Marcus' Model Railway Journey

The full-size model of the IC5 train carriage is equipped with seats, tables and other interiors.

It will be used to validate the train's functionalities and design with DSB's passengers, staff and others.

Alstom declares that “An exceptional travel experience and comfortable seating are key priorities”, and that the IC5 train's interior design meets these, enabling passengers to both relax and work along the journey.

The new design offers improved features including wider table space, reclined chairs, individual armrests, reading light and charging facilities at each seat.

The IC5 train will have more screens than on the current DSB trains, providing passengers enhanced real-time journey information.

Alstom expects to make minor changes before completing the design, but assures viewers that the 1:1 scale IC5 train mock-up offers a strong impression of what passengers and employees can expect.

The new IC5 train is based on Alstom's state-of-the-art, low-floor, high-performance Coradia Stream Electric Multiple Unit (EMU) and meets the demands of today's regional and intercity transport.

The train has a modular design, which allows operators to choose the configuration and interior that they want.

In total, over one thousand trains based on the Coradia Stream train family have been ordered so far by transport operators in Italy, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands among others.

The train family offers versions with zero direct emissions such as battery or hydrogen for non-electrified lines.

Alstom asserts that its sustainable approach to services considers the entire life cycle of the product, from initial design to end of life, which will maximise the value of DSB's asset.

The IC5 trains are adapted to meet the requirements of the Danish rail network and its top speed of 200 km/h will help ensure swift mobility across the country.

They are prerequisites for being able to take full advantage of the major infrastructure projects on the railway that are currently being carried out, such as electrification and new signals.

The trains will replace the IC3, IC4, IR4 and Øresund trains.

These will be continuously phased out, and will operate as both high-speed, intercity and regional trains.

Materials in the new IC5 trains are inspired by Danish design tradition.

They include seat fabric with a high proportion of wool, which will mean that the seats will avoid environmentally-harmful surface treatment.

All products and materials are eco-labelled, and up to 96% of the train can be recycled.

The IC5 train has five carriages with three hundred seats.

The carriages have low entry, good flex areas for bicycles and prams, and even more places for storing luggage than the existing trains.

Alstom has been present in Denmark for twenty years, having sold over five hundred regional trains in the country, as well as signalling solutions.

In Denmark, Alstom is currently delivering the ERTMS signalling solutions for Banedanmark for Trackside in Eastern Denmark, and for on-board equipment nationwide.

Flemming Jensen, CEO of Danish State Railways, said:

“We have reached an important milestone together with Alstom. The IC5 trains will be the backbone of climate-friendly, comfortable and efficient train traffic in Denmark in a few years. With the design of the trainsets finally frozen in, production of the IC5 trains can begin,”

Emmanuel Henry, Managing Director of Alstom in Denmark, said:

“Through strong cooperation with DSB, we have now reached an important milestone with the finalised design – and real-size mock-up – of the IC5 train. Now, we are looking forward to the production and delivery of the trains, which are based on our well-proven Coradia Stream train family. It combines innovation, sustainability, and great passenger comfort in the best possible way. The details of the train are customised for Denmark, so there is no train like this elsewhere.”

15th May 2023

Rail Accident Report​

Report 05/2023: Track worker struck by train near Chalfont & Latimer station

Published: 15th April 2023

RAIB has today released its report into a track worker struck by train near Chalfont & Latimer station, Buckinghamshire, 15 April 2022.

Summary

At around 09:28 hrs on Friday 15 April 2022, a London Underground passenger train travelling at around 25 mph (40 km/h) struck and injured a track worker who was working as part of a planned patrol near Chalfont & Latimer station on the Metropolitan line of the London Underground network.

The track worker was working as part of a group of three, undertaking the role of second lookout, and had been provided by a recruitment agency for the day’s work.

The patrol was planned to be undertaken during traffic hours when trains were running.

The accident happened because the track worker had moved from a place of safety and into the approaching train’s path to get a better view of the track ahead, just as the train was about to pass her.

She was walking with her back to the approaching train when she was struck and was not aware of the risk the train posed to her.

RAIB’s investigation found that the track worker was not familiar with the exact location of the accident and that safety briefings provided to her on the day were not effective at giving her the information she needed to work safely.

Underlying factors to the accident were that London Underground’s processes for managing track worker safety did not adequately control the risk to staff working on the line in traffic hours and that elements of the organisational culture at London Underground did not support effective management of track worker safety.

Although not relevant to the cause of the accident, RAIB observed that some designated places of safety on the Metropolitan line are sometimes obstructed, preventing them from being used as places of safety. RAIB also observed that the safety‑critical communications after the accident were effective, and that an accurate understanding of information was reached by all the parties involved.

The accident

Summary of the accident

At approximately 09:28 hrs on Friday 15 April 2022, a track worker acting as the second lookout during a track patrol was struck by a London Underground passenger train travelling at approximately 25 mph (40 km/h).

The train involved had just departed from Chalfont & Latimer station on the Metropolitan line of the LUL system and was heading towards Chesham when the accident occurred.

The track worker sustained head and body injuries and was taken to hospital.

She was released from hospital later the same day but has continued to suffer from the effects of the accident.

The second lookout was one of three staff involved in a planned track patrol.

Immediately before being struck, the second lookout was not in a place of safety and was walking between a signal post and the track, facing away from the train’s direction of approach.

Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing location of accident, near Chalfont & Latimer station.

Location

The accident occurred on the Chesham branch of LUL’s Metropolitan line, around 500 metres north-west of Chalfont & Latimer station.

The Metropolitan line runs from Aldgate, in the City of London, and serves several destinations in north-west London and Buckinghamshire.

The junction where the line to Chesham diverges from the Amersham line is located near the north-western end of Chalfont & Latimer station.

There are three platforms at Chalfont & Latimer, platform 1 serves the northbound line to Amersham and services to Chesham, platform 2 serves the southbound line towards Rickmansworth and central London, and platform 3 is now disused.

The mainline operator, Chiltern Railways, operates some of its London Marylebone services over the Metropolitan line between Harrow-on-the-Hill and Amersham (the north-western limit of the Metropolitan line), passing through Chalfont & Latimer station.

LUL’s infrastructure meets the national rail network at a boundary approximately 2.2 kilometres (1.37 miles) north-west of Amersham station.

The lines between Amersham and Chalfont & Latimer are the southbound (towards Chalfont & Latimer) and northbound lines (towards Amersham).

Both have a maximum permitted speed of 60 mph (97 km/h) and each normally carries trains running in only one direction.

The Chesham line has a maximum permitted speed of 35 mph (56 km/h) and is a single line on which trains can run in both directions.

There is a cess (an area outside of the tracks which may provide a safe place to stand or walk clear of passing trains if there is adequate clearance) located north of the Chesham single line between it and the railway boundary, where it is safe to be positioned while trains pass.

Trains in this area are controlled from the LUL signal cabin (equivalent to a signal box on the mainline railway) at Amersham.

Track layout of the lines north of Chalfont & Latimer station.

Track patrols at Chalfont & Latimer

Track patrolling in the Chalfont & Latimer area is performed by staff based at Rickmansworth track depot.

The track patrol being undertaken on the day of the accident was a pre-planned patrol undertaken twice a week and was carried out during traffic hours, while trains were running.

The team undertaking the track patrol on the day of the accident comprised three people.

These were a patroller, a distant lookout and a second lookout.

Organisations involved

LUL, a wholly owned subsidiary of Transport for London, is the owner and operator of the Metropolitan line.

It also employs the train operator (driver) of the Metropolitan line train involved.

The patroller was employed by LUL and worked at Rickmansworth depot.

Morson Human Resources Ltd (referred to as Morson in this report) is the employer of the second lookout.

Morson is a recruitment agency, contracted to supply a pool of qualified workers to LUL protection services (a division within LUL), which then allocates work to individuals from this pool on a temporary basis, as and when required.

On the day of the accident, the second lookout was provided by Morson to work at LUL’s Rickmansworth depot.

Cleshar Contract Services (Cleshar) is a supplier of track workers on a temporary basis.

They normally provide resources directly to LUL protection services.

On the day of the accident Cleshar had provided the distant lookout to work at Rickmansworth depot.

Train involved

The train involved was a northbound Metropolitan line service from Baker Street to Chesham, service number 701, which departed Baker Street at 08:45 hrs.

It was formed of an eight-car ‘S’ stock train.

The train was fitted with on-train data recorders (OTDRs) but was not fitted with forward-facing closed-circuit television equipment (FFCCTV).

‘S’ stock train

Staff involved

The second lookout, who was struck by train 701, had been working for Morson for eight years.

Two lookouts were required because the track curvature present for parts of the patrol north of Chalfont & Latimer restricted the sighting of approaching trains.

The second lookout is responsible for relaying warnings from the distant lookout to the work group, which in this case consisted only of the patroller.

The second lookout held ‘site person in charge, protecting workers on the track – traffic hours’ (referred to as a PWT- TH) competency but was not acting in that role at the time of the accident.

She was assessed as competent to perform PWT-TH duties (which included lookout competency) in July 2020.

The second lookout had previously worked in the general vicinity of the accident a few years before, although she was not familiar with the exact location where the accident occurred.

The patroller has been employed by LUL since 2012.

At the time of the accident, he had been in his current role working for the asset performance and capital delivery track patrol team at Rickmansworth depot for around five years.

He was responsible within this team for carrying out track inspections.

In accordance with LUL rules, he was also the PWT-TH for the patrol.

As PWT-TH, the patroller was required to set up and maintain a safe system of work so that all members of the work group were aware of approaching trains and had sufficient time to go to a place of safety, a designated location where it is safe to stand safely while trains pass.

The patroller had undertaken patrols and provided protection in this area, including the patrol being undertaken on the day of the accident, throughout his employment at Rickmansworth depot.

At the time of the accident, the patroller was certified as competent by LUL to patrol and inspect track and to act as a PWT-TH, having last been deemed competent in that capacity on 17 March 2020.

The distant lookout had been working for Cleshar since 2017.

The duties of a distant lookout are to warn the others in the work group when a train is approaching that could put them in danger.

Before a patrol starts, they are positioned by the PWT-TH to achieve at least the minimum sighting time of 25 seconds necessary for everyone to move off the track and to be in the position of safety before a train arrives.

The distant lookout had been assigned as a lookout at Rickmansworth track depot most weekdays for the previous two years.

He had approximately 20 years’ experience working on LUL infrastructure at the time of the accident, was familiar with the location where the accident occurred and was assessed as competent on 14 November 2019.

There is no separate lookout competence on LUL; all lookouts hold the PWT-TH competence.

The distant lookout was not acting in the PWT-TH role at the time of the accident.

The operator of train 701 had worked in the role for twenty-six years, seven years of which had been spent driving trains on the Metropolitan line.

Events preceding the accident

The patrol that was carried out on the day of the accident was normally undertaken by a permanent member of LUL staff acting as patroller and with lookouts usually provided by LUL protection services.

However, it was identified a few days before the accident that one of the regular lookouts (an agency worker from Morson who regularly worked at Rickmansworth depot) was not available and so arrangements were made by LUL protection services to provide a different lookout for the team.

On 13 April, two days before the accident, the second lookout received a text message from LUL protection services to inform her about the possibility of undertaking the upcoming lookout duty, which she accepted.

Later that day she received an email containing a briefing sheet with further details of the work.

On the morning of the accident, the second lookout booked on duty at around 07:15 hrs at Rickmansworth depot.

She had not previously worked with the other two track workers who were going to be undertaking the patrol.

The patroller who would be acting as PWT-TH gave a safety briefing to the second lookout at the depot, where they had met.

The safety briefing covered information about the track, the places of safety, the sighting times and the first aid arrangements for the day’s work.

On the day of the accident, the patrol of the southbound lines from Rickmansworth to Amersham was split into three parts to make effective use of available resources:

• Rickmansworth to Chorleywood
• Chorleywood to Chalfont & Latimer
• Chalfont & Latimer to Amersham.

Each of the three parts of the patrol were undertaken by a different combination of staff.

The patroller and second lookout left Rickmansworth depot and travelled by train to Chorleywood station.

They then undertook a patrol from Chorleywood to Chalfont & Latimer station along the southbound line.

The distant lookout booked on at Rickmansworth depot at 07:30 hrs and started work at 08:00 hrs.

He undertook the Rickmansworth to Chorleywood part of the patrol with a different patroller.

When this was complete, he travelled by train from Chorleywood to Chalfont & Latimer station where he met the patroller and the second lookout on the platform at around 09:00 hrs.

The patroller stated he gave another safety briefing on the southbound platform at Chalfont & Latimer station before the next patrol began.

There is conflicting evidence about what was said in this briefing.

Although the patroller stated that this was a full briefing to both lookouts, the distant lookout stated that he only arrived for the end of it.

The second lookout stated that she did not consider this to be a full briefing in accordance with the Rule Books, but that she did not challenge the patroller about this. Immediately after this safety briefing, the group accessed the track from the station platform ramps and walked onto the southbound line to begin the patrol.

On accessing the track, the distant lookout was walking ahead of the others, followed by the second lookout and then the patroller.

The patroller began inspecting the track and associated components.

At this point, the second lookout was standing next to him while the distant lookout was positioned further along the track to look out for approaching southbound trains.

At approximately 09:15 hrs, train 2C13, a southbound Chiltern Railways train, approached the work group.

Witness evidence suggests that when the distant lookout sounded a warning for this train, which was relayed to the patroller by the second lookout, all three track workers were in the four-foot of the southbound line.

FFCCTV images from train 2C13 showed that the second lookout moved to the Chesham single line cess, while the distant lookout and the patroller moved to the Chesham single line four-foot.

This was not a recognised place of safety to stand in while the train passed.

FFCCTV image from train 2C13

After train 2C13 had passed the group, the patroller returned to the four-foot of the southbound line to continue the inspection.

Witness evidence indicates that at this time the second lookout left the cess and took up a position standing near to the patroller in the ten-foot between the southbound line and the Chesham single line.

The distant lookout returned to the southbound line four-foot to look out for southbound trains.

At this point, the second lookout decided to move away from the side of the patroller as she did not feel the ten-foot she was standing in was a place of safety.

She then moved to the cess of the Chesham single line.

At approximately 09.19 hrs, four minutes after the first train had passed, a second train passed the work group.

This was train 704, a southbound LUL train from Chesham that was travelling along the single line and heading for platform two at Chalfont & Latimer station.

The distant lookout saw the train and gave a warning which was repeated to the patroller by the second lookout.

Although train 704 was not fitted with FFCCTV equipment, witness evidence indicated that both the patroller and the distant lookout moved to the cess of the Chesham single line, the designated place of safety, where the second lookout was already positioned.

Once the train had passed, the group continued with the patrol.

The patroller returned to carrying out an inspection of the points, with the second lookout remaining in the Chesham single line cess, while the distant lookout returned to the southbound four-foot.

Positions of the track workers when train 704 passed them.

Events during the accident

From their experience of the location, both the patroller and the distant lookout knew that, as a southbound train from Chesham had just passed them, a northbound train would soon be returning to Chesham along the single line.

The second lookout, however, stated that she did not know that the Chesham line she was walking next to was bi-directional and that trains could approach from behind her.

The third train to approach the work group at approximately 09.28 hrs was train 701 which was heading to Chesham.

As the train was leaving Chalfont & Latimer station, around one minute before the accident, the operator of train 701 sounded the train’s warning whistle to warn the work group of the train’s presence.

He stated that he received acknowledgement of the warning from both the patroller and the second lookout.

Although the second lookout did not remember hearing the warning from train 701, the patroller stated that he received a warning from the second lookout for the train and that he had acknowledged that warning.

The train operator stated that he saw there was one track worker nearest to him in the ten-foot walking northbound (the patroller), one in the Chesham cess (the second lookout) and one further away acting as a southbound lookout (the distant lookout)

Positions of the track workers when train 701 sounded a warning.

The second lookout remained walking in the Chesham single line cess in a position of safety as train 701 approached her.

However, in the final seconds of the train’s approach, the second lookout moved from the cess and into a position between a signal post and the track to get a better view of the trains approaching from Chesham as she walked.

She was not aware that train 701 was approaching her from behind.

As the train approached the second lookout, the train operator did not realise that she had moved nearer to the Chesham single line and was in the swept path of the train.

As the train passed the group, the train operator heard a ‘bang’ and applied the emergency brake.

The train’s OTDR showed that the train stopped approximately 8 seconds after the emergency brake was applied, having travelled around 43 metres.

At the time of impact, the train was travelling at approximately 27 mph (43 km/h).

Space in which the second lookout walked as the train approached.

Events following the accident

The patroller and the distant lookout became aware that something was wrong when the train stopped unexpectedly.

The train operator opened the cab door after stopping and saw the second lookout lying injured on the ground.

The train operator made an emergency call to LUL control to report what had happened and requested an ambulance.

LUL control contacted the emergency services, who arrived at the location at approximately 09:49 hrs.

The second lookout was taken by ambulance to hospital and was released later the same day.

Analysis

Identification of the immediate cause

The second lookout was in the swept path of train 701 as it passed her.

Witness evidence confirmed that the second lookout was in the Chesham single line cess in a position of safety as train 701 approached her but moved from the cess and into a position between a signal post and the track just before the train reached her.

The operation of the train

The train operator did not sound an emergency warning as he was approaching the second lookout because he did not believe that the second lookout was at risk of being struck by the train.

The train operator stated that he received an acknowledgement of the warning whistle from the patroller and the second lookout when he was departing Chalfont & Latimer station.

The train operator therefore believed that both track workers were aware that the train was approaching them, so concluded that he did not need to take any further action.

The train operator was unaware that the second lookout had moved towards the track.

This may have been because his attentional focus was no longer on the second lookout, believing that she was safe and had acknowledged the warning whistle, and was switched instead to the view ahead.

Alternatively, if the second lookout moved towards the track in the final seconds of the train’s approach, it is possible that the train operator’s view of her was obscured by the cab structure.

During a reconstruction of the train’s path from Chalfont & Latimer station onto and along the Chesham single line, RAIB observed that the train operator generally has good forward visibility although there is some obscuration of the right-hand side view caused by a central console and structural pillar.

RAIB’s analysis, based on OTDR information and this reconstruction, suggests that the second lookout would have been visible to the train operator during the train’s approach until the last seconds before impact.

View from S stock train leaving Chalfont & Latimer station.

Approximate point the second lookout would have last been visible to the train operator.

Location of the track workers immediately before the second lookout was hit by train 701.

Witness evidence, supported by photographs, show that, despite being a designated place of safety for track workers undertaking patrols in traffic hours, some places of safety in the cess do not meet these criteria.

Photographs of the cess on the Metropolitan line north of Rickmansworth.

Recommendations and learning points

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made:

1. The intent of this recommendation is that London Underground Limited improves its understanding and management of the risk from people being struck by trains while working on the line during traffic hours.

London Underground Limited should review how it assesses and controls the risk of people being struck by trains while working on the line during traffic hours.

This review should consider available research and good practice from other parts of the rail industry and should specifically examine:

• If its current understanding of risk accounts for the uncertainty inherent in the use of controls that rely principally on human performance for their effectiveness (such as compliance with training, rules and procedures).
• Whether the current risk control measures in place need to be modified, or additional measures adopted, to reduce the risk to staff working on the track so far as is reasonably practicable. This should include consideration of the way in which safe systems of work are planned, documented and briefed to staff.
• Defining and delivering appropriate non-technical skills training for track workers.
• Working with organisations that provide agency or contract staff to seek improvements in team working between internal and external staff. London Underground Limited should develop a timebound programme for the implementation of any appropriate measures identified.

2. The intent of this recommendation is for London Underground Limited to minimise the requirement for staff to work on the line in traffic hours.

London Underground Limited should carry out a review of track work undertaken during traffic hours.

This review should consider the amount of, and reasons for, traffic hours working and the additional risks to which it exposes staff when compared to working where lines are closed to traffic.

London Underground Limited should develop a timebound programme for the implementation of any opportunities identified to reduce work undertaken in traffic hours and take appropriate actions to control the associated risks where such a reduction is not possible.

3. The intent of this recommendation is to seek improvements in safety assurance and safety reporting on London Underground.

Taking into account the findings of this investigation, London Underground Limited should review its current processes for:

• Assuring that safe systems of work are being correctly planned, implemented and followed, and that the intended control measures to manage risk are performing as expected.
• Ensuring there is an effective reporting system which allows all staff to report incidents and accidents, so that safety issues are properly identified and appropriate and timely actions are taken in response.
• Fostering a culture that encourages all staff (employees and contractors) who work on or near the line during traffic hours to challenge and report unsafe practices without fear of any form of reprisal.

4. The intent of this recommendation is that the cess is in an appropriate condition to be used as a designated place of safety on the Metropolitan line.

London Underground Limited should review its track assets on the Metropolitan line to ensure that, where the cess is expected to serve as a place of safety for staff working on the line, it is suitable for this purpose.

This review should consider:

• whether there is sufficient space from passing trains
• the condition of the lineside
• obstructions which may cause staff to move closer to lines which are open to traffic on which trains may run.

Note: this recommendation may apply to other parts of London Underground Limited’s organisation.

Learning points

RAIB has identified the following important learning points:

1 This accident highlights the importance of targeted and effective safety briefings, and of reaching a clear understanding about safe systems of work before work begins on or near lines on which trains are still running.
2 The immediate aftermath of this accident demonstrated the contribution that good safety‑critical communication can make to the effective handling of an emergency.

15th May 2023

London North Eastern Railway celebrates its centenary by naming an Azuma train​

The train has been named 'Century' and features a livery celebrating the Azuma Fleets on the East Coast Route.​

London North Eastern Railway is celebrating its 100-year anniversary by naming its first Azuma Train.

It also carries a special livery celebrating the Azuma Fleet's services on the East Coast route, keeping people on the move between London, Yorkshire, the North East of England and Scotland.

The train has been named ‘Century' in celebration of the rail operator's impressive anniversary, which saw its first operations get underway in 1923.

The reveal of the special livery took place at York Railway station today (15th of May).

London North Eastern Railway colleagues chose the name ‘Century' after a special train naming panel was formed in order to truly capture the sentiment and price of the rail operator's historic past while representing its innovative approach in the present and ambitious aims for the future.

The operator has operated a legendary service keeping both the English and Scottish capital cities connected.

To this day, the East Coast Main Line is a popular and busy route offering an array of destinations and stunning scenery along the route.

The last 100 years have seen a number of iconic trains operate the service including ‘Flying Scotsman', ‘Mallard' and ‘Sir Nigel Gresley'.

David Horne, Managing Director at LNER, said: “It's a truly special moment for everyone at LNER to be unveiling the first named Azuma on the fourth anniversary of our Azuma trains first entering into passenger service.”

“Century' recognises the successes and iconic moments of our proud past which have defined who we are today, as well as looking forward to the innovation and technology which will see us through 100 more years of taking people on exciting journeys on the East Coast route. The livery perfectly depicts our story to date and we can't wait to see customers enjoying it out on the route.”

The special livery sees London North Eastern Railway colleagues, past and present, featured on a photographic timeline covering 100 years.

The livery also features Joe Duddington, who drove Mallard at record-breaking speeds.

The livery also features other iconic locomotives which have operated the service and well-loved destinations.

The Azuma was driven by one of the rail operator's newly qualified drivers, Jordan Cochrane.

The naming event saw the train get a special welcome in the form of a rousing trumpet fanfare on its arrival into York.

Tim Dunn, Rail Historian and presenter of The Architecture the Railways Built said: “The LNER brand has had a colourful and pioneering history – ever since it appeared in 1923. One hundred years later, this moment brings it all together perfectly!”

“The introduction of ‘Century' means many more people have on the East Coast Main Line will be inspired to learn more about LNER's impact on rail travel in the UK.

The brand is associated with some extraordinary moments, such as Mallard's speed record run; and the introduction of the latest fleet – the Azumas.

These moments have helped define the railway's identity in the UK and I am sure LNER will be known for them for generations to come.”

Carolyn Sheard, LNER Customer Experience Leader who features within the livery, said: “I am so proud to be featured on the ‘Century' livery–I love my job and really enjoy working for the company so it's an honour to be involved in the celebrations this year.”

‘Century' will be in operation permanently on the East Coast Mainline.

15th May 2023

Hitachi Rail engineers help convert disused carriage into library​

Hitachi Rail engineers have helped to transform a carriage from a disused Pacer train into a unique learning environment for a primary school in Spennymoor in County Durham.

In 2019, following a surge in pupil numbers, Kirk Merrington Primary School appealed to the local community for help after outgrowing its existing facilities.

School staff devised an ambitious plan to convert their current library into an extra classroom, and launched a fundraising campaign to purchase a disused Pacer train that they could convert into a unique learning environment.

The school was successful in their bid for a decommissioned unit, and volunteers from Network Rail worked to install track, sleepers and ballast for the train to sit on.

After being placed on the track, the carriage needed to be stripped out and made into a safe environment.

It was at this stage that engineers from Hitachi Rail volunteered to help the school as a colleague of the engineers had a child who attended the school.

Expressing their desire to become involved, four members of the team worked for two weeks to completely strip out the train, before other Hitachi Rail employees worked to make the carriage safe for use as a library.

After two years of hard work, the primary school's all-new learning environment and the library opened in March, with Hitachi Rail engineers in attendance for the official opening as well as many members of the local community.

Steven Hall, Senior Section Leader at Hitachi's works at Newton Aycliffe, was one of those who contributed.

He said “It's invaluable being involved in the community like we are up here at Newton Aycliffe.

The school have been so thankful for the community coming together to help them out.

“For us specifically, it's been fantastic to support such a unique local project that will provide the children at Kirk Merrington with a fun environment in which to read and learn.”

15th May 2023

Cleopatras Birthday!

Well, it's off to Cardiff to celebrate Cleo's 65th Birthday.

First we need to catch our train to Cardiff Central.

Here's the train we missed!

This train is one of the new Transport for Wales Class 231'flirts', this one, 231001, is named 'Sultan' after a pit pony.

We were a few minutes late to catch this one.

Hoping the next train will be a new one too.

Well, we had a few minutes to wait for the next train, so I thought I'd look around.

End of the line.

Looking back up the platform.

Ooh look! Track!

Our train has arrived! Yay!

And it's a new one!

Transport For Wales Stadler Class 231 'FLIRT' Diesel Unit, No. 231010​

Neonlake excitedly pointed out that the seats had USB and power points!

The WiFi was very good as well as the service announcement screens and audio.

We had the carriage to ourselves for a while.

Cardiff Central, Platform 6

Cardiff Central, Platform 7, Class 150 'Sprinter' 150262

Standing at the end of Platforms 6/7 at Cardiff Central looking up at the north-end station throat.

I could spend all day here, but I must remember it's Cleo's birthday.