[Private] R4R regarding "On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations"

Vivanco

Legal Nerd? Yeah, that's me
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vivanco
The Court Examiner has opened before us a brand new Request for Review here.

Briefing period has opened, and it'll end in five days (On the 6th)
 
As I stated in Discord, this one potentially is pretty easy, but that depends on which approach we take.

The law was changed specifically to respond to the original ruling, so that joint ops where restricted actions took place could still be viable for the NPA. That law was then changed again over concerns the original fix didn't actually fix the issue, though the Court never reviewed the matter. Now that the law has changed and appears to explicitly respond to this ruling, the examiner is challenging it as defunct. First thing for us to decide is whether that is actually true. If it is, this is a rather routine matter and we can render the ruling defunct. If however it is not defunct, then we have to uphold the original ruling or reconsider it.

So why do I think this is in question? As @Vivanco is well aware, having served on the Court when that ruling came down, the Court's position was informed by a belief that the provision requiring the NPA to act with respect to a region meant that participating in a joint raid, even where someone else carried out the actions, was not consistent with that clause. The law at the time did not specifically allow for the possibility of participating in a joint op where others carried out the forbidden actions, however. Now it does. Does that matter, assuming you continue to share the same opinion you did back then? If that's the sticking point, then the clause intended to fix this may not really be a fix.

In my view, the acting with respect clause is not automatically violated by participation in a joint operation. And the fact the RA explicitly allows such participation, with the restrictions it has, implicitly means they do not consider this to be a contradiction. In my view, the law has sufficiently changed that such activity is now permissible. This would render the prior ruling defunct. But that ruling also did not go into deeper detail as to how it felt those clauses were violated, nor were the reasonings shared in deliberations translated into the final decision. We instead have a very basic laying out of the principle in that ruling, due to Lore's choice to be as simplistic as possible (and this is a good example of why that is not always the best approach). I think we ought to actually lay these thoughts out clearly, especially if either of you feel differently from me as to whether the respect clause means the subsequent clause is incompatible. The opinion before hinged on the respect clause, and the fact that relying on others in a joint op to carry out the raid actions the NPA normally cannot was not enough to get around those restrictions before. The respect clause is a lot less extensive than it used to be, and the action the Court used to consider a violation is explicitly allowed. But the last line of the opinion says that if a member of the NPA cannot do these things, then the NPA cannot actively or passively support violations of the restrictions without violating them themselves. This in my view goes beyond the specifics that led the justices to agree with Lore's ruling, and presents a problem no matter what the law says. It states a principle, one I would challenge as there is no textual basis for it, and one that flies in the face of what I consider to be the RA's clear intent, that the actions of other militaries that would be forbidden by our laws mean our military cannot take part, because that is against our own rules. The sentiment itself is just wrong, and while rendering the decision defunct would make it go away, I think it is important for us to clearly push back on it. That requires overruling it.
 
Ah, one of my first rulings that I joined. Let's see how things have changed in these times. Before posting a proper draft opinion, that I will be the one doing since I would like to, I will be posting my thoughts, and if we're all on the same page, following that same train of thought, I shall draft up the opinion.

The issue that was brought before the original R4R, for context's sake, was that the actions taken by the NPA alongside other organisations that don't set themselves to the same scrutiny or ethics that the NPA must adhere to, brought concern to a NPA soldier whenever following orders when they could be a potential breach of TNP law.

The ruling ended up stating that the fact that the NPA does not hold control over the operation at hand wouldn't be an excuse for NPA soldiers to break TNP's law, and that the NPA can't either passively or actively support actions that would break TNP's law, as they're subject to it.

With this in mind, let's see the current R4R at hand, how the law has changed, and if such position can truly be considered being "over" and defunct.
To begin, the Legal Code's articles that were subject at hand. Before, the NPA had the obligation to "refrain from excessive use of force including altering the regions chosen embassy list or password protecting the region. Before leaving, The North Pacific Army must provide natives with the means to restore the region to its original state. Exceptions to this clause must be publicly authorised by the Delegate when it is in the best interests of The North Pacific or its allies" in general. This article has since changed to the "Class A restrictions" and the "Class B restrictions".

The matter was also changed with the article 51, given protagonism in the R4R, as "Members of The North Pacific Army may participate in joint operations with other militaries that perform restricted actions, and may serve as Regional Officers in foreign regions during such joint operations, but may not perform any restricted actions themselves in the joint operation, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.", a direct answer to the former R4R's concerns, but let us remember that the previous ruling did not already add that NPA soldiers should not do such actions, but that they couldn't passively accept them. It is, indeed, a matter of principles that are not set in stone, more set in the foundations of the spirit of the law rather than in the law themselves.

I would agree that taking our foot out of the accelerator just enough to allow us to see what's the RA's intent, but without getting enough leave to have anything standing.

The standing that I took back in the day has changed somewhat, but I still firmly believe that the NPA should take themselves to their best behaviour, to not support overly-endangering actions or take advantage of loopholes that would've been "if we act in this, we technically won't be breaking the law". It might have been too harsh, but in the day, the law was harsher and the status of the NPA was required to take itself higher in general.
 
Vivanco if I understand you correctly, you are agreeing with me that there is a fundamental principle that the previous ruling held (the NPA cannot passively allow these things to happen) even if the law explicitly allows them. So we have to deal with that assertion - in effect, we have to decide if that assertion is itself valid, and that it’s not simply a matter of this being defunct. In other words, the Court went further than what any change in law can address, which is a significant thing since there’s no higher law this decision rests in - it’s just the preference of the justices.

I understand your preference is for the NPA not to act in a way or be party to actions that are not what our law prefers, but legally what mandates that standard? I think that principle outlined in the previous ruling was wrong and shouldn’t continue to be an obstacle when the RA has clearly attempted to clarify its position and accommodate exceptions to its requirements. If I am not understanding your position then I apologize, and ask you state it a bit clearer. Perhaps seeing a draft opinion expressing this position would clear things up. I’m not sure if we’re actually at odds yet.
 
Alright, I still am interested in seeing your thoughts fleshed out and translated to a more official form @Vivanco (as well as your own thoughts @Nutmeg The Squirrel ) but given how much time has passed, I took a stab at drafting an opinion utilizing the argument I have been making in these discussions. Let me know what you think.

Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by TlomzKrano on the Reconsideration of the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations
Opinion drafted by Chief Justice Pallaith, joined by Justice Nutmeg The Squirrel, and Justice Vivanco, who filed a separate concurrence

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Jinkies, and here by SkyTheAquariusOP.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Legal Code of The North Pacific.
Chapter 7: Executive Government:
Section 7.6: The North Pacific Army
50. Members of The North Pacific Army holding a Regional Officer position in a foreign region as part of an operation in that region may not use that position to perform restricted actions, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.
51. Members of The North Pacific Army may participate in joint operations with other militaries that perform restricted actions, and may serve as Regional Officers in foreign regions during such joint operations, but may not perform any restricted actions themselves in the joint operation, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.

The Court took into consideration prior rulings by the Court here, here, here, here.


The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The petitioner is the Court Examiner and enjoys universal standing for all questions before this Court. There is no question of proper standing in this case.

On the Court’s Prior Ruling
The Court now considers a prior ruling related to a matter that has been impacted by changes to the law since the ruling was made, in this case the law related to the region’s military. This Court previously held that the restrictions placed on the North Pacific Army still applied even in joint military operations, and that the fact other regions may carry out the forbidden actions instead of the NPA soldiers deployed on the operation wouldn’t make the participation any less problematic, as the NPA would still be passively supporting the actions the legal code prohibited. Since this ruling, the Legal Code was extensively amended, with the intent of distinguishing this scenario from the restrictions typically placed on the NPA. The Court Examiner asserts that the existing law clearly contradicts this Court’s prior ruling and it is no longer in step with the Regional Assembly’s position on this matter. The Court Examiner is right to observe the Regional Assembly’s position on the matter is not the same as the Court’s conclusion, but is wrong that the law as currently constituted contradicts the ruling.

The Legal Code currently takes pains to set parameters for how members of the NPA may behave in joint raiding operations. It makes clear that restrictions apply to their actions but not to the operation, and that participating in such operations is permissible if they abide by the restrictions themselves. If the Court had been content to state that without explicit allowance for joint operation participation, such participation would violate the law’s prohibition, that would be one thing, and we could safely say this ruling is defunct. However, that was not actually what the Court had concluded. The Court asserted that the intent of the law was to limit the harmful impact of the NPA while deployed in foreign regions, and cited clauses including one stating that the NPA “will act with respect towards the natives of the region, and refrain from excessive use of force…” The language that requires the NPA to act with respect is still in the Legal Code, albeit in a much simpler form. The law still lays out exemptions for these restrictions, and how those exemptions may be granted. The Court relied on this language to conclude that even if the NPA does not actively take part in destructive acts, and even though the legal code cannot mandate how other militaries behave, the NPA’s presence there at all is still passively participating in illegal destructive acts. This principle goes beyond any specific permission for joint operation activity, because it asserts that the law contradicts itself if it restricts the NPA from taking certain action but later allows it to passively participate in an operation where the restricted activity takes place. In other words, despite the fact that the assembly sought to patch the law by explicitly allowing participation in joint operations, the Court declared that any such allowance is incompatible with the law as it exists. Because the law stated certain actions needed to be permitted on a case-by-case basis by the Regional Assembly, and because the NPA was expected not to be unnecessarily destructive and to respect other regions, passive participation in unrestricted destructive acts would not be permissible.

On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations
There is a fundamental question that the Court attempted to answer in a quick and succinct way, doing a great disservice to the region in the process. Without explaining a constitutional or precedential basis for doing so, the Court declared that passive participation in an operation where restricted actions took place, even if done by other militaries and even if their presence in an operation were specifically authorized (in this case by the same legal code the Court is attempting to strictly interpret), still violates the legal code. With that understanding, then, there is no way that the RA’s latest alteration to the legal code could contradict this ruling. With that understanding, in fact, there is no actual way for the regional assembly to get around this pesky principle. Ostensibly participation in a joint raiding operation would require a vote of the assembly to exempt the region targeted in the raid, even though the law says that joint operations are permissible under the circumstances outlined. This Court is not in the habit of creating unbreakable walls that the regional assembly cannot overcome, especially when its intent is clear and it is explicitly attempting to correct the state of things caused by this Court. For a principle to be so strong and fundamental that a simple amendment of the legal code is insufficient, one would expect there to be a constitutional principle, perhaps even an aspect of the bill of rights, that stands in the way. And yet, no such principle exists, or is asserted by the original Court ruling.

The Court was asked, in the absence of the legal code contemplating the scenario, if joint operations where destructive acts took place were operations the NPA could participate in. As the Court said in our prior ruling, and as remains true now, we cannot apply our own restrictions to those of our partners in joint operations. Since that ruling, clear guidelines now exist in the law as it stands for how the NPA can participate in joint operations where restricted actions take place. The scenario is no longer absent from the law, and the Regional Assembly has decided that its restrictions on the NPA are not inherently a barrier to cooperating with other regions. We must read the conditional allowance for joint operations to be as much of a check on NPA action as the restricted acts and means of exempting the NPA from those restrictions. And we must acknowledge that the law providing for exemptions and allowing for joint operations given certain circumstances coexists with the language mandating the treatment of other regions with respect. Our interpretation of how far these provisions extend is not as pivotal as the assembly’s interpretation, and their work on this matter sends as clear a signal as any as to how they want the military to operate and how these clauses should be understood. Without any constitutional principle to back it up, and especially without sufficient elaboration as to why the Court came to its conclusion that a fundamental contradiction existed, the Court’s previous assertion that joint raiding operations could not be supported by the NPA was plain wrong and bad jurisprudence.

This Court deliberated on the matter, and those deliberations are now a matter of public record. There were arguments that could have been advanced in the final decision that was handed down, ones this Court could appropriately and officially reconsider in this case. But those arguments were never outlined or elaborated, and as a result do not hold the force of law and are as incidental as any of the briefs considered by this Court. The Court at the time felt that participation in such raids was inherently disrespectful to the regions impacted by those raids, and that simply having another military do the dirty work was not enough to get around the restriction. Had those conclusions been key to the decision, they would have still lacked the crucial legal underpinning that such rulings must have when this Court considers an ambiguous area. We have ruled previously that this Court must rely on legal logic traced to a constitutional principle or pattern. The Court relied instead on a gap in the law and its own personal preference, essentially ruling the way it did because it said so. We believe there was potentially more to its opinion than that, even if it relied simply on the justices’ own sense of logic and reasoning, but the Court did not show that to the region in its decision. It is important for rulings to be understandable and clear in their application and reasoning, and it can be good for the region when these decisions are short and to the point, and do not mince words. But it can clearly be seen that a lot of crucial context and foundational logic and reasoning can be lost when expedience and simplicity are the only goals considered. The Court erred in how it presented its argument, and it established a principle that unnecessarily restricted the regional assembly from adjusting its own rules for the NPA that had no deeper legal foundation.

Holding
We hereby overturn the ruling On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations in its entirety. We affirm that restrictions placed on the NPA’s actions in its operations apply to all operations it engages in, whether alone or with other militaries, but that this does not mean that participation in joint raiding operations is inherently restricted.
 
Just for clarity, I will be posting a draft of my own in this day/weekend.
 
Just for clarity, I will be posting a draft of my own in this day/weekend.
Vivanco, I am eager to see your take on how this one should be decided. With the benefit of more time to consider my position, I think it still holds up and is the correct resolution to this question, but I am open to hearing from you if I missed anything.
 
Vivanco, I am eager to see your take on how this one should be decided. With the benefit of more time to consider my position, I think it still holds up and is the correct resolution to this question, but I am open to hearing from you if I missed anything.
I am working on it, I'm trying to fix some essential stuff such as my own clarity and some typos that I seem to have missed.
 
Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific


In regards to the judicial inquiry filed by TlomzKrano on Reconsideration of the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations
Opinion drafted by Justice Vivanco, joined by Justices

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by Jinkies.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by SkyTheAquariusOP.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by QuietDad.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Bill of Rights of The North Pacific:

9. Each Nation in The North Pacific and its territories is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region and its territories on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region and its territories shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific and its territories, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific and its territories the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution. No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law or a bill of attainder as to any act for purposes of criminal proceedings.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 7.6: The North Pacific Army
44. The North Pacific Army is the military of The North Pacific. The Executive Officer charged with military affairs will endeavor to maintain an active and well trained military, capable of executing both offensive and defensive operations.
45. When deployed in a foreign region, The North Pacific Army will act with respect towards the natives of the region.
[...]
50. Members of The North Pacific Army holding a Regional Officer position in a foreign region as part of an operation in that region may not use that position to perform restricted actions, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.
51. Members of The North Pacific Army may participate in joint operations with other militaries that perform restricted actions, and may serve as Regional Officers in foreign regions during such joint operations, but may not perform any restricted actions themselves in the joint operation, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.
The Court took into consideration the prior rulings by the Court here, here, here and here

The Court opines the following:

On Standing

The petitioner is the Court Examiner, and according to Section 3.6 of the Legal Code, The Court Examiner will have standing in all cases of judicial review brought before the Court. This being the case, there is no question regarding standing in the case.

Factual Background

On the 29th of december, 2020, BMWSurfer submitted to the Court a Request for Review as soldier and officer of the NPA regarding the decision of the Ministry of Defense to allow the NPA to conduct Joint Operations with organizations who do not follow the standards set for the NPA in the Legal Code, as a question if the members of the NPA should have to face the potential legal responsibility from their actions when, upon taking orders during a joint operation, they break the laws.

The Ruling was submitted on the 27th of January, 2021, and stands that the Court found that any NPA Policy that allowed the NPA to support raids that engage in acts prohibited by the Legal Code would put the organization in violation of the region’s laws. It also clarifies the fact that the NPA falls under the jurisdiction of the Legal Code, and if the actions were a violation of the Legal Code by a member of the organization, the NPA couldn’t, in the Court’s opinion in this case, actively nor passively support the violations that occurred.

Regarding the Previous Opinion

The Court takes the task to analyze the previous ruling number 64, On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations taking in consideration the changes that the legal status of the region have changed, providing that no exemptions existed at the time for joint operations. The Court Examiner presents that this is no longer the case.

At the time of the original R4R, the NPA had to follow the following obligation:
To “refrain from excessive use of force including altering the regions chosen embassy list or password protecting the region. Before leaving, The North Pacific Army must provide natives with the means to restore the region to its original state. Exceptions to this clause must be publicly authorized by the Delegate when it is in the best interests of The North Pacific or its allies”.

Since then, the requisites established by the law have changed, to the NPA having an obligation to act with respect towards the natives of the region, and included a set of restricted action, and among it, the Legal Code includes that the members may participate in joint operations with other militaries that perform restricted actions, so long as they do not perform any restricted actions themselves, except where necessary to restore a region to a prior native-controlled state.

By such current legal standards, and taking in consideration the needs and flexibility of the NPA, and regarding that limitations have been put in place in the Legal Code other than the Court’s ruling that do regulate such circumstances regarding Joint Operations, in which the mere participation of the region’s military organization may take part, but not commit directly such actions that bypass the restrictiveness established by law, the use of the previous ruling has outlived its usefulness, as regarded by the legal standard.

Holding

We hereby overturn the ruling On the Constraints of the NPA while on Joint Raiding Operations in its entirety, as the legal standard that affected the previous ruling has changed to a different standard and paradigm, in which the participation in joint raiding operations is not restricted in full.
 
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@Vivanco your argument seems to primarily be an argument that the old ruling is now defunct, but you ultimately overturn the ruling. I’m reading an implied argument that the court’s imposed restrictions have to be struck down because they don’t accommodate the flexibility needed for the military. We end up in the same place, overturning the ruling and acknowledging that it’s defunct in part. I’m not sure I understand the difference other than how it’s written. Are you concerned with the way my argument is delivered?
 
@Vivanco your argument seems to primarily be an argument that the old ruling is now defunct, but you ultimately overturn the ruling. I’m reading an implied argument that the court’s imposed restrictions have to be struck down because they don’t accommodate the flexibility needed for the military. We end up in the same place, overturning the ruling and acknowledging that it’s defunct in part. I’m not sure I understand the difference other than how it’s written. Are you concerned with the way my argument is delivered?
As I was drafting and re-drafting, I ended up deciding with this idea as it seemed the most sound after exploring it.
My primary concern currently with your argument is not that it's wrong, but that for what I believe are the needs of the R4R I still remain of the thought that the Court could define such limitations as per the Legal Code at the time wasn't clear enough, as your own argument declares it was an error to do so as per the Bill of Rights declares that each organisation of the region shall abide to certain fundamental principles, being the one of accountability amongst them. I believe that the way the former ruling was established was the way of ensuring that such guiding principle was followed where the Legal Code did not allow for those other actions (as it is allowed now as per the current legal status).

I think the main concern we face between our arguments is that standing of the prior R4R whenever it was a proper action or not.
 
As I was drafting and re-drafting, I ended up deciding with this idea as it seemed the most sound after exploring it.
My primary concern currently with your argument is not that it's wrong, but that for what I believe are the needs of the R4R I still remain of the thought that the Court could define such limitations as per the Legal Code at the time wasn't clear enough, as your own argument declares it was an error to do so as per the Bill of Rights declares that each organisation of the region shall abide to certain fundamental principles, being the one of accountability amongst them. I believe that the way the former ruling was established was the way of ensuring that such guiding principle was followed where the Legal Code did not allow for those other actions (as it is allowed now as per the current legal status).

I think the main concern we face between our arguments is that standing of the prior R4R whenever it was a proper action or not.
I understand. We believe in the same conclusion but feel the arguments need to be different. I’m not sure if I can adjust the opinion to sufficiently address your concern.

@Nutmeg The Squirrel where do you land on this one? Could you see yourself signing on to either of these opinions as currently written?
 
I understand. We believe in the same conclusion but feel the arguments need to be different. I’m not sure if I can adjust the opinion to sufficiently address your concern.

@Nutmeg The Squirrel where do you land on this one? Could you see yourself signing on to either of these opinions as currently written?
I will sign my name to yours, as I don't wish to protect the legitimacy of 64 as a Court Ruling, that's the only real difference I see between these two drafts
 
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