the approach to Loversall Carr Junction, the driver received four AWS warnings, the first of which was for signal D187 (showing a flashing double yellow aspect).

The driver pressed the AWS reset button for all four of these warnings.

Reaction times of the driver of train 4E11 to AWS reset for signals approaching D197
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Relevant previous RAIB investigations and academic research show that drivers can respond to AWS and DSD warnings in an automatic manner, even while fatigued, becoming habituated to cancelling AWS warnings without it drawing their attention to the driving task as a whole.

In this case, the warnings sounded did not serve to alert the driver or raise their awareness, and the driver continued to operate the DSD foot pedal and AWS reset button.
 
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The Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS)

TPWS was developed in the mid‑1990s to address the risk arising from trains passing signals at danger.

It is fitted at signals which can show a stop aspect to protect crossing or converging movements on passenger lines and certain other conflicting movements.

TPWS is not a failsafe protection system; it is designed to reduce the likelihood and consequences of an undesirable event.

It is also not intended to intervene across the full range of train speeds.

TPWS uses radio frequency transmitters (known as ‘loops’) placed between the rails.

When used at signals, a pair of loops are placed at the signal itself.

This is known as a train stop system (TSS).

These are energised when the signal is at danger (showing a red aspect).

The TPWS equipment installed on the train consists of a TPWS receiver, a combined AWS/TPWS control unit and a TPWS visual indicator in the cab.

Should a train pass over the loops when they are energised, the TPWS equipment on the train will detect this and generate an emergency brake demand.

The driver will receive a visual indication that the brake demand has occurred and will be required to acknowledge the demand as part of resetting the system.

At signals fitted with TPWS and on the approach to speed changes or buffer stops, another pair of loops are placed at a specified distance on the approach to the signal, speed change or buffer stop – this is known as an overspeed sensor system (OSS).

The distance between the OSS and the signal, speed change or buffer stop is calculated to stop an approaching train wherever possible, or to at least reduce its speed, before any conflict point is reached.

The OSS loops are activated if the associated signal is showing a danger aspect or are permanently activated at speed changes and on approach to buffer stops.

The Railway Safety Regulations 1999 came into force on 30 January 2000.

Regulation 3 of these regulations originally required railway organisations to fit an appropriate train protection system before 1 January 2004 to mitigate the risks due to trains passing signals at danger and over speeding at speed restrictions.

Following the 1999 Ladbroke Grove accident in which 31 people died, the deadline for fitment of such systems was brought forward to 2003 by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) which was at that time the safety authority for the mainline railways in Great Britain.

During the mid-1990s, the infrastructure managers of the mainline railway in Great Britain (British Rail and subsequently Railtrack) developed and tested the system which would become TPWS.

As this was the only system available which could be implemented on the scale required before the compliance date contained in the regulations, fitment of TPWS was rolled out across the mainline rail network in Great Britain.

In 2003, Network Rail requested, and was granted by HSE, an exemption from the regulations for certain situations.

The different types of exclusion are currently listed within Network Rail Standard NR/SP/SIG/10137 ‘TPWS – Selection of Signals and Other Locations for Provision of Track Sub System’.

Exclusion C of this standard applies to signal D197 due to its categorisation as a ‘plain line signal’ that does not protect a conflict point (such as converging junctions or crossovers).

Signal D197 is, therefore, not legally required to be fitted with a protection system such as TPWS and was not so fitted.

Using the braking data from the OTDR fitted to 4E11’s locomotive, RAIB analysed the potential effect of TPWS if it had been fitted at signal D197.

RAIB’s analysis showed that a TPWS OSS installation at the signal would have reduced the speed, and therefore the severity of the collision, but would not have prevented it.

RAIB’s analysis also showed that if a TSS had been fitted at the signal, then it would have applied the emergency brake around four seconds earlier than the point where the driver applied it during the accident.

This suggests that a TSS fitment alone would have had little effect on the collision.
 
3rd August 2023

Steam locomotive to visit Carlisle this Saturday​

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A Carnforth based steam locomotive is scheduled to haul this weekend's Cumbrian Mountain Express.

It's believed that the train is set to be hauled by 46115 Scots Guardsman or 35018 British India Line

Running on the 5th August 2023, the locomotive is set to haul the Carnforth – Carlisle – Preston section.

The tour will depart London Euston at 06:48 behind an electric locomotive and will then pass through Watford Junction (07:04), Milton Keynes Central (07:28), Rugby (07:55), Nuneaton (08:14), Crewe (09:16), Preston (10:09), and Carnforth North Junction at 10:41.

From here, the steam locomotive is added to the train. Departing at 11:23, the train will head through Oxenholme Lake District (11:42), Penrith North Lakes (12:21) and Carlisle at 12:43.

After time in Carlisle, the train will depart at 14:23 and will pass through Appleby (15:06), Garsdale (15:43), Hellifield (16:14), Clitheroe (17:01), Blackburn (17:27), Preston (17:55 – electric hauled from here), Crewe (19:27), Nuneaton (20:34), Rugby (20:52), Milton Keynes Central (21:25), Watford Junction (21:56) and London Euston at 22:22.
 
3rd August 2023

Steam locomotive 60007 Sir Nigel Gresley to pass through Dawlish this Saturday​

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60007 Sir Nigel Gresley is to haul a tour to Kingswear this Saturday (5th August 2023).

The tour originates at Northampton with diesel locomotives beginning the journey.

Departing Northampton at 05:16, the diesel locomotives will pass through Milton Keynes Central (05:35), Leighton Buzzard (05:55), Berkhamsted (06:13), Hemel Hempstead (06:20), Watford Junction (06:36), Maidenhead (07:33), Reading (07:49), Swindon (Wilts) (08:50), Westbury (09:43) and Taunton at 10:30.

Here, 60007 Sir Nigel Gresley takes over the train. Departing Taunton at 11:01, the train will pass through Tiverton Parkway (11:16), Dawlish Warren (11:52), Dawlish (12:04), Newton Abbot (12:16), Paignton (12:34) and Kingswear at 13:09.

After time in Kingswear, 60007 will depart at 16:35 and will pass through Paignton (17:21), Dawlish Warren (17:55) and Tiverton Parkway at 18:44.

Just outside Taunton, 60007 will make way for the diesel locomotives.

The diesel locos will head back to Slough via the same outbound route, passing through Newbury (20:45), Reading (21:09), Maidenhead (21:31), Watford Junction (22:15), Hemel Hempstead (22:26), Berkhamsted (22:34), Leighton Buzzard (22:51), Milton Keynes Central (23:07) and Northampton at 23:28.
 
4th August 2023

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TRANSPORT FOR WALES

New integrated link to Cardiff International Airport​

Getting to Cardiff International Airport by public transport has been made easier thanks to a new integrated rail and bus ticket partnership between Transport for Wales (TfW) and Adventure Travel.

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Cardiff central 2022​

Getting to Cardiff International Airport by public transport has been made easier thanks to a new integrated rail and bus ticket partnership between Transport for Wales (TfW) and Adventure Travel, who operate the 905 service.

Users looking to travel to the airport can now catch a rail service to Rhoose (Cardiff International Airport) and connect with the 905 bus service from the station to Cardiff International Airport all on one ticket.

The new fares have been integrated with the rail and bus timetables, simply add 'Cardiff Air Ria' into either your origin or destination journey to search for your ticket.

The total journey time from Cardiff Central is 43 minutes, with single tickets costing just £7.20.

Customers who use the route regularly can also benefit from a seven day, monthly or annual season ticket linking the rail and bus services.

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4th August 2023

Watchdog challenges Transport for Wales over poor performance​

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Refurb 153's​

Transport Focus is continuing to challenge Transport for Wales to improve its rail services.

The watchdog wrote to TfW in April, highlighting poor services and frequent disruption, and is calling on Wales' transport body to listen to the voice of transport users and keep performance high on its agenda.

It asked TfW to take specific actions, and is pressing for these to be carried out.

Transport Focus is passing the information it has gathered to regulator the Office of Rail and Road, which has the power to make formal decisions.

This information is also passed to Network Rail, which can carry out the necessary work in conjunction with TfW.
 
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Transport Focus asks passengers on trains and at stations about their travel experiences.

It puts the understanding and first-hand evidence that this provides into reports and uses it to identify recommendations.

Transport Focus is continuing to challenge Transport for Wales to improve its rail services.

The watchdog wrote to TfW in April, highlighting poor services and frequent disruption, and is calling on Wales' transport body to listen to the voice of transport users and keep performance high on its agenda.

It asked TfW to take specific actions, and is pressing for these to be carried out.

Transport Focus is passing the information it has gathered to regulator the Office of Rail and Road, which has the power to make formal decisions.

This information is also passed to Network Rail, which can carry out the necessary work in conjunction with TfW.

Transport Focus asks passengers on trains and at stations about their travel experiences. It puts the understanding and first-hand evidence that this provides into reports and uses it to identify recommendations.

Transport for Wales has an improvement plan for the Wrexham-Bidston line and plans to introduce more new trains for the North Wales service and on the Manchester-Cardiff route, which will give passengers more seats.
 
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Wrexham General​

However, Transport Focus remains concerned about poor information and support for passengers during disruption, which it says “is falling way behind expected standards” and is a key priority for passengers.

It acknowledges improvements in the delay repay process, but wants to see more proactive promotion of the scheme, so that passengers whose journeys are delayed know how to claim the compensation they are entitled to.

The watchdog also acknowledges improvements to rail replacement services, with new branding and improved signage, and TfW surveying passengers to identify further improvements.

Transport Focus's last Rail User Survey saw passengers rate Transport for Wales joint worst for overall satisfaction.

It promises to look for improvements for passengers in its next survey in September, and to continue to raise issues and work with Transport for Wales to ensure the situation improves.
 
4th August 2023

First fire lit in steam locomotive 'James Spooner'​

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James Spooner​

The first fire for new build Double Fairlie, James Spooner, was lit today outside the Ffestiniog Railway's Boston Lodge Works.

This is a major milestone for the new build Double Fairlie, which is due to go into the paint shop soon.

It is expected that James Spooner will debut at October's Bygones Weekend, which we cant wait to see!

The James Spooner project was announced in March 2016, with the new engine being a replacement for “Earl of Merioneth”.
 
Butterflies In My Garden:

This butterfly tends to fly around the garden, settling briefly and leaves.

I haven't seen a female yet, just the males.

Common Blue
Polyommatus icarus

The Common Blue is the most widespread blue butterfly in Britain and Ireland and is found in a variety of grassy habitats.

The brightly coloured males are conspicuous but females are more secretive.

The colour of the upperwings of females varies from almost completely brown in southern England to predominantly blue in western Ireland and Scotland, but the colour is variable within local populations with some striking examples.

Unlike Adonis and Chalkhill Blues, the dark veins do not extend into white fringes of wing margins.

It remains widespread but there have been local declines within its range.

Size and Family
Family: Blues
Size: Small
Wing Span Range (male to female): 35mm

Conservation Status
Butterfly Conservation priority: Low
European status: Not threatened

Common Blue ♂
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A very common butterfly in my garden, settling on many plants.

Sadly, all too often falling victim to the cats. :umm:

Large White​

Pieris brassicae

A large, strong flying butterfly.

The brilliant white wings have black tips to the forewings, extending down the wing edge.

Females have two spots on the forewings, which is not present in males.

The undersides are a creamy white with two spots.

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Size and Family​

  • Family: Whites and yellows
  • Size: Large
  • Wing Span Range (male to female): 63-70mm

Conservation Status​

  • Butterfly Conservation priority: Low
  • European status: Not threatened
Large White ♂
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This butterfly is a regular visitor to my garden.

Sadly, the only one I've seen so far this year was the mangled remains that Tess brought into the house. :blink:

Painted Lady​

Vanessa cardui

The Painted Lady is a long-distance migrant, which causes the most spectacular butterfly migrations observed in Britain and Ireland.

Each year, it spreads northwards from the desert fringes of North Africa, the Middle East, and central Asia, recolonising mainland Europe and reaching Britain and Ireland.

In some years it is an abundant butterfly, frequenting gardens and other flowery places in late summer.

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Size and Family​

  • Family: Nymphalids
  • Size: Medium
  • Wing Span Range (male to female): 50-56mm

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Conservation Status ​

  • Butterfly Conservation priority: Low
  • European status: Not assessed
Painted Lady
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