Marcus' Model Railway Journey

14:46​

James Spooner heading back to Porthmadog

15:01​

Passing David Lloyd George at Tan-y-bwlch

15:24​

Almost back at Porthmadog

16:00

James Spooner takes its coaches back to Boston Lodge after a success trip to Blaenau Ffestiniog and back.

16:10

With James Spooner back at Boston Lodge, this brings us to the end of the naming ceremony journey.

James Spooner at Porthmadog after an official naming ceremony

23rd October 2023


RAIB

Press release:​

Report 11/2023: Two trains in the same signal section at South Wingfield

Published: 23rd October 2023

RAIB has today released its report into two trains in the same signal section at South Wingfield, Derbyshire, 26 October 2022.

Summary

At about 07:02 hrs on 26 October 2022, a train travelling between Derby and Chesterfield unexpectedly encountered a signal displaying a red (stop) aspect.

The previous signal had displayed a green (proceed) aspect.

As the train was travelling at 100 mph (161 km/h), it was unable to stop before the red signal and passed it by about 760 metres.

The train’s driver called the signaller straight away to report the incident.

About 17 minutes later, the following train approached the signal which was now displaying a yellow (caution) aspect.

After passing the signal, while travelling at about 20 mph (32 km/h), the driver of the second train saw the taillights of the first train stationary ahead of it and braked to a controlled stop.

The second train stopped about 75 metres from the rear of the first train, with both trains now in the same signal section.

There were no significant consequences and both trains were able to continue their journeys after obtaining permission from the signaller.

The signal had displayed incorrect aspects to the drivers of the two trains as the wiring controlling its red and yellow aspects was crossed on two terminals in a nearby equipment cabinet, which was where a cable running to the signal was connected to the rest of the signalling system.

This cable had been disconnected and reconnected during track engineering work the previous night and this work had introduced the wiring cross, which was not identified when the signal was tested afterwards.

The testing was affected by a combination of time pressure, tester workload and possibly by unfamiliarity with the configuration of the signalling equipment.

An underlying factor was that Network Rail had taken steps to assure the signal maintenance testing carried out by its own staff but had not yet included testers employed by contractors.

A second underlying factor was that no one was carrying out any signalling related assurance activities when this type of track engineering work was taking place.

RAIB noted that the potential for a collision between the two trains was reduced by the actions taken by the signallers at East Midlands Control Centre and the second train driver.

RAIB observed four issues with the testing work covering test records, tester licensing, deficiencies with drawings, and the omission of tests the previous night.

RAIB also observed that while initial welfare checks were carried out for both drivers, follow-up post-incident welfare checks were only carried out for one of the drivers involved.

As a result of the investigation, RAIB has made five recommendations.

The first two are addressed to Bridgeway Consulting and Randstad Solutions and seek to enhance the non-technical skills among the staff working for them, with specific emphasis on effective communication, safe decision‑making, and safe behaviours when placed under time pressure.

The third is for Network Rail to better manage the workload on lead testers.

The fourth is for Network Rail to implement measures to better assure itself that signal maintenance testing by contractors on this type of track engineering work is to the required standard.

The fifth, also addressed to Network Rail, is to provide testers with a means of recording the test steps when a signal’s aspects are tested.

RAIB has also identified six learning points.

The first highlights the importance of signal maintenance testers following the required testing process and the second is about staff working in management or supervisory roles not placing testers under undue time pressure to complete their work, even when they are under time pressure themselves due to work overrunning.

The third and fourth highlight the importance of communication between signallers and train drivers when an incident occurs.

The fifth is a reminder about testing signalling equipment, particularly track circuits, after engineering work has taken place on the track, and the sixth is a reminder to carry out follow-up post-incident checks with all drivers involved in a signalling irregularity.

The incident

Summary of the incident

At about 07:02 hrs on 26 October 2022, an empty coaching stock train was travelling on the Down Main line between Derby and Chesterfield after passing a series of signals showing green (proceed) aspects, when it unexpectedly encountered a signal in the vicinity of South Wingfield, Derbyshire, displaying a red (stop) aspect.

As the train was travelling at 100 mph (161 km/h),it was unable to stop before the signal and passed it by about 760 metres.

The driver called the signaller on the Chesterfield workstation at East Midlands Control Centre (EMCC) straight away to report the incident.

Extract from Ordnance Survey map showing the location of the incident at South Wingfield

Shortly afterwards at 07:07 hrs, the signaller on the Derby workstation at EMCC contacted the driver of the following train on the Down Main line, which was a passenger train that had just departed from Belper station.

The Derby workstation signaller advised the driver of this train to proceed at a reduced speed as the train ahead had passed a red signal in the Wingfield area.

At about 07:19 hrs, the passenger train approached the signal that the previous train had passed at red.

The signal was now displaying a yellow (caution) aspect.

After passing this signal at a speed of about 20 mph (32 km/h), the passenger train driver saw the taillights of the first train, which was stationary on the line ahead.

The driver brought the passenger train to a controlled stop about 75 metres from the first train, with both trains now in the same signal section.

There were no significant consequences and both trains were able to continue their journeys.

Image from the forward-facing closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage recorded by thesecond train showing the first train ahead of it

There was disruption to train services between Derby and Chesterfield throughout the rest of the morning as the wrong side failure of the signal, which had allowed the two trains to be in the same signal section, was investigated by a local Network Rail signalling maintenance team.

The team found a problem in the wiring associated with the signal, some of which had been disconnected and reconnected the previous night as part of planned track renewals work.

The team corrected the problem, tested the affected equipment and, having confirmed that it was now functioning correctly, placed it back into service.

Overview of the location where the two trains stopped

Context

Location

The incident happened in the South Wingfield area, on the railway line between Derby and Chesterfield, which is part of Network Rail’s East Midlands route within its Eastern region.

This is often referred to as the Wingfield area by railway staff due to the nearby Wingfield Tunnel and former Wingfield station which closed in 1967.

The signal which allowed the two trains to be in the same section was signal DY586.

It is located at mileage 141 miles 967 yards (from a reference point at London St Pancras).

At this location the railway comprises two tracks, designated the Up Main line towards Derby, and the Down Main line towards Chesterfield.

Both lines have a permissible speed of 110 mph (177 km/h) for high speed trains and 100 mph (161 km/h) for all other trains.

The approach to signal DY586, when travelling in the down direction, starts as a long left-hand curve and then changes into a short right-hand curve, with the signal located at the start of a long straight which lies beyond this shorter curve.

The track curvature means the signal is first visible to train drivers from about 400 metres away.

Organisations involved

Network Rail is the owner and maintainer of the infrastructure at Wingfield.

It is the employer of the signallers at EMCC.

Network Rail was the lead organisation for the overnight track renewals work.

This work was part of a programme of work delivered by the high output track renewals (HOTR) project which carries outwork, often overnight, using specialised trains to replace either the ballast, rails or sleepers.

It employs the staff who planned this work at Wingfield and the staff who had overall responsibility for delivering it.

East Midlands Railway was the operator of both trains and is the employer of both train drivers.

The driver of the first train was based at its Derby train crew depot, while the driver of the second train was based at its Nottingham depot.

Bridgeway Consulting Limited (referred to as Bridgeway) is the employer of four of the staff (in a group of six) working on the signalling equipment at Wingfield to facilitate the track renewals work.

Randstad Solutions Limited (referred to as Randstad) is the employer of the other two staff in the signalling group.

Network Rail, East Midlands Railway, Bridgeway and Randstad all freely co‑operated with the investigation.

Layout of the railway in the Wingfield area

Trains involved

The first train, which passed signal DY586 showing a red aspect, was the 06:45 hrs empty coaching stock service from Derby Etches Park depot to Sheffield.

Its reporting number was 5C23 and it comprised a seven-car, class 222 diesel electric multiple unit, number 222002.

Class 222 diesel electric multiple unit, number 222002

The second train, which passed signal DY586 showing a yellow aspect, was the 06:55 hrs passenger service from Derby to Sheffield.

Its reporting number was1F02 and it comprised a pair of two-car, class 158 diesel multiple units, numbers 158854 and 158857.

Class 158 diesel multiple units, numbers 158854 and 158857

Signalling equipment involved

Signal DY586 is a three aspect, colour light signal, meaning it can display a red, yellow or green aspect.

It has a light emitting diode (LED) signal head so it can display all three colours through a common single aperture.

Signal DY586

Signal DY586 is located next to the Down Main line.

The cabling for the signal runs under both tracks to an equipment cabinet, known as a location case.

It is numbered 141/2 and is on the opposite side of the railway to the signal.

The location case contains terminal bars that the external cables running to and from trackside signalling equipment and other location cases further along the railway are connected to.

Also connected to the terminal bars is the wiring inside the case, going to equipment such as relays, transformers, power supply busbars and fuses.

Location case 141/2 in relation to signal DY586

Signal DY586 is an automatic signal, so it changes its aspect with the passage of a train without intervention by a signaller.

The colour of the aspect displayed is based on the occupation and clearance of defined track sections, and the aspects shown by the signals beyond it.

It has a rectangular plate fitted to it to identify it as an automatic signal.

The signal is fitted with a signal post replacement switch (SPRS) that prevents the signal from showing any aspect other than red when operated with a special key.

The signal is fitted with automatic warning system (AWS) equipment.

This is a safety system that uses permanent magnets and electromagnets placed between the rails and which alerts train drivers about the aspect displayed by a signal ahead.

The magnets for signal DY586 are located 233 metres on the approach to the signal.

When a train passes over the magnets, and a red or single yellow aspect is displayed by the signal, a horn sounds in the driving cab, and a black, yellow and white indication is shown to the driver.

The driver must acknowledge the horn sound by pressing a button in the cab, or the train’s brakes will automatically apply.

When a green aspect is displayed by a signal, a bell sounds in the cab, and a black indication is shown to the driver.

The signal is not fitted with the train protection and warning system (known as TPWS).

The purpose of TPWS is to automatically apply the brakes on a train that has passed a signal displaying a red aspect without authority, or approached a signal displaying a red aspect too fast.

TPWS is not designed to prevent the train from passing the red signal, but to mitigate against the consequences of it doing so, by preventing the train from reaching a conflict point ahead of the signal.

It is typically fitted at signals that protect conflicting movements, such as at a junction where crossing or converging movements can take place.

Signal DY586 has no conflict points ahead of it and hence is not fitted with TPWS.

Signal DY586 is the last signal before the boundary of two interlockings and two control areas.

It is the last signal in the down direction within the Ambergate interlocking area, and it falls within the control area of the Derby workstation signaller.

The next signal in the down direction, signal DC4833, is in the adjacent Clay Cross interlocking and the control area of the Chesterfield workstation signaller.

Signal DY586 is shown on both signaller workstations.

Signalling design practices in 1969, around the time the Ambergate interlocking was commissioned, did not require signallers to have any controls to change the aspect displayed by automatic signals.

Therefore, the Derby workstation signaller was not able to command signal DY586 to display a red aspect.

These practices also limited what information the signalling system needed to provide to signallers, so information about what aspect the signal is displaying is not passed back to either the Derby or Chesterfield workstations.

On the workstations, the signallers can see a symbol providing the location of signal DY586 but, while other signals might indicate the aspect being displayed, this is greyed out for signal DY586.

It is the same on the Chesterfield workstation.

Staff involved

The group of six staff that worked on the signalling equipment at Wingfield during the night before the incident comprised three signal maintenance testers and three technicians.

The role of a signal maintenance tester is to test signalling equipment in accordance with the processes and test plans that are documented in Network Rail's signal maintenance testing handbook (SMTH).

The processes in SMT Hare used when the work being carried out on the signalling equipment does not change its configuration or functionality.

Design documents and drawings that describe the engineering details of the work are not provided, and instead the existing infrastructure records are used as the reference documents.

Typically, local Network Rail maintenance teams follow the SMTH process for the replacement or repair of defective or life‑expired equipment.

This can involve replacing the original failed item with a newer version as long as it is functionally the same.

The SMTH process can also be used for like-for-like renewals of equipment, or when signalling equipment needs to be disconnected and moved aside for other work to take place, before being reconnected and tested to ensure correct operation (as was the case in this instance).

All three signal maintenance testers were familiar with working on the HOTR project.

Their role at the start of the work was to identify any differences between the on-site drawings and the affected signalling equipment before it was disconnected.

After the HOTR work was completed, their role was to test the functionality of the affected signalling equipment after reconnection.

The role of the three technicians was to disconnect and reconnect the cables, under instruction from the testers.

The signal maintenance tester who was carrying out the role of lead tester for this work (referred to as SMT1) is employed by Bridgeway.

SMT1 had seven years experience working on signalling equipment and had been working full-time on the HOTR project in the months before the incident.

The second signal maintenance tester (referred to as SMT2) is employed by Bridgeway and had seven years’ experience working on signalling equipment.

SMT2’s working time was split between carrying out maintenance work on signalling equipment at private sidings and working on the HOTR project.

The third signal maintenance tester (referred to as SMT3) is employed by Randstad.

SMT3 had 21 years’ experience working on signalling equipment, including 16 years carrying out signal maintenance testing and had been working full time on the HOTR project in the months before the incident.

The three technicians, two from Bridgeway and one from Randstad, worked under the instruction of the signal maintenance testers.

Their roles were primarily limited to installation activities which involved disconnecting and reconnecting the affected cables.

None of the technicians disconnected or reconnected the signal's cable and none were involved in testing the signal.

A supervisor, who was carrying out the works manager role, had overall responsibility for delivering the site phase of the HOTR project work at Wingfield.

The works manager is employed by Network Rail and had ten years’ experience working in the rail industry.

They had been working on the HOTR project since 2019 and was usually based at the HOTR project’s Newcastle depot.

At the time of this incident, they had been seconded to the Central depot (based at both Crewe and Doncaster) that was delivering the work at Wingfield.

External circumstances

It was dark when the signalling group carried out its work.

The signalling group did not use any site lighting for its work at the signal or location case and there were no external light sources from nearby buildings and roads to illuminate the area.

Witness accounts reported that it was raining at times during the night and four local weather stations, located between 2.2 miles (3.5 km) and 3.6 miles (5.8 km)away, recorded data showing rain showers between 00:00 hrs and about 04:00hrs on 26 October.

The weather stations reported that, while the signalling group was working at Wingfield, the air temperature in the area rose from about 11°C (at 23:00 hrs on 25 October) to about 14°C (at 06:00 hrs on 26 October).

The sequence of events

Events preceding the incident

Signal DY586 maintenance activities

According to maintenance records, the last time any significant maintenance work took place on the signal was in August 2015 when its filament lamp signal head was replaced with an LED version.

The work to install and test the new signal head was carried out by staff from the local signalling maintenance team based in Derby.

The team tested the signal with its new head using the SMTH process as it was functionally the same as the old one.

This change also required some of the drawings to be updated.

The local signalling maintenance team made some of the updates and placed copies of the revised drawings onsite in location case 141/2.

However, not all of the required updates were made leaving some deficiencies.

After August 2015, the maintenance records for signal DY586 show that routine maintenance activities took place at the frequencies required by the relevant signalling maintenance specifications.

There were no failures or out-of-course maintenance activities recorded for the signal between August 2015 and the time of the incident.

The last routine maintenance on signal DY586 before the incident was on16 August 2022.

No issues were noted by the local signalling maintenance team that carried out the required maintenance checks.

These checks included testing the operation of the SPRS.

HOTR project activities

Network Rail staff from the local track maintenance team had identified that the track quality on the Up Main line in the Wingfield area was deteriorating.

It requested, through the route engineer (track) team, that work was carried out to refresh or replace the ballast.

Over time, the sharp edges of the ballast will start to round off so it will not lock together to support the track as it should.

This also creates dust that contaminates the ballast and affects the drainage of water through it.

Carrying out HOTR work replaces this ballast with new and/or recycled stone that locks and aids drainage.

The route engineer (track) team accepted the request and Wingfield was added to the work bank.

The team, working alongside the HOTR project, then decided what HOTR jobs within the work bank would be delivered in control period 6 (from April2019 to March 2024).

Further work was carried out by both the team and HOTR project to analyse and filter the jobs to be delivered in control period 6.

As well as prioritising the order in which jobs needed to be done, this activity looked at when it would be best to deliver jobs based on when possessions were planned to take place, and when the required HOTR equipment would be available to-do the work.

From these activities, the route engineer (track) team tasked the HOTR project with delivering the work at Wingfield in the 2022 to 2023 financial year (which runs from April 2022 to March 2023).

The HOTR project next created a plan for that year’s work, which is referred to as a ‘campaign’.

There can be up to 25 separate sites within a campaign.

The work at Wingfield was planned for week 30, running from the evening of Monday 24 October to the morning of Friday 28 October.

In March 2021, about 84 weeks before the work at Wingfield was due to be delivered, the HOTR project team started work to define and plan what needed to be done.

One of the first activities to be carried out took place in April 2021, when the HOTR project team undertook a walkout at Wingfield, in the vicinity of signal DY586, to scope the ballast cleaning to be done on the Up Main line.

The walkout included a member of the HOTR project Central depot signalling team.

Their role was to identify what signalling assets would be affected by the work.

The output from the walkout helped the project team develop what is known as a plain line specification.

This specification identified the areas where the ballast was to be renewed.

It also identified where work could not be carried out due to restrictions such as structures along the track.

The specification also listed other requirements that the project team needed to be aware of, such as the affected signalling assets.

Version one of the specification was issued in February 2022.

On 9 May 2022, the HOTR project team carried out a dilapidation survey at Wingfield.

This survey included an assessment of the affected signalling equipment and recorded its condition.

From this information, the HOTR project signalling team determined what level of signalling resource was needed to disconnect, reconnect and test the affected signalling equipment.

On 16 September, it sent a request to Bridgeway for two signal maintenance testers and two technicians.

It also sent a request to Randstad to supply a signal maintenance tester and a technician.

On 4 October 2022, Bridgeway provided the names of the four staff it would be supplying for this work.

Randstad provided the names of its two staff on13 October.

Once the resources for the signalling work were confirmed, the HOTR project Central depot signalling team finalised the work pack which detailed the signalling work to be carried out at Wingfield.

On 18 October, the team sent the work pack to Bridgeway and Randstad so it could be passed to the staff nominated for this work.

At 21:40 hrs on 24 October, the first of four nights of HOTR work started at Wingfield.

The HOTR train cleaned and replaced ballast on the Up Main line from 141 miles 1200 yards to 141 miles 1056 yards, completing the 144 yards(132 metres) it was planned to deliver.

The possession was handed back on time at 05:40 hrs on 25 October.

No signalling equipment was disconnected and reconnected during that night’s work, but the six members of the signalling group were still all on shift at Wingfield while this work took place just in case they were needed.

Overnight work on signal DY58642

At 20:45 hrs on 25 October, SMT1 arrived at Alfreton station.

This was where everyone working at Wingfield that night was required to sign in before heading to the site.

Soon after arriving, SMT1 was called into a briefing with the engineeringsupervisor.

Receiving this briefing meant that SMT1 could now sign in to the engineering supervisor’s work site as a controller of site safety (COSS).

The other members of the signalling group arrived to sign in at about 21:00 hrs.

At 22:00 hrs, the group travelled to the access point at Wingfield.

By 22:15 hrs, the possession was taken, and the engineering supervisor had set up the work site where the work was to take place.

SMT1, as the COSS for the signalling group, signed in to the work site with the engineering supervisor.

The group then went onto the railway at about 22:25 hrs.

At 22:27 hrs, SMT1 called the Derby signaller and signed the affected signalling equipment out of use.

The signalling group then began its work to disconnect and move the affected cables out of the way, including the cable for signal DY586.

By 23:20 hrs, the signalling group had finished disconnecting the cables and had moved them clear of the tracks.

A short time later, the HOTR train moved into position on the Up Main line, and once the train’s preparation activities were complete, it began its ballast cleaning work at 23:59 hrs.

At 01:50 hrs on 26 October, the HOTR train stopped ballast cleaning.

It had worked from 141 miles 1032 yards to 141 miles 649 yards, a distance of 383 yards (350 metres).

The train was then made ready for its movement from the site, and it moved clear of where the work had taken place at 02:45 hrs.

At 02:56 hrs, two on-track machines began their first pass.

The first machine lifted and slued the track into the correct position and consolidated the new ballast under the track, while the second machine distributed the ballast along the track and shaped its profile relative to the sleepers.

The first pass was completed at 04:00 hrs.

After travelling back to the starting point, the on-track machines began a second pass at 04:07 hrs.

This pass raised the track quality to a level that allowed the Up Main line to be handed back with an 80 mph (129 km/h)temporary speed restriction in place.

At about 04:15 hrs, once the on-track machines were clear of the area in the vicinity of signal DY586, the signalling group started reconnecting the signalling cables.

The on-track machines completed the second pass at 04:40 hrs and then headed north on the Up Main line, moving clear of where the signalling related work was taking place by 05:04 hrs.

Between 05:09 and 05:23 hrs, SMT3 tested the four track circuits that had been disconnected and reconnected.

From 05:25 to 05:40 hrs, SMT1 and SMT3 made telephone calls to both the Derby and Chesterfield signallers, plus the signalling technician based at EMCC, about changing the aspect of signal DY586 to test it, but they were unable to command the signal to display a yellow aspect.

At 05:41 hrs, SMT1 called the Chesterfield signaller and asked them to change the aspects on the signals they controlled so that signal DY586 would display a green aspect.

The signaller responded that they were busy arranging for the on‑track machines to exit the north end of the possession and told SMT1 to call back in ten minutes.

At 05:51 hrs, SMT1 called the Chesterfield signaller back.

The signaller changed the aspect on signal DC4833 from red to green, which in turn allowed signal DY586 to display a green aspect.

At 05:54 hrs, SMT1 called the Chesterfield signaller to say that their testing was complete.

Shortly afterwards, the signalling group left the railway to go back to their vehicles at the access point.

At 05:56 hrs, SMT1 called the Derby signaller and handed all the signalling equipment back into service.

At 05:57 hrs, the engineering supervisor gave up the work site.

The possession was handed back at 06:05 hrs for trains to start running on both lines.

Between 06:40 and 07:00 hrs, three trains passed through the Wingfield area on the Down Main line without incident.

These were a passenger train going from Kettering to Sheffield, a track recording train from Derby to Barnetby and a passenger train from Birmingham to Edinburgh.

When all three trains passed signal DY586, it was correctly displaying a green aspect.

The cables disconnected by the signalling group

Events during the incident

At 07:01:50 hrs, train 5C23, the fourth train along the Down Main line that morning, passed the preceding signal on the approach to signal DY586, signal DY584, while it was displaying a green aspect.

The train was travelling at100 mph (161 km/h) and continued at this speed.

At 07:02:29 hrs, as train 5C23 approached signal DY586, the driver began braking as they could tell in advance that signal DY586 was unexpectedly displaying a red aspect because the red light from the signal was reflecting off the inside of the rails on the right-hand curve.

Signal DY586 then came into the driver’s view; its aspect was red.

At 07:02:34 hrs, while still travelling at 100 mph (161 km/h), train 5C23 passed over the AWS magnet associated with signal DY586.

This sounded a horn in the cab which the driver acknowledged by pressing a pushbutton.

Five seconds later, the train passed the red signal while travelling at 89 mph (143 km/h).

At 07:03:25 hrs, train 5C23 stopped, with its leading end about 760 metres beyond the signal.

Ten seconds later, the driver of train 5C23 called the Chesterfield signaller to report that their train had passed signal DY586 displaying a red aspect.

At 07:05:56 hrs, the following train, 1F02, departed from Belper station.

At 07:06:39 hrs, its driver responded to a request from the Derby signaller to call them.

The signaller told the driver about an incident involving the train ahead in the Wingfield area, that it had passed a red signal and that it might have had a problem stopping.

The signaller advised the driver to reduce their speed and expect signal DY584 to be at red.

In response, the driver of train 1F02 maintained a speed of about 40 mph (64 km/h) and further reduced the train’s speed to 20 mph (32 km/h) after passing signal DY584 displaying a yellow aspect.

At 07:17:56 hrs, train 1F02 passed over the AWS magnet for signal DY586 while travelling at 20 mph (32/km/h).

The driver could see the signal was displaying a yellow aspect.

At 07:18:27 hrs, train 1F02 passed signal DY586.

Almost straightaway, the driver of train 1F02 saw a red light ahead but was unsure what it was.

In response they put the traction controller to the off position at 07:18:30 hrs.

The train then continued travelling at 20 mph (32 km/h) until the driver realised there were in fact two red lights, and these were the taillights of a train stopped ahead.

At 07:19:15 hrs, the driver of train 1F02 applied the brakes to make a controlled stop.

Train 1F02 stopped at 07:19:27 hrs, with its leading end about 75 metres from the rear of train 5C23.

Events following the incident

At 07:20 hrs, the Chesterfield signaller called the driver of train 5C23.

The signaller asked the driver if they had seen a yellow signal and the driver confirmed all the signals before signal DY586 had been displaying green aspects.

While this conversation was taking place, at 07:21 hrs the Derby signaller called the driver of train 1F02 just as the driver was about to call the signaller to report what had happened.

The signaller asked the driver to confirm the train’s location.

The driver replied that their train was now stopped but was in the same signal section as the train ahead, having passed signal DY586 displaying a yellow aspect.

At 07:25 hrs, the Derby signaller called the driver again and instructed that train 1F02 not be moved.

At 07:27 hrs, the Chesterfield signaller called the driver of train 5C23 and instructed that their train be moved forward two signal sections to signal DC4837 (passing signals DC4833 and DC4835 in between).

At 07:39 hrs, the driver called the signaller back to report the train was now at signal DC4837.

The Chesterfield signaller asked the driver to call East Midlands Railway control.

The driver spoke to a controller and agreed to take the train forward to Sheffield and then back to Derby.

At 07:49 hrs, the driver then called the Chesterfield signaller and advised that they had spoken to their control and that they were going to take the train to Sheffield.

At 07:51 hrs, the Chesterfield signaller gave the driver of train 5C23 permission to proceed.

At 08:03 hrs, the Chesterfield signaller called the driver of train 1F02 and gave permission for the train to proceed to Chesterfield station where the service would terminate.

At about 10:00 hrs, having been requested by the signalling staff at EMCC, a signalling maintenance team arrived on site at Wingfield to carryout a signalling failure investigation for signal DY586.

At 10:47 hrs, the team reported it had found a wiring anomaly in location case 141/2.

The team recorded and then corrected the wiring anomaly.

At 12:47 hrs, normal working resumed after the team had completed its testing of signal DY586 and confirmed that it was now operating as expected.

Identification of the immediate cause

Signal DY586 displayed incorrect aspects to the drivers of trains 5C23 and 1F02 because the wiring for its red and yellow aspects was crossed within location case 141/2.

Signalling circuit diagram for the signal’s aspects

The operation of the relays and the aspect displayed by the signal

Stills from the video footage recorded by the local signalling maintenance team showingsignal DY586 displaying the incorrect aspect

The wiring terminals within location case 141/2

How the signalling circuit diagram could have been annotated

Close-up of the internal wiring on terminals C1 to C6

Example of how cables can be identified

The links on the terminal bar

The aspects shown by signal DY586 through the actions taken by the Chesterfield signaller

RAIB’s report into a collision at London Waterloo station (RAIB report 19/2018) explains how a set of points, which was not in the correct position, directed a passenger train away from its intended route and into the side of a freight train.

The train driver and signaller had received indications that the points were correctly set.

However, the signalling system did not detect that the points were in the wrong position because staff had made an uncontrolled modification to the signalling system during testing and commissioning activities.

The investigation found the actions of the staff involved in this testing work indicated that appropriate non-technical skills were not applied.


The accident at Waterloo

The investigation into the accident at Waterloo, supported by RAIB’s investigation of a serious irregularity at Cardiff East Junction (RAIB report 15/2017), suggested that some in the railway industry might be forgetting the lessons learnt from the Clapham Junction accident in which 35 people died.

This accident, which happened on 12 December 1988, involved three trains colliding just south of Clapham Junction, in London.

A train driver received a proceed aspect at a signal which should have been displaying a red aspect, and collided with the train in front which should have been protected by the signal.

A third train then collided with the wreckage.

The incorrect proceed aspect was shown because inadequate working practices during a re-signalling project had resulted in a loose, uninsulated, redundant wire remaining close to, and eventually coming into contact with, other circuitry.

The Clapham Junction accident is of particular relevance to the incident at Wingfield.

Both involved a train driver receiving a proceed aspect at a signal which should have been displaying a red aspect, as there was a train in front which should have been protected by the signal, due to a problem with the signal's wiring after work had taken place on it.

The accident at Clapham Junction

24th October 2023


RAIB

Press release:​

Report 12/2023: Collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction

Published: 24th October 2023

RAIB has today released its report into a collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, Wiltshire, 31 October 2021.