Well in the interest of getting the ball rolling on this one, I took the liberty of drafting the opinion. I was inspired by our discussion on the other r4r currently pending, and decided to try some language out for how to handle revisiting old questions and addressing elements that can and cannot be rendered defunct. As far as what's happening, I do believe the old decision is defunct as it is concerned with the question of terms rather than elections. What was once referred to as terms is now understood to be election cycles, so the Court's conclusion in the defunct portion was actually consistent with existing law since that interpretation is what the new law is. However, the conclusion they reached was concerned with the terms and that does create some space for ambiguity. That ambiguity doesn't matter, though, since the new wording is what matters, and it renders that ambiguity obsolete. Hence, why the old decision is defunct. Obviously the old decision also answered very specific questions and answered them appropriately for existing law at the time, so I would clearly articulate those portions are not defunct. Perhaps this way of parsing things can be applied to the other case we're considering.
Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by TlomzKrano on the Reconsideration of Delegate Term Limits
Opinion drafted by Justice Pallaith
The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed
here by TlomzKrano
The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed
here by Robespierre
The Court took into consideration the relevant portion of the Constitution of The North Pacific.
Article 3: The Delegate and Vice Delegate
13. The Delegate and Vice Delegate will be elected by the Regional Assembly every four months. No person shall be elected Delegate to a full or partial term in three consecutive election cycles.
The Court took into consideration the prior rulings by the Court
On Delegate Term Limits,
On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections,
On Recognizing Outdated Rulings, and On Defunct Rulings
The Court opines the following:
On Standing
The petitioner is the Court Examiner, and enjoys universal standing for all questions before this Court. There is no question of proper standing in this case.
On the Court’s Prior Ruling
This Court is asked to reconsider one of its prior rulings in light of a change that was made to the Constitution since that opinion was delivered. That ruling,
On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections, was concerned with defining terms and what constituted consecutive terms. In applying the Court's test as outlined in
On Defunct Rulings, we conclude that the Court's ruling was correct at the time. In fact, that decision is wholly consistent in result with the current constitutional term limit for the Delegate. However, while one of the original questions the Court considered mentioned consecutive
and elected terms, the Court did not generalize based on whether the terms were elected. That aspect could be seen as specific to the example in the question, and the Court did not address elections except to assert that a candidate for Delegate could not participate in any election that took place in a term following their second consecutive term in office. Because of this, we accept that there may be some ambiguity as to whether that decision would prevent an
unelected Delegate from running for a second consecutive
elected term, and as a result this decision may conflict with the current constitutional language.
On Subsequent Constitutional Amendment
On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections was concerned with a constitutional provision that specified “No person may serve more than two consecutive terms as Delegate.” Since then, the Constitution was amended so that “No person shall be elected Delegate to a full or partial term in three consecutive election cycles.” The emphasis is now on the elections, not on the terms, and serves as a much clearer standard, considering this Court had two separate decisions on this question previously. This Court concludes that the underlying constitutional language upon which the prior decision relied changed sufficiently for the decision to require revision, and renders part of the ruling defunct.
On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections
In the interest of resolving other potential ambiguities, the Court now reconsiders the original topic through the lens of current law. It is clear that the Constitution and Legal Code continue to make no distinction between phases of a Delegate’s term and therefore there is no difference as to when a special election takes place as far as the law is concerned: whether a special election is for a partial term lasting the majority of a Delegate’s term, or only a few weeks, the limit applies. The Constitution’s reference to “election cycle” means any of the designated periods in which a Delegate’s term would fall, which is currently the four months between January and May, May and September, and September and January. The limit applies even in the unlikely event that multiple special elections take place in the same term. So, for example, a Delegate could not be elected in January and May and then run for a special election in November of the September cycle, even if that person did not run in the normal September election or a special election that followed it in October, as the candidate would still potentially be elected to a partial term in a third consecutive election cycle. And as for the Court Examiner’s reference to recent events, where an acting delegate served prior to being elected Delegate in the following cycle, such a person could serve as acting delegate in the January cycle and be elected Delegate in the following May and September cycles, as there is a clear difference between an acting or serving delegate and an elected one, and the Constitution specifies a limit on
elections and not on
terms.
Holding
As the case was properly decided and the Court's consideration of partial term limits, including its overturning of
On Delegate Term Limits, is consistent with existing Constitutional language and affirmed again by this decision,
we find that the following portion of part 2 of our prior ruling On Delegate Term Limits in Special Elections, is now defunct as precedent:
The Delegate has still served in 2 consecutive terms - it is irrelevant whether they served the whole term, the first half or the second half.
Having established the set terms, the Court believes that it is not legal for a Delegate to contest any Delegate election, be it general or special, in the term immediately following his second consecutive term.
Therefore, that portion of the ruling will be modified with strikethrough tags, acknowledging its obsolescence while preserving it for historical purposes.
