Security Council

Matthuis actually could have held the Delegate spot much longer. He only failed because his allies grew weary. It had nothing to do with TNP. In fact TNP handled the matter very badly. Trust me I know. I had an inside look at it all. And you don't have to boot 100+ minnow at update. You can just banject throughout the day. And actually kicking 100+ would be extremely easy as long as you have access to an endotoaster.  :shifty:
Kicking 3000 non-WA Minnow nations is extremely easy but once you start ejecting and banning WA nations, even Minnow nations, each one chips a small (it says insignificant but that insignificant times several dozen or a 100 is not so) measure from your overall Influence. Eventually you will get to the point where you will go to the Regional Controls and attempt to eject a nation and it will tell you that you do not have enough Influence to eject and ban or eject that nation. Sometimes that happens when you are still listed as a Vassal or higher on your nation display because the updating of that doesn't always match immediately.
I posted this on page 4.
 
And looks like we're continuing. Joy :eyeroll:

Okay... That, of itself, is not actually contradicting what I said. The estimate I made of 500 is actually amazingly high; I'm pretty sure that if we added it up, the amount of nations we're talking about is well below that. I am well aware of the exaggeration on my part and apologize for it.

So, want to get together the 7 or so nations capable of being in the Security Council and examine their endorsements to see how many it would actually be? We can ignore the ones currently ranked as Vassal, since they would be ejected outright instead of their support being eroded. That brings the nations down to around... 5. Maybe 4. I lost count of which was which when I was checking them.

In any case, it doesn't realistically disprove my challenge; it only brings into the light the fact that I relied upon an exaggeration rather than bother and do endorsement examination.

Or, can we agree to what Heft said and just drop it?
 
The Council shall have the power to impose an emergency halt to any action by the Executive.  The Council must provide the Regional Assembly with written explanation of this action within 48 hours.

This gives the Council far too much unrestricted power without any checks or balances on that power. How many members of the RA have influence above minnow? Not that many I'm sure. Just one or two nations could really influence that elite clique if they managed to gain membership (which is actually easier that election and requires less effort as long as they're committed to it timewise)

At this rate we are potentially giving this group far too much unchecked power that they could abuse at will. Although I trust members like Great Bights Mum, its a dangerous position to place ourselves in and I would like that to be rectified with significant avenues for scrutiny before I can support its passing into law. Even if we dont need them at this time, I would rather have mechanisms in place to check their power if needs be than regret it later.
 
The Council shall have the power to impose an emergency halt to any action by the Executive.  The Council must provide the Regional Assembly with written explanation of this action within 48 hours.

This gives the Council far too much unrestricted power without any checks or balances on that power. How many members of the RA have influence above minnow? Not that many I'm sure. Just one or two nations could really influence that elite clique if they managed to gain membership (which is actually easier that election and requires less effort as long as they're committed to it timewise)

At this rate we are potentially giving this group far too much unchecked power that they could abuse at will. Although I trust members like Great Bights Mum, its a dangerous position to place ourselves in and I would like that to be rectified with significant avenues for scrutiny before I can support its passing into law. Even if we dont need them at this time, I would rather have mechanisms in place to check their power if needs be than regret it later.
Currently the CLO has the same power without the requirement to report their actions to the RA.
 
This Legislation has failed. I suggest we continue this discussion in order to come up with a more refined piece of legislation that will get majority approval. I would also suggest...prior to presenting this again...that we do a quick vote here to make sure it passes.

I would like to remind everyone that this legislation is important for our security. This is the only reason I am pushing for this.
 
Right....unfortunately it wasn't a overwhelming decision. The proposal had 17 nay and 16 Aye. A few of the Nay voted this way because they did not like aspects of the proposal...had lil to do with anything else.
 
It won't be tonight, but I do intend to offer a new version that addresses some of the objections that were raised (including my own.) (OOC: It's hard to concentrate on this stuff while the US election campaign was ongoing. Now that a state has actually spilt its electoral votes in a presidential election -- Nebraska had a congressional district award its EV to President-elect Obama -- for the first such spilt in US history, there's more time and energy to attend to other things. )

:lol:
 
While the proposed legislation may have failed, the immediate danger of not having such a system in place remains. As such, I invite the detractors to smooth over their divisions both personally and in the writing of this amendment. This is your chance to lead and do better for this region.
 
I think what we can do is propose this Security Council without transferring CLO responsibilities to it, and leave the elected CLO untouched.
 
I've had other things to address, but I am working on something right now.

I am trying to find a middle ground on some of it, but it needs to make sense, and some of the objections aren't exactly consistent.
 
Proposal:
Replace Article IV of the Constitution with the following:

Article IV: Security Council

Section 1: Membership

1. The Security Council (Council) shall be composed of trusted members of The North Pacific with an influence level above Minnow. Unless an exception is granted, Council Members shall be members of the Regional Assembly.
2. The Vice Delegate shall serve as Chair of the Council.
3. Assembly members may apply to join the Council if they meet the minimum Influence and endorsement levels prescribed by law.
4. The Council shall admit by majority vote those applicants who the Council determines are not a Security Risk to the North Pacific.
5. The Assembly may require the Council to admit an applicant by a two thirds supermajority vote.
6. Members of the Council are subject to impeachment and removal by the Regional Assembly.

Section 2: Powers

1. The Council shall enforce impeachment or recall of the Delegate by the Regional Assembly.
2. The Council may impose an emergency suspension to any action by the Executive for prompt review by the Assembly. The Council must provide the Regional Assembly with proposed legislation and written explanation of their action within 48 hours.
3.  The Council may present emergency legislation for a vote of the Assembly.
4.  The Vice Delegate, as President of the Council, shall keep record of members of the Council and remove members if empowered to do so by law.

Section 3: Responsibilities

1. Members of the Council shall be responsible for maintaining an endorsement level and influence level consistent with laws concerning endorsement and influence levels.
2. The Council shall submit to the Assembly a proposal to update endorsement level and influence level requirements for the Council on a regular basis, as required by law.
3. Each member of the Council shall execute an oath of office.
4. Members of the Council are required to remain members of the Assembly. The Assembly may approve exceptions to this requirement.

The language in blue reflect revisions or additions to the proposal as it was voted on by the Regional Assembly.

This language:
  • makes clear that the emergency suspension is time-limited so as to permit RA review.
  • retains the CLO model as to submitting emergency legislation even when there is no suspension of an executive action.
  • makes clear that the members of the Council may be removed by impeachment; thereby using the process already in the Constitution rather that vaguely creating something that was ill-defined.
  • clarifies that the COuncil enforces removal by impeachment of the Delegate.
  • Clarifies the language that permits membership on the Council for high-influence nations in the region who are not members of the RA. The last proposal required RA membership to join without exception, and only permitted exceptions after approval for Council membership.
Edited Section 2.1. to include both impeachment and recall.
 
I don't get the changes to section 1.1. I mean if they have to be in the RA, then shall should be replaced with must. If it means they can or should then there's no need to add what is already obvious.
 
Section 1.6 and Section 2.3 seem to be the only changes/additions. Why so much blue?

Also, why not make just those suggestions in the original discussion threads? You didn't actually do anything but add two relatively minor aspects that could have been incorporated into the voted on version.

If I didn't know better I would think that you either half-assed this effort or were just making up stupid crap just because in the other thread so that it would fail and you could propose an "alternative".

Oh well. :eyeroll:
 
Play nice Ivan!!

Better late than never.

P.S. In case Khark thinks I want a Security Council in order to retain power and influence later on...I will never apply to join after my term is done.
 
I will vote for a Security Council in whatever incarnation it reaches the floor unless it is completely ridiculous so no worries here.

I believe it to be a legitimate means of opposing a hostile Delegate in a consistent and constitutional manner so that there are no ambiguities in regards to governmental succession, etc.
 
Tresville, that would be silly. You have Truckler influence and would be freaking useful to the region.

I would prefer redoing the Council in a manner that strips it of some powers people worry about to forcing you to stay out.
 
The change in Section 1.1 makes explicit the intent of the "exception" clause in Section 3.4. It deals with nations that have the influenjce level to apply for the Security Council who have chosen not to participate in the Regional Assembly.

This was one of the concerns addressed in the original discussion several months ago. It is appropriate given the language in the Bill of Rights that
Clause 3 Bill of Rights:
3. Participation in the governmental authorities of the region is voluntary.
The RA approving an exemption, in my mind, serves as a check-and-balance in having Council members who are not members of the RA. I think it's a workable middle-of-the road approach to the issue.

Section 1.6 is actually a transfer from the proposed law presented with the previous proposal. Since impeachment is a constitutional process, I think it makes more sense to include it as part of the constitutional change the SC proposal requires.

Section 2,1.. The Constitution includes two completely separate removal processes:
Constitution Article II Section 3 Clause 2:
2. Only Assembly-members may bring up impeachment charges against any member of the Government. The Assembly is the jury for all impeachment cases.
Constitution Article II Section 3 Clause 4:
4. The Assembly may remove any member of the Government by a motion of recall approved by a two-thirds supermajority of the Regional Assembly.
The last proposal refered to enforcement of recall in the constitutional amendment, and referred to impeachment in the proposed law. While I used impeachment here, I am open to exclusively using recall, or include both impeachment and recall. As things currently stand, we don't know what majority of the RA is required for it to convict in an impeachment trial.

The changes in Section 2.2 and 2.3 is an attempt to narrow the open-ended language concerning the duration of the Council's blocking power. My intent with this language is to have the block expire once the RA acts, or decies not to act, on the issue.

Section 2.3 is designed to allow the Council to bring forward emergency legislation in other circumstances where a block of Exeuctive action is not used. This carries forwards the current CLO power on emergency legislation.
 
A small thought.

1. The Security Council (Council) shall be composed of trusted members of The North Pacific with an influence level above Minnow. Unless an exception is granted, Council Members shall be members of the Regional Assembly.

It occurs to me, doesn’t the influence level requirement here jar with the “minimum influence pr. by law” mentioned later in the amendment? I understand that it isn’t contradictory, as such, but it seems somewhat superfluous to me.
As such I wonder if the following might be a better wording of the first article.

“1. The Security Council (Council) shall be composed of trusted Regional Assembly members of The North Pacific who hold World Assembly membership and meet the influence and endorsement requirements set out in law.”

Also, I personally believe RA membership requirements shouldn’t be waived; RA membership is not particularly onerous to claim or maintain and I think considering the role of the Council it is perfectly appropriate that its members are at the very least active members of the community.
 
My biggest concern is the possible inflation of the SC ranks. When I wrote in the CLO, my most important criterion was that it had to be small. A small group allows for prompt, immediate action against possible Government malfeasance.

By increasing the size of the Council, I worry that it makes the group more ponderous--faster than the RA still but not fast enough to effectively respond to Government actions.

So. Can someone tell me how big they expect this Council to be if it gets voted in?
 
My biggest concern is the possible inflation of the SC ranks. When I wrote in the CLO, my most important criterion was that it had to be small. A small group allows for prompt, immediate action against possible Government malfeasance.

By increasing the size of the Council, I worry that it makes the group more ponderous--faster than the RA still but not fast enough to effectively respond to Government actions.

So. Can someone tell me how big they expect this Council to be if it gets voted in?

yeah I think an updated public result of the endo scanner is needed to make the case for such a radical shift in power.
 
If one looks at those nations who have the greatest level of influence and endorsements, who have the longest presence in the region, and are perceived as trustworthy, some of them are not and have not been members of the RA. When the original discussion group started on the concept of a Security Council, we had to address this circumstance.

As I pointed out in my last post we have to acknowledge the provision of the Bill of Rights on the voluntary nature of government participation. Since the intent is to include and coordinate the endorsement and influence levels of the region's ,ost trusted members, the language has to reflect that fact.

Keep in mind that the reference to levels above Minnow is an outer limit of who might be eligible to apply for Council membership. Either the Council or the RA must still approve the particular applicant. The implementing law on endorsement and influemce levels contemplated by this amendment may impose any influence level higher than that; the clause in Section 1.1 limits the flexibility of the chosen influence level in that law.

If my memory serves me right, I think the number was about a half-dozen, plus-or-minus. But I haven't seen any recent list of influence and endo levels.

I should also point out that since the influence and endo levels are to be specifically set by a law which is regularly updates to reflect current conditions, we can effective set the ultimate size of the Council based upon the reality on the ground when the law is first enacted, and when it is thereafter updated. It's a very flexible mechanism, with emphasis on the word "flexible."
 
Elu posted the following information in response to a question about current endo and influence levels:
There are currently 10 nations with Influence greater than Vassal in the North Pacific:

1. great_bights_mum -- Auxiliary
2. former_english_colony -- Ambassador
3. unterwasserseestaat -- Envoy
4. kitabo -- Envoy
5. frejmark -- Envoy
6. groovistan -- Duckspeaker
7. zemnaya_svoboda -- Truckler
8. the_tresville_element -- Truckler
9. laibach -- Truckler
10. ilvsivm_ii -- Truckler

There are 13 nations with Influence of Vassal:

11. span -- Vassal
12. moany_old_gits -- Vassal
13. ermarian -- Vassal
14. fengate -- Vassal
15. namyeknom -- Vassal
16. yaorozu -- Vassal
17. mr_sniffles -- Vassal
18. roscodakilla -- Vassal
19. jayzer -- Vassal
20. governmentum -- Vassal
21. elevation -- Vassal
22. velon -- Vassal
23. impenyer -- Vassal

Key:
Delegate
Vice Delegate
Assembly Member
Former Assembly Member

After reflection I think the reference to enforce remvoal of the Delegate should mean both recall and impeachment. I'll make the appropriate edit in the proposal shortly.
 
My biggest concern is the possible inflation of the SC ranks. When I wrote in the CLO, my most important criterion was that it had to be small. A small group allows for prompt, immediate action against possible Government malfeasance.
The Security Council under the last Constitution was about 10 percent of the RA and was elected. But it had a realistically low quorum requirement in order to take action quickly, and there's no guarantee that all Nations above "Minnow" status would join the SC, and the implementing law could select a higher influence level in order to realistically limit the size of the SC.
 
A better solution would be to have a line of succession of influential nations that can temporarily act as delegate in the even a delegate expends too much influence defending the region. Essentially a peace/war delegate arrangement.
 
Roman, without some sort of structure under which to implement a line of succession as you are suggesting, I can see all sort of problems in practice in trying to create such a process.

Mr Sniffles, there's a rule of construction in legislative law that when two propositions are enacted by a boody at the same event, the proposition that greats the greatest number of approving votes would be implemented. I have no problem applying the appropriate variation of that princiople in submitting both my and Eluvatar's proposals to a simultaneous vote in the RA.

My bigger concern is how to do it in December and how to do it before many people vanish for the holidays. It happens every year.

I'd also point out that we do have holidays in TNP, and as I recall we at a few of those duriong this period.
 
I have a quick clarification question regarding the recent vote.

I thought we were voting on which proposal we would then vote on as an amendment, not on the amendment itself.

Why did the vote conclude in a manner consistent with an amendment vote (stating that it had failed) when two conflicting items were on the table?
 
I have no idea why the Speaker strctured the vote the way he did. I thought it would have been more logical to vote on each separately at the same time, and if both achieved 75%, then the one with the larger majority would pass.

That's the way I conducted the votes on the three alternate Constitution proposals ;ast year, which led to the ratification of the current Constitution.

At this point, I wouldn't objecty to a re-vote under this approach. It would be fairer to all involkved. And it would give both Elu and I an opportunity to change "impeachment" to "recall," anf fix that change caused by the approval of the constitutional amendment that incorporated that change.
 
I believe it is clear that Eluvatar's proposal is the more likeable (no offense) one and since it clearly won the poll should be the single issue voted upon. But, I would support multiple polling if it solved the issue.

I do not believe it consistent with the Constitution to have the RA vote on amendments collectively as this was done. I fully agreed with having the RA decide on which proposal it supported as the final draft for amendment and when voting believed that to be what was occuring considering the wording in the initial post.
 
We had two very different proposals and since neither could have passed and been added, I chose to have either one or the other.

I have repeatedly stated why I did this here on Nov 21st.
 
We had two very different proposals and since neither could have passed and been added, I chose to have either one or the other.

I have repeatedly stated why I did this here on Nov 21st.
But you presented them as a single item for vote. Each individual proposal has the same substantive right to be addressed by the RA as every other proposal and grouping them together defeats that.
 
I have repeatedly stated why I did this here on Nov 21st.

I think if both GM and I found the procedure you followed flawed, maybe that explaination was unckear or insufficient or ambiguius, or something.

I would be interested in hearing from Tresville on this whole matter. It was he would pulled a number of us together to discuss this idea in the first polace, and I would agree to support voting on his preferences as to the Security Council proposal, with the "fix" on the impeachment language.
 
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