Firstly, having to do with bowloftoast's comments.
Collateralisation, currency and fair market value. The collateralisation element cannot possibly be interpreted in the manner in which you want it to be interpreted, insofar as it explicitly says "in which a security interest in the form of currency is placed in a transactional account". It is specifically currency and it is specifically in a transaction account. A house is not currency. A house cannot be put in a transaction account.
Capital requirements. The specific figure is different between jurisdictions. There are also different capital requirements between jurisdictions and different conceptions of what that capital is. The composition of the capital reserve is not a matter without merit. The abstraction of all of those matters to committee doesn't in fact give clarification, because the committee is not empowered to make those assessments, rather, it is directed to enforce the regulations. The GA consensus is (this isn't debatable) that the law does what the law says, and there does not seem to exist any sort secondary legislative authority granted by the proposal.
Basel. Comparisons to Basel are unapt, insofar as Basel deals with risk-weighted assets and not deposits themselves. Moreover, there are different kinds of deposits (e.g. Core and not core, like brokered) which are treated by the banks and regulators differently. The percentages may be similar, but the numerator and denominator's composition, meaning, and interpretation are substantially different.
Monetary policy. Your comment here:
Absolutely not, if the goal is tougher regulation on institutions, to mitigate them taking on unnecessary risk and placing people and economies in jeopardy. This is the best part of this resolution. It doesn't bend the rules to enable those who choose to fly closer to the sun, it puts the emphasis on preventing them doing so - leveling the playing field for the financial security of all, and a sober return to well-regulated, commodities-based financial models.
doesn't coincide with how banks work. Higher capital requirements make banks safer. I asked whether or not higher capital requirements ought be required in countries which have more fragile depository sectors. If you want to make them safer, increase the capital requirements. I'm not sure whether I'm interpreting your statement correctly, but it seems to me to imply that your believe that raising those requirements will make depository institutions less safe. That's wrong.
If you want to limit the size of the amplitude of business cycle shocks, you want more effective monetary and fiscal stabilisers. Reducing the scope of monetary stabilisers has the opposite effect and makes life worse in the short run for society writ large. I'm not sure where you're coming with this, because the warrants you give are all ones which have to do with alleviating economic downturns, but you use them to justify a policy (floors on reserve ratios) that would make them worse.
Secondly, on to Lusane's remarks.
Corporations. My issue with the repeated use of corporations is that there are many forms of industrial chartering which are not corporations. LLPs are examples of this. Your proposal does not cover them because they are not corporations or government entities. Banks can recharter themselves as LLPs to avoid your definitions and regulations predicated on their being in those definitions. Regulatory arbitrage is a thing.
Capital requirements. Where I say that most modern nations do not have capital requirements above 10 per cent (also, of their deposits, not of assets writ large), that does not exclude the possibility that there are less developed countries that also have banks that also have capital requirements that also lack effective enforcement due to lack of state capacity. Perhaps the word modern is unclear, because it can both be interpreted in a temporal and a developmental sense, but I meant the latter.
Occupation. Regarding your being a law student, you'll be happy to know there's a ridiculous number of lawyers and law students in the GA. Visit the Discord... we have law-related discussions every Thursday (not literally)! I think you'll find yourself at home.
Definitions and "well-written". When I say that the definitions are wrong, I mean that they do not accord with the generally accepted meaning of those words. I would similarly accept that my definition of the word "secret treaty", excluding pluralisations, is
wrong in that it does not mean what most people would expect it to mean, but also that it is hilarious. And on the remark on length, I think that Debtor Voting Rights is a well-written resolution. It does exactly what it is meant to do, precisely and succinctly. I do not adjudge the quality of being "well-written" on length or on my particular grammatical preferences, I adjudge it solely on whether or not the language is precise and accurate. My issue with the well-written-ness of the proposal is its accuracy.
Drafting. Regarding your remarks here: "why if you had these specific concerns, why you did not address them in this manner" and "It dosen't [sic] seem you had an intention to aid the legislation in being anything better than "poorly written", as you stated, from the get-go". I spent an almost an hour five days ago writing a
four-page long response to your proposal. It covered every clause which I thought important, and was generally through. You quoted part of it above. There was a lot more feedback than just that section of the response.
On 10 April, I came back asking you to run it through a grammar checker. Following that, I then had work at my job where I spent a ton of time talking about bank resolutions. I touch back on the GA every few days and not every few hours. Then, my next post was on the 13th, which was solely confined to the GA Joke thread, and I did not read anything else because I was busy thereafter. The responses here are made towards the
specific legislative choices you made in response to those remarks. I've been very critical of the fact that criticism comes out of the woodwork only upon submission (this is especially the case in repeals, where minor errors become massive legality challenges). That simply does not apply here.
You could say that I did not purposefully maximise the amount of input that I gave to your proposal. You could even say that I missed some things on my first pass through it. I vehemently resent, however, the suggestion that I did not have an intention to give input, or a desire to give input, or purposefully withheld input so to oppose this proposal. I have made my position on the idea of financial legislation in the Assembly quite clear, and have desired to support it writ large. To say the opposite is, in my opinion, absolutely without basis.
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EDIT: The macro prudential concerns, which are the core of the part you quoted supra (and then called squeezing water from a stone), are actually located in my response when it says
Third, higher capital reserves reduce the quantity of loanable funds. This has three effects: (1) fewer investments are made, meaning that firms and households cannot borrow as much to fund purchases of capital machinery or smooth their consumption; (2) a supply reduction causes there to be higher interest rates, harming people with adjustable rate loans and also increasing the price necessary to make investments profitable, which also reduces the number of investments which have positive net present value; and (3) makes it more difficult for banks generally to survive, biting into all the harms spoken of above (see supra at α).
To say those parts weren't addressed is highly economical with the truth.
Also, these following remarks were not addressed (not an exhaustive list):
A poor definition. You just told me that financial institutions are depository ones. That's untrue. Pull out a NAICS book and you'll see they're classified under different subsections (52X).
> I see you complaining that I didn't bring up my belief that your definitions are poor. But I did, right here, and they are poor for the exact same reasons.
Situational doesn't mean anything here, unless you meant something like "consistent". Moreover, on a structuring level, you should give a list of the actual provisions you want to implement before creating an enforcement mechanism for them. Just put this at the bottom. However that is, jurisdiction is the wrong word, say "empower".
> This was raised then and was raised again. But in response to your comments above, I would say that you should just get rid of the word because it doesn't seem to do or modify anything. Or substitute case-by-case, if that's what you mean.
