In light of the recently passed AGORA Act, is it your opinion that the Court no longer can resolve matters of ambiguity or clarify legal questions through the normal Court process? If not, what is the best way for the Court to do that? Is that something the Court should be doing?
Judicial review remains a cornerstone of the Court's duties; however, its purview has certainly been reduced. Legal questions concerning the constitutionality of legislation or lawfulness of government acts remains squarely within the Court's domain, and is the most important part of judicial oversight. Resolving conflicts or ambiguities in the body of law beneath the Constitution, however, is now a matter for the Regional Assembly alone. This makes the Court's duties clearer and more predictable, and enforcement of the law accordingly less mutable, but requires swift and decisive action by the RA where the best course of action cannot be resolved, in lieu of guidance by the Court serving as a stopgap.
What is your opinion on setting up a civil procedure for the Court? Is it necessary? Would it work? If you attempted to pursue it, how would you do it?
Coming from TVF, where a large proportion of cases were civil matters, TNP has a much more effective system of moderation which renders the intervention of the Court largely unnecessary. And given the sheer size of players in the region, if the Court were to take on a primary role in the resolution of civil disputes, it would very quickly become bogged down in disputes which, while valid, do not run afoul of the Criminal Code and hold few implications for the region at large. In my view, civil disputes are adequately addressed by the mechanisms we have in place at this time.
As to the mechanics of a civil procedure, were it to exist, I agree wholeheartedly with what
@Zyvetskistaahn remarked in his own campaign thread. For it to work, such a procedure requires a high barrier to entry, such that the Court only hears matters that cannot be resolved through normal moderation procedures, and only on such disputes for which the Court can reasonably hope to provide a remedy.
Is there any criteria you feel would render a legal complaint frivolous or illegitimate? If so, what circumstances do you imagine would meet this criteria?
The Court must give complainants the benefit of the doubt unless there is a compelling reason to reject it out of hand. A complaint which does not hold solid legal merit in its presentation or otherwise is part of a pattern of excessive or unmeritorious complaints against an individual or official by one or a group of complainants may be considered frivolous. On this charge, which is largely dependent on inference of the motivation(s) of the complainant, it is nearly impossible to draw up an exhaustive standard. In the words of Potter Stewart, "
I know it when I see it".
There have been a series of cases within the last year which featured guilty pleas and advocacy for reduced sentences, and yet the Court rendered what many felt were overly harsh judgments. Looking back at these recent cases, can you identify any which you feel had overly harsh sentences, and if so, how would you have ruled differently?
In
The North Pacific v. Bobberino, the defendant certainly deserved punishment for the abuse of his power as Minister of Defense, not only by utilizing the official announcements channel to promote his campaign, but doing so under the apparent threat of a ban. However, given the defendant's guilty plea and acceptance of punishment for his actions, even if they were intended as a joke, as well as his good standing in and contributions to TNP, I found the five-month suspension of voting rights to be disproportionate, especially in light of the verdicts in
TNP v. Madjack and
TNP v. Tomb, which had other charges/exacerbating circumstances. A three-month suspension would have been more appropriate and in line with precedent.
Is there any other case previously heard by the Court that you feel was decided incorrectly or inappropriately, and if so, how would you have ruled differently?
The most recent and obvious answer here is
TNP v. Whole India. The authentication of the images provided by Whole India did not follow the Court's own rules and procedures governing the authentication of evidence, and though there was ample evidence, including a guilty plea, to sentence the defendant, improperly authenticated evidence should not have formed part of the Court's rationale.
Judicial restraint is something many would consider to be worthy of pursuit. Explain your vision and personal philosophy as it comes to restraint and how this principle would be embodied, or tempered, by your own actions on the Court.
In criminal cases or reviewing government acts, each case is unique, with its own mitigating or exacerbating circumstances. Thus, rubber-stamping precedent onto any case which seems similar may very well lead to a miscarriage of justice which does not fully account for the circumstances of the individual case or entirely remedy the situation which brought the participants before the case in the first place. Precedent plays an important role in the judicial system, and must guide and strongly inform future decisions, serving as further clarification on the penal code in criminal trials, but cannot advance the cause of equitable justice when treated as one-size-fits-all dogma.
In light of the AGORA Act, the Court's potential to legislate from the bench, as it were, is significantly scaled back. More generally, I'm of the opinion that the Court must, in order to preserve its legitimacy as an impartial and objective body, adhere to the letter of the law, but should not hesitate to exercise its power when the letter of the law is breached, either by criminal acts, the acts of government officials, or contradiction of the Constitution.
Related to the above, given that the number of cases the Court hears each term may be few and far between and the region's Court precedent slow to develop, do you believe that it is desirable to use the Court to right wrongs or address problems in existing law if given the chance with a relevant case? For the purposes of this question, I am taking it for granted that the Court will not rule on something or expand an opinion beyond what is germane to a case they are hearing.
While I believe that it is the mission of the Court to right wrongs and injustices, I also hold that legislation is best left to the legislature itself. The Court must take care to do so only when it is necessary to resolve the specific matter at hand. To approach jurisprudence with a bias for change is to invite overreach and prejudice in the decision-making process.
Considering that Justices are elected in TNP just as officials in the others branches are, do you believe there is an imperative for the Court to defer entirely to the other branches when faced with situations where laws or decisions may be at risk of being overturned or deemed inconsistent with the constitution? Where is the bar for you when it comes to using your judgment to possibly reverse or undo the efforts of the other branches? Are there clear situations where this should or should not be done?
Within its legal remit, the Court stands as a check on all other powers. While the Court should not be deliberately antagonistic or endeavor to stifle the efforts of other government organs without a compelling reason, its job is to interpret and enforce the law, not play politics. The Court should never shy away from pursuing truth and justice, doubly so when it is inconvenient or hard to swallow. Judicial independence is a strong sticking point for me.
The penal code contemplates sentences that are mostly finite in nature, but in a few situations may be indefinite or permanent. In your view is there a functional difference between an indefinite sentence versus a permanent one in our laws as written? If so, what situations may one form of sentence be preferable over the other?
The distinction is semantic, but a permanent sentence is a harsher one than an indefinite sentence. While the former explicitly closes the door to the possibility of clemency, an indefinite sentence does not. In practice, the difference is largely academic, but the choice of words speaks to the strength of the condemnation.
It has been remarked at various times that the Court does not provide an opportunity for interested citizens to learn the ropes or get acquainted with the region's legal system outside of reading legal documents and case law. Do you believe there is a way to provide such opportunities to citizens, such as a clerk or staff position working under the justices? Is this even something that is desirable or worthy or pursuit? If so, how would you propose going about doing that?
A legal apprenticeship may very well be worth looking into, and would be a good way to gain firsthand insight into the legal system, but more pertinent to the general public, I think, is outreach that doesn't require one to actively pursue a staff position. A similar system to the North Pacific University, focusing on the body of law and jurisprudence of the region itself, including frequently asked questions, would provide a more welcoming opportunity for those unacquainted with the region's legal system to learn more and ask any questions which may arise.
Follow up for you Alamei:
Individual justices decide on criminal cases and may also draft opinions alone. Given that you have advocated for the other justices to participate in cases by asking questions during proceedings so as to better inform their collective judgment in deciding a case, do you believe there may be situations where one could successfully argue the entire bench recuse themselves in the event the decision is appealed or reviewed?
This is a particularly interesting question. Given my model of non-moderating justices asking questions for clarification, their level of participation in the trial process is still rather limited in comparison to the Moderating Justice. I would venture that if a justice's questions were especially pointed or hostile so as to betray bias that would call into question their impartiality, a case could be made for their recusal. Of course, in such an event, a justice should properly have recused themselves from the beginning. I suppose that, as I suggested when I posed the idea, allowing all justices to participate in the hearing process holds the potential to render an individual justice's reasoning and thought process more transparent, and in that way would make such a scenario more plausible, albeit unlikely.
---
Would you have ruled differently on the original sentencing order in relation to TNP vs. Whole India? If so, how?
Yes; as I indicated above in response to
@Pallaith , because the images provided by Whole India were clearly authenticated improperly, they should not have been entered into evidence and used against the defendant. However, I concur with the Court's revised sentence and rationale thereof, because the purportedly doctored screenshots did not form the bulk of the evidence against the defendant and did not themselves result in the original sentence being significantly harsher than it otherwise would have been.
