Security Council

Gracius Maximus

Tyrant (Ret.)
This is a reworking of Eluvatar's proposal that incorporates more checks and balances on the Council while still leaving it with the ability to carry out its duties, which primarily consists of keeping the Delegate in check:

This would need to be addressed as a full Constitutional amendment as it would replace the CLO with the Security Council:

Article IV: Security Council

Section 1: Membership

1. The Security Council (Council) shall be composed of trusted Regional Assembly members of The North Pacific with an influence level above Minnow.
2. The Vice Delegate shall serve as Chair of the Council.
3. Assembly members may apply to join the Council if they meet the minimum Influence and endorsement levels prescribed by law.
4. The Council shall admit by majority vote those applicants who the Council determines are not a Security Risk to the North Pacific.
5. The Assembly may require the Council to admit an applicant by a two thirds supermajority vote.

Section 2: Powers

1. The Council shall enforce any approved motion of the Assembly to recall the Delegate.
2. The Council shall have the power to impose an emergency halt to any action by the Executive.  The Council must provide the Regional Assembly with written explanation of this action within 48 hours.
3. The Vice Delegate, as President of the Council, shall keep record of members of the Council and remove members if empowered to do so by law.

Section 3: Responsibilities

1. Members of the Council shall be responsible for maintaining an endorsement level and influence level consistent with laws concerning endorsement and influence levels.
2. The Council shall submit to the Assembly a proposal to update endorsement level and influence level requirements for the Council on a regular basis, when required by law.
3. Each member of the Council shall execute an oath of office.
4. Members of the Council are required to remain members of the Assembly unless special provision, by Regional Assembly vote, provides exception to this rule.

This would need to be addressed as Law after and if the above is approved:

The Security Council Regulation Act

Section One: Requirements

1. Members of the Security Council (Council) must have an Influence level above Vassal.
2. Members of the Council should maintain at least 50% of the Delegate’s endorsement count or less if by agreed consensus of exception from Council vote.

Section Two: Reporting and Updating

1. The President of the Council shall provide the Regional Assembly with monthly reports on the activities of the Council in regards to membership, endorsement levels and regional security.
2. The Regional Assembly will hold a vote on the regulations and requirements as needed.

Section Three: Enforcement

1. The Vice Delegate may remove members of the Council who violate the requirements of this Act.
2. The Regional Assembly may vote to remove members of the Council for violations of this Act or the regional Constitution. Nations removed through Regional Assembly vote are to be treated as nations impeached from any standard government office per the Constitution of The North Pacific.

All references to the CLO will be replaced by Security Council with relevant semantic changes to the Constitution.
 
The other motion made by Eluvatar to change the wording in the Miscellany seems perfectly fine to me and can be submitted as a corollary if needed.
 
I do have one question. This one has been bugging me a bit as I've looked over the drafts.

This creates a possible situation where the Vice Delegate may end up getting impeached due to reasons related to the Security Counsel. Is this an acceptable effect of this legislation?

I just want to make sure.
 
Any government official can be impeached by act of the Regional Assembly. I am not sure how the Vice Delegate is singled out. Can you give an example of what you mean?
 
Right, he chairs the Council as its President.

The Vice Delegate can be subject to impeachment if he breaks the law so yes if he breaks the law through action in the Council he can be impeached.
 
Right, he chairs the Council as its President.

The Vice Delegate can be subject to impeachment if he breaks the law so yes if he breaks the law through action in the Council he can be impeached.
...

Forensatha:
This creates a possible situation where the Vice Delegate may end up getting impeached due to reasons related to the Security Counsel. Is this an acceptable effect of this legislation?
 
The Security Council becomes part of the Constitution if this passes so again I do not understand the differentiation that you keep asking about.

Yes, the Vice Delegate can be impeached in relation to the Security Council, just as a Judge can be impeached in relation to the Court and a Minister can be impeached in relation to the Cabinet and an Assembly person removed in relation to the Regional Assembly.

I'm not trying to be difficult and would like to fully address your concern but I can not determine what that concern actually is.
 
The simple fact is that these nations exist in the region with or without our blessing and they could form their own group with or without our consent.

This at the very least allows us to codify how much say they have in how the region is governed.
 
Thank you for proposing this, GM. This is a level and workable proposal, and the amendment has my support.

I am not entirely comfortable with the law regulating a Council member's allowable percentage of endorsements. That is something which should be adaptable to circumstances, particularly as there are currently no requirements as to the level of endos the delegate ought to maintain.

For example, the delegate can decide he wants to be "TAOist" and amass 600 endos. It wouldn't seem wise to make a Council member lose eligibility because he failed to keep up. Similarly, during times of delegate transfers, whether orchestrated or not, a Council member may have more than the 75% allowed.

I also have a question regarding influence. I have noticed mine alternating between Ambassador and Auxillary for months. Could it present a problem for the Council if members happen to drop back to Minnow? If so, should the influence level requirement be set higher to prevent this from happening?
 
I was using the Minnow requirement from the original submission and quite honestly am not familiar with the current Influence rankings. They have changed since my last time as a Delegate.

In regards to the endorsement levels, I do believe there should be some leeway but couldn't really think of a good method of codifying it. Do you have a suggestion?
 
I have a serious long-standing objection to fixed endo-caps, such as what you propose in your version, as opposed to the original posted by Eluvatar. In that proposal, which worked out a system that is more flexible, allowed revision to meet currrent circumstances; it represented a workable compromise between those of us who have philosophical objections to fixed endo caps, and the desire to have some means of determining when somneone's action might pose a security risk.

I know that you have always loved fixed endo caps. (I have a long memory of that point), but the endo caps laanguage you are proposing is a deal-breaker as far as I'm concerned.
 
The original submission included fixed numbers for endorsements, thus fixed endo caps. Percentages allow a more fluid endorsement policy.

The method of updating that you mention still exists, but is given to the RA:

2. The Regional Assembly may update the regulations and requirements in Section One through regular Assembly vote.

For reference, here is the original:

1. Members of the Security Council (Council) and the Auxiliary shall adhere to an influence requirement of having influence greater than Vassal.
2. Members of the Council shall maintain at least 130 endorsements and no more than 200.
3. Members of the Auxiliary shall maintain at least 100 endorsements and no more than 150.

Could you explain how that is not a fixed endo cap? :blink:
 
I am against endocaps, and this agreement will also encourage more endotarting among those who want to be eligible.

It creates more problems than it solves, and would lead to more bannings and ejections if implemented.

Oh, and the discriminatory aspect I mentioned earlier.
 
Yep, and therefore it keeps one of the most loyal and active groups of citizens from ever holding this office- the military and security guys, who leave the region and change UN's enough that they never gather influence.
 
My largest concern is with the NPA as well. Essentially, those that work for the region's military goals are already by default disallowed from becoming head of government, and this only worsens that. Whether or not this particular situation requires codifying is still up for debate.

(Also, I believe Foren's question was along the lines of "Can the Vice Delegate be removed from the Vice Delegacy by being impeached as a member of the Council?")
 
The original proposal makes the adjustment of the numbers a regular obligation of the Council to review and an obligation of the RA to vote on an expedited basis. The original proposal also reflects the historic practice in TNP of flexible levels which neither uses a fixed number or a fixed percentage.

I believe, and have frequently stated that the flaw of a permanent fixed numberor a permanent fixed percentage is that it creates a safe harbor of endos for those who would attempt to go for the Delegacy outside the Constitution. With the original proposal, it would leave outsiders guessing as to what levels would be in place, as it could change at least once every other month, if not more frequently.

FWIW, the orginal proposal offers a new and different approach on the issue that as far as I know hasn't been tried, and is worth the test. The percentage fized limits has been tried and failed elsewhere, and it makes no sense to me to try something that experience elsewhere has shown does not work.
 
You are speaking in circles.

You keep pointing at the original proposal, which the majority of comments indicated as being insufficient, and then arguing against fixed numbers, which the original included.

Would a suitable compromise to your dilemma be that the RA hold a vote on the designated percentage (or number since it doesn't really matter) on a regular basis, perhaps bi-weekly or monthly?
 
My largest concern is with the NPA as well. Essentially, those that work for the region's military goals are already by default disallowed from becoming head of government, and this only worsens that. Whether or not this particular situation requires codifying is still up for debate.

(Also, I believe Foren's question was along the lines of "Can the Vice Delegate be removed from the Vice Delegacy by being impeached as a member of the Council?")
I can not speak to the NPA, that is a voluntary institution and any choosing to take part in it do so of their own wish. Not being able to take part in some aspects of the government because of that choice shouldn't be the burden of the government.

As far as the question of whether the Vice Delegate can be impeached from the Vice Delegacy by act of being impeached as a member of the Council I believe the two would be synonymous since any act that is in violation of the Constitution that would result in impeachment would include removal from all offices in the region.
 
I've been apart of this effort since it was first brought forward by Eluvatar and many others, I am very glad to see that you have taken the mantle to see this through.

However the endorsement cap, I find completely unnecessary. There are nations who qualify for this council who don't have enough endos but are up to Duckspear as there are nations with endos that could be over the limit and not be above minnow.

Endorsement caps have never worked in this region and has only worked in the Pacific where mass bannings are needed to channel influence directly to the Delegate. Which would not work in our system where Delegates regularly handover power.

It is also redundant as no other nation may surpass the Vice Delegate in endorsements.
 
Okay, if you and others don't like the idea of including endo caps then why were they in the original submission?

All I did was rework the original proposal so that the ultimate authority remained in the hands of the Regional Assembly instead of creating a self regulating entity.

If endorsement caps are unnecessary and unwanted then they shouldn't have been included in the original, especially since it was in development apparently for months.
 
Maybe it's time to explore the underlying goals of this legislation, and see if they will indeed be advanced by the amendment.

The primary objective is to provide for regional security. That is, to take over the delegacy in the event of an invasion or rogue delegate. Certainly having a group of nations who are equipped to carry out this objective will be an asset.

Now gamewise, there is a short list of TNP nations who have the goods. Add "trust" as a requirement, and that number is more than halved. Next, take away the nations who just aren't interested in politics. That leaves a list of less than a dozen nations. Finally, impose endorsement standards upon the remaining nations and you end up with an even smaller pool of nations who would be interested in being involved in a Security Council.

I think the direction we need to take is in looking at ways to build a strong, trustworthy and reliable force. I believe making demands is going to be counter-productive to that goal. As such, endorsement levels should be presented as guidelines, not as a code.

Actually, it would be a good idea to have suggested expectations for the Delegate, as well as relative levels for the Vice-Del, SC and the population in general. I would support a system that spelled out acceptable ranges, while still allowing for situations to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

@Khark, you probably don't know that I was NPA when I first decided to run for delegate. I had 0 influence and 0 endorsements. So, never say never. It can be done!
 
Okay, if you and others don't like the idea of including endo caps then why were they in the original submission?

All I did was rework the original proposal so that the ultimate authority remained in the hands of the Regional Assembly instead of creating a self regulating entity.

If endorsement caps are unnecessary and unwanted then they shouldn't have been included in the original, especially since it was in development apparently for months.
Once again you answered your own question. It was stalled in development for months because of disagreements on issues.

Which is why we're glad you've taken the task to be shot at continue this very important piece of legislation.

Note: we've just updated the Legal Code to remove all obsolete ministries, including the SC. Might want to work that in or amend it later on if this passes.
 
How about this then:

The Security Council Regulation Act

Section One: Requirements

1. Members of the Security Council (Council) must have an Influence level above Vassal.
2. Members of the Council should maintain at least 50% of the Delegate’s endorsement count but no more than 75% unless acting in accordance with mandated regional government act stipulating the removal of the sitting Delegate or by agreed consensus of exception from Council vote.

Section Two: Reporting and Updating

1. The President of the Council shall provide the Regional Assembly with monthly reports on the activities of the Council in regards to membership, endorsement levels and regional security.
2. The Regional Assembly will hold a vote on the regulations and requirements in Section One on a monthly basis. Any change to the regulations and requirements must be presented as a separate item for discussion at least 72 hours prior to the designated voting period.

Section Three: Enforcement

1. The Vice Delegate may remove members of the Council who violate the requirements of this Act.
2. The Regional Assembly may vote to remove members of the Council for violations of this Act or the regional Constitution. Nations removed through Regional Assembly vote are to be treated as nations impeached from any standard government office per the Constitution of The North Pacific.
 
Okay, if you and others don't like the idea of including endo caps then why were they in the original submission?
If you'll look at that thread, you might notice that the reception wasn't exactly the warmest. Not frosty, mind you, but some people were not overly thrilled, if they paid attention at all.

I was under the impression that the bill had died while still in discussion.
 
Okay, if you and others don't like the idea of including endo caps then why were they in the original submission?

All I did was rework the original proposal so that the ultimate authority remained in the hands of the Regional Assembly instead of creating a self regulating entity.

If endorsement caps are unnecessary and unwanted then they shouldn't have been included in the original, especially since it was in development apparently for months.
Once again you answered your own question. It was stalled in development for months because of disagreements on issues.

Which is why we're glad you've taken the task to be shot at continue this very important piece of legislation.

Note: we've just updated the Legal Code to remove all obsolete ministries, including the SC. Might want to work that in or amend it later on if this passes.
I have actually submitted a separate amendment for discussion in the Court which will be presented to the Regional Assembly if the other Court authored amendment regarding the Legal Code passes, specifically in regards to Law 1.
 
Okay, if you and others don't like the idea of including endo caps then why were they in the original submission?
If you'll look at that thread, you might notice that the reception wasn't exactly the warmest. Not frosty, mind you, but some people were not overly thrilled, if they paid attention at all.

I was under the impression that the bill had died while still in discussion.
Which is why I have submitted it as a new amendment.
 
So, if people didn't like provisions of the old one, why are you so shocked that they do not like similar provisions in yours?
You misunderstand, I am not shocked that someone like yourself, who is a CLO member, would disagree. I am shocked that some parties that were co-authors of the original disagree.
 
Back
Top