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[Chambers] On When an Election Commissioner is No Longer a Candidate
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From a purely textualist point of view, the law makes no comment on an Election Commissioner beginning a candidacy therefore triggering an absence, and then withdrawing *before the election* to return to their role.
In 4.4.25, the law states that "Candidates for that race whose names appeared on the first ballot will retain their candidacy unless they choose to withdraw".
While I believe the intent of the law is that a withdrawal from candidacy means you are no longer a candidate, it could be a reach to take this specific clause and apply it to pre-election withdrawal.
Per the interpretation R4R put forward
To remedy this issue, there should be a clarification via amendment (RA's job not ours) that more aptly defines what a candidate is and also speaks on withdrawing from candidacy.
I am of course open to other arguments and what you all think. I just thought I would begin the discussion with the above.
In 4.4.25, the law states that "Candidates for that race whose names appeared on the first ballot will retain their candidacy unless they choose to withdraw".
While I believe the intent of the law is that a withdrawal from candidacy means you are no longer a candidate, it could be a reach to take this specific clause and apply it to pre-election withdrawal.
Per the interpretation R4R put forward
I do not believe this is correct as the definition of 'candidate' is narrowly defined as anyone who "declare themselves or accept a nomination by another citizen as a candidate for an office to be chosen at that election." and makes no comment as to a withdrawal. Therefore per the text 'in which they are a candidate', they qualify regardless of whether or not the actually participate in the election.
To remedy this issue, there should be a clarification via amendment (RA's job not ours) that more aptly defines what a candidate is and also speaks on withdrawing from candidacy.
I am of course open to other arguments and what you all think. I just thought I would begin the discussion with the above.
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I was prepared to accept your position Tlomz, because while it’s obvious to me that an EC who is no longer on the ballot isn’t a candidate and shouldn’t be considered absent, the law does create that ambiguity in how it is worded. But then I read Zyvet’s brief, and now would take the opposite position.
I believe he cited all the relevant case law as well, the Court has considered ECs and elections many times. We should also consider the EC rules for reference. It would also be helpful to consult any prior cases that dealt with this kind of ambiguity in language and see how the Court addressed it. Any strict constructionist type rulings would also be valuable to compare to this situation. As far as expressing my thoughts more specifically on the argument, that will have to wait, I’m up late enough as it is right now.
I believe he cited all the relevant case law as well, the Court has considered ECs and elections many times. We should also consider the EC rules for reference. It would also be helpful to consult any prior cases that dealt with this kind of ambiguity in language and see how the Court addressed it. Any strict constructionist type rulings would also be valuable to compare to this situation. As far as expressing my thoughts more specifically on the argument, that will have to wait, I’m up late enough as it is right now.
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Imo, Zyvet makes the same flawed argument that Dreadton did on the definition of Candidate.
I will expand on this after breakfast.
I will expand on this after breakfast.
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From my perspective it seems pretty straight forward. To start, I strongly disagree with Sil's model of the strictest interpretation of the letter of the law. The model, which suggests that a candidate who withdraws is still considered a candidate but they are only left off the ballot, doesn't make much sense and also can not be possible or it would conflict with previous court rulings stated in Zyvet's brief that a candidate that is left off the ballot is considered a violation of Section 9 of the Bill of Rights.
The definitions in the Legal Code answer the Petitioner's question for us. Section 4.2.7 defines what a candidate is and the Petitioner fit this definition and so was considered a candidate since he was standing "to be chosen" for an office. At the same time, Petitioner is also a member of the Election Commission. Section 4.3.15 of the Legal Code says Election Commissioners who are also candidates are considered absent from their Election Commissioner role and cannot participate in the supervision of the general election or make decisions alongside the Election Commission. This circles back to Section 4.2.10 which defines an absence as being when a holder of an office is by law temporarily prevented from exercising their duties. Petitioner then, being a member of the Election Commission and a candidate at the same time, by law, is considered absent during the general election.
However, the Petitioner withdrew his candidacy. I don't think the concept of withdrawing is that confusing. Since the Petitioner withdrew his candidacy he then removed his standing to be chosen for an office. This removes the definition of candidate from the Petitioner and, to that effect, once he withdrew he ceased being a candidate. Thus, since he ceased being a candidate he is no longer prevented from exercising his duties as Election Commissioner and, through Legal Code Sections 4.2.10 and 4.3.15, he is no longer absent.
I do not agree that 4.4.25 even applies. The law in that Section states candidates whose names appeared "on the first ballot" retain their candidacy, unless they withdraw. The phrase "on the first ballot" implies that in that particular race, there is more than one ballot. What Section 4.4.25 tells us is that in the case an election has multiple ballots, the candidates on the first ballot continue to be put on all subsequent ballots, unless they withdraw. Not only was the Petitioner not on the first ballot to begin with, but the Petitioner was no longer considered a candidate before the first ballot was published. So from my perspective, this Section just does not apply to this case.
Therefore, it is my belief that Petitioner is able to resume their duties as Election Commissioner for this general election, and that preventing them from doing so is illegal. But, in my personal opinion, I would not find it ethical if the Petitioner were to participate in the general election as Election Commissioner after returning to their role since they were a former candidate.
The definitions in the Legal Code answer the Petitioner's question for us. Section 4.2.7 defines what a candidate is and the Petitioner fit this definition and so was considered a candidate since he was standing "to be chosen" for an office. At the same time, Petitioner is also a member of the Election Commission. Section 4.3.15 of the Legal Code says Election Commissioners who are also candidates are considered absent from their Election Commissioner role and cannot participate in the supervision of the general election or make decisions alongside the Election Commission. This circles back to Section 4.2.10 which defines an absence as being when a holder of an office is by law temporarily prevented from exercising their duties. Petitioner then, being a member of the Election Commission and a candidate at the same time, by law, is considered absent during the general election.
However, the Petitioner withdrew his candidacy. I don't think the concept of withdrawing is that confusing. Since the Petitioner withdrew his candidacy he then removed his standing to be chosen for an office. This removes the definition of candidate from the Petitioner and, to that effect, once he withdrew he ceased being a candidate. Thus, since he ceased being a candidate he is no longer prevented from exercising his duties as Election Commissioner and, through Legal Code Sections 4.2.10 and 4.3.15, he is no longer absent.
I do not agree that 4.4.25 even applies. The law in that Section states candidates whose names appeared "on the first ballot" retain their candidacy, unless they withdraw. The phrase "on the first ballot" implies that in that particular race, there is more than one ballot. What Section 4.4.25 tells us is that in the case an election has multiple ballots, the candidates on the first ballot continue to be put on all subsequent ballots, unless they withdraw. Not only was the Petitioner not on the first ballot to begin with, but the Petitioner was no longer considered a candidate before the first ballot was published. So from my perspective, this Section just does not apply to this case.
Therefore, it is my belief that Petitioner is able to resume their duties as Election Commissioner for this general election, and that preventing them from doing so is illegal. But, in my personal opinion, I would not find it ethical if the Petitioner were to participate in the general election as Election Commissioner after returning to their role since they were a former candidate.
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The mention of 4.4.25 was to point out the law establishes that candidates who withdraw are no longer candidates (in that specific scenario) and how that concept could be logically extended to other cases - namely this case.
On Zyvet's brief and the current conversation above - I agree that the case law is compelling and it is quite logical that once a candidate withdraws, they are no longer a candidate, otherwise their rights would have been violated per the omission from the ballot. Zyvet specifically demonstrated that clause 4.4.21 indicates that candidates may withdraw at any time and clause 4.4.25 establishes that a candidacy ends when a withdraw occurs. However clause 4.4.25 only applies to elections with multiple ballots and is the only time any clause provides a 'fail state' for candidacy to end. If we want to reason that a candidacy ends when a withdrawal occurs, then I believe 4.4.25 would be good to mention as its the only time the legal code ever acknowledges that candidacies end with withdrawal.
The issue that I maintain is the definition of 'candidate' (4.2.7) and all of the successive clauses that address candidacy specifically before the election commences never provide a fail state for candidacy. The current best argument that "a withdrawal indicates the end of a candidacy" is a withdrawn candidate's right would be violated once they are excluded from the ballot if their withdrawal isn't considered the end of their candidacy. I believe there is a certain implied ambiguity that the lack of clarity in the definition (4.2.7) provides and such ambiguity is only compounded by one clause (4.4.25) saying that candidacy ends with a withdrawal after the first ballot and no clauses speaking on withdrawal before the election or at any other time. (Besides 4.4.21 which only comments on the candidate's ability to withdrawal and not the impact on their candidacy).
The aforementioned ambiguity concerns me and I am uncomfortable in allowing previous interpretations on the scope of the BoR to dictate current interpretations of clauses solely because any other interpretation would result in the violation of candidate's rights. I believe that the best way to remedy this is an amendment (again, not our job) to correct the improperly constructed clauses so as to ensure the correct interpretation is very clear and does not rely on previous interpretations of citizen rights in regards to candidacy that do not specifically touch this topic.
Edits: Grammar, additional thoughts, rewording
On Zyvet's brief and the current conversation above - I agree that the case law is compelling and it is quite logical that once a candidate withdraws, they are no longer a candidate, otherwise their rights would have been violated per the omission from the ballot. Zyvet specifically demonstrated that clause 4.4.21 indicates that candidates may withdraw at any time and clause 4.4.25 establishes that a candidacy ends when a withdraw occurs. However clause 4.4.25 only applies to elections with multiple ballots and is the only time any clause provides a 'fail state' for candidacy to end. If we want to reason that a candidacy ends when a withdrawal occurs, then I believe 4.4.25 would be good to mention as its the only time the legal code ever acknowledges that candidacies end with withdrawal.
The issue that I maintain is the definition of 'candidate' (4.2.7) and all of the successive clauses that address candidacy specifically before the election commences never provide a fail state for candidacy. The current best argument that "a withdrawal indicates the end of a candidacy" is a withdrawn candidate's right would be violated once they are excluded from the ballot if their withdrawal isn't considered the end of their candidacy. I believe there is a certain implied ambiguity that the lack of clarity in the definition (4.2.7) provides and such ambiguity is only compounded by one clause (4.4.25) saying that candidacy ends with a withdrawal after the first ballot and no clauses speaking on withdrawal before the election or at any other time. (Besides 4.4.21 which only comments on the candidate's ability to withdrawal and not the impact on their candidacy).
The aforementioned ambiguity concerns me and I am uncomfortable in allowing previous interpretations on the scope of the BoR to dictate current interpretations of clauses solely because any other interpretation would result in the violation of candidate's rights. I believe that the best way to remedy this is an amendment (again, not our job) to correct the improperly constructed clauses so as to ensure the correct interpretation is very clear and does not rely on previous interpretations of citizen rights in regards to candidacy that do not specifically touch this topic.
Edits: Grammar, additional thoughts, rewording
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I have begun drafting an opinion, though I haven't gotten to the meat of it yet. I hope to have something out by the evening, but it's Mother's Day so that's going to be tough.
Here's where I'm at currently: obviously everyone knows that withdrawing means you're not a candidate anymore. The question is, how strict and binding is a definition which doesn't mention withdrawal? I think it makes sense to explicitly address withdrawal in the clause Zyvet cited - you're talking about restarting nominations after an election was completed, and that provisions makes it clear that the old candidates are there by default, rather than them having to declare again. It helps to have that made clear, and isn't necessarily guaranteed if you try to apply logic. When it comes to withdrawing in general, though, logic clearly dictates that if you leave the race, you are not a candidate. Does the legal code need to explain that if an elected official resigns, they are no longer an elected official? Does it even need to specify resignation is an option? Of course not. Incidentally, resignation in the context of the office is only mentioned once, in the definition of vacancies, but it never defines it, nor does it address it in cases other than elections - yet we have other government officials, none of whom are elected, who obviously can resign. Some things don't have to be spelled out.
So we hold that you're still a candidate because the definition of candidate doesn't mention anything about withdrawing...and then we allow ballots to exclude these legally defined candidates? In the face of precedent which continuously holds how bad it is to leave candidates off the ballot? It's nonsensical. You can withdraw anytime, only it doesn't matter because you're still considered a candidate? The provision stating you can withdraw anytime was not written to create space for withdrawals, but because the law used to restrict people from withdrawing once declarations were completed. It took even longer to allow withdrawals during voting. Even back then, when there was no clause talking about it, people recognized the ability to withdraw candidacy. It might be a good thing to leave no doubt at all with an amendment to the law, but us sticking to common sense isn't legislating from the bench. I believe ruling that Dreadton is still legally a candidate despite his withdrawal risks creating more problems, namely by opening the door to the mischief that comes with years of precedent about recognizing candidates on the ballot. Sure, he won't challenge his exclusion from the ballot, but we would be purposely looking the other way on an improperly held election if we claimed he was a candidate but did not make any move to restart the election.
You also glossed over one of Zyvet's most important points: some people are ineligible to be candidates in an election, and the definition of candidate does not address this either. If you would point out that it doesn't have to, that obviously someone judicially barred or someone who hasn't been a citizen long enough can't be a candidate in an election, how can you nevertheless say they would be even if they withdrew? At this point I'm interested in finding other case law that deals with the same unspoken, understood reality that doesn't have to be directly addressed in law, because I bet the Court has ruled in part on common sense things to get to the answer to other questions. This is just all about that common sense vs. perceived rules as written.
Here's where I'm at currently: obviously everyone knows that withdrawing means you're not a candidate anymore. The question is, how strict and binding is a definition which doesn't mention withdrawal? I think it makes sense to explicitly address withdrawal in the clause Zyvet cited - you're talking about restarting nominations after an election was completed, and that provisions makes it clear that the old candidates are there by default, rather than them having to declare again. It helps to have that made clear, and isn't necessarily guaranteed if you try to apply logic. When it comes to withdrawing in general, though, logic clearly dictates that if you leave the race, you are not a candidate. Does the legal code need to explain that if an elected official resigns, they are no longer an elected official? Does it even need to specify resignation is an option? Of course not. Incidentally, resignation in the context of the office is only mentioned once, in the definition of vacancies, but it never defines it, nor does it address it in cases other than elections - yet we have other government officials, none of whom are elected, who obviously can resign. Some things don't have to be spelled out.
So we hold that you're still a candidate because the definition of candidate doesn't mention anything about withdrawing...and then we allow ballots to exclude these legally defined candidates? In the face of precedent which continuously holds how bad it is to leave candidates off the ballot? It's nonsensical. You can withdraw anytime, only it doesn't matter because you're still considered a candidate? The provision stating you can withdraw anytime was not written to create space for withdrawals, but because the law used to restrict people from withdrawing once declarations were completed. It took even longer to allow withdrawals during voting. Even back then, when there was no clause talking about it, people recognized the ability to withdraw candidacy. It might be a good thing to leave no doubt at all with an amendment to the law, but us sticking to common sense isn't legislating from the bench. I believe ruling that Dreadton is still legally a candidate despite his withdrawal risks creating more problems, namely by opening the door to the mischief that comes with years of precedent about recognizing candidates on the ballot. Sure, he won't challenge his exclusion from the ballot, but we would be purposely looking the other way on an improperly held election if we claimed he was a candidate but did not make any move to restart the election.
You also glossed over one of Zyvet's most important points: some people are ineligible to be candidates in an election, and the definition of candidate does not address this either. If you would point out that it doesn't have to, that obviously someone judicially barred or someone who hasn't been a citizen long enough can't be a candidate in an election, how can you nevertheless say they would be even if they withdrew? At this point I'm interested in finding other case law that deals with the same unspoken, understood reality that doesn't have to be directly addressed in law, because I bet the Court has ruled in part on common sense things to get to the answer to other questions. This is just all about that common sense vs. perceived rules as written.
Alright, here is my draft opinion. Let me know what you think and let's see if we can get consensus on this tomorrow.
The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Dreadton
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Sil Dorsett
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn
The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the Rules of the Election Commission.
The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, and here,
The Court opines the following:
On Standing
The petitioner is a member of the Election Commission and was a candidate in the May 2022 General Election, until he withdrew from the race. He was then temporarily given access to the commission’s counting spreadsheet before the Chief Election Commissioner revoked that access and treated him as absent from the Election Commission after the petitioner expressed his concern with the legality of allowing him to continue to serve. There is no question of proper standing in this case.
On the Definition of a Candidate
The Legal Code defines candidates in elections as citizens who declare themselves candidates or accept a nomination for office during the candidacy declaration process. The petitioner was a citizen who declared himself a candidate for Delegate in the May 2022 General Election. According to the Legal Code’s definition, he was a candidate. Clearly, in both the logical and legal sense, he was a candidate for office. Because the petitioner also served on the Election Commission, he was considered absent from the commission by virtue of being a candidate for office. The following day, he withdrew his candidacy while the declaration process was still ongoing. Initially he was permitted access to the commission’s spreadsheet, as he was no longer a candidate, but the petitioner felt that his candidacy status was in doubt as a strict reading of the Legal Code’s definition for candidate could be construed to still consider himself one despite his decision to withdraw. The Court is therefore asked to confirm whether or not a candidate who at first declared his candidacy for Delegate but then withdrew from the race is nonetheless still legally a candidate for office. We find that a candidate who withdraws from an election is no longer a candidate for office.
The Court has previously ruled on questions concerning the proper administration of elections. It has always held that to leave a candidate’s name off the ballot would be a violation of the candidate’s rights under the Bill of Rights. Elections have been restarted for missing a candidate’s name, even when that error was caught early and the ballot was amended to add the missing name. For us to rule that someone is still legally a candidate despite their having withdrawn from the race would create a bizarre scenario: either the candidate would need to be added to the ballot, despite a clear preference not to be on it, in which case we would need to restart an election to have it added; or we would allow the election to continue and create a type of candidate that can be left off a ballot, but can still affect other portions of the Legal Code that have to do with candidates.
On Absences from the Election Commission
Election Commissioners who are candidates for an office are considered absent from the commission. Since the petitioner withdrew his candidacy, he was no longer a candidate when he was permitted access to the commission spreadsheet. Therefore, we find that the Chief Election Commissioner’s revocation of the petitioner’s access to the commission’s tools was made in error, as the petitioner should not have been considered absent from the Election Commission.
On Implicit Provisions
The question before the Court is an example of reading too much into explicit provisions in the Legal Code without consideration to its implicit ones. While it is important be careful when attempting to assume what the law actually means when such meaning may conflict with a plain reading of the law, we must also recognize when what is written in the law involves implicit impacts that need not be explicitly stated. As was argued in the brief filed by Zyvetskistaahn, the definition of candidate in the Legal Code does not need to explicitly carve out individuals who have not been citizens long enough to qualify for office, or who are judicially barred from being citizens. Other provisions in the law make it clear that such citizens would not qualify as candidates, despite the definition of citizen making no mention of these scenarios. Similarly, everyone would agree that despite no formal process being laid out for the resignation of government officials, they may nevertheless resign from their offices, and would not continue to be considered occupants of their office just because the provisions establishing their powers and parameters do not mention the possibility of resignation.
In the case of candidates, the Legal Code does contain explicit provisions about withdrawing candidacy: one that permits withdrawal to happen at any point in an election; and one that excludes candidates from being included on the ballot when a majority votes to reopen nominations if they withdraw from the race. These provisions clarify withdrawal when it may not be intuitive to assume that it is possible to happen. In the case of the first provision, it explicitly permits withdrawal to happen at any point in an election, so there is no doubt about timing, and to avoid situations where voting must restart in the middle of voting. We also do not need to debate this intention – it was clearly addressed when the Legal Code was amended to allow withdrawal at any time. In the case of the second provision, it eliminates a scenario where some candidates may neglect to declare candidacy again while others would think such a declaration was needed when nominations open a second time. Reasonable arguments could be made for why candidates would or would not automatically be included in a reopened nomination period, so the law explicitly outlines how that is handled.
The fact that these provisions are explicit should not be construed as signifying something is missing from the definition of candidate. A candidate can obviously withdraw their name from a ballot, and therefore cease to be a candidate, especially when the availability of this option is so clearly understood to exist throughout the Legal Code.
Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Dreadton on the Definition of a Candidate
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Pallaith, [joined by Justice Kronos and THO Tlomz], with justice Sil Dorsett recused
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Dreadton on the Definition of a Candidate
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Pallaith, [joined by Justice Kronos and THO Tlomz], with justice Sil Dorsett recused
The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Dreadton
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Sil Dorsett
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn
The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the Rules of the Election Commission.
The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, and here,
The Court opines the following:
On Standing
The petitioner is a member of the Election Commission and was a candidate in the May 2022 General Election, until he withdrew from the race. He was then temporarily given access to the commission’s counting spreadsheet before the Chief Election Commissioner revoked that access and treated him as absent from the Election Commission after the petitioner expressed his concern with the legality of allowing him to continue to serve. There is no question of proper standing in this case.
On the Definition of a Candidate
The Legal Code defines candidates in elections as citizens who declare themselves candidates or accept a nomination for office during the candidacy declaration process. The petitioner was a citizen who declared himself a candidate for Delegate in the May 2022 General Election. According to the Legal Code’s definition, he was a candidate. Clearly, in both the logical and legal sense, he was a candidate for office. Because the petitioner also served on the Election Commission, he was considered absent from the commission by virtue of being a candidate for office. The following day, he withdrew his candidacy while the declaration process was still ongoing. Initially he was permitted access to the commission’s spreadsheet, as he was no longer a candidate, but the petitioner felt that his candidacy status was in doubt as a strict reading of the Legal Code’s definition for candidate could be construed to still consider himself one despite his decision to withdraw. The Court is therefore asked to confirm whether or not a candidate who at first declared his candidacy for Delegate but then withdrew from the race is nonetheless still legally a candidate for office. We find that a candidate who withdraws from an election is no longer a candidate for office.
The Court has previously ruled on questions concerning the proper administration of elections. It has always held that to leave a candidate’s name off the ballot would be a violation of the candidate’s rights under the Bill of Rights. Elections have been restarted for missing a candidate’s name, even when that error was caught early and the ballot was amended to add the missing name. For us to rule that someone is still legally a candidate despite their having withdrawn from the race would create a bizarre scenario: either the candidate would need to be added to the ballot, despite a clear preference not to be on it, in which case we would need to restart an election to have it added; or we would allow the election to continue and create a type of candidate that can be left off a ballot, but can still affect other portions of the Legal Code that have to do with candidates.
On Absences from the Election Commission
Election Commissioners who are candidates for an office are considered absent from the commission. Since the petitioner withdrew his candidacy, he was no longer a candidate when he was permitted access to the commission spreadsheet. Therefore, we find that the Chief Election Commissioner’s revocation of the petitioner’s access to the commission’s tools was made in error, as the petitioner should not have been considered absent from the Election Commission.
On Implicit Provisions
The question before the Court is an example of reading too much into explicit provisions in the Legal Code without consideration to its implicit ones. While it is important be careful when attempting to assume what the law actually means when such meaning may conflict with a plain reading of the law, we must also recognize when what is written in the law involves implicit impacts that need not be explicitly stated. As was argued in the brief filed by Zyvetskistaahn, the definition of candidate in the Legal Code does not need to explicitly carve out individuals who have not been citizens long enough to qualify for office, or who are judicially barred from being citizens. Other provisions in the law make it clear that such citizens would not qualify as candidates, despite the definition of citizen making no mention of these scenarios. Similarly, everyone would agree that despite no formal process being laid out for the resignation of government officials, they may nevertheless resign from their offices, and would not continue to be considered occupants of their office just because the provisions establishing their powers and parameters do not mention the possibility of resignation.
In the case of candidates, the Legal Code does contain explicit provisions about withdrawing candidacy: one that permits withdrawal to happen at any point in an election; and one that excludes candidates from being included on the ballot when a majority votes to reopen nominations if they withdraw from the race. These provisions clarify withdrawal when it may not be intuitive to assume that it is possible to happen. In the case of the first provision, it explicitly permits withdrawal to happen at any point in an election, so there is no doubt about timing, and to avoid situations where voting must restart in the middle of voting. We also do not need to debate this intention – it was clearly addressed when the Legal Code was amended to allow withdrawal at any time. In the case of the second provision, it eliminates a scenario where some candidates may neglect to declare candidacy again while others would think such a declaration was needed when nominations open a second time. Reasonable arguments could be made for why candidates would or would not automatically be included in a reopened nomination period, so the law explicitly outlines how that is handled.
The fact that these provisions are explicit should not be construed as signifying something is missing from the definition of candidate. A candidate can obviously withdraw their name from a ballot, and therefore cease to be a candidate, especially when the availability of this option is so clearly understood to exist throughout the Legal Code.
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Looks good,
I think this section is a bit of a word salad. I will edit and post on some suggested changes.
I think this section is a bit of a word salad. I will edit and post on some suggested changes.
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I noticed some things of my own that may need some edits.
First, for the second paragraph under the Candidate section where it states that an election was restarted because a name was left off of a ballot despite the ballot being amended to include the name, is that occasion linked to a past ruling or is it separate? If it is separate should we cite where we found it?
Second I found a grammar error here "While it is important be careful when attempting to assume what the law actually means when such meaning may conflict with a plain reading of the law, we must also recognize when what is written in the law involves implicit impacts that need not be explicitly stated."
Third, justice Sil should be Justice Sil.
I concur with Tlomz about the section quoted. This section of the draft mentions provisions of the Legal Code that deal with withdrawing from candidacy, but it does not mention which provisions those are which makes the explanations of those provisions, as seen in the quoted paragraph, make less sense and like a salad. They may have already been cited at the beginning of the opinion, but we cannot say if they are for sure because the paragraph does not cite them. We the Court already know what provisions those are since we have been discussing them over the weekend they will be in our heads for a bit. But an approach I like to see in an opinion, since it is basically a report of our findings, is making it easy to understand.
First, for the second paragraph under the Candidate section where it states that an election was restarted because a name was left off of a ballot despite the ballot being amended to include the name, is that occasion linked to a past ruling or is it separate? If it is separate should we cite where we found it?
Second I found a grammar error here "While it is important be careful when attempting to assume what the law actually means when such meaning may conflict with a plain reading of the law, we must also recognize when what is written in the law involves implicit impacts that need not be explicitly stated."
Third, justice Sil should be Justice Sil.
I concur with Tlomz about the section quoted. This section of the draft mentions provisions of the Legal Code that deal with withdrawing from candidacy, but it does not mention which provisions those are which makes the explanations of those provisions, as seen in the quoted paragraph, make less sense and like a salad. They may have already been cited at the beginning of the opinion, but we cannot say if they are for sure because the paragraph does not cite them. We the Court already know what provisions those are since we have been discussing them over the weekend they will be in our heads for a bit. But an approach I like to see in an opinion, since it is basically a report of our findings, is making it easy to understand.
Too slow Tlomz. I have revised the wording, and moved the absence section to the end. Your comments were also addressed Kronos.
The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Dreadton
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Sil Dorsett
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn
The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the Rules of the Election Commission.
The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, and here.
The Court opines the following:
On Standing
The petitioner is a member of the Election Commission and was a candidate in the May 2022 General Election, until he withdrew from the race. He was then temporarily given access to the commission’s counting spreadsheet before the Chief Election Commissioner revoked that access and treated him as absent from the Election Commission after the petitioner expressed his concern with the legality of allowing him to continue to serve. There is no question of proper standing in this case.
On the Definition of a Candidate
The Legal Code defines candidates in elections as citizens who declare themselves candidates or accept a nomination for office during the candidacy declaration process. The petitioner was a citizen who declared himself a candidate for Delegate in the May 2022 General Election. According to the Legal Code’s definition, he was a candidate. Clearly, in both the logical and legal sense, he was a candidate for office. Because the petitioner also served on the Election Commission, he was considered absent from the commission by virtue of being a candidate for office. The following day, he withdrew his candidacy while the declaration process was still ongoing. Initially he was permitted access to the commission’s spreadsheet, as he was no longer a candidate, but the petitioner felt that his candidacy status was in doubt as a strict reading of the Legal Code’s definition for candidate could be construed to still consider himself one despite his decision to withdraw. The Court is therefore asked to confirm whether or not a candidate who at first declared his candidacy for Delegate but then withdrew from the race is nonetheless still legally a candidate for office. We find that a candidate who withdraws from an election is no longer a candidate for office.
The Court has previously ruled on questions concerning the proper administration of elections. It has always held that to leave a candidate’s name off the ballot would be a violation of the candidate’s rights under the Bill of Rights. Elections have been restarted for missing a candidate’s name, even when that error was caught early and the ballot was amended to add the missing name, as happened in our ruling On Leaving a Candidate’s Name off the Ballot. For us to rule that someone is still legally a candidate despite their having withdrawn from the race would create a bizarre scenario: either the candidate would need to be added to the ballot, despite a clear preference not to be on it, in which case we would need to restart an election to have it added; or we would allow the election to continue and create a type of candidate that can be left off a ballot, but can still affect other portions of the Legal Code that have to do with candidates.
On Implicit Provisions
The question before the Court is an example of reading too much into explicit provisions in the Legal Code without consideration to its implicit ones. While it is important to be careful when attempting to assume what the law actually means when such meaning may conflict with a plain reading of the law, we must also recognize when what is written in the law involves implicit impacts that need not be explicitly stated. As was argued in the brief filed by Zyvetskistaahn, the definition of candidate in the Legal Code does not need to explicitly carve out individuals who have not been citizens long enough to qualify for office, or who are judicially barred from being citizens. Other provisions in the law make it clear that such citizens would not qualify as candidates, despite the definition of citizen making no mention of these scenarios. Similarly, everyone would agree that despite no formal process being laid out for the resignation of government officials, they may nevertheless resign from their offices, and would not continue to be considered occupants of their office just because the provisions establishing their powers and parameters do not mention the possibility of resignation.
The Legal Code contains explicit provisions about withdrawing candidacy: one that permits withdrawal to happen at any point in an election; and one that excludes candidates from being included on the ballot when a majority votes to reopen nominations if they withdraw from the race. The first provision, as can be seen when reading back the RA’s debate of the Legal Code amendment that led to this wording, was designed to eliminate situations where withdrawal led to restarted elections, and avoided specific periods where withdrawal was allowed and others where it was not. Clarity in language helped facilitate the goal of avoiding unnecessary disruptions in elections. The second provision eliminated the confusion candidates may have as to whether or not they should re-declare their candidacy if a majority voted to reopen nomination. Requiring this, or automatically including the same candidates on the re-opened ballot, are both reasonable ways to handle the situation, so one solution was chosen to avoid any doubt.
The fact that these provisions are explicit should not be construed as signifying something is missing from the definition of candidate. In both cases, an implicit feature of elections, the ability of candidates to withdraw, was made explicit to help citizens better understand how to navigate potentially tricky situations, not because there is an assumption that withdrawal must be directly addressed and spelled out in great detail as a general rule. A candidate can obviously withdraw their name from a ballot, and therefore cease to be a candidate.
On Absences from the Election Commission
Election Commissioners who are candidates for an office are considered absent from the commission. Since the petitioner withdrew his candidacy, he was no longer a candidate when he was permitted access to the commission spreadsheet. Therefore, we find that the Chief Election Commissioner’s revocation of the petitioner’s access to the commission’s tools was made in error, as the petitioner should not have been considered absent from the Election Commission. As a current member of the Election Commission, and one who is not barred from service in any other way, the petitioner should have his access to the commission’s spreadsheet restored and continue his service on the Election Commission.
Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Dreadton on the Definition of a Candidate
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Pallaith, joined by Justice Kronos and THO Tlomz, with Justice Sil Dorsett recused
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Dreadton on the Definition of a Candidate
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Pallaith, joined by Justice Kronos and THO Tlomz, with Justice Sil Dorsett recused
The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Dreadton
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Sil Dorsett
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Zyvetskistaahn
The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.
The Court took into consideration the Rules of the Election Commission.
The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, and here.
The Court opines the following:
On Standing
The petitioner is a member of the Election Commission and was a candidate in the May 2022 General Election, until he withdrew from the race. He was then temporarily given access to the commission’s counting spreadsheet before the Chief Election Commissioner revoked that access and treated him as absent from the Election Commission after the petitioner expressed his concern with the legality of allowing him to continue to serve. There is no question of proper standing in this case.
On the Definition of a Candidate
The Legal Code defines candidates in elections as citizens who declare themselves candidates or accept a nomination for office during the candidacy declaration process. The petitioner was a citizen who declared himself a candidate for Delegate in the May 2022 General Election. According to the Legal Code’s definition, he was a candidate. Clearly, in both the logical and legal sense, he was a candidate for office. Because the petitioner also served on the Election Commission, he was considered absent from the commission by virtue of being a candidate for office. The following day, he withdrew his candidacy while the declaration process was still ongoing. Initially he was permitted access to the commission’s spreadsheet, as he was no longer a candidate, but the petitioner felt that his candidacy status was in doubt as a strict reading of the Legal Code’s definition for candidate could be construed to still consider himself one despite his decision to withdraw. The Court is therefore asked to confirm whether or not a candidate who at first declared his candidacy for Delegate but then withdrew from the race is nonetheless still legally a candidate for office. We find that a candidate who withdraws from an election is no longer a candidate for office.
The Court has previously ruled on questions concerning the proper administration of elections. It has always held that to leave a candidate’s name off the ballot would be a violation of the candidate’s rights under the Bill of Rights. Elections have been restarted for missing a candidate’s name, even when that error was caught early and the ballot was amended to add the missing name, as happened in our ruling On Leaving a Candidate’s Name off the Ballot. For us to rule that someone is still legally a candidate despite their having withdrawn from the race would create a bizarre scenario: either the candidate would need to be added to the ballot, despite a clear preference not to be on it, in which case we would need to restart an election to have it added; or we would allow the election to continue and create a type of candidate that can be left off a ballot, but can still affect other portions of the Legal Code that have to do with candidates.
On Implicit Provisions
The question before the Court is an example of reading too much into explicit provisions in the Legal Code without consideration to its implicit ones. While it is important to be careful when attempting to assume what the law actually means when such meaning may conflict with a plain reading of the law, we must also recognize when what is written in the law involves implicit impacts that need not be explicitly stated. As was argued in the brief filed by Zyvetskistaahn, the definition of candidate in the Legal Code does not need to explicitly carve out individuals who have not been citizens long enough to qualify for office, or who are judicially barred from being citizens. Other provisions in the law make it clear that such citizens would not qualify as candidates, despite the definition of citizen making no mention of these scenarios. Similarly, everyone would agree that despite no formal process being laid out for the resignation of government officials, they may nevertheless resign from their offices, and would not continue to be considered occupants of their office just because the provisions establishing their powers and parameters do not mention the possibility of resignation.
The Legal Code contains explicit provisions about withdrawing candidacy: one that permits withdrawal to happen at any point in an election; and one that excludes candidates from being included on the ballot when a majority votes to reopen nominations if they withdraw from the race. The first provision, as can be seen when reading back the RA’s debate of the Legal Code amendment that led to this wording, was designed to eliminate situations where withdrawal led to restarted elections, and avoided specific periods where withdrawal was allowed and others where it was not. Clarity in language helped facilitate the goal of avoiding unnecessary disruptions in elections. The second provision eliminated the confusion candidates may have as to whether or not they should re-declare their candidacy if a majority voted to reopen nomination. Requiring this, or automatically including the same candidates on the re-opened ballot, are both reasonable ways to handle the situation, so one solution was chosen to avoid any doubt.
The fact that these provisions are explicit should not be construed as signifying something is missing from the definition of candidate. In both cases, an implicit feature of elections, the ability of candidates to withdraw, was made explicit to help citizens better understand how to navigate potentially tricky situations, not because there is an assumption that withdrawal must be directly addressed and spelled out in great detail as a general rule. A candidate can obviously withdraw their name from a ballot, and therefore cease to be a candidate.
On Absences from the Election Commission
Election Commissioners who are candidates for an office are considered absent from the commission. Since the petitioner withdrew his candidacy, he was no longer a candidate when he was permitted access to the commission spreadsheet. Therefore, we find that the Chief Election Commissioner’s revocation of the petitioner’s access to the commission’s tools was made in error, as the petitioner should not have been considered absent from the Election Commission. As a current member of the Election Commission, and one who is not barred from service in any other way, the petitioner should have his access to the commission’s spreadsheet restored and continue his service on the Election Commission.
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- TNP Nation
- Kranostav
- Discord
- Tlomz
Thanks for catching that, it’s this darn keyboard.
It’s not necessary to number them, plus we reference them at the beginning of the ruling. I hope to hear from @Kronos as well so we can get this published.
- TNP Nation
- Kranostav
- Discord
- Tlomz
Kronos
Registered
- TNP Nation
- Kronogistan
- Discord
- Kronos#7021
Kronos
Registered
- TNP Nation
- Kronogistan
- Discord
- Kronos#7021
It is released! Good job to everyone!