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- Eluvatar#8517
Yes, r3n was.
Injunction to Halt Elections
- Thread starter Mall
- Start date
Abbey
TNPer
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Mall on the restarting of the Vice Delegate election
Opinion drafted by r3naissanc3r, joined by Abbey Anumia and punkdThe Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Mall.
The Court took into consideration the following Articles of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific:
9. Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
10. Each Nation entitled to a vote in any manner under the fundamental laws of the region is entitled to the equal treatment and protection of that Nation's right to vote.
The Court took into consideration the following Clause of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
Article 3 9. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a majority vote every four months. No person shall be elected Delegate to a full or partial term in three consecutive election cycles.
The Court took into consideration the following Sections of the Codified Law of The North Pacific:
Section 4.2: Election Law Definitions
4. "Abstentions" are not votes for or against any candidate, and may not be used to determine the results of any election. They may be used for quorum, activity, or other purposes.
5. "Candidates" are those citizens who declare themselves, or have accepted a nomination by another Assembly member preceding the close of nominations, as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election. Candidates may only stand for one office during a given Election Cycle.
6. "Election Commissioner" is an individual designated to supervise a given election. No one who may be a candidate in an election may serve as an Election Commissioner during it.
7. "Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The dates for the Election Cycle will be designated at least 30 days in advance by the Delegate .
8. A "vacancy" in an office occurs when the holder of it resigns, is removed, or abandons it . An office is abandoned when its holder does not log onto the regional forums for two weeks without prior notice, or when an election winner or appointee fails to post the Oath of Office. Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election unless a it cannot be completed prior to the beginning of the appropriate scheduled election cycle. Pending an election, however, a vacancy may be temporarily filled as provided by the Constitution, this Legal Code, or a rule adopted by the appropriate body. Vacancies of appointed positions may be filled in accordance with proper appointment procedures.
Section 4.3: Overall Election Law
9. In General and Judicial elections, Election Commissioners will be appointed by the Delegate to oversee the nomination and election processes at least one week before the month in which the election begins. If an appointment of Election Commissioners has not been made by that time, the Chief Justice shall promptly make the appointment within 48 hours.
10. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy shall last for seven days.
11. Voting will begin three days after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for seven days.
12. If a run-off vote is required it will begin within two days of the first vote ending and it shall last for five days.
Section 4.4: General Elections
13. The election cycle for the terms of the Delegate and Vice Delegate, and of the Speaker, will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.
14. Non-incumbent candidates for Delegate or Vice Delegate may not obtain an endorsement level during the election cycle greater than the level authorized for members of the Security Council under Chapter 5.
Section 4.6: Special Elections
18. A special election will be held in the event of a vacancy in any elected office or position.
19. The Delegate, or if the Delegate is not available, the Speaker, or if the Delegate and Speaker are not available, any Court Justice, will serve as Election Commissioner for the special election.
20. The period for nominations or declarations of candidacy in the special election will last for five days, beginning within two days after the vacancy is noticed.
21. Voting will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately.
The Court took into consideration its previous rulings:
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot]
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot
The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by King Durk the Awesome.
The Court took into consideration the Relevant section of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
The Court took into consideration the Relevant sections of the Bill of Rights of the North Pacific:
Bill of Rights:
The Court opines the following:
It is the belief of the Court that the accidental omittance of a Candidate from the Ballot does in fact violate that Candidates Rights under Section 9 of the Bill of Rights. It is therefore ordered that the voting period for the Special Election of Vice Delegate is restarted immediately. The Court believes that in such cases where a timetable for elections is present when a violation of the Bill of Rights or Constitution is found in order to keep the legitimacy of the election the timetable must be altered as not doing so would in itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.
The Court recognizes mcmasterdonia's immediate attempt to rectify the situation by adding the missing candidates name back to the ballot as soon as being made aware of the situation. The Court does appreciate when an official in the Government attempts to correct a mistake however this specific rectification was not enough to satisfy the Bill of Rights.
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers]
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers
Opinion drafted by Gaspo, joined by Hileville and Sanctaria
The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r, and the follow-up posted by Crushing Our Enemies.
The Court took into consideration the following elements of Article 4 of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
The Court opines the following:
The Court has before it two issues, tangentially related but submitted loosely together. The Court will first address Crushing Our Enemies' inquiry regarding the ability of this Court to review the policies of other elements of the government.
Crushing Our Enemies:
This request has two interpretations: depending upon where one places the emphasis, and whether or not one comprehends sarcasm, it may either be taken on its face, as suggesting that the Court cannot review anything other than its own opinions. We first address this interpretation.
The Court finds no merit in this position as stated. The Court has been specifically charged with reviewing government policies, and no reason has been given in support of the assertion that this Court cannot review other the policies and actions of other elements of the government, upon request. The Courts are granted this power to provide a balance against abuses of power, and to provide recourse to allow citizens to have their grievances addressed by a neutral party.
Under COE's proposed interpretation, the Court would have no purpose, as it would only be permitted to conduct criminal and civil trials, and clarify ambiguity. It would not be able to hold elected officials accountable for their actions, or determine whether or not policies are in accordance with the Constitution; these powers of judicial review are essential to the operation of the court and the balanced structure of democracy within a 3-branch system.
The Court rejects COE's assertion, and maintains that, subject to the request of an affected party, it may review and offer its legal opinion on any action, policy, law, rule, or decision made by any government official.
If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.
Turning to r3naissanc3r's request for review, the Court recognizes that r3n's proposed interpretation is the most literal, most restrictive view which may be taken of this Court's freedom regarding past decisions. While this Court places strong importance on precedent, and is exceedingly hesitant to overturn it even in part, the interests of justice and the evolution of the law require that the Court be able to overturn precedent where appropriate. At one point, for example, FALCONKATS as Special Assistant Attorney General refused to bring any civil case before the Court, asserting (in direct contradiction with the Constitution) that the Court was exclusively able to hear criminal matters. Let's say that were appealed, and the Court erroneously upheld his decision. Under r3n's proposal, that would stand forever. The only means of bypassing it, would be for the Regional Assembly to pass a law saying that the Constitution says something that it already said in the first place. Inescapable binding in Court decisions would not advance the interests of Justice.
Let's look at another example to illustrate this. Suppose a Counsel submits an Affidavit as evidence in a current trial. Affidavits are neither permitted nor barred, currently - they are not discussed in the current Court Rules. Let's say that this Affidavit was submitted, and objected to, and the objection was upheld. It was then appealed, and the Court opined that Affidavits were not permissible. That would be binding forever. Ah, you say, but the legislature could legislate around that, thus restoring balance! You would be wrong. The RA would not be able to change the rules, because evidentiary concerns are addressed in the Court Rules, which only the Court can change. And the Courts would not be able to contradict binding precedent, thus permanently barring Affidavits from ever being used in TNP Courts. The law must be allowed to evolve to match society, and conclusively binding decisions carry with them the potential to greatly restrict the ability of the law, and the Court, to adjust with the times.
The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court's discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.
In other words, the Court must explain itself fully when overturning precedent. The Court must try, wherever possible, to act in accordance with precedent, so long as that precedent does not conflict with new law, or the fundamental principles of justice established by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
To specifically answer r3n's questions, the binding effect prescribed by the Constitution applies to the Court to the extent that it does not bring the Court's precedent into conflict with the Constitution or with subsequent substantive law. The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to "look again"), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.
Ruling of the Court of the North PacificIn regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Blue Wolf II on whether or not Eluvatar is term-barred from being a candidate in the Special Elections for Delegate
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Blue Wolf II on whether or not Eluvatar is term-barred from being a candidate in the Special Elections for Delegate
Opinion drafted by Abbey Anumia, joined by Sanctaria and punk d
The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Blue Wolf II.
The Court took into consideration the Relevant Sections of the Legal Code and Constitution of the North Pacific:
Constitution:
Legal Code:
The Court opines the following:
1) What period of time constitutes a legal term for Delegate, if at all possible, put in terms of specific months of the year (ex. January to May)?
The legal terms for Delegate are set as 4 month periods, starting in January, May and September.
2) Is it legal for a Delegate who just served two consecutive and elected terms as Delegate to run in a special election for the term he/she was legally barred from running for during the General Elections?
No. The Delegate has still served in 2 consecutive terms - it is irrelevant whether they served the whole term, the first half or the second half.
Having established the set terms, the Court believes that it is not legal for a Delegate to contest any Delegate election, be it general or special, in the term immediately following his second consecutive term. Although this ruling established that finishing out the term did not constitute serving a term, this Court believes that there is no distinction in the Constitution or the Legal Code which would allow for discrimination based on when in a term the special election is held and the new Delegate elected. The Court can therefore not hold with that previous ruling.
3) Is Eluvatar, at this present time, a legal candidate for Delegate in either this Special Election or any other Special Delegate election this term?
No. He has served in the two terms immediately preceding the term in which this Special Election is held, therefore he is not eligible.
4) If Eluvatar is ruled to be a legal candidate and were to win the Special Elections, would he be legally allowed to seek re-election in the following May and September General Elections?
As the Court has ruled that Eluvatar is not a legal candidate, this question is moot.
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Funkadelia on the limits of Election Commissioners' powers]
Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Funkadelia on the limits of Election Commissioners' powers
Opinion drafted by Abbey Anumia, joined by punk d
The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Funkadelia.
The Court took into consideration the Relevant parts of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:
The Court opines the following:
The Legal question before the Court is whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place. The Court was presented with two potential interpretations of the relevant law in this case. One potential interpretation was that the Election Commissioners do not have this power, and that candidates simply have to declare themselves as such. The second interpretation was that they do have this power, and that Candidates must post their declarations in the relevant thread.
In order to make a decision, the Court considered the first of these possible rulings, and found that it would lead to absurdity when all of the relevant Law is considered together. If the Election Commissioners do not have the power to require candidacy declarations to be in their designated threads, then there would be no requirement for Candidates to post their declarations anywhere obvious, or even publicly. This would impact on the Election Commissioners ability to supervise and oversee elections, as set out by the Legal Code. Thus, the Court rejected this interpretation.
To this end, the Court finds that requiring Candidates to post their declaration in a thread designated for such a purpose is a reasonable manifestation of the Election Commissioners' ability to oversee an election. This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned.
The Court took into consideration the following Clauses of The North Pacific Legal Code, TNP Law 26:
"Election Cycle" is defined as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made, includes all voting periods, and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election. The exact dates for the Election Cycle shall not include any legal holidays provided in Law 23, and those dates shall be designated at least 30 days in advance by The Delegate so as to encourage the greatest level of participation by eligible voters during the designated month.
The Court took into consideration the following announcements made by the respective Election Commissioners: here; here; here; here; and here.
The Court opines the following:
The court has been requested by Mall to review the decision made on May 15th 2013 by the Election Commissioners overseeing the General Election of May 2013 ("the Electoral Commission"), to restart the vote for the Vice Delegate portion of the election cycle ("the Vice Delegate election"). Mall petitioned for the review claiming that his candidacy in the Delegate portion of the election cycle ("the Delegate election") affords him the status of affected party required of those requesting review. In granting the petition, the Court has recognized this claim.
Mall ("the petitioner") presented the Court with four questions pertaining to this decision of the Electoral Commision. The Court will address these questions separately.
Violation of equal treatment and protection right.
The petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the Electoral Commission's decision to restart the Vice Delegate election has violated the equal treatment and protection right provided by Article 9 of The Bill of Rights for all Nations of The North Pacific ("Bill of Rights"). The petitioner specifically presented the Court with the following argument: i. The Electoral Commission's earlier decision to not include Romanoffia in the ballot for the Vice Delegate election caused anomalies in that election. ii. Because the Delegate and Vice Delegate elections are closely linked, the same anomalies affected the Delegate election. iii. The Electoral Commission took action to relieve those involved in the Vice Delegate election from the negative effects of these anomalies by restarting that election, but took no similar action with regards to the Delegate election. iv. From this discrepancy stems the alleged violation of the equal treatment and protection right, which the petitioner argues would require similar action to be taken to relieve those involved in the Delegate election. As evidence for the anomalies caused in the Vice Delegate election, the petitioner presented the declared protest votes cast for Vice Delegate.
The Court is not convinced by the second proposition in the above argument. The Court rejects the proposition that anomalies in the Vice Delegate election are certain to affect the Delegate election. The Court recognizes that the inherent connection between the two elections makes it reasonably likely that disruptions in one may affect the other. The difference is salient: a proposition only likely to be true still needs to be substantiated by evidence before it is considered true with certainty; and absent this evidence the Court cannot act upon such a proposition by presumptively asserting its validity. The Court also finds the truth of this proposition to be necessary to the entire argument presented by the petitioner.
The petitioner has not presented any evidence of disruptions directly affecting the Delegate election necessary to substantiate the second proposition in his argument. With regards to the particular instance of disruptions the petitioner submitted occurred in the Vice Delegate election, protest votes: in addition to the lack of evidence of their certain occurrence in the Delegate election, the likelihood of their occurrence is further ameliorated by the fact that voters were provided ample time after the Electoral Commission's decision to amend any protest votes. Therefore, the Court concludes that it cannot validate the second proposition in the petitioner's argument, and by the reasoning presented in the previous paragraph the Court rejects the petitioner's argument.
Decision.
The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate election did not violate the right to equal treatment and protection granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.
Violation of right to prior notice.
The petitioner requested that the Court examine whether the Electoral Commission's actions in restarting the Vice Delegate election violated the right to prior notice of actions of governmental authorities provided to him by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.
The Court believes that the Electoral Commission constitutes a "governmental authority" for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, thus its actions are subject to the sufficient prior notice standard required by that Article. Therefore, the Court concludes that the request by the petitioner merits investigation.
The Court first needs to determine what constitutes sufficient prior notice. There are three sources the Court can use to inform its decision: statutory legislation, precedent set by this Court's prior decisions, and past practice.
In electoral matters for which the legislator has provided explicit instructions for their administration, sufficient prior notice would be at least as much time as prescribed by those instructions. When such instructions are absent, as in the case under consideration, in the interests of consistent application of law, the Court can seek to draw inferences from: i. legislation on closely related matters; and ii. credible evidence of legislative intent that can be determined from intrinsic aids within the statute and legislative history. In terms of the former, the electoral matter of closest nature regulated by electoral law is run-off votes: run-off votes uniquely share with the vote under examination the defining characteristics of being unexpected until they arise as a consequence of circumstances in a regular vote, and therefore not a-priori scheduled. The relevant provisions in the Codified Law of The North Pacific ("the Legal Code"), found in Chapter 4, Section 4.3, Clause 12, prescribe that run-off votes must be started "within two days" of the end of the vote necessitating them. This provision provides no lower bound on the amount of prior notice that must be given (a vote can be started immediately), and from its phrasing the Court assumes that its intent is to ensure expediency rather than sufficient prior notice. Cues can be taken from provisions for other types of votes, where a few clauses (Section 4.3, Clauses 10 and 11, and Section 4.6, Clause 20 and 21) regulate a specific amount of time before voting commences. Though it is the belief of the Court that this time is provided primarily to allow for candidates to campaign, it can be reasonably expected that the legislator additionally intended for this time to act as a form of prior notification to voters. This expectation is reinforced by taking into consideration legislative history, and in particular the introductory paragraphs to TNP Law 26, from which current electoral legislation is derived. There, it is declared that electoral dates must be declared in advanced "so as to encourage the greatest level of participation", providing credible evidence that the legislator agonized to ensure that the right of voters to sufficient prior notice is observed. The same argument however can be used to infer that the legislator took this into consideration when deciding not to provide for additional prior notification in run-off election.
In terms of case precedent, the Court examined its determinations in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. The circumstances decided there are conspicuously similar to those currently under examination: a vote was started with a candidate's name omitted from the ballot, and when it was determined that the omission was improper, the vote was restarted. In that case, the Court ordered the vote to be restarted immediately. Another Court decision addressing similar circumstances can be found in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Blue Wolf II on whether or not Eluvatar is term-barred from being a candidate in the Special Elections for Delegate; however in that case the Court did not make any determinations related to the question we investigate.
Finally, the Court turns its attention to prior practice. The Court has identified two past situations where a vote had to be restarted, both alluded to in the previous paragraph in the context of respective Court decisions they triggered. The first is the Special Election for Vice Delegate held in November-December 2012; in that case, the vote was restarted immediately, per the order of the Court. The second is the Special Election for Delegate of March 2013, where the vote was also restarted immediately. This however can be assumed to have been compliance with the previous Court order, so does not offer any new information either. Looking at prior practice in a more general context, the Court observes that the general accepted standard for actions by governmental officials is that they are visibly announced in a designated place within the constitutionally designated Regional Forum, with visibility usually achieved through the use of a new thread. This standard also applies to actions of the various Electoral Commissions, which usually provide no additional prior notice besides any legally mandated time interval before commencing a vote.
In order to reach a conclusion, the Court has balanced the various sources of information available to it and the guidance they provide. The Court considers the most pertinent to be the precedent set by the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. The Court has also not identified any irreconcilable conflict between that ruling and the Constitution and substantive law. The Court is also conscious of the boundaries it set upon itself in the Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers. Requiring additional prior notice before a vote is restarted would at least partially overturn the precedent set by that decision, which required the respective vote to be restarted immediately. Seeing also that this is consistent with prior practice, and with what weak cues can be drawn from existing related legislation, the Court believes that an announcement of the restarting of a vote made in a new, separate thread in an area of the Regional Forum designated for use for electoral matters constitutes sufficient prior notice for the purposes of Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. The Court notes that this is a sufficient, not necessary standard. The Court also finds that the manner in which the Electoral Commission announced the restarting of the Vice Delegate election satisfied this standard.
Decision.
The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate election did not violate the right to prior notice granted to the petitioner by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights.
Violation of right to protection of right to vote.
The petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the Electoral Commission's decision to restart the Vice Delegate election has infringed upon his and others' right to vote, as protected by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. The petitioner identified the potential infringement in the discounting of votes, cast in compliance with pertinent law, that occurred as a consequence of the decision to restart the election.
The Court recognizes the fact that restarting an election already in progress results in the discounting of legally cast votes. When this discounting happens without due justification, the Court believes that it constitutes a violation of the rights granted by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights. The question then becomes, what is due justification? The Court, in the interests of judicial restraint, will answer, partially at least, a narrower question: what is due justification for restarting an ongoing vote? Once this is answered, the Court will then apply the answer to the specific circumstances of the Vice Delegate election.
This Court has already provided some guidance on how to approach this issue, in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by King Durk the Awesome on Leaving a Candidates Name off the Ballot. There, the Court found that
Parsing this finding, it is first determined that the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is a violation of their rights under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights that can only be remedied by restarting the vote. Importantly, it is further determined that not restarting the vote---or not altering the timetable as otherwise required---would itself be a violation of the Bill of Rights.
The Court wishes to elaborate on these findings, and the second determination in particular. The violation of the Bill of Rights in the above set of circumstances is twofold. The omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot, the Court found previously, is in violation of Article 9. The remedy for this violation is to render the vote void. Consequently, votes cast using the erroneous ballot are also invalidated. Their invalidity is not by fault of the voters, but of the Electoral Commission, which failed to provide those entitled to vote with an opportunity to exercise their right in a valid way. This failure is, by itself, a violation of Article 10. The remedy for the second violation is to discount the invalid votes and restart the vote. In the context of our original question, the discounting of the votes resulting by restarting a vote under these circumstances is justified: the mishandling of the original vote was egregious enough to invalidate those votes beyond repair, and thus making their discounting in favor of a new vote the only means available for safeguarding the rights guaranteed under Article 10.
The above argument points to an answer to the question the Court set to investigate. Restarting a vote, and the discounting of votes it implies, is justified and necessary when it is the only remedy appropriate for a transgression---be it with regards to the Constitution and Bill of Rights, electoral law and its interpretation by the Court, or rules set by the Electoral Commission itself---that occurred during the conduct of a vote by fault of the Electoral Commission overseeing it. This answer is not to be interpreted as an exhaustive enumeration of conditions for restarting a vote: the one condition presented is merely sufficient. Furthermore, care must be taken when determining the truth of the first part of the condition, the uniqueness of the remedy. As the petitioner presented, discounting previous votes by restarting a vote runs the danger of voters who already cast their ballot not realizing that they need to recast it, and therefore going against the very rights of Article 10 they set to protect. At the same time, not restarting the vote runs the danger of the same voters not realizing that there has been a change in the circumstances under which they originally cast their vote, again posing hazards for the Article 10 rights. Both risks are remedied to an extent by the requirement for sufficient prior notice for actions of the Electoral Commission placed by Article 9 of the Bill of Rights. All these factors must be taken into consideration, and be balanced against the severity of the effects of the transgression, when determining whether restarting a vote is the only available remedy. The fact that, as decided previously by the Court, the omission of a valid candidate's name from the ballot is one case justifying restarting a vote should provide a standard of comparison when making this determination.
Having answered the question of what provides due justification for restarting a vote is justified, the Court will now apply the answer to the specific case at hand. What needs to be determined is whether a valid candidate had been left off the ballot of the original Vice Delegate vote. The petitioner contended that the Court had previously found, in Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific in regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Funkadelia on the limits of Election Commissioners' powers, that no such incident had occurred. The Court disagrees with this assertion. The Court, in that case, was asked to determine "whether the Election Commissioners have the power to set regulations for elections which require candidates declarations of candidacies to be placed in one place". All of the findings of the Court in that case must be interpreted in the context of this question; this includes the concluding statement of the ruling: "This means that the Election Commissioners' decision not to include Romanoffia on the ballot for the Vice Delegate election was legal, and those elections should continue as planned." The term "legal" in this statement, when interpreted in the context of the question asked, means that it was within the Electoral Commission's power to make a decision to not include a candidate on the ballot based on an alleged violation of rules the Electoral Commission set in place. Whether the decision was correct or not, that is whether a violation had indeed occurred, is a separate determination that the Court was not asked to, and did not make. Analogously, the statement that "those elections should continued as planned", when interpreted in the context of the question asked, means that the election could not be challenged on the grounds that the Electoral Commission made a decision it was not within its prerogative to make. Challenging the election on the grounds that the decision itself was incorrect is, once again, a different issue that the Court presented no opinion on.
The Court is convinced by the arguments presented by the Electoral Commission in their announcement concerning the reasons for restarting the Vice Delegate vote. The Court therefore defers to the Electoral Commission's decision, and accepts their finding that Romanoffia was omitted from the ballot for the Vice Delegate vote while his candidacy was valid. Taken jointly with the determinations in the remaining of this section, the Court concludes that the Electoral Commission's decision to discount votes by restarting the Vice Delegate election was justified.
Decision.
The Electoral Commission's decision to discount prior votes by restarting the Vice Delegate election did not infringe upon the right to vote and its protections provided by Article 10 of the Bill of Rights.
Violation of the Legal Code by decision to restart only the Vice Delegate vote.
Finally, the petitioner asked the Court to determine whether the decision of the Electoral Commission to restart only the Vice Delegate vote without restarting the other votes in the general election was in violation of the provisions of the Legal Code covering electoral matters. The petitioner claimed that the intent of the Legal Code is for Delegate and Vice Delegate election to be run simultaneously "so as to provide a more stable campaign atmosphere and to allow for candidates to cooperate and run joint campaigns". To support these claims, the petitioner cited, somewhat confusingly, Article 3, Clause 9 of the Constitution.
The Court has first examined the specific law cited by the petitioner. The Court finds that Article 3, Clause 9 of the Constitution poses no requirement whatsoever that the elections for the offices of Delegate and Vice Delegate be held simultaneously.
As far as the Legal Code is concerned, the Court has identified relevant provisions in Section 4.2, Clause 7; Section 4.3, Clause 12; and Section 4.4, Clause 13. The latter is the only place where a requirement for contemporaneous elections can be found. The clause can be interpreted in two ways: either that the elections for Delegate, Vice Delegate, and Speaker must all take place within the same, single election cycle, starting on the specified days; or that the distinct election cycles for Delegate, Vice Delegate, and Speaker must all start simultaneously on the specified days. An "election cycle" is then defined in Section 4.2, Clause 7, as "as the period of time that begins on the first day on which nominations, or a declaration, of candidacy are made and concludes with the final declaration of results for an election." Taking the two clauses together, the first interpretation effectively places no simultaneity constraints: the mandated single election cycle can begin with nominations for, say, Delegate; continue with the vote and results for that office; then continue with nominations for Vice Delegate; and so on. The second interpretation is more restrictive, in that it requires nominations for all three offices to begin simultaneously. Under none of the two possible interpretations the Court has identified are the votes for the three offices, or the announcement of their results, required to take place jointly.
In fact, the Legal Code makes special provision in Section 4.3, Clause 12 for asynchronous voting, in the event of a required run-off vote. In the event that such a vote is necessary, the Legal Code places no requirements for synchronizing any stage, nominations, voting, or announcement of results, of other elections happening at the same time with the election requiring the run-off vote. Therefore, even if the Court were to consider legislative intent, whatever evidence is present indicates that the only likely synchronization requirement on the administration of the three elections is that their nomination stages begin simultaneously. This is also consistent with previous practice, specifically the general election of January 2013: a run-off was necessary to determine the winner of the Vice Delegate election, but the elections for Delegate and Speaker concluded normally, as if the run-off were not required.
Therefore, the Court concludes that neither the Constitution nor the Legal Code create a requirement for the Electoral Commission, when they decide to restart the vote for one office in a general election, to also restart the votes for the remaining two offices.
Decision.
The Electoral Commission's decision to restart only the Vice Delegate vote without restarting the votes for Delegate and Speaker did not violate the Legal Code.