North Pacific Security Council Disclosure Act

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The Disappointed Father
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TNP Nation
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Hyperion#1325
This Act will amend the Legal Code by adding the following section to Chapter 5: Regional Security Law:

North Pacific Security Council Disclosure Act:
Section 5.5 Disclosure of Security Council Information
26. Private Security Council records that reach one year of age will be relocated to the appropriate Declassified Archive visible to residents.
27. Information eligible for declassification will be reviewed by the Vice Delegate and the Security Council. The review will redact any information that fits any of the below definitions:
  • Real-life information about any NationStates player from which there is a risk of inferring that player's real-life identity and which has not willingly been disclosed to the public, including, but not limited to, an individual's name, IP address, physical address or location, phone number, place of employment or education, appearance, social media accounts, and other knowledge about a player, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Real-life information about any NationStates player for which there exists a reasonable real-life expectation of privacy or discretion, including, but not limited to, health status, both mental and physical; financial status; personal tragedies; changes in personal status such as marriage, divorce, pregnancy, birth, or death; and other similar information, unless the player in question provides explicit consent for this information not to be considered private.
  • Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize any ongoing military or intelligence operations; or jeopardize the security of units and agents participating in them, or be harmful to the diplomatic interests, military interests, or security of The North Pacific.
  • Information that, upon being made public, would jeopardize Security Council operations in response to threats and attempted coups.
  • Comments made by previous members of the Security Council who are not able to consent to their comments being made public.
28. At any time a citizen may request the release of any private record from the Security Council through the Vice Delegate.
29. The Vice Delegate will retrieve the information and present it for a review to the Security Council. The Security Council will have 14 days to review the compiled information for any information that should be deemed classified and redact said information. Once the 14 days has elapsed, the information requested will be presented as is, with the exception of Real-life information.
30. The Vice Delegate will present the requested information, including indicators of redacted information.
31. Residents who do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in any laws or regulations or information they feel may have been redacted incorrectly may file a request for review from the Court, where the Vice Delegate may present evidence that addresses any claim that the release of the information meets one or more of the acceptable criteria for classification. This evidence does not need to include the redacted information itself, simply evidence as to why the information should remain redacted.
32. Information appropriately not disclosed will be accepted as classified by a two-thirds vote of the Court sitting as a three-member panel.

In response to the veto of the GOAT Act, I present the North Pacific Security Council Disclosure Act. I respect the desire for transparency and accountability. I believe that this bill incorporates avenues for transparency and accountability, while still protecting the confidentiality of the Security Council and providing methods to validate that confidentiality through the Court. I welcome discussion and feedback on this bill.
 
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27 seems very broad and potentially open to misuse, but it's a good start. I'm not entirely how I'd reword the 3rd and 4th definitions but I'm sure suggestions will be forthcoming.

It might be my brain, but 32 worded correctly? It reads like it's missing some words.
 
27 is meant to be somewhat broad. It is reviewable by 31 through the court.
 
Information that, upon being made public, would threaten practices of the Security Council to provide for the security and stability of the region.

Even as a Security Councillor, I'm curious about what "practices" these are. Unless you're talking about our need to be fully honest with each other in our nomination discussions, this sounds like a catch-all clause, even if the court is the deciding body in the end. Can you clarify what your intent was on this one?

Comments made by previous members of the Security Council are not able to consent to their comments being made public.

I think this is the big difference between this bill and Praetor's bill. I think past security councilors who have since gone would not be pleased to find out their comments were forced open while they were acting under the impression that they were private. Of course, some people around here might not care...
 
Ok...
Um...this is weird. I have intentionally kept myself out of discussions of this sort since my election to the Delegacy as I believe that my job isn't to tip the scales of the democratic process.

That being said...this bill is an attempted "second go" at the GOAT Act I vetoed earlier. In that announcement of the veto I indicated that I would sign a version of the bill that the GOAT Act's author, @Praetor , worked on with the Security Council.

I would say that- in light of my earlier veto- it would be appropriate to say that this bill addresses most of my concerns with the GOAT Act. I am curious as to what Praetor thinks, and whether he feels this would be an acceptable alternative or not.
 
I was unaware that the Vice Delegate would be drafting a new bill.

I'm not sure the purpose behind introducing a new bill when there is already one being discussed?

Either way, there are a number of issues I take with this bill but I will await Artemis's answer to my question.
 
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It is not uncommon for alternative versions of bills to be proposed as a result of the debate, especially when the alternative is not simply tweaked language but goes in a very different direction. When a bill would change to an extent that the original author wouldn't be advancing the same thing, or a very specific element is focused on, this is precisely what tends to happen. Based on what Praetor has said, I think it's fair to say he wouldn't be willing to change his bill to the extent that he would employ a similar process to what is present here, so it wouldn't make sense for these suggestions to be offered for his bill - it would simply be too big a departure. I think it makes perfect sense then that this different bill would be introduced while the other is being discussed - this one would not exist if it were not for the other.

My primary concern with Praetor's bill is addressed here. Not only that, but it is an even better compromise than the one I advocated for, as it would still allow the release of records older than the passage of this act, and it would subject current members of the SC to disclosing older posts that were made with no expectation of privacy. That is a far greater problem for those of us who have left than for those of us currently on the SC. Current members would have to give up that privacy, but I think we'll live. Otherwise, it operates much like FoIA. This approach, whether it is this bill or a substantially similar approach in Praetor's, would have my support.
 
This Act will amend the Legal Code by adding the following section to Chapter 5: Regional Security Law:

In response to the veto of the GOAT Act, I present the North Pacific Security Council Disclosure Act. I respect the desire for transparency and accountability. I believe that this bill incorporates avenues for transparency and accountability, while still protecting the confidentiality of the Security Council and providing methods to validate that confidentiality through the Court. I welcome discussion and feedback on this bill.
I'd argue for striking out #31 and #32. I don't believe that the Court should be involved. The responsibility of determining if and what to release should be with the Vice-Delegate, who is, from my understanding, an ex officio member of the SC - not a permanent one. (It just so happens that the current VD is a member of the SC.) The buck should stop with the Vice Delegate.

I suppose the SC handles and discusses very sensitive information, and this is why we only let trusted people into the SC. People vote for members of the SC (and the VD) knowing that they will be having access to sensitive stuff vital to the security of the region.

Now, if I read it right, court justices will also become privy to classified SC information even if it's not released. Let's say Citizen A requests info X. SC rejects the request. Citizen A files in Court to have it released. The Court will have to decide whether if it stays classified or not... and that means the Court will now also be privy to classified information regardless of whether it's released or not.

That's a loophole. It's far far harder to be elected to SC than it is to be elected justice. It's easier to be elected justice than delegate/vice-delegate, for instance. Let's say an enemy of TNP infiltrates the region: B and C then become citizens. B manages to become elected justice, and they have C request classified info. The SC/VD rejects the request and C now runs to the court with B on it. He can either dissent and say go ahead and release it (since #32 says that decision to classify must be unanimous) - which means that the sensitive info will now be revealed. Even if Justice B goes on with the charade and votes to classify, the enemy of TNP now has access to the info via B even if the info wasn't released.

"But Kyle, we need another check! balance! appeal! bureaucracy!" No, you don't need it for everything, let alone for super sensitive info. You don't like the decision of the VD to keep something classified? There's the ballot box - there's your check and balance. Don't vote for that VD if s/he runs again or vote for someone who will want to open the Pandora's box for you.

Second, I agree with someone (who I can't remember) that this should not apply retroactively. There should be a clause that says only discussions active from this date forward will be covered.

Thirdly, I would like to encourage the SC to implement what Fiji said here. I think it is a good idea, that would also minimise the workload this thing would give to the VD.
 
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People vote for members of the SC (and the VD) knowing that they will be having access to sensitive stuff vital to the security of the region.
People vote for the delegate knowing that they will be having access to sensitive stuff vital to the security of the region. That, frankly, still isn't reason enough not to expect transparency and disclosure at the proper time. I don't find this argument compelling, and clearly, judging by the passage of the GOAT Act, neither did the rest of the RA.
 
People vote for the delegate knowing that they will be having access to sensitive stuff vital to the security of the region. That, frankly, still isn't reason enough not to expect transparency and disclosure at the proper time. I don't find this argument compelling, and clearly, judging by the passage of the GOAT Act, neither did the rest of the RA.
Yes, we expect that from them. But that is not the point why I said this. I was comparing the difference on the difficulty of being elected Delegate/VD or getting to SC, vs being voted into the Court because with #31 and #32, we should now also be expecting it from the Court if they, too, will have access to the sensitive information.

Removing #31 and #32 will not decrease the expectation of transparency and disclosure. It merely reduces the bureaucracy and the number of people that are privy to possible sensitive information.
 
Yes, we expect that from them. But that is not the point why I said this. I was comparing the difference on the difficulty of being elected Delegate/VD or getting to SC, vs being voted into the Court because with #31 and #32, we should now also be expecting it from the Court if they, too, will have access to the sensitive information.

Removing #31 and #32 will not decrease the expectation of transparency and disclosure. It merely reduces the bureaucracy and the number of people that are privy to possible sensitive information.
Removing 31 and 32 provides zero protection from a Vice Delegate or the SC as a whole misusing the process in 27 to not disclose information that should be disclosed.
 
Removing 31 and 32 provides zero protection from a Vice Delegate or the SC as a whole misusing the process in 27 to not disclose information that should be disclosed.
The VD is a public official. And thus would/should have the region's wellbing and the citizen's rights in mind. If we don't trust a VD's decision on a simple FOIA request, how can we trust a VD then?

There is no limit as to how many times information can be requested (in the proposal). So if a citizen genuinely believes that it has to be disclosed and the VD did not disclose it, s/he can lodge another request later with a different VD or make it a campaign issue in the next VD elections. If one wants check-and-balance, I believe that for this case, the best would be during election time - with the citizenry, rather than with just three people.
 
Just a nitpick: shouldn't "Section 5.5 Disclosure of Security Council Information" read Section "5.5: Disclosure of Security Council Information"?
 
I do think 31 and 32 need to stay in some form so that the VD is held accountable, but I am worried about Justices needing to see the information to be able to decide whether it meets the requirements being a security threat in itself. I do suppose, though, that we can turn trusting Justices with potentially sensitive security-related information into an election issue.

Also, MJ, for what it's worth, definition 3 of clause 27 is a carbon copy of LC 7.4.21, 3rd definition. If you're worried about the definition in this bill, I'm curious as to whether you'd also reword the already existing law. I do share your concern about definition 4 though, which is why I asked what I asked earlier.
 
Even as a Security Councillor, I'm curious about what "practices" these are. Unless you're talking about our need to be fully honest with each other in our nomination discussions, this sounds like a catch-all clause, even if the court is the deciding body in the end. Can you clarify what your intent was on this one?
This section is intended to cover response plans and methods used by the Security Council in dealing with security situations.

I was unaware that the Vice Delegate would be drafting a new bill.

I'm not sure the purpose behind introducing a new bill when there is already one being discussed?

Either way, there are a number of issues I take with this bill but I will await Artemis's answer to my question.
I don’t see a question being asked by you? So I am afraid I cannot provide an answer to a question that has not been posed.

In regards to 5.30, the intent of this section is to provide evidence as to why said information meets on the qualifications for redaction, not presenting the information itself.
 
The question may be hard to find, but here is a hint - there is a question mark. A grossly misused punctuation in this region.

I have highlighted it in bold for you.

Presumably, he is asking what is the intent of pursuing a new bill as opposed to making proposed amendments to the one that has been discussed and received nearly 70% support of those voting.
I was unaware that the Vice Delegate would be drafting a new bill.

I'm not sure the purpose behind introducing a new bill when there is already one being discussed?

Either way, there are a number of issues I take with this bill but I will await Artemis's answer to my question.


I would add that I think it would be best for FOIA to be contained as one section, rather than two sections. But that is just my personal preference.
 
I do think 31 and 32 need to stay in some form so that the VD is held accountable, but I am worried about Justices needing to see the information to be able to decide whether it meets the requirements being a security threat in itself. I do suppose, though, that we can turn trusting Justices with potentially sensitive security-related information into an election issue.
I'd prefer have the election issue being with the Vice-Delegate than with the Justices. Because once the information is released, there's nothing you can do to hide it again. I'm going on the side of caution here (wherein the less people who will see the info, the better), since I suppose we are dealing with sensitive information.
 
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I have made some edits to 5.5.27.4. I hope this further addresses the question raised by @Sil Dorsett.
I also made an edit to 5.5.32.

I'd prefer have the election issue being with the Vice-Delegate than with the Justices. Because once the information is released, there's nothing you can do to hide it again. I'm going on the side of caution here (wherein the less people who will see the info, the better), since I suppose we are dealing with sensitive information.
I fully understand where you are coming from Kyle. But I understand that many want to see more ways to hold the Vice Delegate and Security Council accountable. By letting the courts adjudicate the validity of the evidence for classification, it removes the pretense that the Security Council is being secretive for secretive sake.
 
Any further thoughts?
This bill removes each of the concerns I had had with the GOAT Act. I believe it offers a sincere compromise that should alleviate some of the distrust that has been evident in recent discussions. I would be willing to offer my support for the bill if/when it goes to vote.

To Kyle's point about sections 31 and 32 pertaining to Court Justices, I agree with Sil Dorsett and Artemis that the Courts will help implement accountability to the SC that the VD simply cannot provide. To help ease these fears, it may be necessary to extend a section of the bill to the Court as well, to specify that any classified information that the court rules should remain classified should not be leaked to the public. While I think this would already fall within the Oath of Office of these officials, directly specifying such criminality might provide clarity. Further, line 31 states that the court may not need to be provided with such classified information in the first place in order to make their ruling. Nevertheless, that's not really an issue so long as elections to the Court are viewed with a higher standard, as Sil discussed.

And as a very minor concern, the editor in me is obliged to mention that "...simple evidence as to why..." should be "...simply evidence as to why..." in line 31.
 
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I'm not sure the purpose behind introducing a new bill when there is already one being discussed?
I assume this is what you are referring to. Not so much of a question as a statement, but I will try to answer your "question". Unsure why this has prevented you from addressing the issues that you have with this bill.

Regarding introducing a new bill, I felt that this is bill takes a different direction then the GOAT Act. There were several aspects and intentions of that bill that I did not agree with, and ultimately, I should have expressed my concerns earlier in the process. But that is in the past and we are working towards addressing the wishes for transparency, while still providing operational security for the Security Council.

This bill addresses many concerns raised on both sides of the discussion of the GOAT Act. It takes a step further by placing a time limit for the Security Council to review material that meets the qualification to be disclosed. Any redacted information will be indicated as such. And if the citizens of the region feel that any information has not been properly disclosed, they have recourse through the Courts.
 
This bill addresses many concerns raised on both sides of the discussion of the GOAT Act. It takes a step further by placing a time limit for the Security Council to review material that meets the qualification to be disclosed. Any redacted information will be indicated as such. And if the citizens of the region feel that any information has not been properly disclosed, they have recourse through the Courts.
What penalty would there be if that time limit is exceeded? Maybe just that the document must be released in whatever state it is? And the Court could step in. I bring this up not because I expect or intend this to happen, but have noted Praetor's concerns with how FOIA is being addressed in the executive.
 
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What penalty would there be if that time limit is exceeded? Maybe just that the document must be released in whatever state it is? And the Court could step in. I bring this up not because I expect or intend this to happen, but have noted Praetor's concerns with how FOIA is being addressed in the executive.
I will add some language to address this.

Is there any other thoughts on this bill?
 
I’d like to encourage @Praetor to share his thoughts, especially in regards to his statement about the issues he has with this bill.
If there isn’t any additional debate here in the next 48 hours, I will motion for a vote.
 
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I motion for a vote.
Second the motion for a vote.
The motion to vote has been recognized by the Speaker’s Office. This act is now in Formal Debate and will remain in the Formal Debate period for the next five days.

During this period you may continue to amend the proposal, however after such time has elapsed no further amendments may be made. A vote will be scheduled no fewer than two days after the current period concludes.
 
I'd still like to see the Eluvatar version, but given that the afforded time has long since elapsed, I suppose this version will do. If we go to vote without seeing it, I'd rather implement this one and then go back later and clean up the redundant language.
 
I can live with this, as it eliminates the problem of publicizing the comments of those who are no longer with us.

There are a couple of typos:

Comments made by previous members of the Security Council who are not able to consent to their comments being made public.

31. Residents who do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in any laws or regulations or information they feel may have been redacted incorrectly may file with a request for review from the Court, where the Vice Delegate may present evidence that addresses any claim that the release of the information meets one or more of the acceptable criteria for classification.

Does anyone want to take a stab at simplifying some of the more unwieldy sentences?
 
There are a couple of typos:

Comments made by previous members of the Security Council who are not able to consent to their comments being made public.

31. Residents who do not receive this information for any reason not specifically designated in any laws or regulations or information they feel may have been redacted incorrectly may file with a request for review from the Court, where the Vice Delegate may present evidence that addresses any claim that the release of the information meets one or more of the acceptable criteria for classification.
These have been updated.
 
My thoughts on the bill that would not substantively alter the content of the bill are that:
  • it is preferable to combine FOIA for the SC with FOIA for the Executive, I think otherwise, it makes the Legal Code longer than it needs to;
  • the classified information third and fourth clauses seem redundant, the third clause should cover what is in the fourth clause, if for some reason it does not, I would recommend combining the two;
  • the last clause for the classified information is problematic in that it somehow introduces the idea of consent for declassification, which should not be at all relevant to this discussion (the SC isn't consenting to the FOIA, they are required unless there is an exception);
  • there should be a timeline for the VD to collect the information if we are giving a timeline for the SC to review the information (additionally two weeks seems like a significantly long time.
 
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