Marcus' Model Railway Journey

19th December 2023


RAIB

Report:​

Report 14/2023: Freight train derailment at London Gateway

Published: 19th December 2023

RAIB has today released its report into a freight train derailment at London Gateway, Essex, 24 December 2021.

Summary

At around 05:45 hrs on 24 December 2021, 5 wagons of a 33-wagon intermodal freight train derailed at low speed as the train was entering the rail terminal at London Gateway port, Essex.

The derailment started when wheels on a wagon in the middle part of the train suddenly lifted off the track, just before reaching the port boundary, with the other wagons becoming derailed as they passed over points within the rail terminal.

While no one was injured, infrastructure damage disrupted rail freight access into and out of the port for 14 days.

The first derailed wagon was the unloaded centre wagon of a triple-wagon, which was made up of three individual wagons permanently coupled together.

The wagons on the train either side of the unloaded centre wagon were all loaded, and a train brake application had recently been made when the derailment occurred.

A longitudinal train dynamic simulation model, specially developed as part of the investigation, showed that compressive forces generated in the train were larger towards the middle of the train, where the triple-wagon was located, and rapidly increased to a maximum as the centre wagon approached the place where it became derailed.

Data from the train’s on-train data recorder showed that this was shortly after brake forces acting on the locomotive had peaked and that the train’s brakes would have been starting to release.

Derailments in 2015 involving an earlier version of the type of triple-wagon involved demonstrated that triple-wagons of this design configuration were susceptible to derailment when large longitudinal compressive forces are suddenly applied.

Early derailment simulation studies had confirmed this and helped inform a decision to lengthen the bar coupler on the earlier version of these wagons to improve derailment resistance.

The wagon designers identified the need to make other design changes when the new version of the triple-wagon was developed for unrelated reasons.

However, although the risks due to longitudinal compressive force continued to be recognised, the need to make further design improvements to address them was not deemed to be necessary.

Derailment simulations undertaken in support of the investigation helped show that the new version of the triple-wagon remained similarly susceptible to derailment and confirmed that the lack of payload on the centre wagon, and possibly in-service degradation of the bogie, increased the derailment risk.

The investigation found that the risks associated with the longitudinal dynamic behaviour of long freight trains are not well understood in the rail industry and that there are limited processes, tools, and knowledge resources available to assess
and manage them.

This was identified as an underlying factor.

The investigation has identified the design management arrangements that were adopted during the development of the new version of the triple-wagon as another underlying factor.

It is possible that these arrangements limited the designers’ ability to understand the dynamic behaviour of the triple-wagon and did not result in the identification of critical performance requirements.

The train following the derailment

RAIB has made three recommendations.

One is directed to VTG Rail, the owner and developer of the triple-wagon, covering the need to identify and implement any necessary design changes and operating restrictions.

The second is directed to GB Railfreight, the operator of the train, covering the need to develop instructions and best practice guidance for its operations staff.

The third is directed to RSSB covering the need to raise the rail industry’s understanding of the derailment risks associated with longitudinal compressive forces and the management strategies that need to be introduced.

The accident

Summary of the accident

At around 05:45 hrs on 24 December 2021, five wagons within freight train reporting number 4L471 derailed on the Thames Haven line on the approach to London Gateway port, near to Stanford-le-Hope, Essex.

Train 4L47was the scheduled GB Railfreight (GBRf) 22:35 hrs (on 23 December) intermodal service from the freight terminal at Hams Hall, near Birmingham, to London Gateway port.

The service was carrying freight containers.

Train 4L47 had been routed off the Down Tilbury line at Thames Haven Junction.

The train had just started to enter the port infrastructure when the derailment occurred.

The 12th wagon derailed to the left on a section of line without points or crossings (termed as ‘plain line’) approaching LG11 signal, just before reaching the boundary between Network Rail’s infrastructure and that managed by the port operator.

The locomotive’s on-train data recorder (OTDR) registered that the train brakes were being applied at the time of the derailment and that the train was rapidly slowing to a speed of 9 mph (14.5 km/h).

The 11th, 13th, 14th and15th wagons subsequently derailed as a consequence.

Realising something was wrong, the driver brought the train to a stand on the Port Arrivals line, 740 metres beyond LG11 signal.

The train remained coupled together during the derailment, with all the wagons staying upright.

No one was injured in the accident, although there was major damage caused to the railway infrastructure and six wagons required repair.

The derailment also resulted in major disruption to rail freight access into the port.

Context

Location

London Gateway port is a deep-water container terminal on the Thames, located around 40 km east of central London.

Constructed on the site of a former oil refinery, it opened for operation in 2013.

The Thames Haven line connects the mainline railway to the rail terminal at the port.

The line and associated railway infrastructure were redesigned and renewed as part of the construction work for the new port.

The new rail terminal is capable of handling trains up to 775 metres long.

Trains join the Thames Haven line at Thames Haven Junction (26 miles 41 chains) on the London, Tilbury, and Southend line.

It initially comprises two lines: the Down Thames Haven, used by trains entering the port, and the Up Thames Haven, used by departing trains.

Trains entering the port pass LG11signal, then a user worked level crossing (The Bridleway) (28 miles 7 chains) and, shortly afterwards, the infrastructure boundary (28 miles 9 chains) between the mainline railway and the port.

The two lines then join to form the Thames Haven Single line at LG1 points.

The single line continues under the overbridge carrying the port access road, after which LG2 and LG3 points provide access to the Port Arrivals and Port Departures lines and the rail terminal sidings.

Trains routed towards London Gateway port enter the Down Thames Haven line on a right-hand curve and climbing gradient.

After reaching an initial peak, the curvature on the line eases to the left and the railway continues to climb, reaching a final summit at 27 miles 45 chains, just over one mile (1.7 km) beyond the junction.

The line then descends on a gradient of 1 in 108 and becomes level shortly before LG11 signal.

The gradient profile is also shown in the diagram above.

Various maximum permitted line speeds apply for trains routed into the port rail terminal.

These are:

• a 25 mph (40 km/h) limit from Thames Haven Junction on the Down Thames Haven line to 28 miles 33 chains on the Thames Haven Single line, shortly after the overbridge
• a 15 mph (24 km/h) limit from 28 miles 33 chains to 29 miles 74 chains on the Thames Haven Single line, and also on the Port Arrivals and Port Departures lines
• a 5 mph (8 km/h) limit beyond 29 mile 74 chains on the Thames Haven Single line.

Train movements outside the port rail terminal are controlled by lineside signals operated from Network Rail’s Upminster signalling control centre.

LG11 signal controls access into the rail terminal.

LG11 signal, and the signals used to control movements within the rail terminal, are operated from the London Gateway rail control centre.

Organisations involved

Network Rail owns, manages, and maintains the railway infrastructure on the approach to the infrastructure boundary where the 12th wagon (wagon 122) derailed.

This section of line lies within Network Rail’s Anglia route, which is part of its Eastern region.

DP World owns, manages, and maintains the railway infrastructure within London Gateway port (beyond the infrastructure boundary) where the four other wagons (wagons 11, 13, 14 and 15) consequently derailed and train 4L47 came to astand.

GBRf operated train 4L47 and employed its driver.

It leased wagon 12, an FWA type wagon, and the 11 other FWA type wagons on the train.

It also either leased or owned the other vehicles on the train, including the locomotive, and was responsible for the maintenance for most of them.

DP World contracted GBRf to operate the port rail terminal and to provide the ground staff required.

VTG Rail owned and maintained the FWA wagons on the train, including wagon 12, and leased them to GBRf.

All the FWA wagons on the train were of the Ecofret 2 variant, a wagon of recent design.

VTG Rail specified the Ecofret 2design requirements and led the development, procurement and approval work needed to obtain authorisation for placing the wagons into service.

VTG Rail appointed consultants to assist it with the work.

Wabtec UK Ltd (referred to as ‘Wabtec’ in the remainder of this report) designed, manufactured, and supplied the bogies that VTG Rail required be fitted to the Ecofret 2 wagons.

It supported VTG Rail with the approval work needed to obtain authorisation for placing Ecofret 2 wagons into service.

WH Davis designed and manufactured the Ecofret 2 wagon underframe.

It was based on the design of the Ecofret 1 wagon, an earlier FWA wagon variant, the design rights for which VTG Rail already owned.

WH Davis also assembled the wagons and supported VTG Rail with the approval work needed to obtain authorisation for placing Ecofret 2 wagons into service.

VTG Rail appointed AEGIS Certification Services Limited (ACS) to undertake conformity assessments for the Ecofret 2 wagon against applicable technical standards and safety requirements.

This was part of the approval work needed to obtain authorisation for placing Ecofret 2 wagons into service.

The Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB) is the organisation that supports the rail industry in improving its safety performance.

Its principal activities include: managing research and development programmes; developing, agreeing and maintaining standards; and providing insight, analysis and guidance on railway systems, safety and health.

Network Rail, DP World, GBRf, VTG Rail, Wabtec, WH Davis, ACS and RSSB freely co-operated with the investigation.

The Class 66 [66779 'Evening Star'] involved in the accident, photographed on May 22, 2021

Train involved

Train 4L47 was formed of a class 66 diesel-electric locomotive and a mixture of 33 intermodal flat wagons.

These were:

• four Ecofret 2 triple-wagons, each comprising three wagons permanently coupled with a bar coupler between each wagon (12 wagons altogether)
• six FEA type twin-wagons (a mixture of FEA-A, FEA-B and FEA-C types), each comprising a pair of wagons permanently coupled with a bar coupler between them (12 wagons altogether)
• nine FEA-S type single wagons. Each triple-wagon, twin-wagon, single wagon and the locomotive were coupled to each other using a conventional screw coupling and side buffer arrangement.

Wagon 12, the first wagon to derail, was the centre wagon of an Ecofret 2triple- wagon.

As such, it was permanently coupled (by a bar coupler) to two outer wagons.

These were wagon 11 in front, and wagon 13 behind.

Except for wagon12, all the wagons on the train carried at least one freight container.

The table below is a summary of the consist of train 4L47 and the payload recorded on the train document.

The train had an approximate length of 621 metres.

Train 4L47 consist and recorded payload

Railway and port infrastructure

The track on the Thames Haven line was laid for the port’s opening in 2013.

It comprises CEN60 rail5 supported on concrete sleepers and stone ballast.

The rails are seated on polymer pads and secured to the sleepers with steel rail fastenings.

Network Rail’s track geometry measurement train ran over the Down Thames Haven line on 13 July 2021.

This was the last recording run before the derailment.

No track geometry faults were recorded in the vicinity of the derailment that required intervention before train 4L47 ran over the line on 24 December 2021.

RAIB compared data from the recording run with track gauge and cross level measurements that Network Rail made immediately after the derailment.

This indicated that the track had not significantly deteriorated in the meantime.

On entry to the port rail terminal, trains pass a set of lineside cameras and optical character recognition (OCR) scanners.

These collect information about the train and the container payload.

The equipment is located just after the port access road overbridge.

It includes lights to illuminate the train as it passes.

Staff involved

31 The driver of train 4L47 joined GBRf in January 2019 with no prior experience as a train driver.

They were assessed as competent to operate class 66 locomotives in October 2019 and assessed as competent to operate trains over the route into London Gateway port in January 2021.

They had regularly driven trains into and out of the port since then.

The driver had no previous safety incidents recorded by GBRf.

External circumstances

32 The nearby weather station in Corringham (2.5 km to the north-east) recorded an air temperature of 7.7°C at the time of the derailment and a wind speed of 1 km/h.

There was no report of precipitation. It was dark when the derailment occurred.

The sequence of events

Events preceding the accident

Train 4L47 departed from Hams Hall on time at 22:35 hrs on 23 December 2021.

The train was routed via Whitacre Junction, Rugby and Watford Junction and arrived at Wembley European Freight Operating Centre (EFOC) at 00:52 hrs on 24 December where there was a change of drivers.

After preparing the locomotive and checking the handbrakes on the train were released, the driver who operated train 4L47 from Wembley EFOC to London Gateway port was ready to depart.

GBRf drivers needed to know if the train included Ecofret 2 wagons because this required them to apply the brake in a specific manner.

GBRf stated that drivers would know if there were Ecofret 2 wagons as this was detailed on the train document.

The driver who operated train 4L47 to London Gateway, however, stated that they used the running brake test (required to take place at the start of the journey) to determine if there were Ecofret 2 wagons, since it was their experience that trains containing this type of wagon responded differently during these tests.

The train departed from Wembley EFOC at around 03:45 hrs, three minutes early.

It was routed along the North London line to Stratford and then onto the London Tilbury and Southend line at Barking.

The driver recalled that the train felt “heavy", and that the journey had been slow because of an unusually large number of restrictive signals, but that nothing untoward occurred during this part of it.

Train 4L47 passed over Thames Haven Junction and onto the Down Thames Haven line at 05:22 hrs, six minutes later than scheduled.

Events during the accident

The Figure below is an analysis of the locomotive OTDR recording of the journey along the Down Thames Haven line, starting at Thames Haven Junction.

It shows:

• the throttle number (between 1 and 8) that was selected by the driver to control traction effort
• the train brake pipe pressure (which is measured at the locomotive) and the corresponding locomotive brake cylinder pressure generated in response to braking changes made by the driver
• the gradient profile (track elevation)
• the train’s speed and the maximum permitted line speed at the location
• the location of important infrastructure features and of train 4L47 at the time of the derailment, including the position of wagon 12 (leading bogie).

Train 4L47 passed over Thames Haven Junction at around 22 mph (36 km/h).

The locomotive OTDR recorded a mixture of traction effort demands and single brake applications as it continued to the summit and then descended the 1 in108 gradient to LG11 signal.

The driver recalled the signal clearing as the train approached.

The OTDR recorded two consecutive brake applications (a ‘double brake application’) shortly after the front of the train passed the signal.

At this time, wagon 12 was approaching the point of derailment.

Together with the derailment marks and other evidence (see paragraphs 42-44), the OTDR analysis shows that the leading bogie on wagon 12 derailed as the brakes were releasing after the second of the two brake applications.

The driver recalled a sudden jolt and, looking back, noticed dust coming from the train.

On realising something was wrong, they brought the train to a stand.

Events following the accident

The driver secured the train and walked back to confirm what had happened.

On returning to the cab, they made a GSM-R call to the signaller to report the derailment.

The signaller notified the London Gateway rail control centre.

A member of ground staff arrived, and both they and the driver acted to protect the train.

After the accident, the driver was tested for the presence of both non-medical drugs and alcohol at London Gateway port.

The driver tested clear for both.

It was 14 days before temporary repairs could be made to the railway and the rail connection into the London Gateway port reopened.

An assessment of final infrastructure repairs identified the need for extensive renewal work including there placement of nearly 700 metres of track and the installation of a complete new set of points.

Background information

Examination of the track and derailment site

Marks and damage on the track were found on the approach to LG11 signal.

They were consistent with:

• both left-hand wheels on a single bogie lifting up onto the rail
• the left and right-hand wheels of both wheelsets then becoming airborne for around two metres
• the right-hand wheels then landing on the sleepers between the rails (the 'four- foot’) and the left-hand wheels landing in the track bed alongside the railway (the ‘cess’).

The first identified derailment mark was on the left-hand rail, approximately 11 metres on the approach to LG11 signal.

This was designated the point of derailment and numbered as sleeper 0.

The second derailment mark was identified at sleeper -3, around 2 metres beyond the point of derailment.

The separation of the marks was consistent with the 1.8 metre wheelbase of theTF20 bogies fitted to wagon 12.

This, and the form of the marks (short, and at an angle to the rail), shows that both wheelsets on the same bogie had lifted suddenly, and simultaneously left the track on a trajectory towards the left.

Other marks were found further along the track.

These took the form of damage to sleepers in the four-foot and cess.

There was an absence of marks between sleeper 0 and sleeper -3, evidence of one wheelset running derailed between sleeper -3 and sleeper -6 and, after this, evidence of two wheelsets running derailed.

This indicates that the two wheelsets on the bogie landed more or less at the same time, the leading wheelset close to sleeper -6 and the trailing wheelset close to sleeper -3.

They had remained airborne in the meantime.

There were no marks to suggest that more than one bogie ran derailed on the Down Thames Haven line.

RAIB has concluded, from other evidence, that the wheelsets which derailed at this point were on the leading bogie of wagon 12.

Closed-circuit television (CCTV) images from the lineside cameras showed that three bogies in total had derailed by the time wagon 12 was running on the Thames Haven Single line.

These were the trailing bogie on wagon 11 and both bogies on wagon 12.

All three of these bogies were shown running derailed to the left.

RAIB concluded that the trailing bogie on wagon 12 and the trailing bogie on wagon 11 had been drawn into derailment due to the path that the already derailed leading bogie of wagon 12 was forced to take as it ran through LG1 points, where the Up Thames Haven and Down Thames Haven lines join to form the single line.

Marks and damage on the track at LG1 points support this.

When the derailed train reached LG2 points, the leading bogie on wagon 11 and both bogies of wagon 13 also derailed.

Ecofret 2 wagons

Intermodal wagons operating on the mainline railway in Great Britain (GB) have been historically designed to accommodate container payloads of up to 60 feet (18.3 metres) in length.

This means that they can typically carry a40- foot container plus a 20-foot container, three 20-foot containers or two 30-footcontainers.

Examples of such wagons include the FEA type wagons within train 4L47.

With 40-foot containers becoming more popular (and 20 and 30-foot containers becoming scarcer), freight train operators were finding many of their wagons were carrying solitary 40-foot containers, resulting in wasted capacity.

VTG Rail identified a market for a shorter intermodal wagon that carried only a single40- foot container.

This led to it contracting an engineering consultant to design the Ecofret 1 wagon.

A prototype Ecofret 1 triple-wagon was in built in 2012, with Ecofret 1 production versions being built both in triple-wagon and twin-wagon configurations.

A continuing demand for intermodal wagons led to the development of the Ecofret 2 wagon, based on the earlier Ecofret 1 design.

VTG Rail identified that the following changes to the Ecofret 1 design were needed:

• A bogie that would enable compliance with new ride requirements. VTG Rail opted to specify a bogie of the TF20 type that Wabtec was in the process of developing.
• Brake equipment from a different supplier. The aim was to avoid problems that had been experienced with the brake equipment fitted to Ecofret 1 wagons.
• Flexibility to carry one 40-foot or two 20-foot containers on any of the three wagons (rather than only the centre wagon which Ecofret 1 allowed) of a triple- wagon.

In other areas it was decided to keep the wagon designs as similar as possible.

This was to aid maintenance and spares management.

The objective of minimising change led to VTG Rail deciding to specify the same longer bar coupler that had been retrofitted to Ecofret 1 triple-wagons during early service.

VTG Rail led a team to project manage the various development tasks and engaged consultants to assist.

The team included representatives from its suppliers, Wabtec and WH Davis.

The division of the engineering responsibility can be summarised as below:

• VTG Rail – wagon technical specification and overall design, and the management of the approval work needed
• WH Davis – modifications of the Ecofret 1 wagon underframe design including incorporation of the new brake equipment, the revised container securing arrangements and the interfaces for the TF20 bogie
• Wabtec – design and development of the TF20 bogie and work needed to demonstrate compliance with wagon ride and running safety requirements that were identified as relevant.

The figure below shows the three wagons making up a typical Ecofret 2 triple-wagon.

Each has a welded steel underframe comprising a central longitudinal rectangular box (the ‘underframe spine’) from which the bolster, headstock and other fabrications provide the interfaces for the bogies, couplers and buffers, brake equipment and the spigots needed for securing the containers.

The bar couplers that connect Ecofret 2 triple-wagons together are anchored within a central pocket on the inner headstocks (the ‘headstock pocket’).

With reference to the figure below, the bar coupler arrangement comprises a rigid drawbar (1) that connects to spring units (2), one on each wagon, VI aspherical bearings (3).

Each spring unit is made up of three elastomeric ring elements.

These are preloaded by being clamped between two steel plates (4), which locate and secure each spring unit within the headstock pocket (5).

The spring units enable the drawbar couplings to compress (or extend) when the externally applied longitudinal force exceeds the preload amount in either compression (causing the coupled wagons to draw closer together) or tension (causing the coupled wagons to separate).

The material used in the spring components enables the bar coupler arrangement to absorb energy when alternating forces apply.

The spherical bearings allow the rigid drawbars to pivot in both the vertical longitudinal (‘pitch’ rotation) and horizontal (‘yaw’ rotation) planes.

Relatively large angles of movement are possible.

No mechanism or design feature is provided to restrict these rotations before the rigid drawbar contacts the sides, or top and bottom, of the headstock pocket.

The outer wagons are nearly a metre longer than the centre wagons.

This is to accommodate the conventional screw coupling and side buffer arrangement needed to couple to other vehicles.

With reference to the figure below, the arrangement comprises a conventional draw hook and screw coupling (6).

This connects to a draw gear spring unit (7) on the outer headstock via a clevis and pin (8).

The draw gear spring unit comprises two side-by-side stacks of elastomeric ring elements.

These are also preloaded. Conventional buffer units(9) with internal spring elements (10) are bolted to the outer headstock, one on either side.

When coupled, the link on the screw coupling is placed on the draw hook of the other vehicle (or vice versa) and the screw coupling tightened.

If this results in the buffer faces being in contact (without buffer unit compression), then any longitudinal compressive force generated along the train will act only on the buffer unit pairs, with the coupled vehicles coming closer together as the buffer units deflect.

Insufficient tightening of the screw coupling results in a gap between the buffer faces.

This is referred to as ‘slack’, which needs to be taken up (closed) before the buffer units can touch and start to deflect.

With the buffer faces in contact (but without buffer unit compression), any longitudinal tensile force generated acts only on the connected draw gear spring unit pairs.

In this case, the coupled vehicles will separate, but only once the draw gear spring unit preload is overcome and the drawbar spring units can start to deflect.

If any slack was present (buffer faces not in contact), then this would need to be taken up before this force can act.

The material in the spring components enables the arrangement to absorb energy when alternating forces apply.

The TF20 bogie has a fabricated steel bogie frame supported by four coil spring primary suspension units, one at each axle box, with the axle boxes being also connected to the bogie frame via a primary traction rod arrangement.

The bolster on the wagon underframe is supported by a pair of rubber secondary suspension springs.

Primary and secondary hydraulic dampers are fitted to help control dynamic behaviour.

The bogie is designed to run with the ‘P8’ type wheel profile that was developed by British Rail.

Examination of the derailed wagons

RAIB examined wagons 11, 12 and 13 (which together formed a Ecofret 2triple-wagon).

It recorded the condition of the suspension, wheels, bogie brake equipment and couplers and found that the damage to the wheel treads and flanges and the brake equipment was consistent with all the bogies of these wagons having run derailed.

RAIB also measured the wheel profiles and relevant wheelset dimensions for use in subsequent wagon derailment simulation studies.

RAIB identified witness marks on the headstock pockets where wagon 11 and wagon 12 were coupled together.

The marks were consistent with the leading end of wagon 12 running derailed to the left and the rigid drawbar coming in to contact with the headstock pockets as a result.

The marks were only found on one side of the headstock pockets.

From this, and the available CCTV evidence, RAIB has concluded that the leading bogie of wagon 12 was the first to derail.

Special suspension movement control devices were added to the TF20 bogie as a late modification.

Referred to as ‘primary lateral buffers’ (PLBs), they comprise a sliding frame designed to capture and restrain a vertical metal lug on top of each axle box.

The lug is informally known as the ‘shark fin’.

With reference to the figure below, the sliding frame (11) is secured to the underside of the bogie frame, the shark fin passing through a rectangular void (12).

Two friction strips (13) attached to the sliding frame are designed to bear against the sides of the shark fin.

These allow the shark fin (and axle box) to slide up and down.

The side-to-side (lateral) movement of the axle box is restrained by two laminated elastomeric springs (14).

RAIB identified signs of significant damage and degradation on several PLBs.

On wagon 12, nearly all the friction strips had detached and there was evidence that some of the laminated elastomeric springs had split.

Degradation of the PLBs on Ecofret 2 wagons was a problem that existed before the derailment, and work was being carried out to investigate it when the derailment occurred.

Summary of conclusions

Immediate cause

Longitudinal compressive forces generated within train 4L47 during braking were sufficient to cause the wheels on the leading bogie of wagon 12 to suddenly lift and run derailed.

Causal factors

The causal factors were:

a. Wagon 12 was susceptible to derailment under longitudinal compressive force; its condition, and the loading of the Ecofret 2 triple-wagon of which it was a part, increased this risk. This causal factor arose due to a combination of the following:

i. The design process for Ecofret 2 wagons did not fully recognise the need for there to be a change in design from the Ecofret 1 wagon to improve behaviour under longitudinal compressive forces.
ii. It is possible that degradation and wear had resulted in the bogies on wagon 12 being in a condition that made the wheel flanges more prone to being forced into contact with the rail under longitudinal compressive force.
iii. The way that wagons 11, 12 and 13 were loaded made the wheels of wagon 12 more prone to lifting under longitudinal compressive force.

b. The longitudinal compressive forces generated within train 4L47 during braking and which acted on wagon 12 were large, significant, and sudden. This causal factor arose due to a combination of the following:

i. Wagon 12 was within a part of the train where the longitudinal compressive force generated during braking was likely to be higher than at other locations along the length.
ii. A double brake application, made shortly after passing LG11 signal, resulted in a sudden and large longitudinal compressive force being generated that acted on wagon 12. This coincided with wagon 12 approaching the point of derailment.

Underlying factors

The underlying factors were:

a. Derailment risks associated with the longitudinal dynamic behaviour of long freight trains are not widely understood within the rail industry and there are limited supporting processes, tools and knowledge available to assess and manage them .
b. VTG Rail adopted design management arrangements that possibly limited its ability to understand the dynamic behaviour of the triple-wagon as a complete vehicle system and did not result in it identifying critical subsystem performance requirements that were associated with the behaviour of the train as a whole.

Urgent operating notice concerning trains with Ecofret2 wagons

20th December 2023

Class 37 locomotive photoshoot raises £3,000 for Yorkshire children’s hospice​

Network Rail workers organised a charity photoshoot in York and raised three thousand pounds for Yorkshire charity, Martin House Children's Hospice.

The event took place at Network Rail's Holgate Engineering Works, which is its largest in the country.

More than seventy people attended the one-off photoshoot on Saturday evening, which marked the end of the leaf-busting season for the network's Rail Head Treatment Trains (RHTT).

Volunteers from across the rail industry cleaned five Class 37 diesel locomotives, which were stationed at the works throughout the RHTT season.

Once they looked their best, attendees took photographs which captured what Network Rail describes as “enigmatic and atmospheric images under the evening's moonlight”.

Photographers each paid a donation to be a part of the evening.

The organisers held the event because they knew that the locomotives are very popular with rail enthusiasts, who often follow their activities.

During the autumn, the trains blast fallen leaves off the railway and leave a sand-based substance on the rail head to help train wheels grip and run reliably.

The Railway Benefit Fund recently awarded staff from Network Rail and DB Cargo a ‘Heart of Gold' award for raising over £250,000 for the charity through organising a series of rail tours across the country.

In April, Network Rail and DB Cargo staff handed a cheque for two hundred thousand pounds to Martin House.

Chris Gee, Programme Director for Network Rail and one of the event's organisers, said: “We had a brilliant evening on Saturday as over 70 people from the across the industry and beyond came down to Holgate Works to mark the end of Rail Head Treatment Train season through pictures and raise a great amount of money for Martin House.

“It has been a busy season for the locomotives based at Holgate and it was lovely to see them presented so nicely after working hard throughout the autumn keeping the nation's passengers moving.

“Network Rail has supported Martin House's incredible work for a number of years now and it is amazing that we have been able to raise even more money for them through this special event.”

20th December 2023

Steam locomotive to depart London this Thursday​

LSL operated LMS Black 5 No. 45231 The Sherwood Forester will haul Steam Dreams' Santa Steam Express this Thursday (21st December 2023).

The Santa Steam Express runs 4 times on Friday, with part of the trip being operated by a diesel locomotive.

The first trip will depart London Victoria at 09:26 and will pass through West Brompton (09:51), Kensington Olympia (09:54), Shepherds Bush (09:57) before reversal at Willesden No7.

From here (expected to be diesel hauled with 45231 on the rear of the train), the train will pass through South Acton (10:37), Barnes (10:46), Clapham Junction (10:54) and London Victoria at 11:08.

The second trip will depart London Victoria at 11:44 and will pass through West Brompton (12:00), Kensington Olympia (12:03), Shepherds Bush (12:06) before reversal at Willesden No7.

From here (expected to be diesel hauled with 45231 on the rear of the train), the train will pass through South Acton (12:26), Barnes (12:53), Clapham Junction (13:01) and London Victoria at 13:20.

The third trip will depart London Victoria at 15:31 and will pass through West Brompton (16:00), Kensington Olympia (16:03), Shepherds Bush (16:06) before reversal at Willesden No7.

From here (expected to be diesel hauled with 45231 on the rear of the train), the train will pass through South Acton (16:36), Barnes (16:46), Clapham Junction (16:54) and London Victoria at 17:04.

The final trip will depart London Victoria at 18:20 and will pass through West Brompton (18:37), Kensington Olympia (18:40), Shepherds Bush (18:42) before reversal at Willesden No7.

From here (expected to be diesel hauled with 45231 on the rear of the train), the train will pass through South Acton (19:12), Barnes (19:29), Clapham Junction (19:38) and London Victoria at 19:51.

20th December 2023

Tilbury Tank steam locomotive takes up residence at Bury Transport Museum​

The 89-year-old 2500 Tilbury Tank has arrived at Bury Transport Museum, on loan from the National Railway Museum.

The iconic engine joins several other artefacts from railway history, such as a battery-electric locomotive built in 1944, which arrived at the museum last month.

It is hoped that these new additions will make the Bury Transport Museum an attractive hub for railway historical preservation in the North West of England, drawing in crowds in the local area who are eager to learn about the country's transport heritage.

The museum regularly hosts historical events that exhibit a variety of famous engines, including arguably the most famous tank engine of all, Thomas.

The Tilbury Tank was originally constructed in 1934, and was designed to serve the London Tilbury and Southend line as part of the London Midland and Scottish Railway.

Thirty-seven engines were constructed, but Bury Transport Museum's latest resident was the first to be completed, marking an important moment in railway history.

It is also the last surviving example of this particular model of tank engine.

These tank engines feature three cylinders, which were incorporated into the design to aid with acceleration.

This was a particularly important feature on busy railway lines of the time, as trains were required to stop and start frequently along the route.

The Tilbury Tank can be identified by its relatively short smoke stack and smaller external cylinders, which differ from other 2-6-4 engines of the era.

East Lancashire Railway Director and Bury Transport Museum Chairman Keith Whitmore welcomed the new arrival, saying:

“We are absolutely delighted to be strengthening our working partnership with the National Railway Museum.

“The 2500 is an LMS Large Tank locomotive built in 1934 that now looks very much at home in our museum, representing the zenith of steam power on the London Midland and Scottish Railway before post war British Railways came into being.

“We are working closely with the Science Museum Group to ensure that our Museum is a must see visitor attraction in the North West and are looking forward to further announcements shortly on a further refresh of our displays.”

These words were echoed by the National Railway Museum's Paddy McNulty, who said:

“We are proud to be working with ELR and the Bury Transport Museum to enable LMS locomotive no. 2500 to go on display. This will give the public additional opportunities to see this important part of the National Collection for themselves.”

21st December 2023

TRANSPORT FOR WALES

Reopening the Treherbert railway line​

The Treherbert railway line will reopen to passengers in February 2024, following a huge upgrade as part of the South Wales Metro project.


The Treherbert railway line will reopen to passengers in February 2024, following a huge upgrade as part of the South Wales Metro project.

Transport for Wales (TfW) and partners have removed some of the oldest railway infrastructure in Wales, and replaced it with a modern, brand-new signalling system including the installation of Overhead Line Equipment that will electrify the line in the near future.

Additionally, three new track loops have been installed that will allow more frequent services and there have been various station works including the extension of platforms and adding new footbridges.

The infrastructure changes are all part of the South Wales Metro project that will deliver more frequent, greener and improved rail services within the region.

The transformation of the Core Valley Lines for the Metro has been part-funded by the European Regional Development Fund through Welsh Government, and will enable faster, more frequent services between Cardiff and the heads of the valleys.  

WATCH:VIDEO

Starting in early January 2024, TfW drivers will begin their training on the upgraded line, new track layout and signalling systems, as well as further training on the new Metro tram-trains.

As trains will be running on the track from January 2024, TfW are reminding people that no unauthorised personnel should attempt to trespass onto the railway line, as it is extremely dangerous and illegal.

Bus replacement services will remain in place until passenger trains start again in February 2024.

From February 2024, TfW will reintroduce two trains per hour onto the Treherbert line, with brand-new Metro trains expected to enter service from summer 2024.

Karl Gilmore, Rail Infrastructure Director said: “This is another key milestone as we continue to deliver the South Wales Metro project for the people of South Wales. We’ve upgraded a Victorian railway line to a modern, 21st century electrified line that will run brand-new tram-trains in the near future.

“I’d like to thank all our customers and railway neighbours for their support and patience during this time of transformation and wish them all a Merry Christmas. In 2024, people will really start to see the benefits from much of the work that has been carried out.”

As a thank you to TfW customers and lineside neighbours for their patience, TfW will be extending the Rhondda Railcard discount for 3 months following the reopening of the line in February 2024.

You can learn more about the transformation of the Treherbert line by visiting tfw.wales/projects/metro/south-wales-metro/treherbert-line-transformation

Our vision for the South Wales Metro by visiting tfw.wales/projects/metro

22nd December 2023


RAIB

News story:​

Collision between a road-rail vehicle and a trolley near Brading

Published: 22nd December 2023

Investigation into a collision between a road-rail vehicle and a trolley near Brading, Isle of Wight, 22 November 2023.


During the early hours of 22 November 2023, a road-rail vehicle (RRV) collided with a hand trolley which had been placed on the railway between Smallbrook Junction and Brading, on the Island Line.

At the time of the accident, the Island Line was under possession as part of maintenance work and was therefore closed to normal rail services.

As a result of the collision, the hand trolley struck two track workers who were standing near to the railway.

Both track workers sustained injuries which required hospital treatment.

No damage was caused to the RRV or to the trolley involved.

Our investigation will seek to identify the sequence of events that led to the accident.

It will also consider:

• the actions of those involved and anything which may have influenced them
• the management of the railway staff involved in the accident, including their training and competence
• the method of operation in use when the collision occurred and the policies and procedures in place for managing such operations
• any underlying management factors.

Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the rail industry or by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.

We will publish our findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of our investigation.

22nd December 2023

TRANSPORT FOR WALES

Introducing the new TrawsCymru T22 route​

Transport for Wales and Cyngor Gwynedd are delighted to announce the latest brand new TrawsCymru service will commence operation in February 2024.


Transport for Wales and Cyngor Gwynedd are delighted to announce the latest brand new TrawsCymru service will commence operation in February 2024.

These will be the first electric buses on Gwynedd's public transport network will operate between Caernarfon, Porthmadog and Blaenau Ffestiniog.

The vehicles and charging facilities have been provided thanks to financial support from the Welsh Government and will be operated by Llew Jones International.

Councillor Dafydd Meurig, Cyngor Gwynedd's Environment Member, said: "It is excellent news that the first electric buses are being introduced on our public transport network here in Gwynedd. The new T22 service will offer more travel options along the Blaenau Ffestiniog to Porthmadog route and on to Caernarfon, with significant environmental benefits.

"This is the culmination of a lot of close collaboration between Gwynedd Council and Transport for Wales, with financial support from the Welsh Government as well, and is an example of what can be achieved with working together despite the difficult financial climate.”

When it starts from February, the T22 service will enable people to travel hourly between Blaenau Ffestiniog and Porthmadog, and every two hours between Porthmadog and Caernarfon.

In addition, the TrawsCymru T2 service will continue to operate between Aberystwyth and Bangor passing Porthmadog and Caernarfon.

Gethin George, Programme Manager for TrawsCymru at TfW commented: “We’re delighted to be working with Cyngor Gwynedd to introduce this additional route to the TrawsCymru network providing improved access to public transport and helping deliver our vision for better integration between bus and other modes of transport and encouraging people to leave their cars behind and take the bus whenever possible.”

Llew Jones International are extremely proud to have been awarded the ground-breaking T22 Electric Bus contract, marking a historic moment as it becomes the first independent SME, public bus operator, in Wales to deliver a fully electric, zero-emission regular stopping service.

"We are thrilled to be at the forefront of innovation and sustainability in the public transportation sector," said Steve Jones, Managing Director at Llew Jones International.

"Being awarded the T22 TrawsCymru electric bus contract not only marks a significant achievement for our company but also underscores our dedication to providing eco-friendly and efficient transport solutions for the communities we serve."

The electric buses will offer quieter journeys for passengers, with wireless charging facilities USB ports at every seat and next stop displays and announcements.

There will be an opportunity to find out more about the service and take a look at one of the buses on Friday 9 Feb in Porthmadog

More information will be available on traws.cymru in the new year.

22nd December 2023

Steam locomotive Linda returns to steam at Ffestiniog Railway​

Ffestiniog Railway has announced that its popular Hunslet 2-4-0 Linda has returned to steam after an overhaul.

Linda is the sister locomotive to Blanche, which is also at the Ffestiniog Railway, while a third Hunslet 2-4-0 locomotive, Charles, is in the museum around twenty miles away at Penrhyn Castle.

Originally built as an 0-4-0ST by the Hunslet Engine Company in Leeds, and named after Linda Blanche Douglas-Pennant (1889-1965), the daughter of Edward Sholto and Blanche Georgina Douglas-Pennant, Linda arrived at the Ffestiniog Railway in July 1962.

Linda was fitted with a new boiler in April 1936, returned to traffic in 1937, stored at Port shed from 1940 to 1950, and received a welded tank in January 1951.

The loco worked its last trip at Penrhyn on 11 July 1962.