1. What law, government policy, or action (taken by a government official) do you request that the Court review?
Court ruling number 69 (2022), On the Definition of Treaties and the Delegate's Authority to Sanction Residents.
2. What portions of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Legal Code, or other legal document do you believe has been violated by the above? How so?
Chapter 7 of the Legal Code, particularly Section 7.7. The ruling applies to a lack of language in the law—specifically, the definition of a treaty—that has since been added by subsequent legislation of the Regional Assembly.
3. Are there any prior rulings of the Court that support your request for review? Which ones, and how?
Court ruling number 41 (2015), On Recognizing Outdated Rulings, establishes the precedent for acknowledging obsolete rulings to be no longer in effect, as a result of subsequent legislation superseding the language that they relied on at the time. This was further reinforced by Court ruling number 72 (2023), On Defunct Rulings, which establishes the ability for the Court to render previous Court rulings defunct as precedent due to subsequent legislation superseding them when targeted by an R4R.
4. Please establish your standing by detailing how you, personally, have been adversely affected. If you are requesting a review of a governmental action, you must include how any rights or freedoms of yours have been violated.
Standing derives from my position as Court Examiner, as defined in Section 3.6, Clause 25 of the Legal Code: “The Court Examiner will have standing in all cases of judicial review brought before the Court.”
5. Is there a compelling regional interest in resolving your request? If so, explain why it is in the interest of the region as a whole for your request to be decided now.
In the absence of a definition of a treaty in the Constitution and Legal Code at the time, the Court issued its own definition based on historical examples of treaties ratified by the Regional Assembly. This definition was later superseded by that of the Treaty Translation Act, a law passed by the Regional Assembly after the ruling, which makes the latter contradictory to the laws of the region and therefore should be rendered defunct.
In this particular ruling, the Court also committed several legal and logical errors in its reasoning, leading to bizarre conclusions that should be reexamined for the sake of legal clarity and a consistent application of the law.
Firstly, the Court opined that the Delegate’s statement on the events in Equilism constituted a treaty per se under its own definition of the term, although it did eventually conclude that the sanctions in that statement were already ratified by way of its incorporation in the previously ratified MGC treaty. Despite acknowledging at the beginning that defining a treaty to be “any agreement between the North Pacific and any foreign power” would be “impractical and absurd,” the Court then created a definition with several criteria that were sufficiently broad to encompass both formal treaties, which require RA ratification, and informal agreements, which do not. An agreement may be signed and adhered to “between the North Pacific and one or more foreign sovereigns, that will remain in effect indefinitely until either formally revoked or irreparable breached, and which outlines binding obligations and responsibilities of the signatories”, but would still not constitute a treaty due to their politically-binding-but-legally-non-binding nature and a lack of a formal adoption—and repeal—process in accordance with the laws of the respective signatories. An agreement significantly differs from a treaty in that the former is only binding on the Delegate’s government insofar as the current Delegate and their successors choose to honour the terms of said agreement, while the latter, if ratified by the Regional Assembly, requires the government to follow its terms at all times until it is officially repealed. Yet, the Court chose to categorise the Delegate’s statement, and the sanctions within, as a treaty under a flawed misapplication of its own definition of a treaty. It also requires that the Delegate specify within the text of the sanctions that they are “non-binding on the government and can be revoked at any time” for it not to be considered a treaty, even though the lack of a formal adoption and repeal process in the sanctions already indicates its politically-binding-but-legally-non-binding nature as described above.
Secondly, the Court stated that the sanctions “impose a crime, the association with the Brotherhood of Malice and/or the Black Hawks, and a punishment, barred from participation in regional events and instant hostilities against any World Assembly proposal they may present.” This is a terrible misuse of definitions to invoke a misguided analogy between the sanctions, a coercive political measure targeting adversarial regions against TNP, and the crimes and punishments thereof in the Legal Code for offending residents and citizens. Being a member of hostile regions isn’t a crime as prescribed by law, since those affected by sanctions aren’t charged or sentenced by a court or the government. Impacted residents can also remove themselves from sanctions by ceasing their membership within sanctioned regions and organisations, without any further punishment or a criminal record for their past associations. In addition, there is no right to have a WA proposal supported in the Constitution, and the Delegate’s WA vote was already held to have broad discretion as affirmed in Court ruling number 2 (2012), On the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly Voting.
Thirdly, the Court asserted that residents of The North Pacific cannot be excluded from government-hosted cultural events because it would be a violation of the right to association, which the Court declared to be “a part of both the right of Assembly and the right of Free Speech” outlined in the Constitution. This is an illogical interpretation of rights. The Constitution protects citizens and residents from government infringement on their political speech and activities, but does not extend that protection into public entitlement to government-organised events, media, and festivals. There is no provision in the Constitution that requires the government to host any resident in any event freely in perpetuity, and it would be plainly irrational to believe the right to association (and assembly) includes such an entitlement. Sanctioned residents excluded from government festivals and newspapers can still be able to organise their own events and publish their own speech in free association with any other resident who may agree to join, without government interference, since the Constitution protects that right. In short, the denial of government-hosted events to sanctioned residents does not constitute government infringement on their rights, because the Bill of Rights does not prescribe free and equal access to government-hosted events as a constitutional right.
6. Do you have any further information you wish to submit to the Court with your request?
No.
Court ruling number 69 (2022), On the Definition of Treaties and the Delegate's Authority to Sanction Residents.
2. What portions of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Legal Code, or other legal document do you believe has been violated by the above? How so?
Chapter 7 of the Legal Code, particularly Section 7.7. The ruling applies to a lack of language in the law—specifically, the definition of a treaty—that has since been added by subsequent legislation of the Regional Assembly.
3. Are there any prior rulings of the Court that support your request for review? Which ones, and how?
Court ruling number 41 (2015), On Recognizing Outdated Rulings, establishes the precedent for acknowledging obsolete rulings to be no longer in effect, as a result of subsequent legislation superseding the language that they relied on at the time. This was further reinforced by Court ruling number 72 (2023), On Defunct Rulings, which establishes the ability for the Court to render previous Court rulings defunct as precedent due to subsequent legislation superseding them when targeted by an R4R.
4. Please establish your standing by detailing how you, personally, have been adversely affected. If you are requesting a review of a governmental action, you must include how any rights or freedoms of yours have been violated.
Standing derives from my position as Court Examiner, as defined in Section 3.6, Clause 25 of the Legal Code: “The Court Examiner will have standing in all cases of judicial review brought before the Court.”
5. Is there a compelling regional interest in resolving your request? If so, explain why it is in the interest of the region as a whole for your request to be decided now.
In the absence of a definition of a treaty in the Constitution and Legal Code at the time, the Court issued its own definition based on historical examples of treaties ratified by the Regional Assembly. This definition was later superseded by that of the Treaty Translation Act, a law passed by the Regional Assembly after the ruling, which makes the latter contradictory to the laws of the region and therefore should be rendered defunct.
In this particular ruling, the Court also committed several legal and logical errors in its reasoning, leading to bizarre conclusions that should be reexamined for the sake of legal clarity and a consistent application of the law.
Firstly, the Court opined that the Delegate’s statement on the events in Equilism constituted a treaty per se under its own definition of the term, although it did eventually conclude that the sanctions in that statement were already ratified by way of its incorporation in the previously ratified MGC treaty. Despite acknowledging at the beginning that defining a treaty to be “any agreement between the North Pacific and any foreign power” would be “impractical and absurd,” the Court then created a definition with several criteria that were sufficiently broad to encompass both formal treaties, which require RA ratification, and informal agreements, which do not. An agreement may be signed and adhered to “between the North Pacific and one or more foreign sovereigns, that will remain in effect indefinitely until either formally revoked or irreparable breached, and which outlines binding obligations and responsibilities of the signatories”, but would still not constitute a treaty due to their politically-binding-but-legally-non-binding nature and a lack of a formal adoption—and repeal—process in accordance with the laws of the respective signatories. An agreement significantly differs from a treaty in that the former is only binding on the Delegate’s government insofar as the current Delegate and their successors choose to honour the terms of said agreement, while the latter, if ratified by the Regional Assembly, requires the government to follow its terms at all times until it is officially repealed. Yet, the Court chose to categorise the Delegate’s statement, and the sanctions within, as a treaty under a flawed misapplication of its own definition of a treaty. It also requires that the Delegate specify within the text of the sanctions that they are “non-binding on the government and can be revoked at any time” for it not to be considered a treaty, even though the lack of a formal adoption and repeal process in the sanctions already indicates its politically-binding-but-legally-non-binding nature as described above.
Secondly, the Court stated that the sanctions “impose a crime, the association with the Brotherhood of Malice and/or the Black Hawks, and a punishment, barred from participation in regional events and instant hostilities against any World Assembly proposal they may present.” This is a terrible misuse of definitions to invoke a misguided analogy between the sanctions, a coercive political measure targeting adversarial regions against TNP, and the crimes and punishments thereof in the Legal Code for offending residents and citizens. Being a member of hostile regions isn’t a crime as prescribed by law, since those affected by sanctions aren’t charged or sentenced by a court or the government. Impacted residents can also remove themselves from sanctions by ceasing their membership within sanctioned regions and organisations, without any further punishment or a criminal record for their past associations. In addition, there is no right to have a WA proposal supported in the Constitution, and the Delegate’s WA vote was already held to have broad discretion as affirmed in Court ruling number 2 (2012), On the Limitations Set by the Council of 5 in Regards to World Assembly Voting.
Thirdly, the Court asserted that residents of The North Pacific cannot be excluded from government-hosted cultural events because it would be a violation of the right to association, which the Court declared to be “a part of both the right of Assembly and the right of Free Speech” outlined in the Constitution. This is an illogical interpretation of rights. The Constitution protects citizens and residents from government infringement on their political speech and activities, but does not extend that protection into public entitlement to government-organised events, media, and festivals. There is no provision in the Constitution that requires the government to host any resident in any event freely in perpetuity, and it would be plainly irrational to believe the right to association (and assembly) includes such an entitlement. Sanctioned residents excluded from government festivals and newspapers can still be able to organise their own events and publish their own speech in free association with any other resident who may agree to join, without government interference, since the Constitution protects that right. In short, the denial of government-hosted events to sanctioned residents does not constitute government infringement on their rights, because the Bill of Rights does not prescribe free and equal access to government-hosted events as a constitutional right.
6. Do you have any further information you wish to submit to the Court with your request?
No.
