Marcus' Model Railway Journey

26th July 2023

Inside The Train Shed

Finished sorting out the storage boxes, apart from the Locomotives, I may get time to do those tomorrow.

27th July 2023

Independent report:​

Report 07/2023: Embankment washout under a passenger train at Haddiscoe

Published: 27th July 2023

RAIB has today released its report into an embankment washout under a passenger train at Haddiscoe, 30 January 2022.

Summary

At about 07:45 hrs on Sunday 30 January 2022, a passenger train, which was travelling from Norwich to Lowestoft, ran on to a washed out section of track between Reedham and Haddiscoe stations.

The train, which was crewed by a driver and a guard, was carrying five passengers.

The driver had seen that the track was flooded ahead of the train and so brought it to a stand.

Once the train had stopped, the driver noticed that the ballast was washing away under the train.

While the driver was preparing to drive back towards Reedham, the situation worsened and a section of ballast washed away, leaving a large void under the track on which the train was standing.

As the driver moved the train it started to lean over.

The driver therefore made the decision that it was too dangerous to continue moving the train, and they and the guard evacuated the five passengers.

RAIB’s investigation found that unusually high water levels existed on the day of the incident due to a combination of tidal surge and tidal locking.

Localised low spots in the flood defences next to the track concerned then allowed this water to enter the railway.

The train involved was not prevented from entering the flooded section of track because Network Rail was not aware that water was entering the railway at this location.

RAIB also found that Network Rail’s flood risk management processes were not effective at warning that the track at Haddiscoe was at serious risk of flooding.

Underlying factors were that the Environment Agency’s management of flooding risk in the area did not account for, and was not required to account for, the impact of localised flooding on the railway, and that Network Rail was not effectively managing the risks to its assets and services associated with third party flood defences.

A possible underlying factor was that no joint strategy was in place to protect the railway from flooding at this location due to the Environment Agency and Network Rail not effectively collaborating.

As a result of the investigation RAIB has made five recommendations.

The first is made to the Environment Agency and Network Rail and aims to ensure that railway‑related flood risk is managed appropriately alongside Haddiscoe Cut.

The second and third recommendations are made to Network Rail and concern the integration of flood risk into their weather management strategies.

The fourth recommendation is intended to improve interaction between Network Rail and those organisations responsible for tidal flood defences in England and Wales, while the final recommendation is intended to improve these interactions in Scotland.

The incident

Summary of the incident

At approximately 07:45 hrs on Sunday 30 January 2022, the driver of train reporting number 2J66, the 07:25 hrs Greater Anglia passenger service travelling from Norwich to Lowestoft, made a call to the signaller reporting water escaping from an adjacent waterway and towards the railway.

During this call, the driver also reported pooling water on the line ahead, and brought the train to a stand between Reedham and Haddiscoe stations.

The train stopped on the area of flooding, where a significant amount of ballast supporting the track was washing away.

This began creating a void under the track beneath the stationary train.

After a short period, in which the driver attempted to reverse the train off the affected area, the train started to lean to one side.

The driver and guard decided it was therefore safer to leave the train where it was and to evacuate the five passengers from the train.

All passengers and crew were off the train by 08:12 hrs and were picked up by a rescue train at 09:08 hrs.

Both lines were blocked by the washout, and services between Ipswich, Norwich and Lowestoft were suspended until 5 February 2022.

Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing location of incident at Haddiscoe

Context

Location

The incident occurred on the lines from Norwich to Lowestoft, between the villages of Reedham and Haddiscoe, in Norfolk.

At this location, the railway consists of the Up and Down Lowestoft lines with each line allowing a maximum permitted speed of 60 mph (97 km/h).

Trains are signalled in accordance with track circuit block regulations using colour light signals, with the signalling controlled from Colchester signal box.

From Reedham, the railway continues east, then diverges; trains can continue north-east on to Great Yarmouth, or curve south towards Lowestoft.

The Lowestoft lines then pass over the River Yare using Reedham swing bridge, and curve left and then right.

For around 1.24 miles (2 km), the railway then runs straight and parallel to a body of water known as the New Cut waterway.

The track washout occurred on this section at 15 miles 28 chains, approximately 16 miles (25.7 km) south-east of Norwich.

Map of area showing the track layout and relationship between the railway and New Cut

The Norfolk and Suffolk Broadlands form a large, low-lying wetland in a flat landscape in Norfolk and on the Suffolk border, commonly known as the ‘Broads’.

This wetland drains a vast area of these two counties which ranges from beyond Fakenham, to the north on the River Wensum, to beyond Eye on the River Dove, to the south in Suffolk.

The water drains into three main tidal rivers, the Bure, the Yare and the Waveney, which meet near Great Yarmouth, where they enter the North Sea.

The Environment Agency divides the Broadlands area into around 40 flood risk management compartments which operate both independently and together to protect adjacent property.

There are149 miles (240 km) of flood bank within the Broadlands area as most of the land is below high tide level or below the level of adjacent rivers.

The New Cut waterway was originally constructed in 1832, joining the rivers Waveney and Yare to provide a direct, navigable link between Lowestoft and Norwich.

The west side bank of New Cut, which is adjacent to the railway, forms part of the boundary of compartment, one of the largest flood compartments.

The east side bank of New Cut lies within compartment, which is an island between New Cut and the Rivers Yare and Waveney.

The rivers within the Broadlands area are tidal, and so rise and fall under the influence of the adjacent North Sea.

In addition to the astronomical tidal cycle giving a high tide every 12 hours and 24 minutes, sea levels are affected by surges.

These are increases or reductions in water levels caused by deep low- pressure weather systems in conjunction with the astronomical tidal cycles.

Organisations involved

Network Rail is the owner and maintainer of the railway infrastructure at this location.

It also employed the staff responsible for signalling the train and managing weather-related incidents affecting the railway.

Greater Anglia (GA), part of Abellio Transport Holdings, is the operator of the train involved in the incident and employs the driver of the train.

EA owns the land that includes the bed of the Haddiscoe New Cut and a thin strip of land between it and the railway.

EA owns the flood defences (crest and frontage piling) along the bank of New Cut and manages these defences to achieve specified objectives.

EA also monitors water levels at approximately 3500 locations around the UK coast and along main rivers using measuring stations.

It uses this data to issue flood alerts and warnings to anyone who signs up to this service.

Broadlands Environmental Services Limited (BESL) was contracted by EA in 2001 to manage and maintain the flood defences as part of the Broadland Flood Alleviation Project (BFAP).

BESL originally comprised a construction company, Edmund Nuttall, and a design company, Halcrow.

Changes in ownership led to these becoming, respectively, part of BAM Nuttall and Jacobs before BESL completed its flood defence contract in November 2021.

Jeremy Benn Associates Limited (which trades as JBA Consulting) hosts the Flood Warning Database (FWD) for Network Rail which sends flood warnings to Network Rail control centres.

All organisations freely co-operated with the investigation.

The flood defences

The flood defences along Haddiscoe New Cut comprise a bank supported by frontage piles, which is topped with crest piling.

The bank also supports the railway, with the railway boundary fence on the landward side of the crest piling.

Frontage piles, which can be made of various materials including wood and steel, protect the riverbank from the erosion caused by river currents and provide some support to the ground behind them.

Steel frontage piling was in use at the location of the incident.

The crest piling was installed in 2006 to provide a consistent flood defence level in an area where the bank was no longer considered to be at a sufficient height.

The crest piling was made of plastic.

Train involved

The train involved in the incident, reporting number 2J66, was the 07:25 hrs passenger service from Norwich to Lowestoft.

It was a class 755/3 bi-mode multiple unit train, formed of four vehicles.

The train was fitted with an on‑train data recorder (OTDR) and with forward-facing, rear-facing, and body side mounted closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems.

Staff involved

The driver of the train was based at Norwich depot and had worked as a driver with GA for two years at the time of the incident.

During the previous 18 years, they had worked on the railway in various other roles.

All the relevant competence assessments for the driver were up to date.

External circumstances

At the time of the incident, there was no wind or rain in the local area and the sun was just breaking over the horizon.

However, storms in the days before the incident resulted in higher than usual water levels in the Broadland river system.


The train involved - Abellio Greater Anglia Class 755 FLIRT 755331 sits in Norwich Jubilee sidings before departing for Ipswich on a test run on February 22, 2020

The sequence of events

Events preceding the incident

On 29 and 30 January 2022, two storms affected much of the UK.

Storm Malikand and Storm Corrie were deep low-pressure systems which moved over the north of the UK, with associated strong winds from a northerly to north-westerly direction.

These weather conditions caused a tidal surge, with unusually high tides on the east coast of England.

This resulted in higher than usual water levels in the Broadland river system, including New Cut.

On Saturday 29 January 2022 at 16:28 hrs, EA issued a flood warning for riverside properties along the tidal River Yare.

At 16:36 hrs it also issued a flood warning for isolated low-lying properties along the tidal River Waveney.

Network Rail Anglia route control received these by email but was not required by its procedures to act based on these warnings.

This is because its procedures state that route control only takes action based on alerts from the separate FWD system used for this purpose.

The last train to use the railway adjacent to New Cut before the incident train was 2J96.

This was a scheduled passenger service and departed from Norwich at 22:40 hrs on the day before the incident and arrived at Lowestoft at 23:21 hrs.

Therefore, it would have passed the incident area on the Down Lowestoft line at approximately 23:05 hrs on the night before the incident.

The driver of this train did not report any issues at the incident location during this journey.

At 07:25 hrs on 30 January, train 2J66 departed Norwich.

It was the first train scheduled to go through the incident site that day.

The train called at Reedham station, departing at 07:39 hrs, and then continued its journey towards Lowestoft.

The driver accelerated the train towards 60 mph (97 km/h), the maximum permitted speed on this section of line, and proceeded along the railway adjacent to the New Cut.

Events during the incident

At 07:45 hrs, the driver of train 2J66 made a call to the signaller using the GSM- R3 radio system to report that there was a “tiny bit of water escaping the banks of the river” at a location approximately 0.6 miles (1 km) before the incident location.

The train was travelling at around 55 mph (89 km/h) at this point.

While still on the radio call, the driver started braking as they could see pooling water on the track ahead.

The driver told the signaller they would need to stop the train as water was clearly visible on both lines.

The railway Rule Book requires the driver to tell the signaller if the flood water is up to the bottom of the railhead, is up to or above the top of the railhead, is moving and likely to dislodge the ballast, or has already dislodged the ballast.

The train stopped on the section of pooling water while the driver was still on the call to the signaller.

The train’s guard joined the driver and together they assessed the situation.

The driver called the signaller back at 07:49 hrs stating that there was some dislodged ballast under the train, but the train was safe, and the void was not big enough to pose danger.

However, five minutes later, the driver called the signaller again and explained that the situation was worsening, and the void was now under the leading vehicle.

The driver requested permission from the signaller to go to the rear train cab and drive the train back one carriage length towards Reedham to move it from being directly over the void.

At 07:58 hrs, the driver called the signaller again to say that they had changed ends and was preparing to move the train.

The driver attempted to move train 2J66 but the rearmost carriage of the train (which had been at the front of the train) had by now started to lean over, so the driver stopped the movement after just a few metres.

At 08:01 hrs, the driver called the signaller again and requested a line blockage (to stop any trains passing on the adjacent line) and permission to evacuate the passengers.

View from FFCCTV just before the driver stopped the train

Events following the incident

By 08:12 hrs, the line blockage had been arranged, permission to evacuate the train had been given and all train crew and passengers had been safely evacuated from the train.

At 08:23 hrs, the driver of train 2C01 (the 08:17 hrs Great Yarmouth to Norwich service) was sent a request to detrain all passengers at Reedham and head towards Lowestoft to collect the passengers from train 2J66.

All passengers were confirmed to be safely on train 2C01 by 09:08 hrs.

This train then took them back to Reedham.

At 09:50 hrs, an empty train was dispatched from Norwich to pull train 2J66 from the affected area.

After work was carried out to stabilise the track, the empty train and train 2J66 were coupled together and left site to travel back towards Reedham at 01:49 hrs on 1 February.

Repairs to the track and temporary repairs to the flood defence were completed by 4 February, and the line reopened to railway traffic on 5 February 2022 with an emergency procedure in place.

This stated that, on receiving an FWD email notification or call from EA, the line between Reedham and Somerleyton would be blocked to traffic in both directions.

Summary of conclusions

Immediate cause

Train 2J66 entered a section of track that was flooded.

Causal factors

The causal factors were:

a. Water over spilled flood defences and flooded the track.

This causal factor arose due to a combination of the following:

i. High water levels existed due to a combination of tidal surge and tidal locking.
ii. There were localised low spots of the flood defences which allowed overtopping on the day of the incident.

b. Train 2J66 was not prevented from entering the flooded section of track.

This causal factor arose due to a combination of the following:

i. Network Rail was not aware that water was entering the railway in the Haddiscoe area on the day of the incident.
ii. Network Rail’s flood risk management processes were not effective at warning that the track at Haddiscoe was at serious risk of flooding.

Underlying factors

The underlying factors were:

a. EA management of flooding risk in the area did not account for, and was not required to account for, the impact of localised flooding on the railway.

b. Network Rail was not effectively managing the risks to its assets and services associated with the reliance upon third party flood defences.

c. EA and Network Rail Anglia were not effectively collaborating in their management of the flooding risk at Haddiscoe. This means that no joint strategy was in place to protect the railway from flooding at this location. This is a possible underlying factor.

Actions reported as already taken or in progress relevant to this report

Following the flooding incident on 30 January 2022, the crest piling was re-instated along a 50 m length at Haddiscoe.

The levels were checked in June 2022 and the crest height was found to be around 1.8 m AOD in the repair area.

Network Rail’s weather taskforce is considering the implications of tidal flood risk in line with other weather threats.

Network Rail has stated that this work is ongoing.

Immediately after the incident, Network Rail reassessed the Haddiscoe flood defence and changed its status from category B to A in the FWD system.

The distribution lists have been updated by Network Rail to ensure notifications are sent to the correct staff.

A replacement for the FWD, the Targeted Flood Warning Service, had been identified by Network Rail.

This became fully operational on 31 March 2023 and is delivered by EA.

Network Rail installed a tidal gauge at Reedham in October 2022.

This allows Anglia route control to log into a system to view the water levels in real time.

This process is carried out when an FWD alert is received.

The route control manager will then chair a conference and deploy a watch person to site if necessary.

This report has been condensed by yours truly

If you wish to read the full 43 page report.....

You can do so by clicking this link:

https://assets.publishing.service.g...ata/file/1174571/R072023_230727_Haddiscoe.pdf

27th July 2023


TRANSPORT FOR WALES

Chester station reaches 175th anniversary as celebrations remember one of the greatest railway engineers​

THIS August sees the 175th anniversary of Chester station opening with multiple activities planned to remember its chief engineer Thomas Brassey.


The main events take place on 1 August and have been organised by 3 Counties Connected, Mid Cheshire and North Cheshire Community Rail Partnerships for the area, with support of Transport for Wales, who currently manage Chester Station and Avanti West Coast.

Celebrations also include the completion lines from Chester to Shrewsbury and Chester to Holyhead which were also completed in 1848.

Record Producer Pete Waterman led by the Thomas Brassey society about the history of the station and Brassey’s long list of achievements in the Queen Hotel opposite the station from 11am and again in the evening from 6pm.

Chirk Station will also see a tea dance and Victorian costume day on 9 August in the town hall.

Community Rail Strategy Lead for TfW Melanie Lawton said: "it was brilliant to bring everyone together to mark the railway history of the city.

“Chester station is a remarkable building in its own right and in railway terms it connects so many communities in England and Wales.

“The fact it has been in operation for 175 years is wonderful and a testament to its designer Thomas Brassey and all those workers and engineers who built it.

“Sharing our history with new generations is vital and we hope these events will help inspire others to follow in his footsteps as we work with communities to better connect them to their railways.”

Stephen Langtree MBE, Chair of the Thomas Brassey Society said: “The 1st of August 2023 will be a memorable day for Chester as it will celebrate the opening of Chester Station, built by Thomas Brassey who had, by this stage, built railways all over the world.

“Working with architect, Francis Thompson, and engineer Robert Stephenson, together they constructed a magnificent, Italian style building which had, at the time, the longest platforms in the country.”

Community Rail Partnership 3 Counties Connected brings together community rail activities across the Chester, Shrewsbury and Crewe areas.

Opened on 1 August 1848, Chester is a key rail hub linking north Wales to the north west of England.

It was built by Thomas Brassey at the tail end of the “railway mania” that had gripped Britain that decade.

Born just outside the city itself, Brassey was also one of the lead engineers on the Chester to Holyhead and the Shrewsbury and Chester lines.

He had trained under the great Thomas Telford and from those early beginnings he went on to build railways all over the world including the 540 mile Grand Trunk railway in Canada which included the Victoria Bridge which was the largest in the world at that time.

If that were not enough, he also constructed dock systems, locomotive factories, sewer systems, amazing bridges and huge viaducts.

A humble man, he refused honours in Britain but was honoured by other countries with their top medals.

He was also a model employer, with a work force numbering up to 80,000 at its peak.

He insisted on proper pay and facilities for his workers and provided a library at his huge Canada works in Birkenhead, 30 years before the first public library was created.

By the late 1840s he had been responsible for building around a third of all Britain’s railways and three quarters of France’s railways.

Such was his renown that he won railway building contracts in countries including Spain, Australia, Norway and the Crimea.

The Thomas Brassey Society work tirelessly to promote his achievements and are currently fundraising for a statue at Chester station,

WATCH:

Chester Station 175th Anniversary​

27th July 2023



NetworkRail:

Passengers reminded to check before they travel between Monmouthshire and Gloucestershire as three-week major resilience scheme continues from Monday​

Region & Route: Wales & Western: Wales & Borders


Network Rail and its contractor, AmcoGiffen, will begin working round the clock on the Severn Estuary line to improve resilience from Monday 31 July to Friday 18 August.

Engineers will be working on a one-mile-stretch of railway, close to Purton, removing around 1,000 tonnes of material from the cliff face as part of the Severn Estuary Resilience Programme (SERP).

An ‘active’ mesh system will then be installed covering 19,500m2, secured by more than 5,000 rock bolts.

This system will hold the cliff face in position and help to prevent landslips from damaging, and subsequently, closing the railway.

The line will be temporarily closed so Network Rail and AmcoGiffen can carry out this work safely and efficiently.

Transport for Wales and CrossCountry trains will be affected, and a rail replacement service will be in place.

Transport for Wales will replace trains with buses calling at all stations:

• Between Severn Tunnel Junction and Gloucester from Monday 31 July to Friday 4 August - this is due to work being carried out on Chepstow viaduct
• Between Chepstow and Gloucester from Sunday 6 to Friday 11 August and Monday 14 to Thursday 17 August
• Weekend train timetables are due to operate on Saturday 5 August and on Saturday 12 – Sunday 13 August

Network Rail urges passengers to visit tfw.wales for more information.

CrossCountry will replace all trains with buses between Newport and Gloucester, calling at all stations:

• Monday 31 July to Friday 4 August
• Sunday 6 to Friday 11 August
• Monday 14 to Thursday 17 August
• Weekend train timetables are due to operate on Saturday 5 August and on Saturday 12 – Sunday 13 August

If passengers are planning to travel between the Midlands and South Wales, they may wish to travel via Bristol Parkway. 

Network Rail urges passengers to visit crosscountrytrains.co.uk/Lydney-2023 for more information.

Nick Millington, route director for Network Rail Wales & Borders, said: “The line between Newport and Gloucester is particularly vulnerable to landslips due to its exposed location along the Severn Estuary.

“We are seeing more frequent extreme weather events as a result of climate change, which is why we are prioritising resilience projects like this, to protect vital passenger and freight links in the Wales and Borders route.

“This investment will ensure fewer closures and speed restrictions in the future, providing passengers and freight customers with a more reliable service.

“I’d just like to thank everyone for their patience while we safely carry out this essential work.”

30th July 2023

Where to see a Jubilee steam locomotive in Shropshire this Monday​

LMS Jubilee No. 45699 Galatea, currently appearing as 45562 Alberta and 45627 Sierra Leone, is set to pass through Shropshire this Monday, 31st July 2023.

Departing the Bristol depot at 10:42, the locomotive and its support coach will pass through Bristol Temple Meads (11:01), Filton Abbey Wood (11:11), Severn Tunnel Junction (11:28), Pontypool and New Inn (12:04), Abergavenny (12:15), Hereford (12:42 & 12:49), Shrewsbury (14:29), Crewe (15:53), Warrington Bank Quay (16:53), Wigan North Western (17:13), Preston (17:45), Lancaster (18:32) and Carnforth at 18:42.

30th July 2023


TANGENT MAN STRIKES AGAIN!
Just when you thought it was safe to be informed only on railway topics!

Back in the garden

My Mountain Ash tree's full of berries.

From the other side - out of the sun.

30th July 2023

Inside The Train Shed

Sorting out some locomotives from the storage boxes.

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30th July 2023

A New Logo for ETHNON RAIL

I asked my son , Neonlake to design a logo for Ethnon Rail

I gave him some ideas and information to help inspire his creativity.

Here are a few ideas that were bandied around.

The following drawings are rough sketches