[GA - Failed] - Against Racial Discrimination (2nd)

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Against Racial Discrimination
Category: Civil Rights | Strength: Significant
Proposed by: The Ice States, Co-authored by: Wallenburg | Onsite Topic


Whereas racial discrimination occurs in many member nations, yet is inherently unjust such that member nations have a duty both to protect their citizens against, and themselves refrain from, racial discrimination; and

Whereas the repeal of "The Charter of Civil Rights" has left an ominous silence regarding protections against racial discrimination;

The World Assembly enacts as follows.



  1. Definition: For the purposes of this resolution, a "racial characteristic" is any characteristic such as skin colour, culture, nationality and language which is the perceived result of an individual's ethnicity or race, including ethnicity and race themselves.

  2. Services: No member nation, or entity therein, may withhold, delay, or segregate any service, right or privilege, including employment and remuneration as well as sale of goods and property, from an individual on the grounds of any racial characteristic possessed or lacked by that individual, subject to Section 3.

  3. Exceptions: Section 2 shall not prohibit a service, right, policy, or privilege clearly related to a racial characteristic, and which is essential to mitigate discrimination or the effects thereof against a particular racial characteristic, from being conditional on a racial characteristic of the recipient. Nor shall Section 2 prohibit an employer from considering a racial characteristic as part of deciding who to employ in a role, where that employer can conclusively show that both (a) the role is clearly related to the said racial characteristic, and (b) that racial characteristic is essential to carry out the relevant tasks if employed.

  4. Segregation: Systematic or otherwise intentional and statistically disproportionate violence perpetrated against a group, forceful isolation or internment of a group in designated areas, removal of a group from designated areas, or the forceful institution of population controls on a group are recognised as acts of genocide. The segregation of a population based on any racial characteristic, regardless of whether such segregation is enforced by a state, is universally prohibited under World Assembly jurisdiction.

  5. Classification: Every member nation is to consider racial characteristics to be arbitrary and reductive, and accordingly enforce laws against hate crime, violence, and other discrimination on the grounds of racial characteristics as with any other arbitrary, reductive characteristic. No part of this resolution should be interpreted as preventing member nations from jointly or severally enacting further legislation to protect against discrimination on the grounds of any racial characteristic.
Note: Only votes from TNP WA nations, NPA personnel, and those on NPA deployments will be counted. If you do not meet these requirements, please add (non-WA) or something of that effect to your vote. If you are on an NPA deployment without being formally registered as an NPA member, name your deployed nation in your vote.
Voting Instructions:
  • Vote For if you want the Delegate to vote For the resolution.
  • Vote Against if you want the Delegate to vote Against the resolution.
  • Vote Abstain if you want the Delegate to abstain from voting on this resolution.
  • Vote Present if you are personally abstaining from this vote.
Detailed opinions with your vote are appreciated and encouraged!


ForAgainstAbstainPresent
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Overview
Against Racial Discrimination is a proposal that aims to prevent numerous forms of discrimination based on characteristics linked to race and ethnicity. It achieves this first through mandates that prohibit the discriminatory provision of goods, services, and privileges. The proposal also prohibits discrimination in employment, on the basis of racial and ethnic characteristics, and the proposal prohibits all forms of segregation.

Recommendation
This proposal intends to replace GA #035, Charter of Civil Rights, and in this regard it excels. CoCR had a very broad exception for a “compelling, practical purpose”, whereas this proposal has a sharply-defined, narrow exception, thereby preventing discrimination from occurring through interpretation in bad faith. The proposal has a range of comprehensive mandates, and it serves to prevent a broad range of types of discrimination, including on language.

For the above reasons, the World Assembly Affairs Ministry recommends a vote For the at-vote GA resolutions, “Against Racial Discrimination”.
 
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This is a second submission. The first one was pulled after scathing criticism from a large number of people (myself included).
 
This is far improved from the previous version and, while I did have some criticism of the previous, I wasn’t burningly opposed to that either. Therefore, I am voting in favour of this. In terms of partially replacing GA #035, it has done well, replacing the “compelling, practical purpose” with a far stricter test. This proposal also contains a further mandate against segregation, which is sensible to include here, as well as having a far clearer definition of what constitutes discrimination. I do have concerns about what it means to “conclusively show”, but these are not sufficient to negate the overall quality of the proposal.

Therefore, I vote for this proposal.
 
Against.

I think that there is still a substantive, merits-based case to oppose this resolution. A "racial characteristic" is defined by s. 1 as "any characteristic ... which is the perceived result of an individual's ethnicity or race" [emphasis mine], and while it includes a list, the use of "such as" to introduce it indicates that the list is non-exhaustive. As a result, any characteristic which is the perceived result - regardless of whether it is the actual result - of an individual's race is covered by this resolution. Thus, when s. 3 establishes that a policy that discriminates on the basis of a racial characteristic is permissible when it is "clearly related to a racial characteristic" and "essential to mitigate discrimination or the effects thereof against a particular racial characteristic," it permits discrimination on the basis of virtually any factor which is - however erroneously - perceived to be caused by race. To illustrate, suppose that in a given society, intelligence is considered to be related to race - an idea not distant from reality given the existence of theories of, for example, "scientific" racism. In that case, the resolution allows for discrimination on the basis of race wherever intelligence (which I use in this analogy in spite of the fact that it is reductive and ignores a lot of nuance for the purposes of simplicity) is "clearly related" to the thing subject to discrimination. Employment, for example, or access to education. It is unfortunate that the authors of this resolution have chosen to disregard this legitimate concern, which was regularly voiced by many GA participants, and push this proposal to a vote nonetheless.

Also, the resolution's definition of genocide is not consistent with the word's actual definition (for example, in the Rome Statute.) The authors were also made aware of this fact and chose to disregard it for no apparent reason, even when it is entirely possible to constrain the acts covered by s. 4 without using the word "genocide."
 
Is there a reason all this opposition is suddenly coming up in the last minute, as opposed to before it actually hit vote?

In that case, the resolution allows for discrimination on the basis of race wherever intelligence (which I use in this analogy in spite of the fact that it is reductive and ignores a lot of nuance for the purposes of simplicity) is "clearly related" to the thing subject to discrimination. Employment, for example, or access to education. It is unfortunate that the authors of this resolution have chosen to disregard this legitimate concern, which was regularly voiced by many GA participants, and push this proposal to a vote nonetheless.
I still don't think this is true. An employer could indeed claim that they are discriminating based on intelligence, but that doesn't change the core fact that they are -- illegally -- discriminating based on race itself. The exception does not allow unrestricted latitude in discrimination which falls under the exception, it merely says that Section 2 does not prohibit such discrimination in principle. An organisation can be engaging in multiple forms of discrimination at once.

Also, the resolution's definition of genocide is not consistent with the word's actual definition (for example, in the Rome Statute.) The authors were also made aware of this fact and chose to disregard it for no apparent reason, even when it is entirely possible to constrain the acts covered by s. 4 without using the word "genocide."
This is an accepted definition used in plenty of prior resolutions, eg "Freedom of Travel" and "Don't Kill the Poor Act". Could you name a singular example of these acts being done without, in fact, being genocidal acts?
 
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Is there a reason all this opposition is suddenly coming up in the last minute, as opposed to before it actually hit vote?
In fact, the substantive points that I raised have both been previously raised by other GA participants well before this resolution reached the voting stage.
I still don't think this is true. An employer could indeed claim that they are discriminating based on intelligence, but that doesn't change the core fact that they are -- illegally -- discriminating based on race itself. The exception does not allow unrestricted latitude in discrimination which falls under the exception, it merely says that Section 2 does not prohibit such discrimination in principle. An organisation can be engaging in multiple forms of discrimination at once.
You claim that a hypothetical employer who did this would be "discriminating based on race itself" "illegally," but in fact the very point I have raised is that this would be entirely legal. Your resolution permits discrimination based on characteristics which are merely "perceived" to be associated with race, so long as the discrimination - based on the "racial characteristic" - is essential (in this hypothetical case, to employment.) Returning to the example I raised, which you have challenged, the legal basis for the employer discriminating on the basis of race would be that there is a perceived causal link to that and intelligence. It does not matter that the discrimination is based on a false correlation between race and some other unrelated human trait, so long as the correlation is considered to be "perceived." Perception, which is inherently subjective and subject to bias, is essential to this resolution's definition of a "racial characteristic," which constitutes a fatal flaw.
This is an accepted definition used in plenty of prior resolutions, eg "Freedom of Travel" and "Don't Kill the Poor Act". Could you name a singular example of these acts being done without, in fact, being genocidal acts?
The existence of prior flawed legislation does not constitute an acceptable reason to duplicate the flaws of those resolutions into new ones. In this specific case, I would note that both of your examples of past usage this definition come from the same person (Wallenburg), who is also a co-author of this resolution. Leaving aside the fact that it is bizarre that this definition is being inserted verbatim into a third resolution authored by the same individual, even accepting that the items mentioned in s. 4 are very often linked to genocide, it has no bearing on whether the definition of the word itself is correct. It fails to encapsulate the word's actual meaning. Especially for a word that is often used for political purposes and in politically charged contexts, it is important to be precise and deliberate about this, so that it does not become eroded by overuse.
 
In fact, the substantive points that I raised have both been previously raised by other GA participants well before this resolution reached the voting stage.
I was referring less to your post specifically than to the sudden flood of Against votes as soon as the resolution hits vote.
You claim that a hypothetical employer who did this would be "discriminating based on race itself" "illegally," but in fact the very point I have raised is that this would be entirely legal. Your resolution permits discrimination based on characteristics which are merely "perceived" to be associated with race, so long as the discrimination - based on the "racial characteristic" - is essential (in this hypothetical case, to employment.) Returning to the example I raised, which you have challenged, the legal basis for the employer discriminating on the basis of race would be that there is a perceived causal link to that and intelligence. It does not matter that the discrimination is based on a false correlation between race and some other unrelated human trait, so long as the correlation is considered to be "perceived." Perception, which is inherently subjective and subject to bias, is essential to this resolution's definition of a "racial characteristic," which constitutes a fatal flaw.
I don't understand this point. Taking intelligence into account in such a situation would not violate the resolution ipso facto. However, applying an interpretation of intelligence that some racial group is inherently less intelligent than another group is in quite clear violation of Section 2, and does not fall under the Section 3 exception taking "race" itself as the relevant characteristic. Hence, I reiterate that it is very much possbile that the employer etc is engaging in multiple forms of discrimination at once..

The existence of prior flawed legislation does not constitute an acceptable reason to duplicate the flaws of those resolutions into new ones. In this specific case, I would note that both of your examples of past usage this definition come from the same person (Wallenburg), who is also a co-author of this resolution. Leaving aside the fact that it is bizarre that this definition is being inserted verbatim into a third resolution authored by the same individual, even accepting that the items mentioned in s. 4 are very often linked to genocide, it has no bearing on whether the definition of the word itself is correct. It fails to encapsulate the word's actual meaning. Especially for a word that is often used for political purposes and in politically charged contexts, it is important to be precise and deliberate about this, so that it does not become eroded by overuse.
Again, can you give a singular example of those acts being conducted in a context where they do not constitute genocide? If not, then one is drawn to the natural conclusion that such acts are, in fact, inherently genocide.
 
This was not why it was withdrawn; rather that was private comments on the proposal from Coporiana.

Still Against. Name one "racial characteristic" that actually is "essential to carry out the relevant tasks if employed". I don't really see that ratified - last time it explicitly said "language", which was considerably worse, this one seems like a dodge.
 
I don't understand this point. Taking intelligence into account in such a situation would not violate the resolution ipso facto. However, applying an interpretation of intelligence that some racial group is inherently less intelligent than another group is in quite clear violation of Section 2, and does not fall under the Section 3 exception taking "race" itself as the relevant characteristic. Hence, I reiterate that it is very much possbile that the employer etc is engaging in multiple forms of discrimination at once..
If intelligence is perceived to be correlated to race - regardless of the fact that that correlation is false and groundless - "applying an interpretation of intelligence that some racial group is inherently less intelligent than another" is explicitly not "in quite clear violation of Section 2." That is because s. 3 exempts all policies of race-based discrimination from the s. 2 ban if they are "clearly related" to a "racial characteristic." Using the definition of "racial characteristic" used in your resolution, this can be restated to say that policies of racial discrimination are exempt from the provisions of s. 2 under s. 3 if they are clearly related to "any characteristic ... which is the perceived result of an individual's ethnicity or race" [emphasis added]. Section 3 does not, in fact, take "race itself" as the relevant characteristic, but instead takes "racial characteristic," which has the flaw of including perception in its definition. In essence, you have incorporated a high degree of subjectivity into your definition of a "racial characteristic," to such an extent that it is not based in fact at all.
Again, can you give a singular example of those acts being conducted in a context where they do not constitute genocide? If not, then one is drawn to the natural conclusion that such acts are, in fact, inherently genocide.
This is not a response to the points I have made.
 
If intelligence is perceived to be correlated to race - regardless of the fact that that correlation is false and groundless - "applying an interpretation of intelligence that some racial group is inherently less intelligent than another" is explicitly not "in quite clear violation of Section 2." That is because s. 3 exempts all policies of race-based discrimination from the s. 2 ban if they are "clearly related" to a "racial characteristic."
It does not do this. It says that Section 2 "does not prohibit" them, not that they are absolutely unrestricted under Section 2 in all forms. If some company is hiring only, say, white people who speak English for a position where only the latter is an actual necessity, the discrimination against white people does not suddenly become legal because the discrimination based on language is, in that particular case, not illegal either.

Using the definition of "racial characteristic" used in your resolution, this can be restated to say that policies of racial discrimination are exempt from the provisions of s. 2 under s. 3 if they are clearly related to "any characteristic ... which is the perceived result of an individual's ethnicity or race" [emphasis added]. Section 3 does not, in fact, take "race itself" as the relevant characteristic, but instead takes "racial characteristic," which has the flaw of including perception in its definition.
Race is explicitly named as an example of a "racial characteristic".

This is not a response to the points I have made.
The paragraph I replied to is not a response to the points I made originally. I said that to effectively ask you to engage with those actual points, not others.
 
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Glad people are at least honest at why all the votes are suddenly coming in at the last minute!

Edit: Preserving in case it gets removed,
For the record, my reason to vote against doesn’t necessarily reflect other people’s reason to vote against.
 
Race is explicitly named as an example of a "racial characteristic".
Yes, it is. However, in the example we are following, intelligence is also a "racial characteristic," on the basis that it is perceived as such. Is that perception true, or based in reality in any way? No, but because you have chosen to use perception in your definition of a "racial characteristic," that does not matter. As such, in the hypothetical that we have continued to follow, the employer in question would justify his racist policies on the basis that intelligence is inherently linked to race.
The paragraph I replied to is not a response to the points I made originally. I said that to effectively ask you to engage with those actual points, not others.
On the contrary, I did engage with your points. You attempted to justify your incorrect definition by changing the standard to justify your definition away from what a definition actually is. I pointed out that what you asked me to prove was not sufficient with respect to determining whether your definition was correct. In response, you simply repeated your original incorrect argument. Even though the items listed in s. 4 are common aspects of genocide, they do not constitute the entire definition, and I do not understand what your - or more likely, your co-author's - resistance to using the correct definitions of words is.
Glad people are at least honest at why all the votes are suddenly coming in at the last minute!

Edit: Preserving in case it gets removed,
No one who has opposed this proposal on its merits has been dishonest.
 
Yes, it is. However, in the example we are following, intelligence is also a "racial characteristic," on the basis that it is perceived as such. Is that perception true, or based in reality in any way? No, but because you have chosen to use perception in your definition of a "racial characteristic," that does not matter. As such, in the hypothetical that we have continued to follow, the employer in question would justify his racist policies on the basis that intelligence is inherently linked to race.
Did you even read the rest of the paragraph you responded to, which explains how this would not be permitted?

On the contrary, I did engage with your points. You attempted to justify your incorrect definition by changing the standard to justify your definition away from what a definition actually is. I pointed out that what you asked me to prove was not sufficient with respect to determining whether your definition was correct. In response, you simply repeated your original incorrect argument. Even though the items listed in s. 4 are common aspects of genocide, they do not constitute the entire definition, and I do not understand what your - or more likely, your co-author's - resistance to using the correct definitions of words is.
If you're arguing that it's too broad, as your original argument seemed to imply, you should be able to give one example of when those acts wouldn't be genocide. If you're arguing that it's too narrow, the list is not exclusive, it merely adds particular acts to the existing list of acts of genocide. In particular see GA #38.

No one who has opposed this proposal on its merits has been dishonest.
I never said that the three of nine people who did actually justify their opposition with merits-based arguments are being dishonest. I don't believe, however, that it is just coincidence that several unexplained votes against, including by voters who rarely vote on GA proposals, were cast as soon as the resolution hit vote.
 
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I don't see a reason to oppose this. Non-WA for, for what it's worth.
 
Did you even read the rest of the paragraph you responded to, which explains how this would not be permitted?
I assume you are referring to this paragraph, in which case, yes, I did:
It does not do this. It says that Section 2 "does not prohibit" them, not that they are absolutely unrestricted under Section 2 in all forms. If some company is hiring only, say, white people who speak English for a position where only the latter is an actual necessity, the discrimination against white people does not suddenly become legal because the discrimination based on language is, in that particular case, not illegal either.
For the record, s. 3 reads as follows:
Exceptions: Section 2 shall not prohibit a service, right, policy, or privilege clearly related to a racial characteristic, and which is essential to mitigate discrimination or the effects thereof against a particular racial characteristic, from being conditional on a racial characteristic of the recipient. Nor shall Section 2 prohibit an employer from considering a racial characteristic as part of deciding who to employ in a role, where that employer can conclusively show that both (a) the role is clearly related to the said racial characteristic, and (b) that racial characteristic is essential to carry out the relevant tasks if employed.
I will continue with the hypothetical scenario in this case. You have not contested that, in a society in which deeply held racism exists, it is possible that intelligence could be perceived to be caused, to some extent, by race, even though this is obviously false. As such, intelligence, in this society, would be a "racial characteristic" under the terms of this resolution. This means that, under the terms of s. 3, s. 2 does not "prohibit an employer from considering [race] as part of deciding who to employ in a role," because your resolution allows for intelligence to be considered to be caused by race. Even though the employer in this hypothetical is clearly just unjustly discriminating on the basis of race, your resolution allows that employer to claim that this discrimination is because race has some causal relationship to intelligence.

The example we are discussing is not the same as "hiring only ... white people who speak English for a position where only the latter is an actual necessity." Instead, it is more akin to hiring only white people because, in this hypothetical society, it is (of course, wrongly) perceived that white people are more intelligent than others. In that case, the "racial characteristic" under the terms of this resolution, is intelligence, which I am sure is not your intention. It is not race as you suggest. Now, if your resolution functioned as it should, and as you clearly intend it to, then race would be the characteristic in question, but because of the inclusion of perception, it is not.
If you're arguing that it's too broad, as your original argument seemed to imply, you should be able to give one example of when those acts wouldn't be genocide. If you're arguing that it's too narrow, the list is not exclusive, it merely adds particular acts to the existing list of acts of genocide. In particular see GA #38.
This is not what a definition is. You cannot cite examples of things which are commonly associated with something as a definition of that thing. Instead, a definition encapsulates the whole meaning of a word - if examples are present, they are merely aids to understanding, further illustrating the definition the reader. To expound on my point about the flawed definition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines genocide as follows:
For the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in, part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
By contrast, the definition of genocide which is in this resolution is as follows:
Segregation: Systematic or otherwise intentional and statistically disproportionate violence perpetrated against a group, forceful isolation or internment of a group in designated areas, removal of a group from designated areas, or the forceful institution of population controls on a group are recognised as acts of genocide. The segregation of a population based on any racial characteristic, regardless of whether such segregation is enforced by a state, is universally prohibited under World Assembly jurisdiction.
What your definition lacks, and what is included in the definition quoted above it, is intent. Except for "intentional and statistically disproportionate violence perpetrated against a group," your definition merely lists several acts - which are certainly reprehensible, I obviously do not contest that - with no reference to intent, in this case "to destroy, in whole or in, part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." Also, your definition includes several items which are not acts which constitute genocide. "Forceful isolation or internment of a group in designated areas" and "removal of a group from designated areas" are more properly recognized as apartheid rather than genocide. "The forceful institution of population controls on a group" includes the one-child policy in China. I have never seen anyone argue that the one-child policy was a genocide.
 
I will continue with the hypothetical scenario in this case. You have not contested that, in a society in which deeply held racism exists, it is possible that intelligence could be perceived to be caused, to some extent, by race, even though this is obviously false. As such, intelligence, in this society, would be a "racial characteristic" under the terms of this resolution. This means that, under the terms of s. 3, s. 2 does not "prohibit an employer from considering [race] as part of deciding who to employ in a role," because your resolution allows for intelligence to be considered to be caused by race. Even though the employer in this hypothetical is clearly just unjustly discriminating on the basis of race, your resolution allows that employer to claim that this discrimination is because race has some causal relationship to intelligence.

The example we are discussing is not the same as "hiring only ... white people who speak English for a position where only the latter is an actual necessity." Instead, it is more akin to hiring only white people because, in this hypothetical society, it is (of course, wrongly) perceived that white people are more intelligent than others. In that case, the "racial characteristic" under the terms of this resolution, is intelligence, which I am sure is not your intention. It is not race as you suggest. Now, if your resolution functioned as it should, and as you clearly intend it to, then race would be the characteristic in question, but because of the inclusion of perception, it is not.
Once again, just because one characteristic is being discriminated on does not mean that discrimination on another characteristic is simultaneously occuring. There is nothing that says that if discrimination on intelligence is happening, that automatically rules out the possibility of discrimination on race itself also happening. The former might, in and of itself, be legal, but the latter is also illegal. The example you are repeating is clearly discrimination based on both, and is therefore still illegal.

This is not what a definition is. You cannot cite examples of things which are commonly associated with something as a definition of that thing. Instead, a definition encapsulates the whole meaning of a word - if examples are present, they are merely aids to understanding, further illustrating the definition the reader. To expound on my point about the flawed definition, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines genocide as follows:
It doesn't supercede the existing definition in #35. The wording is specifically designed to add those points to the existing definition.
What your definition lacks, and what is included in the definition quoted above it, is intent. Except for "intentional and statistically disproportionate violence perpetrated against a group," your definition merely lists several acts - which are certainly reprehensible, I obviously do not contest that - with no reference to intent, in this case "to destroy, in whole or in, part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."
I don't see how it's possible that those acts are committed without intent to destroy a group -- and please read the below responses before replying to this.

Also, your definition includes several items which are not acts which constitute genocide. "Forceful isolation or internment of a group in designated areas" and "removal of a group from designated areas" are more properly recognized as apartheid rather than genocide.
The enforcement of eg ghettos or concentration camps is absolutely a form of genocide. These acts, specifically "forced displacement", are explicitly named by Genocide Watch as being part of persecution as a stage of genocide, which naturally leads to extermination. It is worth noting that the relevant report, here, explicitly states that "All of these destructive acts are acts of genocide outlawed by the Genocide Convention. They are acts of genocide because they intentionally destroy part of a group."
"The forceful institution of population controls on a group" includes the one-child policy in China. I have never seen anyone argue that the one-child policy was a genocide.
The one-child policy applied on all Chinese citizens, not a specific group. If, say, Uyghurs were solely targeted by the one-child policy, that is absolutely a genocidal effort to destroy Uyghurs.
 
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Once again, just because one characteristic is being discriminated on does not mean that discrimination on another characteristic is simultaneously occuring. There is nothing that says that if discrimination on intelligence is happening, that automatically rules out the possibility of discrimination on race itself also happening. The former might, in and of itself, be legal, but the latter is also illegal, so the example you are repeating does not apply.
On the contrary, there is no discrimination with multiple layers. Under this resolution, discrimination can be justified to be on the basis of a characteristic that is merely perceived to be on the basis of race. As such, it can supersede the actual reality of the situation, which is discrimination on the basis of race. Because of your resolution's flawed wording, that sort of discrimination is not considered to be racial discrimination, but instead discrimination on the basis of some trait which is arbitrarily perceived to be caused by race. The "racial characteristic" is not race, it is intelligence, or laziness, or literacy, or some other trait which could be perceived in a deeply racist society to be related to race. Now, in the real world, of course what is actually happening is unjustified racism. But your resolution does not operate in the real world, it operates in the world of the perceived.
I don't see how it's possible that those acts are committed without intent to destroy a group -- and please read the below responses before replying to this.

The enforcement of eg ghettos or concentration camps is absolutely a form of genocide. These acts, specifically "forced displacement", are explicitly named by Genocide Watch as being part of persecution as a stage of genocide, which naturally leads to extermination. It is worth noting that the relevant report, here, explicitly states that "All of these destructive acts are acts of genocide outlawed by the Genocide Convention. They are acts of genocide because they intentionally destroy part of a group."
Yes, but once again, you are conveniently ignoring what a definition actually is. I have already explained this point to you, and you have continued to deliberately ignore it, so there is obviously no point in continuing to debate this point. However, I will respond to this:
The one-child policy applied on all Chinese citizens, not a specific group. If, say, Uyghurs were solely targeted by the one-child policy, that is absolutely a genocidal effort to destroy Uyghurs.
"All Chinese citizens" most certainly constitute a group. They are the group of all citizens of China. If you had, for the purposes of this resolution, defined "group" as something more specific, something that excluded the possibility of "all Chinese citizens" being covered under it, then you would be correct, but you did not.
 
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