Against.
Not a fan of several sections as they could cause unintended problems. Coming from an American Justice System point of view for reference. Additionally, coming from someone who feels that fair plea deals (not coercive ones) should be offered in all cases.
Recusal requirements. A public prosecutor must disqualify himself from a case if there exists a material conflict of personal or financial interest, personal bias or prejudice for or against the accused, personal relationship with the accused, or previous involvement in the case.
There are too many vague items in this section. What constitutes a Material conflict? Additionally, what constitutes "personal bias?" Can a defendant bring a suit if the bias of the prosecutor is that they don't like accused criminals? Also, for "previous involvement in the case," does this mean that if a case is sent back on appeal the prosecutor who previously worked on it and will have full knowledge of the case now cannot work on it again, even if the reason for the return on appeal has nothing to do with the prosecutors previous work? Failure to define or address these issues will lead to extensive litigation and appeals which will further clog up the court system.
Private right of action. A private civil right of action for compensatory and punitive damages, all legal immunity to the contrary notwithstanding, shall exist against any public prosecutor who, aware of the section 1(a) guidelines and their applicability to a case, knowingly elects not to disqualify himself in that case.
I don't like the idea of a private right of action against prosecutors merely for failure to recuse. Bias issues could be used for criminal appeals potentially for malicious prosecution but setting a private right of action is asking for every single defendant to sue their prosecutor for the vague issues discussed above. Additionally, saying there is a private right of action without defining what the penalties or elements for that right of action are (especially given the vagueness issues discussed above) is problematic and doesn't actually do anything.
Anti-retaliation. No prosecutor may take or fail to take any action intended to retaliate against, punish, or deter a defendant from exercising any statutory, constitutional, or World Assembly right. Nor may any prosecutor bring charges in a way that would, to an impartial observer, appear likely to retaliate against, punish, or deter a defendant from exercising any such right.
Who is your impartial observer? To a defense attorney, adding charges that have higher penalties against a defendant might be punishing or deterring a defendant from taking a case to trial if they choose to take a plea bargain on a lesser sentence on lesser included charges. To a prosecutor, this is just charging crimes that there is probably cause for and that they believe they can prove at trial.
Plea bargaining. No prosecutor may, in a plea bargain, threaten to bring more severe charges than those already brought at its start. However, subject to section 2, more severe charges may be brought after the plea bargain begins if the prosecutor becomes aware of evidence that would support those more severe charges.
This section, while clearly intended to prevent prosecutors from saying "take this deal or I'm bringing extra charges with higher penalties," would in fact have the opposite effect. It would likely instead lead to prosecutors always bringing the highest possible charges at the outset in order to have the additional leverage in plea deals. Alternatively, it encourages prosecutors to never start plea bargain negotiations and merely move forward with all charges, then dismiss counts they believe they can't prove at the close of their case. Additionally, I am opposed to the WA dictating what charges a member nation can bring that otherwise fall within their criminal code.
