Marcus' Model Railway Journey

Station track plan

7th August 2023

Steam locomotive to visit Dover and Brentford this Tuesday​

BR Britannia No. 70000 Britannia is set to depart London Victoria this Tuesday (8th August 2023), is hauls two Steam Dreams tours.

The Britannia class of locomotive is hauling The Garden Of England tour as well as The Sunset Steam Express.

With passengers on board The Garden of England tour, 70000 Britannia will depart London Victoria, and will pass through Clapham High Street (10:07), Denmark Hill (10:12), Catford (10:20), Shortlands (10:29), St Mary Cray (10:37), Rochester (11:07), Gillingham (Kent) (11:15), Canterbury East (12:02) and Dover Priory at 12:54.

From Dover Priory, 70000 Britannia will pass through Folkestone West (13:18), Ashford International (13:35), Paddock Wood (14:01), Tonbridge (14:21), Petts Wood (14:46), Bickley (14:50), Brixton (15:10), Wandsworth Road (15:12) and London Victoria at 15:17.

After servicing, 70000 Britannia will depart with The Sunset Steam Express.

Departing London Victoria at 18:15 and will pass through Imperial Wharf (18:30), Kensington Olympia (18:37), Imperial Wharf (18:50), Brentford (19:14), Ashford (Surrey) (19:29), Chertsey (19:45), Woking (20:14), Dorking West (20:49), Purley (21:19), East Croydon (21:28), Balham (21:45), Clapham Junction (21:48), and London Victoria at 22:01.

7th August 2023

Class 50 Alliance marks hundredth charter with Pilgrim Centurion excursion​

Class 50 Alliance 50007 (50034) in GBRF livery heads past Leicester L.I.P working 5Q50 Oxley to Old Dalby on the 2nd March 2023

To celebrate the one hundredth charter train for the Class 50 Alliance and the Fifty Fund, Pathfinder Tours will organise ‘The Pilgrim Centurion' excursion from Swindon to Edinburgh on Saturday 16 September.

This will also be the fiftieth Pathfinder railtour hauled by the Alliance's locomotives.

Just over twenty-five years ago, 50031 ‘Hood' became the first main line certified class 50 in private ownership.

Its first train was ‘The Pilgrim Hoover' charter, and ran on Saturday 1 November 1997.

InterCity 50031 at Kidderminster

Since then, 50031 has been joined on the main line by 50007, 50044 and 50049.

Class 50 locomotives have hauled charter trains over many routes, covering most of Great Britain.

The Fifty Fund is a not-for-profit society that works to promote the activity of the Class 50 Alliance.

It raises money to fund preservation activities, holds class 50 related activities, and represents the interests of its members.

Formed in the early 1990s, the award-winning Class 50 Alliance Ltd maintains the following locomotives:

• 50007 Hercules, bought in 2017, returned to mainline shortly afterwards
• 50031 Hood, bought in 1991, restored, hauled first preserved train in May 1992, returned to mainline in November 1997
• 50033 Glorious, on loan from Tyseley Locomotive Works since May 2018
• 50035 Ark Royal, bought in April 1991, restored, hauled first preserved train in September 1996
• 50044 Exeter, bought in 1991, restored in three years, hauled first preserved train in May 1994, returned to mainline in 1999
• 50049 Defiance, bought in December 1991 in working order, returned to the mainline in 2000.

All the locomotives are based at the Severn Valley Railway.

English Electric-built British Railways Class 50 No. 50035 ‘Ark Royal’ during Severn Valley Railway's spring diesel festival on 18th May 2023

Tony Middleton, chairman of the Class 50 Alliance enthused; “this will be yet another milestone in the history of class 50 preservation and we are very proud of the achievements of our organisation over the last thirty-two years. Main line running is a challenge, and a great deal of effort and commitment is required to maintain our locomotives to the necessary standard, and for that I am eternally grateful to our team of dedicated working volunteers.”

Joe Burr, chairman of the Fifty Fund added; “Pathfinder railtours have been a precious partner since our first charter train with them in 1999 (“The Royal Edinburgh” which 50031 worked from Cardiff to Chester) and we thank them for hiring our locomotives over the last 24 years. It is a privilege to be marking this historic occasion with Pathfinder Tours, an event that is worthy of celebration.”

7th August 2023

Autistic data scientists help Northern improve its diesel fleet​

150001 Huddersfield 15/01/2023

Autistic data scientists are advising Northern on the most fuel-efficient way to operate its fleet of 276 diesel trains.

Working in partnership with Chrome Angel Solutions, Northern is developing a modelling tool that will provide information on the optimum train speeds and braking patterns for the specific topography of the North of England.

Chrome Angel Solutions has previous experience in developing highly structured and flexible ways of working that can take into account neurodiverse thinking and needs.

To facilitate the tool's development, Chrome has partnered with auticon, which is an international technology company dedicated to creating equal employment opportunities for autistic adults.

The modelling tool will use real consumption data to ensure the best fuel efficiency, which in turn will produce lower emissions with their resultant environmental benefits.

Overall, the net effect will bring economic benefits arising from lower consumption of expensive diesel fuel and better overall asset condition, which in turn will help improve the sustainability of the railway by reducing operational costs.

The project is being funded by the Department for Transport as part of the Local Transport Decarbonisation strand of the Transport Research and Innovation Grants (TRIG) programme, which is delivered by Connected Places Catapult, and is being developed with support from Angel Trains and Smart Rail Services.

Further development will now take place to test the model's accuracy against a number of variables such as wind speed and direction.

Before the project progresses further, the model will be validated against different types of trains to ensure accuracy across all of Northern's fleet.

Rob Warnes, strategic development director at Northern, said: “Along with the rest of the UK rail industry, Northern is working towards eliminating diesel-only trains from our fleet by 2040.

“Until then, we want to ensure we're operating those we do use in the most fuel-efficient way – to make sure we're emitting the least amount of CO? and providing value for money for taxpayers.

“The TRIG programme is designed to support highly innovative, early-stage research and development projects like this – and we're incredibly grateful to the Department for Transport for their support.”

Anisa Mamaniyat, product director at Chrome Angel Solutions, said: “Research by The Office for National Statistics shows that less than 22% of autistic people are in a meaningful form of employment that aligns with their educational achievement.

“By bringing their unique skills and talents into our team, we can learn and encourage diversity and inclusion within our sector.

“It's personally very rewarding to see people who might really struggle with traditional practices thrive with some practical adjustments to the way we work. These are changes that are beneficial for many of us.”

7th August 2023

Bahamas steam locomotive set for Kent visit​

Bahamas Locomotive Society owned Jubilee No. 45596 Bahamas will visit Kent this Wednesday (9th August) as it hauls The Kentish Belle.

Departing London Victoria at 09:47, the Jubilee locomotive will pass through Denmark Hill (10:01), Bromley South (10:30), Charing (11:31), Ashford International (11:59), Canterbury West (12:52), Ramsgate (13:20), Broadstairs (13:29), Herne Bay (13:51) and Faversham at 14:07.

Passengers will then have time to explore Faversham. A departure time of 16:47 is timetabled, and 45596 Bahamas will pass through Herne Bay (16:57), Margate (17:12), Broadstairs (17:19), Ramsgate (17:51), Canterbury West (17:51), Headcorn (18:35), Staplehurst (18:51), Bromley South (19:56), Crystal Palace (20:11), Clapham Junction (20:36) and London Victoria at 20:57.

7th August 2023

Northern to begin procurement process for up to 450 new trains​

Rail operator, Northern, is beginning the procurement process for up to 450 new trains for their network.

The Tender, which is viewable on the UK Government website, states that the objective of the tender is to enter into a framework agreement for the manufacture and supply of new trains and the associated support and spares supply.

This will allow Northern Trains Limited to withdraw and replace a significant quantity of its aging fleet.

The government document says that the framework agreement may see up to 450 units procured, though this may be across multiple call-offs.

The first call off contract will be entered into with the framework agreement and are for ‘multi-mode' multiple units

It is anticipated that the successful company will offer new rolling stock with a minimum life of 35 years and couple be converted to become electric multiple units or battery multiple units, with future phases being electric / battery powered from new.

Northern has, in the past few years, withdrawn its Pacer trains and introduced new CAF Class 195 Diesel Multiple Units and Class 331 Electric Multiple Units.

The Government document states requests to participate in the tender can be sent in up until the 25th September 2023.

7th August 2023

Inside The Train Shed

Checking a few early GWR coach types for length, as rakes on platform.

Hornby R446 G.W.R. Four Wheel Coach

GRAHAM FARISH 10624 OO GAUGE RAKE of 2 GW GWR SUBURBAN COMPOSITE COACH

Mainline 937314 GWR Centenary Composite 6659 'Cornish Riviera'

8th August 2023

Independent report:​

Report 09/2023: Near miss with two track workers at Penkridge

Published: 8 August 2023

RAIB has today released its report into a near miss with two track workers at Penkridge, Staffordshire, 10 July 2022.

Penkridge Station

Summary

At 23:58 hrs on 10 July 2022, two track workers narrowly avoided being struck by a train while working close to Penkridge station.

The train was travelling at 61 mph (98 km/h) towards Stafford when the driver saw the track workers standing on the line and sounded the locomotive’s horn.

One of the track workers saw the approaching train and warned his colleague; they both jumped clear of the track less than one second before the train reached their position.

The incident occurred because the two track workers did not have a recognised safe system of work in place to protect them from approaching trains.

The track workers had split off from a larger group to operate an overhead line isolating switch south of Penkridge station.

When they left the group, the track workers and the Person in Charge (PIC) did not reach a mutual understanding of the safety arrangements that would subsequently apply.

At the time the train passed, the track workers believed that the line they were standing on was blocked to the passage of trains, as had been the case when they left the group.

The PIC believed that the track workers were standing away from the track in a position of safety, and so he had allowed the line blockage to be removed without warning them.

RAIB’s investigation found that there was no formal guidance on the arrangements and responsibilities of staff when individuals leave a PIC’s safe system of work.

This was a possible underlying factor.

The investigation included consideration of previous investigations and found that there is a widespread acceptance that PICs and Controllers of Site Safety (COSSs) can actively observe and advise their work group on site over a greater distance than is practical or reasonable.

As a result of this investigation, RAIB has made two recommendations to Network Rail.

The first relates to the improvement of processes and guidance available to PICs and COSSs to help control the risks when groups split or change during a work activity.

The second relates to the practicalities of managing a group on site, and understanding how this can be improved.

RAIB has also identified three learning points relating to the importance of clear communication, the duties allowed to be undertaken by a PIC, and the importance of the availability of train mounted CCTV to assist in safety investigations.

The incident

Summary of the incident

At 23:58 hrs on 10 July 2022, two track workers narrowly avoided being struck by a freight train while they were responding to a fault with overhead line equipment(OLE) just south of Penkridge station, in south Staffordshire.

The train was travelling at 61 mph (98 km/h) as it passed the track workers who jumped clear of the track less than one second before the train reached their position.

The driver then reported the near miss to the signaller.

One of the track workers suffered a minor ankle injury as a result of taking avoiding action, and both were shaken by the incident.

Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing the location of the incident at Penkridge.

Context

Location

Penkridge station is located on the line between Wolverhampton and Stafford, around 6 miles (9½ km) south of Stafford.

The station is located 23 miles and32 chains from the datum at Birmingham Curzon Street.

The route normally carries a high number of passenger services travelling between Birmingham New Street and the north-west of England via the West Coast Main Line.

About a quarter of a mile (400 metres) north of Penkridge station, the route crosses Penkridge Viaduct which allows the railway to cross over the River Penk.

The route through this area consists of two running lines, the Up Penkridge line, which is used by trains heading towards Wolverhampton and Birmingham, and the Down Penkridge line, which is used by trains travelling towards Stafford and the north-west.

The near miss occurred on the Down Penkridge line, around 150 metres south of Penkridge station, at an OLE structure on which a mechanical switch is mounted (designated switch LQ-10/2).

This switch is used to electrically isolate sections of the OLE.

Aerial photograph showing Penkridge station and the overhead line equipment structure and switch LQ-10/2 where the near miss occurred

The line through Penkridge station is fitted with OLE operating at a nominal25 kV AC.

This is monitored and controlled by the electrical control room (ECR) at Rugby Rail Operations Centre (ROC). OLE is split into sections so power feeding, control, isolations and maintenance can be managed.

At the incident location, the Up Penkridge line is section LQ-9, and the Down Penkridge line, LQ-10.

Both of these sections run between Gailey (around 2 miles (3 km) south of Penkridge)and Stafford Trent Valley Junction No. 1 at Queensville.

This is where the Penkridge lines join the West Coast Main Line.

Before reaching Queensville, the Penkridge lines pass through Rickerscote Junction, where the control of the OLE passes from the ECR at Rugby to the ECR at Crewe.

These OLE sections are then further subdivided, with OLE section LQ-10B running from switch LQ- 10/2 at Penkridge to LQ-10/6 at Rickerscote Junction.


Schematic showing the track layout between Penkridge and Queensville, including access points and location of relevant OLE equipment

Simplified isolation diagram showing OLE sections LQ-9C and LQ-10B and associated equipment

Organisations involved

Network Rail owns, operates and maintains the infrastructure at Penkridge, including the track and OLE, and employed all of the track workers involved in the incident.

Penkridge station lies in Network Rail’s North West and Central region, at the border between its Central and West Coast South routes.

The OLE to the south of the structure on which switch LQ-10/2 is mounted is maintained by the Sandwell and Dudley maintenance delivery unit (MDU), part of the Central route.

The OLE to the north of the structure is maintained by the Stafford MDU, part of the West Coast South route.

GB Railfreight Limited operated the train involved in the near miss.

Both organisations freely co-operated with the investigation.

Trains involved

The train involved in the near miss, reporting number 4H98, was the 23:45 hrs freight train service between Bescot sidings and Tunstead sidings, operated by GB Railfreight.

The train was hauled by locomotive 66732, which was fitted with a forward-facing CCTV (FFCCTV) system.

At the time of the near miss, a second train, reporting number 4M48, was passing on the adjacent line.

This train was the 17:48 hrs freight service between Mossend and Daventry.

The locomotive hauling this train was not fitted with FFCCTV.

GBRf Class 66/7 No.66732 'GBRf the First Decade 1999-2009, John Smith MD' at Barham on 6th October 2022 working 6A32 13:34 North Walsham-Harwich Refinery loaded tanks.

Staff involved

The two track workers involved in the near miss were initially part of a wider team on site, which included four technicians and two managers.

The Stafford OLE section manager was acting in the role of maintenance manager in charge(MMIC) and was designated as Network Rail’s level 3 on-call for the area.

They had worked at Stafford depot since 2001 and was the line manager for the section supervisor and the track workers.

They are referred to as the MMIC in this report.

The Stafford OLE section supervisor was acting in the role of Person in Charge (PIC), which included the duties of the Controller of Site Safety (COSS).

They were also acting as a site warden and was designated as Network Rail’s level 2 on‑call for the area.

They had worked at Stafford depot for 18 years and is referred to as the PIC in this report.

Track worker 1 (TW1) was an OLE technician based at Stafford MDU.

They had worked at Stafford for around two and half years and had held COSS competence for around a year.

Their last COSS assessment was around six months before the incident.

Track worker 2 (TW2) was an OLE technician based at Stafford MDU and had worked there for around two years.

TW1 and TW2 were the track workers directly involved in the near miss.

Track workers 3 and 4 (TW3 and TW4) were both OLE technicians based at Stafford MDU.

External circumstances

When the MMIC, PIC, TW1 and TW2 initially arrived on site at around 19:40 hrs on 10 July 2022 it was still light.

However, by the time of the near miss at23:58 hrs it was dark.

While there was some ambient lighting coming from Penkridge station and the surrounding residential area, the team were principally reliant on torches for light and consequently decided to take a line blockage to be directly underneath the OLE above the track, where they believed the fault would be found.

The weather was dry and warm, with a light north-westerly breeze.

There is no evidence that the weather conditions played a part in the incident.

The sequence of events
Events preceding the incident

The MMIC worked during the daytime of 10 July 2022 as the Stafford OLE section manager.

Due to a shortage of staff, he spent the day undertaking routine OLE inspections at various locations around the area.

He completed this work at around 15:00 hrs.

Track workers TW1 and TW2 were rostered to start their night shift at 19:00 hrs that evening.

The PIC and track workers TW3 and TW4 were all rostered to start their shift at 21:00 hrs.

At 18:22 hrs, the circuit breaker controlling the power supply to OLE sectionLQ‑10, which runs on the Down Penkridge line between Gailey and Stafford(paragraph 9), tripped.

The ECR at Rugby tried to re-energise the section, but it immediately tripped again.

The ECR contacted signallers at Rugby ROC and at the West Midlands Signalling Centre (WMSC) in Saltley to advise them of the fault.

A block to electric trains was established on the Down Penkridge line through OLE section LQ-10, meaning trains using electrical traction would no longer be able to travel through this section, although other (diesel powered)trains would.

The signallers at WMSC advised various operational staff of the fault, including OLE staff at Sandwell and Dudley MDU and a Stafford mobile operations manager (MOM).

As these staff began to mobilise to investigate the fault, the Wolverhampton signaller at WMSC instructed train 1O28, a diesel passenger train travelling south on the Up Penkridge line, to travel at caution through the section.

At 18:56 hrs, the driver of train 1O28 reported to the signaller that they had seen nothing amiss.

Train 9S93, a northbound diesel passenger train, was instructed to travel at caution over the affected Down Penkridge line, again reporting afterwards that there were no obvious issues.

At 18:57 hrs, the ECR attempted to re-energise section LQ-10 once more and, after it tripped again, requested via route control at WMSC that OLE staff would need to attend site.

After being advised that an OLE team from Sandwell and Dudley MDU was already on its way, the ECR requested that OLE staff from Stafford MDU were also mobilised, as the systems available to the ECR were suggesting that the fault lay between Penkridge and Stafford and so in Stafford MDU’s area of control.

Route control staff at WMSC contacted the Stafford PIC and MMIC and they began to head from their homes to the Stafford MDU.

As this was taking place, TW1 and TW2 arrived at Stafford MDU for the start of their shift.

On being advised of the fault, they began getting equipment together to go to site.

Another OLE technician, who was due to finish his shift at 19:00 hrs, offered to stay and help.

Between 19:00 hrs and 19:20 hrs, the MOM and Sandwell and Dudley OLE team arrived at Penkridge station.

The Sandwell and Dudley OLE team then began an OLE inspection, working south towards their maintenance area.

By around 19:40 hrs, the various staff mobilised from Stafford MDU had arrived in the Penkridge area to respond to the fault.

To cover more ground, they split into three groups:

a. The PIC, TW2 and the MOM inspected the OLE from Penkridge station to the Swan Lane access point, with the exception of Penkridge Viaduct (which requires a line blockage to access).

b. The MMIC and the OLE technician who had stayed on from the day shift (who also held COSS competency) inspected the OLE between Swan Lane access point and the switch at Rickerscote Junction.

c. TW1 remained in a van and drove the others to the various access points, before remaining at Swan Lane access point.

Schematic showing the patrols undertaken by the groups

Both patrols undertaken by the Stafford teams were done using a separated system of work.

This essentially consisted of inspecting the OLE from the cess (an area adjacent to the track which may provide a safe place to stand or walk clear of passing trains if there is adequate clearance).

Before starting the inspection, the PIC completed an IRP, stating the use of a separated SSoW and that he would act as the site warden.

The MOM andTW2 signed the IRP to confirm that they understood the arrangements.

By around 21:05 hrs, the patrols were completed, which meant the whole line (with the exception of Penkridge Viaduct) between Penkridge station and Rickerscote Junction had been inspected by the Stafford OLE team, and the line to the south of Penkridge station had been inspected by the Sandwell and Dudley OLE team.

No fault was identified during any of these patrols. At around the same time, two more OLE technicians (TW3 and TW4) signed on at Stafford MDU and began to make their way to site.

Once these patrols were complete, TW1 drove the MOM to Penkridge station and returned to Swan Lane access point, where TW2 was waiting.

The PIC also drove from Swan Lane, to join the MMIC at Rickerscote Junction and the OLE technician from the day shift went back to Stafford MDU to sign off duty.

Around this time, it began to get dark.

The MMIC contacted the ECR at Rugby and, after they confirmed that no fault had been found, a further attempt to re-energise the section was made.

The section tripped immediately, but TW1, who was at the gate to Swan Lane access point, reported that, when the re-energisation was attempted, they saw a ‘fireball 'move along the OLE to the south of their location.

They reported this to the MMIC and PIC, who then drove from Rickerscote Junction to Swan Lane access point to join TW1 and TW2.

The PIC, MMIC, TW1 and TW2 accessed the track at Swan Lane and walked to the approximate location of the fireball.

Standing away from the line, the MMIC asked the ECR to re-energise the section again to allow them to pinpoint the precise location of the fault.

However, when re-energisation was attempted again, there was no repeat of the fireball, or anything to indicate a fault at this location.

Following this last attempted re-energisation, the Sandwell and Dudley OLE team, who were standing at switch LQ-10/2, around 150 metres south of Penkridge station, contacted the MMIC to inform them that they had seen a ‘flash 'on the OLE between Penkridge station and Penkridge Viaduct.

To investigate this report, the MMIC, PIC, TW1 and TW2 drove to the Council yard access point, located to the north of Penkridge Viaduct.

They were joined there by TW3 andTW4, who had arrived from Stafford MDU.

The PIC decided that inspection from the cess would now be difficult in the dark, and requested a line blockage of the Down Penkridge line from the signaller, which was granted at 22:36 hrs.

This line blockage was also required for crossing Penkridge Viaduct.

The PIC stated to the signaller that they would need the blockage for one hour, but that they could give it up at very short notice (one minute).

The PIC updated the IRP paperwork to show the line blockage taken on the Down Penkridge line.

The Up Penkridge line would remain open.

The PIC briefed the team on the revised IRP and nominated themselves as the site warden (as they had done earlier).

TW1 and the MMIC signed the IRP to confirm their understanding of the arrangements, but TW3 and TW4 did not sign the IRP, despite witness evidence stating that they were present during thebriefing.

The group accessed the track and walked southwards on the blocked Down Penkridge line towards the site of the reported flash.

TW3 and TW4 remained on track in the vicinity of the access point, while the PIC, MMIC, TW1 and TW2went over the viaduct towards Penkridge station, inspecting the OLE as they progressed.

No evidence of a fault was found in the area where the latest flash had been seen.

Despite them becoming separated from the PIC when the group split, no new SSoW was established for TW3 and TW4 at this point.

Having completed this inspection, conversations took place between the MMIC, the Sandwell and Dudley team and the ECR to formulate a plan.

There was some disagreement between the MMIC and the ECR on the best way to continue but, by around 23:30 hrs, it was agreed that a number of booster transformers would be inspected before any further re-energisations, to prevent further damage to OLE equipment.

Around this time, the Sandwell and Dudley OLE staff were instructed to leave site by their manager, to begin their own priority maintenance work, as it was now clear that the fault was within Stafford MDU’s area.

To facilitate any further attempted re-energisations of section LQ-10B, switch LQ- 10/2 to the south of Penkridge station would need to be operated.

The departure of the Sandwell and Dudley staff meant that Stafford MDU staff were now required to operate this switch.

The PIC decided that TW1 and TW2 would do this and instructed them to go to the switch’s location.

By the time TW1 andTW2 left the group, the line blockage on the Down Penkridge line had been in place for over an hour.

The PIC and MMIC walked to the booster transformer to the north of Penkridge Viaduct, where they were joined by TW3 and TW4. TW1 and TW2 arrived at switch LQ-10/2 at around 23:50 hrs.

At 23:52 hrs, TW1 and TW2 operated the switch on the instruction of the ECR, who asked them to remain at the switch in case further switching operations were needed.

TW1 and TW2 remained standing on the blocked Down Penkridge line while they waited for further instructions.

At 23:54 hrs, following a conversation between the MMIC and the ECR, a further re-energisation attempt was made, with the Stafford OLE teams looking indifferent directions along the line.

A flash was reported as being seen to the north of the MMIC and PIC’s team, towards Swan Lane access point.

Events during the incident

At 23:54 hrs, while the MMIC was on the telephone to the ECR to discuss the next steps, the PIC received a telephone call from the signaller asking for the line blockage on the Down Penkridge line to be given up to allow a train to pass.

The PIC asked for the MMIC, TW3 and TW4 to stand clear of the track and then stated to the signaller that the line was clear.

The line blockage was removed at23:55 hrs.

At around 23:57 hrs, diesel freight train 4M48 approached from the north, passed the PIC and MMIC’s group on the Up Penkridge line and, shortly afterwards, began to pass TW1 and TW2 who were standing on the Down Penkridge line.

At the same time, as a courtesy, the PIC called TW1 to inform them of the removal of the line blockage, but due to the noise of the passing train, they were unable to hear each other and the call was terminated.

At around 23:58 hrs, diesel freight train 4H98 approached TW1 and TW2’slocation from the south on the Down Penkridge line and started passing train 4M48.

Train 4H98 was travelling at 61 mph (98 km/h).

Seeing TW1 and TW2 on the line ahead, the driver sounded the locomotive’s horn.

About the same time, TW1 looked to the south, and seeing train 4H98’s headlights, shouted a warning to TW2 and both staff jumped clear of the track, less than a second before the train reached their location.

The driver of train 4H98 did not make an emergency brake application because they did not believe there was enough time for it to make any difference to the train's speed in the distance available.

Events following the incident

The driver of train 4H98 brought the train to a stand at the next signal and reported the near miss to the signaller.

The signaller then called the PIC to inform them of the near miss.

The PIC was not aware of what had happened and told the signaller that nobody within the group was involved.

The signaller then asked the PIC if they wanted to retake the line blockage.

The PIC agreed and the line blockage was granted at around 00:01 hrs on 11 July.

After speaking to the signaller, the PIC contacted TW1 who confirmed that TW1and TW2 were both clear of the track.

Witness evidence indicates that there was no mention of the near miss in this conversation.

The signaller informed route control staff at Rugby ROC of the near miss.

They in turn contacted the PIC and asked that work be suspended pending investigation.

The PIC and MMIC travelled to Penkridge station to meet TW1 and TW2.

TW3and TW4 were asked to wait at a different access point pending further OLE inspection work.

The Stafford MOM, who was already at Penkridge station, was asked to respond to the near miss and take statements from those involved.

The staff gave initial accounts to the MOM, stating that TW1 and TW2 were working under a separated SSoW and were in the cess when the train passed.

The MMIC and level 4 on-call (a senior manager within the route) had a conversation and confirmed to the route control staff at Rugby ROC that only TW1and TW2 needed to be screened for drugs and alcohol.

The MMIC drove them back to Stafford MDU for this to be done.

The tests returned a negative (clear)result.

The PIC, TW3, TW4 and two further OLE technicians carried on with the OLE inspections and eventually found the fault midway between Swan Lane access point and Penkridge Viaduct, roughly halfway between where the various flashes had been seen.

The fault related to a damaged cap and pin insulator, which had allowed enough current to leak to earth and register as an earth fault, tripping the OLE section.

The damaged component was at the height of the OLE wires, and not easily visible from ground level, appearing intact during the initial visual inspection undertaken by the PIC and TW2.

The final re-energisation attempt caused part of the insulator to fracture fully, dropping to the ground, so it was now visible to the staff.

The insulator was replaced with a polymeric equivalent in an emergency possession later that morning.

The line was fully reopened at 12:18 hrs on 11 July.

The FFCCTV footage from train 4H98 was not immediately available.

RAIB was provided with the footage on 20 July 2022 and RAIB’s analysis showed how close the near miss really was.

Upon reviewing the footage, Network Rail initiated an investigation at route level and the staff involved subsequently chose to revise their statements about the incident.

Picture showing a) the missing section of the cap and pin insulator

Picture showing b) close up of the damaged insulator

Identification of the immediate cause

The two track workers were on an open line as train 4H98 was approaching.

FFCCTV footage from train 4H98 clearly shows at least one track worker in its path.

Witness evidence confirms that the second track worker was also in the path of the train as it approached.

Both staff jumped clear of the track, less than a second before the train reached their location.

The track workers were in the approaching train’s path because there was no recognised SSoW in place to protect them from it.


FFCCTV still from train 4H98 showing the headlamp of TW1 and train 4M48 passing on the adjacent line

Identification of causal factors

The two track workers were not working under a recognised SSoW that would protect them from an approaching train.

The track workers had previously been working under the separated SSoW established by the PIC for the wider group.

When TW1 and TW2moved away from the PIC and the rest of the group, they were effectively no longer working under the PIC’s control or within this system.

TW1 was a competent COSS, and therefore competent to establish a SSoW that would have protected both them self and TW2 from approaching trains.

TW1 did not do this because the PIC and the two track workers did not reach a clear mutual understanding of the safety arrangements which applied when the group split.

8th August 2023

News story:​

Overspeed incidents at blanket emergency speed restrictions

Published: 8 August 2023

Overspeed incidents at blanket emergency speed restrictions between Stirling and Perth, Scotland, 15 July 2023.


On 15 July 2023, two trains travelling between Stirling and Perth, in Scotland, exceeded the maximum permitted speed through a blanket emergency speed restriction between Blackford signal box and Gleneagles station.

This speed restriction had been imposed in response to forecast extreme rainfall.

We have undertaken a preliminary examination into the circumstances surrounding these incidents.

Having assessed the evidence which has been gathered to date, we have decided to publish a safety digest.

The safety digest will be made available in the next few weeks.

8th August 2023

Study starts into increasing train services on South Wales branch line​

A feasibility study into increasing the frequency of train services between Ebbw Vale and Cardiff has been announced by Wales' Economy and Transport Minister Ken Skates.

As well as announcing the feasibility study, the Minister has called for the UK Government to invest more fairly in Wales' rail infrastructure in view of the UK Government's increase in railway spending is concentrated in the wealthier parts of the UK.

The Welsh Government previously entered a contract with Network Rail to investigate increasing the frequency of services to Ebbw Vale. But when costs began to escalate it took appropriate steps to pause and review it.

This was fully supported by Network Rail (Wales Route), which worked closely with the Welsh Government to reduce costs and make sure all expenditure on the scheme would deliver the required outcomes.

The feasibility study will now investigate what is needed to increase services on the Ebbw Vale line to four trains an hour by 2024 as part of the South Wales Metro.

Planned for completion by early this summer, the feasibility study will form part of the Welsh Government's case to the UK Government for investing in the non-devolved railway.

Transport Minister Ken Skates said: “Ebbw Vale needs a high quality and regular rail service – one that can support jobs, investment and economic development in the wider area.

“We are delivering a step change in the provision of rail services in Wales. Our investment through the Wales and Borders rail service contract and in the first phase of the transformation of the South Wales Metro demonstrate what the Welsh Government can deliver when given responsibility and funding.

“This is against a context for rail infrastructure delivery across Wales that is still unnecessarily complex, fragmented and underfunded. Current arrangements in investment in the railway in Wales are a reflection of the time in which they were created, predating devolution. Twenty years on, the Secretary of State for Transport in Westminster continues to retain control of railway infrastructure in Wales.

“The imperfect devolution settlement is the root of many of the problems with our railway. The ongoing lack of infrastructure enhancement investment limits the capacity for new services, restricts the speeds of new trains, and fetters our ability to open the new stations we want to see. When we have intervened, we have done so using devolved budgets. We shouldn't forget that it was Welsh Government funding that lead to the reopening of the Ebbw Branch line and not the owner and funder of the infrastructure.

“Keith Williams' root-and-branch review of Britain's railways is an opportunity to reform the railway and create the fully integrated public transport network that Wales needs. Our expectation is for the Williams review to set out a clear path for further devolution to Wales.“In the meantime, we need fair funding from the UK Government – it must invest given its continued responsibility for rail infrastructure.”