Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
I will provide my comments after I get a good night's sleep. (I've noted the differences that concern me but I think I can explain my concens with some sleep first.)
Once again...There's a couple of issues at hand here that seem to stick in my mind. The one that concerns me most is the ability to defend the region from invasion or rogue-ism.
We need a clear line of succession in which a delegate can be temporarily replaced if inactive in a crisis.
We need a solid core of high-influence nations that are impossible to eject were a rogue delegate to arise.
What we most need is a highly coordinated system that can act rapidly and accordingly if our main goal is to become the preeminent region.
Here's an interesting idea - what if we have an arrangement whereby we have a 'Peace Delegate' that can be anyone elected to the position and a high-influence 'War Delegate' that can be temporarily installed as a tool for ejecting invaders?
The power to bring an emergency halt to an action of the Executive Branch, and the power of the CLO to bring emergency legislation for a vote in the Assembly on an emergency basis, are two distinct powers. There have been times when it has been necessary for the CLO to initiate a emergency vote in the RA on some matter. It is the combination of both powers that provide the necessary check-and-balance to Executive power, not just one of them. Having the power to temporarily freeze executive action without more is essentially meaningless as a balancing mechanism. I believe therefore that the power to bring legislation before the Regional Assembly for vote on an emergency basis is a power that should be retgained in the SC proposal.Eluvatar’s original proposal:3. The Council shall have the power to impose an emergency halt to any action by the Executive and to submit legislation for a vote of the Assembly on an emergency basis.
Eluvatar’s original proposal:Section 4: The Auxiliary
1. There shall be an Auxiliary to the Council composed of members of The North Pacific who do not participate on the official off-site forum.
2. Members of the Auxiliary shall be those nations in The North Pacific with an Influence Level above Vassal that accept membership in it, and whom the Council determines, by a three-quarters majority vote, to be long standing trustworthy residents of The North Pacific who would not back any coup.
3. Members of the Auxiliary shall be responsible for maintaining endorsements in a range set by law.
I’m also not sure why this would be added, and worded the way it is worded. Assuming theirs is a sound reason, then the following might express the ideas more clearly:Gracuis Maximus’ proposal:4. Members of the Council are required to remain members of the Assembly unless special provision, by Regional Assembly vote, provides exception to this rule.
4. Members of the Council are required to remain members of the Assembly. The Assembly may approve exceptions to this requirement.
Gracius Maxiumus’ proposal:The Security Council Regulation Act
Section One: Requirements
1. Members of the Security Council (Council) must have an Influence level above Vassal.
2. Members of the Council should maintain at least 50% of the Delegate’s endorsement count or less if by agreed consensus of exception from Council vote.
Section Two: Reporting and Updating
1. The President of the Council shall provide the Regional Assembly with monthly reports on the activities of the Council in regards to membership, endorsement levels and regional security.
2. The Regional Assembly will hold a vote on the regulations and requirements as needed.
Gracius Maximus’ proposal:Section Three: Enforcement
1. The Vice Delegate may remove members of the Council who violate the requirements of this Act.
2. The Regional Assembly may vote to remove members of the Council for violations of this Act or the regional Constitution. Nations removed through Regional Assembly vote are to be treated as nations impeached from any standard government office per the Constitution of The North Pacific.
Members of the Council are subject to impeachment and removal by the Regional Assembly for violations of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Legal Code, including this Law.
In his example the Crimson Order was not countered directly by a coordinated effort from those that are the current high Influence nations, which would be allowed for and supported via this motion, plus, the levels of Influence held by those nations at the time was lower and some were removed.I note that my objection is based in part upon the past experience of Al Homa, which was helpfully added to this thread at the bottom of page 3 (utilizing standard forum posts per page).
So, yes, my objection does rely upon past experience. No rule of debate says that the past experience I rely on must be my own.
You'll have to excuse me if I do not find this to be particularly true.In his example the Crimson Order was not countered directly by a coordinated effort from those that are the current high Influence nations, which would be allowed for and supported via this motion, plus, the levels of Influence held by those nations at the time was lower and some were removed.
Todays situation would not allow that to happen via game mechanics.
Except that I am correct and you are wrong.You'll have to excuse me if I do not find this to be particularly true.In his example the Crimson Order was not countered directly by a coordinated effort from those that are the current high Influence nations, which would be allowed for and supported via this motion, plus, the levels of Influence held by those nations at the time was lower and some were removed.
Todays situation would not allow that to happen via game mechanics.
One of the things I stopped and did before posting here was investigate a bit more into the mechanics behind how influence works. One of the interesting things I note is that influence is on a declining scale for an invading nation. Realistically, there's no reason for them not to go ahead and pull what I said earlier, with switching delegates and the like. There's nothing within game mechanics that prevents it and, due to how influence works, it's actually a lot easier for them to build up high influence before invading simply through spreading the invaders through small regions, ones they create specifically for getting the influence to begin with.
They may not get all of the Security Council, but they can get enough to make it ineffective. And by the time the rogue delegate would be removed, most of those people will have likely lost enough influence to no longer meet the requirements for reentry to the Security Council.
However, this is just my estimation. I would need to run a few test runs of it before I could say further. And, yes, it is conjecture... but, it's as much conjecture as saying the Security Council, under the current form, would actually work.
This is my last bit on this topic. We're getting nowhere, both sides have made their trenches and armed their guns... so, let's get this to vote. All I need is to see the final drafts. They'll get up to vote as soon as I know what they are.
The final language is in the OP.Once final language has been provided, I'm expecting this to be put up to a vote...
Prove it. You've made some pretty fantastical claims in that post and I don't believe you. I could always claim to be one of the developers or someone who's been around a long time and fully tested the system but has been pretending ignorance to avoid the past, but that doesn't make my claims true. And, if you do prove it, I will openly admit I am wrong and withdraw my challenges.Except that I am correct and you are wrong.
Let me see if I can say this again:
What you are suggesting can not happen. Period. You don't carry Influence with you from region to region. You can spread 100 invader nations in a dozen different regions and accumulate top Influence status in each one but the minute to move to a new region you lose that Influence. Influence is region specific.
I have the largest working knowledge of Influence in the game. I have pushed it to all of its conceivable limits and have done so on multiple occasions. I have had the programmers ask me my opinions on it because they haven't tested it as extensively as I have and they created the damn system. If I tell you it can not be done, then it can not be done.
So, test all you want (although you will never be able to test your "theories" unless you become a rogue Delegate) your conclusions will inevitably support my position.
The final language is in the OP.
Your argument is that instead of doing this, we should do that, which kind of ignores the option of "do both." It also ignores that this would provide a sizable deterrence to anyone considering going rogue, because there would be an organizated entity within the region that would prevent them from being successful for any meaningful length of time (they could screw around until they got caught, and create some trouble, but they would inevitably be brought down, and it wouldn't take incredibly long).An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.
Instead of wasting our time on this, we should be creating alliances and working through existing institutions, debating military and intelligence information, and maybe coming up with a framework for a volunteer region-watching group to make sure that noone attacks us or seizes control. In the case of a rogue delegate, there really isn't much one can do to prevent that except have good internal intelligence- most rogues attempt to gain the support of some segment of the region, and so could be stopped before they had a chance to go rogue.
Ejecting Minnows is easy - particularly non-UN/WA's - but ejecting higher influence nations when only a Minnow or even a Vassal is almost impossible and is limited to 1, possibly 2, depending on their influence level. The "guardian" style system works, we know it works as it is a codification of what happened during the last few rogue delegates.
Haor, Kor and a couple others made the same argument I did, only in a shorter form, in previous pages. In fact, if you stop and look, my argument about ejecting people to maintain power is actually a lengthened form of what Kor posted on page 3.
...
Thirdly, I never bothered to state the rogue nation in question would be at those levels. In fact, if you stop and read my posts, you'll note that I'm stating those are the required levels for the Security Council. If you are going to accuse me of not knowing what I am talking about, then please make sure you actually are responding to what I said and not what you think I intended to say. My words are not chosen with the intention of having multiple meanings, due in part to experience with discussions in the Jolt NSWA forum.
Fourthly, I never stated that they would be ejecting those high-influence nations immediately. In fact, I stated they would work to erode the support for them, which would necessitate the ejection of nations that endorse those nations. The idea is that they get rid of the low-influence members of the Security Coouncil and then work to erode the support of the rest until those rest lack endorsements. This isn't to get rid of their regional influence, but it does slow their gain of it and further erode the tendency of those who wish to stay in the region to support them. Staying in power would be easy enough, and in time they can try to quickly build enough influence to be rid of the nations they couldn't up until that point.
I do not claim it to be a perfect method for staying in power. Yet, I do note that it's a method that GM eroded the primary challenges for by stating how easy it is to eject 3k nations in three days. So, in this matter, I am merely extrapolating from statements of those who are far more experienced than myself in the matter and using their knowledge of the influence system to my advantage. Thus, it's not my knowledge of the system that I'm working on.
Elu:Some Explanation:
The idea behind this bill is as follows:
What has saved the collective bacon of the region in the past has been the continued presence of nations like Great Bights Mum and Former English Colony with high endorsements and, more importantly, high influence. It is these members of the region who's very presence discourages attack and who have the capacity to, with popular support, stand against a rogue delegate.
This bill would create a formal regional body for this purpose, setting up a reasonable system of regulation of endorsements, as well as the means to check on the Delegate. These nations are the nations who actually can check on the Delegate, so I believe it logical to assign them the legal powers involved in checking the Delegate.
Questions? Comments? Calls for me to get out of here?