[DRAFT] Security Council Territorial Representation Act of 2023

I've always noticed a loophole which allows for the "chapter regulating disclosure of executive government records" to be defined as anything other than Sec. 7.4, Chapter 7 of the Legal Code.

Furthermore, I believe that territories should be able to represent themselves within the regional Security Council. That is why I'm introducing Section 5.6, which allows for territories' Frontier Delegates and Vices to appoint ambassadors to represent their territories in the Security Council. Also, the new section allows for ambassadors to be ejected in an instance they are maliciously disruptive to the Council's affairs. The Speaker has Deputies to assist in their duties, so why can't frontiers do the same but with representation in affairs?

Update: added an appointment process for ambassadors, prohibition from viewing classified information, imposed to regional laws, procedures, treaties upon entry.

Security Council Territorial Representation Act of 2023:

The following section is added to Chapter 5 of the Legal Code:

Section 5.6 Territorial Ambassadors
30. Ambassadors will be subject to regional laws, procedures, and treaties upon entering the North Pacific.
31. Serving Frontier Delegates or serving Frontier Vice Delegates may nominate one or more ambassadors to represent their respective territories within the North Pacific's Security Council.
32. The Council will vote to accept ambassador nominees under Section 5.1, Chapter 5 of the Legal Code, exempt from influence and endorsement requirements.
33. No ambassador will access classified information, nor will any Security Counciler provide an ambassador access to such information.
34. The Council may eject an existing ambassador via two-thirds majority vote.
35. Upon ejection, the ambassador's respective territory may override said ejection via two-thirds majority vote.
36. Should an ambassador's ejection fail to be overridden, the aforementioned ambassador shall be prohibited from serving to the Council for a duration set by the serving Vice Delegate.

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Clause 29 doesn't really have much of an effect - it just says where something is regulated. The FOIA law is what regulates SC records - if you deleted clause 29 altogether it wouldn't do anything. It's like those clauses at the beginning of many of the chapters that define what laws belong in them.

I am staunchly opposed to your idea of territorial ambassadors. Territories do not require SC representation, because the SC has basically no powers over them at all. The SC exists to ensure the security of The North Pacific.

Comfed:

Clause 29 doesn't really have much of an effect - it just says where something is regulated. The FOIA law is what regulates SC records - if you deleted clause 29 altogether it wouldn't do anything. It's like those clauses at the beginning of many of the chapters that define what laws belong in them.

I am staunchly opposed to your idea of territorial ambassadors. Territories do not require SC representation, because the SC has basically no powers over them at all. The SC exists to ensure the security of The North Pacific.

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My idea is that territories could collaborate with the SC to protect overall security. The Council would still exist to protect this region's security, but collaboration would also be an option.
Either way, territories belong to TNP. They can have their own SCs, but cooperation with our Council would assist in all parties' security.

This bill makes an end run around the procedures on how Security Councilors are appointed, by basically calling them something else. These new "ambassadors" face less scrutiny and cannot be barred from the SC, but access to the same level of information as a standard SC member. This would open the Security Council to too much risk and jeopardize the region as a whole.

Before I can even think of supporting something like this, there needs to be a strong appointment process that at min matchs what an applicant within TNP faces.

Clause 29 has what is known as a relative reference. If the thing being referenced is moved, the reference adjusts itself to continue to reference the thing it is supposed to reference. By changing it to an absolute reference, as you are proposing, if the section on disclosure of executive government records moves, either by some reorganization, insertion, or deletion, and it is no longer at section 7.4, then the reference either references the wrong thing or nothing at all. Anyone writing a bill that moves that section, either by design or inadvertently, would need to remember to amend that clause to insert the new absolute reference, which would be tedious and prone to error. It's just easier, and safer, to leave it as a relative reference.

Aside from the aforementioned objection to the concept of territorial ambassadors, I want to point out a couple flaws in the wording of that section.
1. "...may appoint one or more competent ambassadors..." - Who judges the potential ambassador's competency?
2. "Should an existing ambassador maliciously interfere with Council affairs..." - Who judges whether the ambassador's alleged interference is "malicious", or who judges whether the ambassador "interfered" at all? This seems as though it would be covered under the criminal code, specifically "Gross Misconduct", for which the penal code already mandates removal from office.
3. "the aforementioned ambassador shall be prohibited from serving to the Council for a minimum of one day and a maximum of two months." - Then it might as well be a 1 day penalty, unless you have someone decide the duration of the penalty. Ignoring the previous point about gross misconduct being covered under the penal code, who would decide the penalty duration?

Updated draft.
Added suggestions.

Territories already work with the SC under the existing law. The Frontier Vice Delegate reports to the SC and is the main conduit through which the SC can observe and gather information on the territories. That doesn’t mean the SC is incapable of watching the territories on their own - they absolutely are. But SC membership requires influence and endorsements to shore up the positions below the delegate and to guarantee that there’s some form of succession. It would be impractical for territory officials using their WA in frontiers to be on the SC, as they couldn’t functionally perform some of the key tasks they would need to.

As for access, the SC can already grant access to non-SC individuals. The most visible example of this is non-SC delegates, or former delegates during transitions. It may be that for better communication with Frontier Vice Delegates, the SC decides to grant them access to the SC spaces. But existing law already gives us that flexibility.

Perhaps it would help if I understood what your aim is with this bill. It sounds like you don’t want the frontiers to be left out of the security space and also want to avoid scenarios where they all have their own separate security apparatus without coordination; and you felt the law had a loophole in how it referenced another section of the law. Am I missing any other goals you had?

Pallaith:

Territories already work with the SC under the existing law. The Frontier Vice Delegate reports to the SC and is the main conduit through which the SC can observe and gather information on the territories. That doesn’t mean the SC is incapable of watching the territories on their own - they absolutely are. But SC membership requires influence and endorsements to shore up the positions below the delegate and to guarantee that there’s some form of succession. It would be impractical for territory officials using their WA in frontiers to be on the SC, as they couldn’t functionally perform some of the key tasks they would need to.

As for access, the SC can already grant access to non-SC individuals. The most visible example of this is non-SC delegates, or former delegates during transitions. It may be that for better communication with Frontier Vice Delegates, the SC decides to grant them access to the SC spaces. But existing law already gives us that flexibility.

Perhaps it would help if I understood what your aim is with this bill. It sounds like you don’t want the frontiers to be left out of the security space and also want to avoid scenarios where they all have their own separate security apparatus without coordination; and you felt the law had a loophole in how it referenced another section of the law. Am I missing any other goals you had?

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I was aiming for the ability of territories to represent themselves in the SC, in order to let territories and TNP collaborate in security-related affairs. I initially thought that clause 29 (as Dorsett explains) had a loophole since it would allow for FOIA to be defined as something other than itself. However, @Sil Dorsett's explanation of how it operates convinced me to remove the change from the proposal.

While SC already works with the territories under existing law, there should be a method of appointing ambassadors to represent those territories in the Council, as it would allow for further collaboration and overall security among the TNP and other regions.

Terra dei Cittadini:

I was aiming for the ability of territories to represent themselves in the SC, in order to let territories and TNP collaborate in security-related affairs. I initially thought that clause 29 (as Dorsett explains) had a loophole since it would allow for FOIA to be defined as something other than itself. However, @Sil Dorsett's explanation of how it operates convinced me to remove the change from the proposal.

While SC already works with the territories under existing law, there should be a method of appointing ambassadors to represent those territories in the Council, as it would allow for further collaboration and overall security among the TNP and other regions.

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Why should there be such a method? Why isn’t the Frontier Vice Delegate good enough?

Pallaith:

Why should there be such a method? Why isn’t the Frontier Vice Delegate good enough?

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The FVD could be absent, or they'd have no time for such.
That's a scenario for such.

I motion this to vote

There's already a provision to cover an FVD absence.

In the case of a vacancy or absence in the office of Frontier Delegate, the Frontier Vice Delegate will assume the duties of the office. In the case of a vacancy or absence in the office of Frontier Vice Delegate, the Vice Delegate may appoint an acting Frontier Vice Delegate until a permanent replacement is confirmed by the Regional Assembly.

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I imagine that removing an FVD that simply doesn't have the time to do their job (which actually doesn't count as an absence) would be a simple recall measure.

Oliver North:

I motion this to vote

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Motion denied. This is a legislative bill. The proposer must be the one to motion it to vote.

Sil Dorsett:

There's already a provision to cover an FVD absence.

I imagine that removing an FVD that simply doesn't have the time to do their job (which actually doesn't count as an absence) would be a simple recall measure.



Motion denied. This is a legislative bill. The proposer must be the one to motion it to vote.

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Think of it this way: The Speaker has Deputies to carry out their duties, so why can't the Frontiers do the same for representation?

Not saying we should reorient ourselves, just saying we could interpret this as such.