Marcus' Model Railway Journey

5th July 2023

When can you ride behind steam locomotive 34072 257 Squadron in Lancashire this July?​

Locomotive no. 34072 ‘257 Squadron' is to visit the East Lancashire Railway (ELR) and haul trains from this Saturday (8 July) until Sunday 25 July.

Having originally announced the visit in February, ELR has now confirmed the dates on which its visitors can ride behind the loco.

34072 ‘257 Squadron' at Corfe Castle

34072 is the sister loco of ELR's no. 34092 ‘City of Wells'. It is based at the Spa Valley Railway, and will be making its first visit to East Lancashire in many year.

‘257 Squadron' entered service in Brighton in 1948 and moved to Eastleigh in 1964, before being withdrawn from service.

In 1984, restorers rescued the loco from a scrapyard, and 34072 ran again in 1990.

Since then, it has visited several preserved railways.

Check the Loco Roster for information on the dates that the locomotive will be running.

The East Lancashire Railway runs between Heywood, Greater Manchester and Rawtenstall in Lancashire,

5th July 2023

75 Years of the NHS celebrated as Great Western Railway names train ‘Aneurin Bevan’​

The Intercity Express train has been named after the Minister for Health, who was responsible for the launch of the NHS back in 1948​

Great Western Railway has named Intercity Express train 800005 ‘Aneurin Bevan' after the Minister for Health, who saw the launch of the NHS in 1948.

The unveiling was carried out by special guest, author Aneira Thomas, who, at one minute past midnight on the 5th of July 1948, became the very first baby to be born on the NHS.

Aneira's parents celebrated her birth, naming her after the Welsh politician.

The train-naming ceremony took place at Newport, which marks the closest Great Western Railway station to Aneurin Bevan's Ebbw Vale constituency and birthplace of Tredegar.

Newport 4/7/23 - Health Minister Eluned Morgan names GWR IET 800005 "Aneurin Bevan" to commemorate the NHS' 75th Anniversary and honouring the founder of the NHS.​

Following the ceremony, the newly named ‘Aneurin Bevan' train got back to work operating a service to London Paddington and calling at Swindon to celebrate the town's railway industry's special part in the formation of the NHS.
In 1847, the Great Western Railway Medical Fund Society was formed thanks to money raised via direct deductions from employees' wages at the railways works in Swindon.

Through 100 years, the impressive society saw several facilities developed such as washing baths, doctor and dental surgeries.

It was these facilities which inspired Bevan following a visit. He remarked:

“There it was, a complete health service. All we had to do was to expand it to embrace the whole country!”.

Aneira's career saw her work as an NHS mental health nurse and author of best-selling book ‘Hold on Edna' said:

“It is such an honour for the 75th anniversary of our NHS to have a train named Aneurin Bevan by GWR. What better compliment to the legacy left to us by the founder of the National Health Service and also the GWR Medical Fund in Swindon, which played a crucial role in getting the wheels in motion.”

“This amazing train will forever be a reminder of the great man and the National Health Service that delivers with such skill, care and compassion. Happy 75th Birthday NHS, thank you GWR.”

Welsh Government Minister for Health and Social Services, Eluned Morgan MS, said: “Our NHS is cherished by everyone in Wales, and we are particularly proud that it was created by a Welshman. So naming this train after Aneurin Bevan is a fitting tribute to the NHS and a great way to celebrate its 75th anniversary in Wales.”

Imperial College Healthcare NHS Trust Chief Nurse, Janice Sigsworth, said: “The NHS remains one of the UK's proudest achievements and I'm delighted to celebrate the 75th anniversary with our neighbours at Paddington station and GWR.”

“The close connection between the station and St Mary's goes back well over 150 years, before the creation of the NHS itself. The extensive transport links are vital for our patients and staff and are one of the reasons that we've developed into a leading provider of clinical care, education and research – and are able to play such an important role in supporting the health and wellbeing of our local community.”

“This connection will only get stronger in the future, as we redevelop St Mary's into a bigger hospital and Paddington becomes a leading hub for life sciences.”

GWR Business Assurance Director, Joe Graham, said: “It is an honour for us to name this Intercity Express Train after Aneurin ‘Nye' Bevan and to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the NHS – with which the Great Western has a unique bond.”

“As well as our connection to the Great Western Medical Fund, we have a long history of naming trains after Great Westerners, the past and present heroes from across our network.”

“It was also such a great honour to welcome Aneira Thomas to Newport station and celebrate her unique place in history as the first baby born on the NHS.”

Transport for Wales Stations Director, Lisa Cleminson, said: “We were delighted to support this train-naming ceremony and welcome guests to Newport station. Aneurin Bevan is such an important figure in the history of Wales and everyone in the rail industry will be proud to see the Aneurin Bevan train stopping at stations across the South Wales mainline.”

WATCH:
Aneurin Bevan Train Naming



It was our great honour to name one of our Intercity Express Trains after Aneurin Bevan today, to celebrate 75 years of the NHS!

We were joined by Aneira Thomas, the first baby born on the NHS, to pay tribute to Aneurin 'Nye' Bevan who was the minister responsible for its launch in 1948.

5th July 2023

PCC Intermodel in Poland sees four new Alstom Traxx 3 multisystem locomotives delivered​

The delivery of the electric locomotives is part of a contract agreed in 2021 which also includes certification, training and full maintenance​

June saw the delivery of four Traxx 3 multisystem locomotives to PCC Intermodal in Poland.

The locomotives have been delivered under a contract signed in 2021 between the PCC Intermodal and Alstom also includes the supply of certification, staff training at PCC Intermodal as well as full maintenance service.

The agreement has been carried out with the ‘Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment' supporting the promotion of low-emission transport solutions.

Thanks to intermodal operator's foresight, Poland has seen a transformation in its intermodal transport both in and through the country over the past 20 years by making use of modern logistics solutions offered by manufacturers who are focused on delivering in line with transport policies for both the country and abroad.

At present, Poland has a number of modern transhipment terminals in operation which support the country and its neighbouring country's networks including Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia for intermodal services which are experiencing a resurgence in container deliveries.

Alstom's Traxx platform has been growing for the past 30 years in order to create a strong, modular platform offering support for single and multi-country use.

Marking the platform's third generation, Traxx locomotives now provide improved performance and reliability, energy efficiency and maintenance which are now needed 33% less often than earlier models, creating greater availability and marking a reduction in maintenance efforts.

A Traxx electric locomotive

Sławomir Cyza, Managing Director of Poland, Ukraine, and Baltic States at Alstom, said: “We are convinced that the Traxx 3 MS locomotive will strengthen PCC's Intermodal market position and will contribute to further development of sustainable and low-emission European Transport Network”

“We are very pleased that Traxx 3 MS locomotives became part of PCC Intermodal SA feel. These vehicles are based on the newest, most modern, and innovative locomotive platform, characterised by its energy efficiency, its proven ability to pull higher loads than comparable locomotives, its simplified interface with the European Train Control System and improved maintainability. We are convinced that the Traxx 3 MS locomotive will strengthen PCC's Intermodal market position and will contribute to further development of sustainable and low-emission European Transport Network”

Adam Adamek, Vice-President of the Management Board of PCC Intermodal SA, said: “To develop further and open new corridors for intermodal transport, in addition to investments in fully functional transhipment terminals, we need appropriate technical facilities: locomotives, reloading equipment, wagons, chassis and trucks. By adding to the company's fleet next Traxx locomotives, PCC Intermodal, operating in total 15 electric locomotives, under its own licences will be able to, expand and increase flexibility of its offer of daily intermodal connections in international corridors.”

5th July 2023

Hitachi Rail to use new testing system for Queensland signalling​

Hitachi Rail is launching a new solution in Australia to test the functionality of switching between the existing interlocking railway signalling system and a new digital signalling system being installed in Brisbane as part of southeast Queensland's Cross River Rail project.

The Cross River Rail project uses the European Train Control System Level 2 (ETCS L2), and Hitachi Rail's testing solution called ‘Over and Back' will drastically reduce the time and costs associated with testing.

‘Over and Back' removes the need for labour-intensive, manual switching between the different signalling systems, saving significant resources and maximising vital testing time.

It normally takes up to ten people to switch between signal systems when they are being tested, and take up to four hours to implement.

This is because existing controls must be disconnected on the track manually before connecting the new system.

Hitachi's new solution was developed locally in Brisbane and enables the changeover between systems to be made instantly via a central control unit in Queensland Rail's Rail Management Centre.

The European Train Control System Level 2 technology is designed to monitor a train's movement on the track and the relevant speed limit.

The system enables trains to operate safely while running closer together.

It is being delivered as part of the Cross River Rail project by the Sequence Signalling and Systems alliance, which includes Hitachi Rail, Queensland Rail, and the Cross River Rail Delivery Authority.

In Queensland, the system will offer the opportunity to benefit from significant energy efficiencies that come from trains consistently operating at an optimum speed, resulting in reduced costs and electricity use.

By significantly saving on resources and time through using the ‘Over and Back' solution, Hitachi Rail will be able to maximise the time needed for testing so as to demonstrate the safety and reliability of the system.

As well as its deployment in Queensland, the ‘Over and Back' solution can be rolled out to other railway systems around the world, resulting in similar benefits for any Hitachi Rail project that involves a transition between interlocking systems.

Roslyn Stuart, Senior Director Australia, said: “Our new ‘Over and Back' solution could potentially transform the testing process for new signalling systems being installed on brownfield sites around the world. It is fitting that we will use the new solution for the first time on Queensland's Cross River Rail project which will ultimately deliver more seamless, sustainable mobility for Queensland Rail and passengers alike.”

5th July 2023


TANGENT MAN STRIKES AGAIN!
Just when you thought it was safe to be informed only on railway topics!

Back in the garden

First flowers on the Geranium

Close-up of one of the Geranium flowers

Closer................

A Postie and a Courier called today............

5th July 2023

New Locomotive Arrived for ETHNON RAIL

Well, my early Birthday present has arrived.

It's from Neonlake, he had a look at it and thought the livery was really cool.

He said "you can have it now Dad, just remember I've bought your present early and don't forget!"

5th July 2023

New Rolling Stock for ETHNON RAIL

X2 GWR MK3 Coaches

6th July 2023

Independent report:​

Report 13/2022: Buffer stop collision at Enfield Town station

Published: 6th July 2023

RAIB has today released its report on a buffer stop collision at Enfield Town station, 12 October 2021.

Collision between a passenger train and a buffer-stop at Enfield Town, 12 October 2021.

Summary

At 08:21 hrs on Tuesday 12 October 2021, an Arriva Rail London (ARL) train hit the buffer stop at Enfield Town station in North London at 7.7 mph (12 km/h).

The trainstruck the buffer stop, which was damaged in the collision, and rode up on it, coming to a rest with its leading wheels about 800 mm above the rails.

No serious injuries resulted from the accident.

The train had been travelling at 10 mph (16 km/h) when it was 69 metres from the buffer stop.

After briefly applying the brakes, the driver made no further control actions for just over seven seconds, until they made an emergency brake application just before the train hit the buffer stop.

This occurred too late to prevent the collision.

The accident occurred because the driver of the train did not apply the brakes in time, as a result of him losing awareness of the driving task.

The loss of awareness was probably a result of him being significantly fatigued at the time.

Post-accident drug and alcohol tests of the driver also yielded a positive result for a recreational drug.

The driver had not reported his fatigue to his employer, who in turn had not identified his fatigue when he signed on duty, or that his personal circumstances made him vulnerable to fatigue.

There was also a potential conflict between his employer’s processes for ensuring that staff attended for duty and for managing levels of staff fatigue.

None of the engineered systems provided automatically applied the train’s brakes, as the conditions for their intervention were not met.

In particular, the Train Protection and Warning System did not activate because the train was travelling below the speed at which the system would be triggered on approach to the buffer stop.

This system was installed in compliance with the relevant standards but did not protect against the conditions leading to this accident.

RAIB has made two recommendations.

The first is addressed to ARL and relates to encouraging staff to report fatigue that could affect their ability to do their jobs safely.

The second, addressed to Network Rail in conjunction with RSSB, seeks to improve the risk assessment process for collisions with buffer stops at terminal platforms.

RAIB also identified three learning points.

The first reminds Network Rail and train companies that engineered safeguards do not protect against all events, and that operational controls may also be required to manage risk.

The second reminds train staff of the importance of reporting fatigue when it affects their ability to work safely.

The third reminds staff of the need to comply with their employer’s drug and alcohol policies.

The accident

Summary of the accident

At 08:21 hrs on Tuesday 12 October 2021, a passenger train hit the buffer stop at Enfield Town station in North London.

The train was travelling at7.7 mph (12 km/h) when the collision occurred, and it rode up over the buffer stop before coming to a rest with its leading wheels about 800 mm above the rails.

The train involved, reporting number 2U14, was the 07:45 hrs London Liverpool Street to Enfield Town service, operated by Arriva Rail London (ARL).

The train’s speed had been reduced by the driver as it approached the station, and it was travelling at about 10 mph (16 km/h) when it was within the length of the platform and 69 metres on approach to the buffer stop.

After this point, the driver briefly applied the brakes to reduce the speed, before releasing them, but then made no further control actions for just over seven seconds as the train continued to coast towards the buffer stop.

Just before the train struck the buffer stop, the driver made an emergency brake application, but it was too late to prevent the collision.

Of the estimated 75 passengers on the train, one reported suffering a minor leg injury and the effects of traumatic shock, while another reported that they were also suffering from traumatic shock.

Neither required hospital attendance after being seen by ambulance staff at the station.

The train’s front end was damaged, but this was largely confined to the replaceable front nose assembly.

There was no structural damage to the train’s body that required major repair.

The buffer stop was destroyed in the collision.

Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing location of accident

Position of the train after the collision

Damage to the front of the train

Location

The accident occurred at the buffer stop at the end of platform 2 at Enfield Town station.

The buffer stop was a fixed, non-energy-absorbing type.

Type of buffer stop at Enfield Town station (platform 3 shown)

Enfield Town station is at the end of a two-track branch line, and consists of three terminal platforms.

Signalling is controlled from London Liverpool Street Signalling Centre.

The line is electrified using 25 kV overhead line controlled from Romford Rail Operating Centre.

The maximum permitted speed on the approach to the station is 50 mph (80 km/h), reducing to 15 mph (24 km/h) in the station area.

Trains enter the station on an uphill gradient of 1 in 121 before running into level platforms.

The station area is protected by the Train Protection and Warning System(TPWS).

At Enfield, this is designed to apply the brakes on approaching trains if they pass the fixed overspeed sensor system (OSS) transmitter loops above their designated ‘set speed’.

There are two sets of TPWS OSS loops at Enfield Town station.

An OSS on approach to the station area is configured to trigger a brake application if a train is travelling faster than its 33.5 mph (54 km/h) set speed when signal L1365 is showing a danger (red) aspect.

A further OSS part way along the platform (69 metres from the buffer stop) is set to trigger a train’s brakes if it is travelling faster than 13.5 mph (22 km/h).

Track layout at Enfield Town station, showing the route of train 2U14

Train involved

The train involved in the collision consisted of two four-car, class 710 electric multiple units.

Class 710 units were introduced onto Enfield Town services during 2020.

Post-accident testing of the train found no faults in the train’s braking.

The maintainer's records for the units involved showed that all the scheduled maintenance was up to date.

RAIB found no evidence to suggest that the condition of the train contributed to the accident.

Class 710 electric multiple unit

Staff involved

The driver of the train involved in the accident had been driving trains for ARL, and the preceding franchisees, for 13 years.

The driver had always been based at Chingford depot and was very familiar with the routes between London Liverpool Street, Chingford, Cheshunt, Enfield Town and Ilford depot.

The driver was also familiar with the class 710 units, having driven them since August 2020.

The driver had been involved in three previous safety incidents.

These consisted of an incident where a train was stopped short of the platform and the train's doors were released, an acceptance of an incorrectly signalled route and a signal passed at danger.

ARL found that the driver was not at fault for the last incident.

External circumstances

At the time of the accident, it was daylight and there was good visibility.

There was light cloud, although it was not raining, and the sun’s position would have been behind the train.

There was no evidence of any abnormal environmental noise being present or that other external circumstances influenced the accident.

Network Rail took routine post-incident samples from the railhead and confirmed that there was no sign of any abnormal contamination that could have led to the wheels sliding on the rails when braking.

However, because data from the train's on-train data recorder (OTDR) later confirmed that the driver had not applied the brakes for most of the final approach to the buffer stop, the level of adhesion between the train’s wheels and the railhead is not considered relevant to this accident.

The sequence of events

Events preceding the accident

On the day before the accident (11 October), the driver worked from 06:14 hrs to 14:20 hrs.

This was his first shift at work after having nine days off.

The driver reported that, after this shift, he had gone to bed at around 21:30 hrs in preparation for his early shift the next day, but that he had only been able to get about one hour’s sleep during the night.

On the day of the accident (12 October), the driver got up at around 04:00 hrs, having been awake before his alarm went off.

After drinking a coffee, he drove by car for approximately 20 minutes to Chingford depot, where he signed on duty and spoke to the supervisor staffing the desk.

He then went to his train and drove it as empty coaching stock to London Liverpool Street station, arriving at05:57 hrs.

At Liverpool Street the driver bought some food and a non-caffeinated drink and took them back to the train to consume in the cab.

He then drove the 06:15 hrs service to Cheshunt.

After arriving at 06:46 hrs, he remained in the leading cab for three minutes, before changing ends.

The driver then drove the 06:52 hrs service back to London Liverpool Street, leaving two minutes late, and arriving on time at 07:31 hrs.

He again changed ends and waited in the cab ready to drive the 07:45 hrs service to Enfield Town, the service involved in the accident.

The driver departed from London Liverpool Street on time, with the service calling at the required booked stops before arriving at Bush Hill Park, the last stop before Enfield Town.

Data from the train’s OTDR shows that the driver departed from Bush Hill Park towards Enfield Town at 08:11:46 hrs, reaching a speed of 44 mph (71 km/h).

At 08:12:20 hrs, the driver acknowledged the automatic warning system (AWS) alarm that indicated signal L1365 was showing a caution (single yellow) aspect for the approach to the station, and then sounded the horn for Lincoln Road level crossing.

The single yellow caution aspect at signal L1365meant that the associated OSS loop for the signal was not active.

At 08:12:43 hrs, after passing the level crossing, the driver braked the train to18 mph (29 km/h), anticipating further speed loss due to the ascending gradient on the approach to the permanent 15 mph (24 km/h) speed restriction for the station area.

The train then coasted into the station and across the points towards platform 2.

At 08:13:33 hrs, while travelling at 12 mph (19 km/h), the driver briefly applied power to maintain the train’s speed on the gradient approaching the platform.

At 08:13:51 hrs, the driver applied the brake for two seconds to bring the speed down to 9.8 mph (16 km/h) for the OSS loop located in the platform area, and 69metres from the buffer stop.

Although this OSS loop was set to trigger at 13.5 mph(22 km/h), the driver had been trained to treat it as being set to 10 mph (16 km/h).

After passing the OSS loop in the platform, the driver made two further brake applications, each of two seconds duration and one second apart.

The first of these was at 08:14:03 hrs, and these brought the train’s speed down to 8.1 mph(13 km/h).

Events during the accident

At 08:14:08 hrs, the driver returned the combined traction and brake handle to the coast position.

He then made no further control actions until the train was virtually at the buffer stop.

Around seven seconds later, at 08:14:15 hrs, the train struck the buffer stop while travelling at 7.7 mph (12 km/h).

OTDR data shows that the driver applied the emergency brake about 0.5 seconds before the collision, when the train was approximately two metres from the buffer stop.

This was too late to have any noticeable effect on the train’s speed.

The buffer stop detached from its fixings and became trapped under the leading end of the train.

The remains of the buffer stop then pivoted backwards due to the force of the collision and lifted the front of the train into the air.

The train stopped with its leading wheels about 800 mm above the rails, and with its front end about one metre from the station concourse wall.

Events following the accident

The train was protected from other train movements by the normal operation of the signalling system, while station staff ran onto the platform to see what had happened, and to assist passengers.

The train driver called the signaller to report the collision.

The driver did not release the doors immediately after the collision, but passengers in the leading unit operated an emergency egress handle in the fourth coach and started to disembark onto the platform.

Passengers on the trailing unit started to disembark after a short delay, also after an emergency egress handle was operated.

British Transport Police (BTP) and London Ambulance Service were at the site of the accident by 08:35 hrs.

Analysis

Identification of the immediate cause

Having controlled the train’s speed into the platform and through the overspeed protection, the driver did not subsequently brake the train to stop before it collided with the buffer stop.

Identification of causal factors

The accident occurred due to a combination of the following causal factors:

a. The driver lost awareness of the driving task as the train approached the buffer stop.

b. None of the engineered protection systems fitted to the train intervened to prevent the collision.

Each of these factors is now considered in turn.

Driving of the train

The driver lost awareness of the driving task as the train approached the buffer stop.

OTDR data shows that the driver applied the emergency brake about 0.5 seconds(approximately two metres) before the train collided with the buffer stop.

No control actions were recorded in the seven seconds before the driver applied the emergency brake.

Before this emergency brake application, the last recorded actions by the driver were two brake applications starting about 12.5 seconds before the collision(about 46 metres from the buffer stop), and ending 7.7 seconds before the collision (about 27 metres from the buffer stop).

The driver had also appropriately controlled the train speed into the 15 mph(23 km/h) limit for the station and towards the OSS loop positioned 69 metres from the buffer stop.

Comparison of the speed profile of the train entering the station with that of a train driven by another driver showed that the approach was similar until the point that the train involved in the accident passed this OSS loop.

Immediately after the accident, the driver reported to the signaller that he had fallen asleep for the last few seconds on the approach to the buffers.

He also reported that he woke just before the buffers and applied the emergency brake.

This is consistent with the data recorded by the OTDR which showed that he performed no control actions for the majority of this period when the train was approaching the buffers.

The driver shared his mobile phone records with his employer.

These showed no evidence of any calls being made in the period immediately before the collision.

BTP also examined the mobile phone and reported that this showed no evidence of any use immediately before the collision.

Train data showing driver control actions before the collision
The driver’s loss of awareness arose due to the following, either singularly or in combination:

a. The driver was driving the train while significantly fatigued, probably affecting his awareness

.b. The driver tested positive for a recreational drug, and it is possible that its presence affected his situational awareness.

Each of these factors is now considered in turn.

Driver fatigue

The driver was driving the train while significantly fatigued, probably affecting his awareness.

The driver stated that he was tired before booking on to his shift due to a lack of sleep.

This was his second early morning shift at work after returning from nine days off.

There is no evidence that his roster pattern created an exceptional risk of fatigue on the day of the accident.

ARL’s risk assessment for the operation of trains had identified that drivers signing on to their shifts while fatigued was a hazard that could lead to an accident.

It noted that the primary mitigations were appropriate driver training and guidance to allow them to manage fatigue arising from their home lives, and good rostering practice to manage fatigue arising from work patterns.

It also identified the provision of engineered systems as providing extra protection.

This probable causal factor arose due to a combination of the following:

a. The driver had insufficient sleep before starting his shift.

b. The driver did not declare that he felt too tired to work before starting his shift.

c. Arriva Rail London did not identify that the driver was fatigued when he started his shift.

d. Arriva Rail London did not realise that the driver’s home circumstances meant that he may have been at an elevated risk of being fatigued when at work.

Each of these sub-factors is now considered in turn.

The driver’s sleep

The driver had insufficient sleep before starting his shift.

The driver stated that he had settled in bed by 21:30 hrs on the evening before, but that he lay awake most of the night due to his partner having a long‑term health condition.

He reported that, as a result, he had only had about an hour of sleep before his shift, and that he had experienced similar sleep patterns on previous nights.

The driver also reported that he was aware of being tired on the drive to work as well as when driving his train before the accident, and that at one point his eyes were stinging and that he just wanted to close them.

Comparison of the OTDR data with records of the driver’s previous assessments showed that, before the collision, there were no significant differences from his normal driving practice.

Declaration of fatigue by the driver

The driver did not declare that he felt too tired to work before starting his shift.

The driver booked on duty at Chingford by signing a sheet in the presence of a supervisor and the two of them spoke briefly.

Chingford is the only sign-on point on ARL’s Anglia routes where a supervisor is present.

At other locations, drivers sign on to duty using unstaffed electronic terminals or by telephone.

The driver stated that he was familiar with his employer’s fatigue management procedures and guidance and knew that he was supposed to report if he felt too tired to carry out his driving duties.

He did not do so on this occasion, despite acknowledging that he was very tired and probably not completely fit to work.

The driver stated that this was because he did not want to be a further burden to his employer, having already taken significant time off work for other reasons.

He was also conscious that his absences were being monitored as part of ARL’s ‘Managing for Attendance’ (MFA) process and was concerned that declaring he felt too tired to work would have worsened both his employer’s and his work colleagues’ perceptions of him.

The driver reported that he believed that his employer knew about the issues at home related to his partner’s illness and the consequent needs for time off, having disclosed them as part of the MFA interview.

He also stated that, despite this, he did not feel that his employer would have been sympathetic if he had reported another absence.

As a result, he continued with his shift in the belief that he would be able to safely get through the day.