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23rd April 2023

Hitachi Rail’s Maintenance contract extended by Great Western Railway​

The extension of the contract will see hundreds of jobs secured alongside supporting the UK supply chain​

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GWR Intercity Train

The maintenance partnership between Great Western Railway, Eversholt Rail and Hitachi Rail will be extended and will see millions of pounds invested into the UK's supply chain in order to bring improvements and increased reliability to rail services for the train operator's customers.

The innovative and extremely successful train maintenance carried out by Hitachi Rail has seen the company awarded with a contract extension until 2028 and has a value of more than £300 million in order to maintain Great Western Railway's West of England fleet which is made up of 36 Class 802 Intercity Express Trains until 2028.

Since Hitachi Rail has been handling maintenance for Great Western Railway, the fleet has seen an increase in reliability performance of more than 94%. Improvements have also been made in terms of reliability thanks to ongoing investment into digitally optimised maintenance, which began back in 2018.

The rail operator takes an ‘always improving' approach and has been rewarded with the Class 802s hitting the best-ever period of performance last summer with 28,537 Miles per Technical Incident.

Hitachi Rail will see ongoing investment made into its digital maintenance abilities in order to improve performance further for Great Western Railway customers and includes technology such as onboard digital monitoring, which can cut bogie and wheelset maintenance needs by half.
 
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GWR Train​

More than 500 highly skilled workers will maintain their position at the West of England depots thanks to the extension.

The majority of Class 802 maintenance takes place at Laira depot in Plymouth with a focus on maintenance being carried out closer to key stations such as Penzance, Exeter and Plymouth which in turn will bring better train availability, optimising the fleet and create a steady flow of work for the Laira depot.

The UK supply chain will also benefit from the extension of the contract with an investment of £70 million coming from Great Western Railway's Intercity Express Train fleet.

Hitachi Rail is focused on prioritising people and the UK supply chain via its maintenance business and providing an annual economic benefit of £462 million throughout the UK.

Simon Green, GWR Engineering Director said:

“This major contract extension demonstrates our partners' confidence in Hitachi Rail's UK maintenance operations and rolling stock technology, which was 2.7 times more reliable than the industry average in 2022.

“As intercity travel continues to recover strongly following the pandemic, we are proud to enhance our maintenance services for GWR and Eversholt Rail. This includes the incorporation of industry-leading digital tools and expanding Hitachi's presence at Plymouth's Laira depot.”

“Since the introduction of this Intercity Express Train fleet almost five years ago, they have made a massive contribution delivering more services and seats and have allowed us to respond positively to changes in demand for leisure travel across many of our long-distance routes.

“The award of this contract means we have continuity in the maintenance of our Class 802 fleet, and we look forward to continuing to work with Hitachi to deliver this fleet into service every day.”

Paul Sutherland, Client Services Director at Eversholt Rail said:

“We are pleased to have secured this maintenance contract extension with Hitachi Rail for the Class 802 fleet. Hitachi Rail's approach to maintenance and their investment in digital maintenance solutions will continue to serve the West of England routes with a high-performing service for years to come.

“This contract continues to build on our strong partnership with both Great Western Railway and Hitachi Rail to deliver the best services to passengers in the South West.”
 
23rd April 2023

Ruislip Lido Railway welcomes the return of Mad Bess​

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Mad Bess, Ruislip Lido Railway​

The Ruislip Lido Railway is today completing the final polish of Mad Bess before its much-awaited return to service on 30 April.

Mad Bess is 2–4–0 saddle tank locomotive built between 1986 and 1998, and will feature in the Railway's Gala on Saturday 13 and Sunday 14 May.
 
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Mad Bess​

To celebrate its return, the Railway is offering Rover Tickets for unlimited travel on Sunday 30 April.

Tickets can be purchased in advance via its online ticket site.

Tickets will be valid all day, trains will run between 12:00 – 17:00 every twenty minutes, with alternate trains hauled by Mad Bess.
 
23rd April 2023

Steam locomotive Adams T3 Class 4-4-0 No. 563 passes its hydraulic test​

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563 Boiler Test​

The 563 Locomotive Group has announced that the next stage in overhauling Adams T3 Class 4-4-0 No. 563 has been reached.

The boiler is being refurbished at the Flour Mill workshop in the Forest of Dean, where the Group's Locomotive Superintendent, Graham Froud, and the boiler inspector witnessed 563's boiler being filled with water and pressurised to check its integrity.

The tests were successfully completed, and an out-of-frames steam test will follow.

That will bring the project closer to returning 563 to steam and is a huge credit to the team at the Flour Mill for all the work they've undertaken to get the boiler this far.
 
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Testing the water pressure​

William Adams designed the T3 Class as an express passenger locomotive for the London and South Western Railway, and 20 were constructed between 1892 and 1893, including No. 563.

By the end of 1933, only three T3s remained in service, with 563 being the last operational T3 lasting until it was withdrawn in August 1945 and set aside for preservation.
 
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The refurbished boiler​

In more recent times, 563 was used in a production of The Railway Children in Toronto, Canada, from May until October 2011, and at King's Cross in London from December 2014 to January 2017.

On 30 March 2017, the locomotive was transferred to the Swanage Railway Trust, under whose guidance it has since been undergoing a full restoration programme.

In order to finish the restoration, the Group still needs more funds, but now there is less than £50,000 left to raise to get the project over the line.

The Group is extremely grateful to everyone who has contributed so far, but anyone who can help contribute to finishing the overhaul can do so in a number of ways.
 
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Close up of the refurbished boiler​

Payments can be made online via the Swanage Railway Trust's website at www.swanagerailwaytrust.org/t3-appeal or the 563 Locomotive Group website www.563locomotivegroup.co.uk.

Alternatively, donations can be made by cheque made payable to the Swanage Railway Trust, endorsed ‘563 Locomotive Group' on the back, and sent to 563 Locomotive Group, Swanage Railway Trust, Station House, Swanage, DORSET, BH19 1HB.
 
23rd April 2023

Dean Forest Railway welcomes visiting pannier locomotive​

Loco 1369 to star in Spring Gala on 20 and 21 May​

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1369 and 4912 at South Devon Railway​

The Dean Forest Railway, in Lydney, Gloucestershire, has announced that GWR Pannier locomotive 1369 will be visiting from the South Devon Railway for its Spring Gala: Panniers and Prairies on Saturday 20 and Sunday 21 May, joining its resident Pannier 9681 and Prairie 5541.

The Railway is now in its sixth decade preserving heritage railway in the Forest of Dean and runs along part of the old Severn and Wye Railway lines, which were first built as a tramroad over two centuries years ago.

It calls itself ‘The Friendly Forest Line', and its four-and-a-half-mile line runs through beautiful woodland and countryside, with five stations along the way.
 
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Pannier 9681 on the Dean Forest Railway ​

At the south end is Lydney Junction station (close to the mainline railway station and a short walk from the harbour) and at the north end Parkend (a small forest village).

The main station is located at Norchard, on Forest Road, in the middle of the line, where visitors will find a large, free car park and a shop, museum and café.


The Railway, which was a finalist in this year's Coiley Award for Steam Locomotive Engineering, has made tickets available now for purchase on its website now.
 
23rd April 2023

ETHNON RAIL

YouTube Channel News

Great news! :D

New Video released!

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- YouTube

Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.
www.youtube.com www.youtube.com

No.3 Ethnon Rail - Update

This video has content about my Xmas Presents, a little bit about where the name Ethnon came from , a snippet about NationStates and a special mention to a nation who supports my blog there.

Also an update on baseboard progress and a little funny bonus material at the end of the vid.

I would like to thank all the people who have supported this channel so far.

Also a special thanks to my son, Neonlake for all his time spent on my videos..... Yes, you are a great editor and animator.

I would ask if you could please remember to 'like, subscribe and share my videos', Thank you. :D
 
Last edited:
*** LATEST: 'Become a Star on ETHNON RAIL' WE HAVE A WINNER! ***]

Well, Random.org has chosen the winner of the competition.

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The Anddoran Commune, United States of Dictators, Marlducro, Vivanco , aenglaland , lionsroar, Communist Beijing Must be China, Nordic-British_Union, The Vickersian Dominion, Illusia and neverendia, Laforeia, Dantek, Gojira, CHERN0BYL 2 and Advancia-Sizzletown.

To remind you, there were 618 lottery entries.

Between 15 nations.

1 Anddora
2 Anddora
3 Anddora
4 Anddora
5 Anddora
6 Anddora
7 Anddora
8 Anddora
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10 Anddora
11 Anddora
12 Anddora
13 Anddora
14 Anddora
15 Cloud
16 Cloud
17 Cloud
18 Cloud
19 Cloud
20 Cloud
21 Cloud
22 Cloud
23 Cloud
24 Cloud
25 Cloud
26 Cloud
27 Cloud
28 Cloud
29 Divided
30 Divided
31 Divided
32 Divided
33 Divided
34 Divided
35 Viv
36 Viv
37 Viv
38 Viv
39 Viv
40 Viv
41 Viv
42 Viv
43 Viv
44 Anddora
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72 Anddora
73 Anddora
74 Anddora
75 Anddora
76 Anddora
77 Anddora
78 Anddora
79 Anddora
80 Anddora
81 Anddora
82 Anddora
83 Anddora
84 Caius
85 Caius
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120 Caius
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122 Caius
123 Cloud
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130 Cloud
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135 Cloud
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148 Cloud
149 Cloud
150 Cloud
151 Cloud
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153 Cloud
154 Cloud
155 Cloud
156 Cloud
157 Cloud
158 Cloud
159 Cloud
160 Cloud
161 Cloud
162 Loh
163 Loh
164 Loh
165 Loh
166 Loh
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170 Loh
171 Loh
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189 Loh
190 Loh
191 Loh
192 Loh
193 Loh
194 Loh
195 Loh
196 Loh
197 Loh
198 Loh
199 Loh
200 Loh
201 Loh
202 Communist Beijing
203 Communist Beijing
204 Communist Beijing
205 Communist Beijing
206 Communist Beijing
207 Communist Beijing
208 Communist Beijing
209 Communist Beijing
210 Communist Beijing
211 Communist Beijing
212 Communist Beijing
213 Communist Beijing
214 Divided
215 Divided
216 Divided
217 Divided
218 Divided
219 Divided
220 Divided
221 Divided
222 Divided
223 Divided
224 Divided
225 Divided
226 Divided
227 Divided
228 Divided
229 Divided
230 Divided
231 Divided
232 Divided
233 Divided
234 Divided
235 Nordy/Cass
236 Nordy/Cass
237 Nordy/Cass
238 Nordy/Cass
239 Nordy/Cass
240 Nordy/Cass
241 Nordy/Cass
242 Nordy/Cass
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255 Nordy/Cass
256 Illusia
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260 Anddora
261 Anddora
262 Anddora
263 Anddora
264 Anddora
265 Anddora
266 Anddora
267 Anddora
268 Anddora
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271 Anddora
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273 Anddora
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277 Anddora
278 Anddora
279 Anddora
280 Anddora
281 Anddora
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285 Anddora
286 Anddora
287 Anddora
288 Anddora
289 Anddora
290 Anddora
291 Anddora
292 Anddora
293 Anddora
294 Anddora
295 Anddora
296 Anddora
297 Anddora
298 Anddora
299 Anddora
300 Caius
301 Caius
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336 Caius
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340 Cloud
341 Cloud
342 Cloud
343 Cloud
344 Cloud
345 Cloud
346 Cloud
347 Cloud
348 Cloud
349 Cloud
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365 Cloud
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367 Cloud
368 Cloud
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371 Cloud
372 Cloud
373 Cloud
374 Cloud
375 Cloud
376 Cloud
377 Cloud
378 Cloud
379 Cloud
380 Loh
381 Loh
382 Loh
383 Loh
384 Loh
385 Loh
386 Loh
387 Loh
388 Loh
389 Loh
390 Loh
391 Loh
392 Loh
393 Loh
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398 Loh
399 Loh
400 Loh
401 Loh
402 Loh
403 Loh
404 Loh
405 Loh
406 Loh
407 Loh
408 Loh
409 Loh
410 Loh
411 Loh
412 Loh
413 Loh
414 Loh
415 Loh
416 Loh
417 Loh
418 Loh
419 Communist Beijing
420 Communist Beijing
421 Communist Beijing
422 Communist Beijing
423 Communist Beijing
424 Communist Beijing
425 Communist Beijing
426 Communist Beijing
427 Communist Beijing
428 Communist Beijing
429 Communist Beijing
430 Communist Beijing
431 Communist Beijing
432 Communist Beijing
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436 Communist Beijing
437 Communist Beijing
438 Communist Beijing
439 Communist Beijing
440 Communist Beijing
441 Communist Beijing
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444 Communist Beijing
445 Communist Beijing
446 Communist Beijing
447 Communist Beijing
448 Communist Beijing
449 Communist Beijing
450 Communist Beijing
451 Communist Beijing
452 Communist Beijing
453 Communist Beijing
454 Communist Beijing
455 Communist Beijing
456 Divided
457 Divided
458 Divided
459 Divided
460 Divided
461 Divided
462 Divided
463 Divided
464 Divided
465 Divided
466 Divided
467 Divided
468 Divided
469 Laforeia
470 Laforeia
471 Laforeia
472 Laforeia
473 Laforeia
474 Laforeia
475 Laforeia
476 Laforeia
477 Laforeia
478 Laforeia
479 Laforeia
480 Laforeia
481 Laforeia
482 Laforeia
483 Laforeia
484 Laforeia
485 Laforeia
486 Laforeia
487 Laforeia
488 Laforeia
489 Laforeia
490 Laforeia
491 Laforeia
492 Laforeia
493 Gojira
494 Gojira
495 Gojira
496 Gojira
497 Gojira
498 Gojira
499 Gojira
500 Gojira
501 Gojira
502 Gojira
503 Gojira
504 Gojira
505 Gojira
506 Gojira
507 Gojira
508 Gojira
509 Gojira
510 Gojira
511 Gojira
512 Gojira
513 Gojira
514 Gojira
515 Gojira
516 Gojira
517 Gojira
518 Gojira
519 Gojira
520 Gojira
521 Gojira
522 Gojira
523 Gojira
524 Gojira
525 Nordy/Cass
526 Nordy/Cass
527 Nordy/Cass
528 Nordy/Cass
529 Nordy/Cass
530 Nordy/Cass
531 Nordy/Cass
532 Nordy/Cass
533 Nordy/Cass
534 Nordy/Cass
535 Viv
536 Viv
537 Lionsmeow
538 Lionsmeow
539 Lionsmeow
540 Dantek
541 Dantek
542 Dantek
543 Advancia
544 Advancia
545 Advancia
546 Chenobyl 2
547 Anddora
548 Anddora
549 Anddora
550 Anddora
551 Anddora
552 Anddora
553 Anddora
554 Anddora
555 Anddora
556 Anddora
557 Anddora
558 Anddora
559 Anddora
560 Anddora
561 Anddora
562 Anddora
563 Anddora
564 Anddora
565 Anddora
566 Anddora
567 Anddora
568 Anddora
569 Anddora
570 Anddora
571 Anddora
572 Caius
573 Caius
574 Caius
575 Caius
576 Caius
577 Caius
578 Caius
579 Caius
580 Caius
581 Caius
582 Caius
583 Caius
584 Caius
585 Caius
586 Caius
587 Caius
588 Caius
589 Caius
590 Caius
591 Caius
592 Caius
593 Caius
594 Caius
595 Caius
596 Caius
597 Cloud
598 Cloud
599 Cloud
600 Cloud
601 Cloud
602 Loh
603 Loh
604 Loh
605 Loh
606 Loh
607 Divided
608 Laforeia
609 Laforeia
610 Laforeia
611 Laforeia
612 Laforeia
613 Laforeia
614 Laforeia
615 Laforeia
616 Laforeia
617 Laforeia
618 Laforeia

The winner has been officially announced on the New ETHNON RAIL YouTube video.

Which you can see here......

- YouTube

Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.
www.youtube.com www.youtube.com

Or, if you wish you can click on this spoiler............

Congratulations!

Communist Beijing must be China!

Communist_Beijing.png
​
 
24th April 2023

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Rail Accident Report​

Report 04/2022: Near miss at Farnborough North footpath level crossing

Published: 24th April 2023

RAIB has today released its report into a near miss at Farnborough North footpath level crossing, 19 May 2022.

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​
Summary

At 08:20 hrs on Thursday 19 May 2022, 144 people were waiting on the east side of the railway to use the footpath level crossing at Farnborough North station.

Pedestrian gates on each side of the crossing were locked until a train had departed from the station.

The crossing users had arrived on this train and were mostly young people.

They were regular users of the station and normally had to wait before crossing the railway to continue their journey to school or college.

There is currently no footbridge or subway at this station.

After the train departed, miniature stop lights at the crossing changed from red to green and an audible warning stopped, indicating that it was safe to cross the railway.

A crossing attendant, located in a cabin next to the crossing on the east side of the railway, responded by turning a switch to remotely unlock the pedestrian gates at both ends of the crossing.

The person at the front of the queue opened the gate and the group started to cross the railway.

Each person held the gate open for the person following them.

When around half the group had crossed, the miniature stop lights changed from green to red and the audible warning started, indicating that another train was approaching.

The crossing attendant turned the switch to lock the gates, but crossing users continued to pass through the gate until the crossing attendant left their cabin and directly intervened to close it.

The driver of a train approaching from around a bend in the track saw people on the crossing ahead and applied the train’s emergency brake and sounded the horn.

The crossing was clear before the train passed over it.

Network Rail staff undertake regular inspections and risk assessments of level crossings on the national rail network.

Farnborough North footpath crossing is considered a high-risk location because of the limited sighting of trains, the number of daily users and a history of safety incidents.

In 2013, Network Rail installed additional ‘back-to-back’ miniature warning lights to help with user decision making.

Network Rail subsequently provided a crossing attendant and lockable gates to manage the risk until it could permanently close the crossing and replace it with a footbridge.

RAIB’s investigation found, however, that Network Rail had not developed a plan or training which would enable the crossing attendant to effectively manage the residual risks that remained at the crossing following the installation of lockable gates.

RAIB also found that the project to construct an accessible footbridge had not obtained planning approval over a prolonged period because of land ownership issues and the need to design a compliant structure which was suitable for the constrained site.

RAIB has made two recommendations to Network Rail regarding improvements in the risk assessment process for footpath level crossings where there is a history of safety incidents occurring, and formalising competency requirements for temporary and interim crossing attendants.

RAIB has also identified one learning point for railway organisations which are reminded that complex projects, or those requiring engagement with external stakeholders over an extended period, require managerial continuity.
 
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The incident

Summary of the incident

At 08:22 hrs on 19 May 2022, train 1V38, the 07:02 hrs Great Western Railway service from Gatwick Airport to Reading was approaching Farnborough North station.

There is a footpath crossing with an adjacent user worked crossing on the south (down-side) approach to the station.

Sighting of both crossings from trains on the down line is restricted to around 320 metres by a bend in the track.

As the train rounded the bend, the driver observed a large group of people crossing the track, applied the train’s emergency brake and sounded the horn.

The footpath crossing is equipped with miniature stop lights and an audible alarm.

This equipment was operating correctly as train 1V38 approached, but crossing users continued to use the crossing.

A crossing attendant was on duty and directly intervened to stop the flow of people by closing the pedestrian gate on the eastern side of the crossing.

The crossing was clear of users six seconds before the train passed over it.

The driver was shaken by the incident but was fit to continue.

There were no reported injuries to passengers or crossing users.
 
Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing location of the incident at Farnborough North footpath level crossing.

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Location

Farnborough North station is located on the double track railway between the stations of North Camp and Blackwater in north-east Hampshire.

The railway here forms part of the North Downs line connecting Redhill with Reading via Guildford.

The station serves an area of Farnborough that includes local schools and a large sixth form college.

It is located in the Farnborough Hill Conservation Area.

The up line at Farnborough North carries services south towards Guildford, Redhill and Gatwick Airport.

The down line carries services north towards Wokingham and Reading.

The line is non-electrified with a maximum permitted speed of 70 mph (113 km/h) on both tracks.

The railway carries a mix of stopping and non-stopping passenger trains and a small number of freight trains.

Signalling is controlled by Guildford area signalling centre.

Farnborough North footpath crossing is located at the south end of the station at 53 miles 11 chains.

The footpath crossing is immediately adjacent to a user worked crossing with telephone (UWC-T) used by vehicles.

The footpath crossing provides platform to platform access within the station and is also a public right of way linking Frimley Green and Farnborough.

The right of way crosses railways at Farnborough North and at Hatches footpath crossing near Frimley Green.

Farnborough North station is geographically 1 km distant from Farnborough Main station which serves the South West main line connecting London Waterloo and Weymouth.

Farnborough Main and Farnborough North stations are on different lines and there is no direct rail connection between them.
 
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Trains involved

Train 1O59 formed the 07:50 hrs Great Western Railway service from Reading to Gatwick Airport.

It approached Farnborough North on the up line and was formed of unit 165116, a 3-car class 165 diesel multiple unit.

It was running on time and called at Farnborough North at 08:19 hrs.

The pedestrians involved in the incident alighted from this service at Farnborough North onto platform 1.

Train 1V38, the 07:02 hrs Great Western Railway service from Gatwick Airport to Reading, was formed by unit 165107, a 3-car class 165 diesel multiple unit.

The train was not scheduled to stop at Farnborough North and was travelling on the down line at 69 mph (111 km/h), just under the maximum permitted speed.

The train was travelling at 35 mph (56 km/h) when it passed over the crossing.

It stopped 82 metres beyond the crossing near the north end of platform two, 390 metres after the emergency brake was applied.

This is consistent with an average braking rate of 12.5%g, which is considered normal for an emergency brake application for this type of train.

There was no wheel slip recorded by the train’s on-train data recorder (OTDR).

The braking performance of the train was therefore not a factor in this incident.
 
The footpath level crossing involved 1

The ‘traverse distance’ or length of a footpath level crossing is measured from the ‘decision point’, located a minimum of two metres from the nearest rail, to a point two metres beyond the furthest running rail.

At Farnborough North footpath crossing, Network Rail’s records show the traverse distance is 10 metres.

LCMs use the traverse distance to calculate the amount of time it takes a typical user to cross.

Network Rail uses a defined walking speed of 1.189 m/s for this calculation which, in some instances (including at Farnborough North crossing), is reduced by 50% to allow for vulnerable users such as children (unaccompanied or in groups), dog walkers, or the elderly, all of whom may walk more slowly.

Including this 50% allowance results in a traverse time of 12.62 seconds.

This is therefore the minimum required sighting time in each direction for trains approaching the crossing at the maximum permitted speed on the line.

This gives a minimum sighting distance of 395 metres.

The footpath crossing has been repeatedly assessed by Network Rail as having a high risk relative to other footpath crossings.

Identified risk factors included the high number of vulnerable users.

Between 2008 and 2012, there were over 70 safety incidents recorded,3 including cases of pedestrians crossing in front of trains.

Sighting of trains approaching the crossing on the down line is limited by the bend in the track.

From the up side of the crossing, the actual sighting distance (the distance at which approaching trains can be seen by crossing users) is 366 metres, closer than the minimum required sighting distance of 395 metres.

Sighting is obscured by track curvature, a cutting slope and vegetation on the up side (inside of the curve).

As crossing users have insufficient sighting to cross safely, they are warned of an approaching train by miniature stop lights (also known as miniature warning lights) changing from green to red.

This equipment, installed after a fatal accident on the crossing in 1985, is activated when a train is detected by the signalling system.

On the down line, the detection equipment which activates the red miniature stop lights and audible alarm is positioned 985 metres from the crossing, giving crossing users 31 seconds warning time at the crossing for an approaching train travelling at the 70 mph (113 km/h) maximum permitted line speed.

A similar warning time is provided by detection equipment fitted on the up line.

The crossing was previously used as a bridleway until equestrian access was permanently prohibited in 2012.

The warning time was reduced from 40 seconds to 31 seconds in 2013.

This exceeds the 20 seconds normally provided at footpath crossings because of evidence that some users were taking longer than this to cross.

Signs at the crossing located underneath the miniature stop lights contain the following text:

‘1. Cross only when green light shows

2. Cross quickly’

Additional miniature stop lights were installed at the crossing in 2013.

The new lights were fitted ‘back-to-back’ with the existing lights, presenting users with a warning light on both the near and far sides of the crossing.

The enhancement was intended to reduce risk to users by providing redundancy and to allow users to check the status of the crossing while they are traversing it.

The audible alarm was also installed at this time.
 
View looking west from near platform 1 showing user worked crossing (left), footpath crossing (centre) and side of crossing attendant’s cabin (right)

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View looking south along platform 1 (not on the day of the incident) showing passenger information screen, crossing attendant’s cabin and footpath crossing

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A crossing attendant has been provided from early morning until late at night since November 2014, and is located in a cabin on the end of platform 1 near the crossing.

The original cabin, installed in 2014, was replaced with a more modern version in 2020.

The attendant is instructed to turn a switch to operate electro-magnetic locks on each pedestrian gate when the red miniature stop lights illuminate and the audible alarm starts sounding at the footpath crossing.

The miniature stop lights are visible from the cabin windows.

The gates are not linked directly to the signalling/crossing system, and the electro-magnetic locks will only be effective at holding closed a gate which is already closed.

If a gate is held open by a user, the lock will be ineffective.

The gates are unlocked by the crossing attendant when the miniature stop lights revert to green.

A push-button release is also provided at both gates which allows users to unlock the gate from within the crossing.

This is to prevent a person becoming trapped on the crossing by a locked gate.

The footpath crossing is located adjacent to a UWC-T.

This is operated either by the user (normally a vehicle driver) who contacts the signaller by telephone and requests permission to cross, or by the crossing attendant acting on the user’s behalf.

The user worked crossing provides vehicular access to land east of the railway and to ponds used by a local fishing club.

This part of the crossing has a good safety record and was not associated with the incident on 19 May 2022.

Staff involved

A crossing attendant was on duty at the crossing at the time of the incident.

Their shift started at 05:15 hrs and they were due to be relieved at 15:00 hrs.

They were on the fifth day of a ten-day run of shifts and had covered this role on a relief basis for about nine months.

The actions of the attendant may have avoided a serious accident.

The LCM is responsible for undertaking risk assessments and overseeing the safe operation of the crossing.

They had been in post since April 2019 and were the second holder of the post since it was created in 2013.

The driver of train 1V38 had over ten years’ experience.

On first sighting the pedestrians on the crossing, the driver applied both the emergency brake and train horn around a second later.

The response of the driver was prompt and their actions helped avoid a possible accident.

External circumstances

The incident occurred in daylight in an area with little external noise.

The temperature was 13°C with a light westerly wind.

External circumstances played no role in the incident.
 
The sequence of events

Events preceding the incident

On 19 May 2022, the driver of train 1V38 had booked on duty at 05:00 hrs as required by their roster.

On arrival at Guildford at 08:06 hrs, the train was running 18 minutes late due to an earlier incident elsewhere.

The driver was therefore instructed that the train was to run non-stop from Guildford to Reading without calling at intermediate stations, including Farnborough North.

Effectively this meant the train was cancelled as far as any passengers intending to board at Farnborough North were concerned.

Just after 08:18 hrs, train 1O59, the Reading to Gatwick Airport service arrived on the up line at platform 1 of Farnborough North.

It was then slightly delayed in departing because of the time taken for the large number of passengers to alight.

After the train departed, the miniature stop lights at the crossing changed from red to green.

A group of 144 people was waiting behind the up-side pedestrian gate to cross from platform 1.

In response to the green light, the crossing attendant turned the switch in the attendant’s cabin to unlock the gates and allow the waiting users to cross the railway.

At this time, the attendant was unaware that train 1V38 was approaching on the down line.

This train should have formed the 08:06 hrs service from Farnborough North to Reading, but the passenger information screen on Farnborough North platform 2 showed it had been cancelled as it was no longer due to call at the station.

The screen was visible from the attendant’s cabin except when a train was in platform 1 and the attendant, having looked at the passenger information screen, understood the train had been cancelled (whereas, in fact, it was now due to run non-stop through the station).

While the attendant was only required to observe the miniature stop lights when making the decision about when to lock the gates, the passenger information screens provided an additional but informal source of information about approaching trains on which to inform any decision.

Some attendants habitually looked at the screens, particularly when a large group needed to cross.
 
Events during the incident

After the large group had started to use the crossing, train 1V38 was detected by the signalling system.

The miniature stop lights changed from green to red and the audible alarm at the crossing started to sound.

The crossing attendant responded within a few seconds by turning the switch in the attendant’s cabin to lock the pedestrian gates.

This activates the electro-magnetic locks fitted to the gateposts.

Because crossing users were holding the gates open for the person following them, energising the locks had no effect on the flow of pedestrians.

The crossing attendant recognised the risk of users continuing to cross while the miniature stop lights and audible alarm were indicating the approach of a train and shouted a warning from the cabin window.

This, however, had no effect and the flow of crossing users continued.

The crossing attendant then left the cabin and directly intervened to close the gate, which prevented users entering the crossing from the platform 1 side at about the same time that train 1V38 came into view.

The actions of the crossing attendant may have prevented a serious accident.
 
Crossing attendant’s cabin showing gate locking switch below the telephone (installed after the incident) with view of crossing and miniature stop light equipment

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Train 1V38 approached Farnborough North on the down line at 69 mph (111 km/h).

Forward-facing CCTV images show that the crossing was not visible until the train was about 320 metres away from it.

The driver observed a group of people on the crossing.

Data from the on-train data recorder shows they quickly applied the emergency brake and sounded the horn continuously for the next 10 seconds.

In a statement to their employer, the driver said, “The people slowly moved to the side of the track as I approached”
 
Forward-facing CCTV image from train 1V38 at 08:21:18 hrs. The crossing is 320 metres ahead and is just visible round a bend in the track

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Forward-facing CCTV image from train 1V38 at 08:21:23 hrs. The crossing is 175 metres (8 seconds) ahead and pedestrians are visible

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The users were clear of the crossing about six seconds before the train passed over it at 35 mph (56 km/h).

The forward-facing CCTV equipment (figure 10) fitted to train 1V38 shows the crossing attendant standing behind the up-side gate with the remaining crossing users as the train passed.

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Forward-facing CCTV image from train 1V38 at 08:21:30 hrs, one second before it passed over the crossing.
The crossing attendant is visible (orange) behind the right-hand pedestrian gate.​
 
Analysis

Identification of the immediate cause

Pedestrians were on the crossing as train 1V38 approached.

Forward-facing CCTV from train 1V38 and witness evidence show that pedestrians were on and continued to enter the crossing as the train approached Farnborough North station at just under the maximum permitted line speed.

Identification of causal factors

The incident occurred due to a combination of the following causal factors:

a. Pedestrians continued to use the crossing after the miniature stop lights turned red and the audible alarm activated.

b. Network Rail did not adequately control the risk of a large group of users continuing to enter the crossing after the miniature stop lights turned red.

These factors are now considered in turn.

Pedestrians continued to use the crossing after the miniature stop lights turned red and the audible alarm activated.

At 08:20 hrs, 144 people were waiting behind the up-side pedestrian gate to use the crossing.

This group comprised mainly school children and college students who had just alighted from train 1O59 onto platform 1.

At 08:20:10 hrs, after train 1O59 departed, the miniature stop lights changed from red to green and the audible alarm stopped.

The crossing attendant turned the switch to unlock the gates and the waiting users started to cross the railway.

The passenger timetable showed a gap of 18 minutes after the departure of train 1O59 before any further trains were due, so the attendants routinely released the gates straight away after this service left.

Station CCTV images recorded at the down-side gate show that the first pedestrians started to exit the crossing 12 seconds later at 08:20:22 hrs.

This is around the calculated traverse time of 12.6 seconds.

After displaying a green light for 48 seconds, the miniature stop lights changed to red and the audible warning started.

If the flow of pedestrians had stopped immediately, then the earlier flow of pedestrians suggest that the crossing would have been completely clear about 12 seconds later, around 22 seconds before the train passed over the crossing.

However, on 19 May, it actually took 28 seconds to clear the crossing after the lights and alarm activated because pedestrians continued to enter and use the crossing after this point in time, stopping only when the crossing attendant left their cabin and physically intervened to close the up-side gate.

This reduced the time between the crossing being clear and the train passing to six seconds.

CCTV images show that users exited the crossing at an average rate of 1.6 people per second.

Assuming a similar rate (and including 12 seconds crossing time), the 16 second additional delay in clearing the crossing indicates that around 25 people ignored the red lights and audible warning.

It also suggests that the whole group of 144 users would have required about 102 seconds to use the crossing.

Network Rail standard NR/L3/XNG/3086 defines using a footpath crossing to cross the railway when the miniature stop lights are red as misuse.

At Farnborough North, the level crossing manager had recognised this risk and taken steps to understand and manage the behaviour of crossing users to improve safety
 
24th April 2023

More trains and new journey options in new Elizabeth Line timetable​

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Elizabeth Line train at Hayes & Harlington​

After its first year of operations, train services on the Elizabeth are set to increase in frequency and introduce a new range of journey options from Sunday, 21st May.

From that date, peak time services between Paddington and Whitechapel will increase to a train roughly every two and a half minutes with up to 24 trains per hour in both directions, and extra trains will serve London Liverpool Street mainline station.

Between Paddington and Whitechapel there will be 16 trains per hour running off-peak.
 
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Inside an Elizabeth Line train​

Main line service between Liverpool Street and Gidea Park will increase, with four additional peak-time services.

Except for a few early morning trains, all westbound trains Mondays to Saturdays will run to central London via Paddington Elizabeth Line station.

However, on Sundays, some trains will depart from Paddington mainline station until 10:18 am and after 22:02 pm.
 
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