The AGORA Act

Not a fan of giving the Delegate so much power over prosecution. Against.
So RA confirmation isn’t enough of a check on that in your book? Hypothetically speaking, do you want the RA to name the prosecutor in addition to confirming that person? Or is this just a very specific form of saying you prefer an elected prosecutor in general?
 
I don’t really know if there’s a way for us to acknowledge the nature of how this discussion has evolved. I do not want to take credit for the work Siwale and COE have already put into this, not so I want to separate the debate that ensued last year from that which occurred after I revived it. This is a natural progression of the bill and I contacted both of them as part of getting it started. Perhaps it cannot be helped. You and I are both former Speakers. I think what I would do is request @Siwale motion for the vote. If that isn’t feasible I’m willing to make a new thread for my revision, but I feel it really should all be part of this thread.

I can appreciate the reason one would want to maintain a single thread and I don’t think the problem is beyond resolution by the Speaker, given the Standing Procedures can be varied whether generally or for particular proposals. Subject to my points below in relation to Siwale’s questions, I think that it would, essentially, be acceptable for a proposal to have multiple authors who could motion to vote.
Can you explain your reasoning behind this decision? What exactly does a brand new thread add to this debate? Keep in mind that the Standing Procedures can be amended at any time by you so stating that “no provisions currently exist” isn’t much of an argument.

Pallaith quite clearly laid out his version of this bill (which he motioned we vote on) while also highlighting the sound reasoning for posting it in this thread. Having me motion for a vote on his bill makes little sense.
There is an advantage to maintaining the proposer as being the person who introduced the thread, as it maintains a single post in which the final text of the Bill will be and will maintain uniformity of that position across all proposals before the Assembly. It can lead to confusion (even if it is confusion that would be avoided by members simply reading the whole thread) if for some bills the final text is in the OP whereas for others it is in a random post by a different member on the second page. I would say that it would be right for the Speaker to insist that the actual final text of the Bill is in the OP and that that version is maintained as current, whether that be by the Speaker editing it on or by requiring members who collaborate on or pass on their proposals to do so.

Slightly more difficult to resolve is that the Rules of the Assembly give particular power to “the citizen that introduced the proposal to the Regional Assembly“, as their involvement is required for a motion for an immediate vote to succeed. The proposer in the rule is identified by the definite article and it is not immediately apparent how it would resolve where there are multiple notional proposers (would it be that any one of them can give sufficient approval for a motion for an immediate vote or would it only be sufficient if all of them support the motion), presuming the rule does allow multiple proposers. The Speaker does, therefore, need a clear way to identify the proposer in relation to any given proposal and requiring proposals to be by the OP is as good a means as any (particularly as it avoids competing versions of proposals in the same thread). That doesn’t require that only the proposer can move to vote or that the proposer alone can make changes to proposals, but I don’t see how it is in any way wrong for the Speaker to say the proposer must remain involved and supportive of the present draft, given the power the Rules give the proposer and the sense of ensuring that there is a single place in the thread that where the final text can be found and that that place is the same place it would be found for other proposals.
 
So RA confirmation isn’t enough of a check on that in your book? Hypothetically speaking, do you want the RA to name the prosecutor in addition to confirming that person? Or is this just a very specific form of saying you prefer an elected prosecutor in general?
How would the RA even name a prosecutor? Sounds like just an election to me...

Additionally, I don't see a procedure for if the RA is able to come to an agreement on a prosecutor for a case.
 
How would the RA even name a prosecutor? Sounds like just an election to me...

Additionally, I don't see a procedure for if the RA is able to come to an agreement on a prosecutor for a case.
Well that sounds like a yes to my last question.

I assume you meant what happens if they can’t come to an agreement? If they agree then that prosecutor is obviously confirmed. If they don’t confirm the prosecutor than I imagine another would have to be appointed and subject to confirmation. I didn’t really think that was something that required any other particular language. I suppose it’s possible they keep rejecting prosecutors, but that’s always a possibility with confirmation votes. I don’t think that’s going to be an issue in practice though.
 
After giving the matter some consideration, I have decided to allow @Pallaiths motion to vote. I recognize that the proposal that Palliath is bringing forward is built upon the proposal that @Siwale and @Crushing Our Enemies originally drafted and it is the culmination of all of their work. The AGORA Act will be formally debated for the next five days, at which point further modifications to the bill will no longer be permitted and a vote will be scheduled. Debate will end and a vote will be scheduled (time=1581638400) in your time zone.

I will ask that @Pallaith clarify that he intends to use the text of the bill as found in post #51 of this thread at the time a vote is scheduled?
 
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I think that the point Praetor raises requires further thought. There is a difference between these appointments and the other confirmations we presently have, in that the Security Council and the Election Commission both undertake tasks that, in general, the Assembly supports and those tasks are what individuals are confirmed to do. That is to say, the question is about the competence of the individual to be confirmed and not about the tasks they are to perform. However, prosecutors are appointed for particular cases and I don’t think it implausible to think that there will be times where the Assembly considers not only the merits of the prospective prosecutor but also whether the Assembly even wants the case prosecuted.

Leaving to one side the extent of the discretion a prosecutor would have to discontinue a case (though it may be that needs some further thought), it strikes me that the Assembly could effectively be given a veto on prosecution of cases it does not wish to be brought by refusing to confirm prosecutors for them.

I also have some thoughts about one of the transitional provisions of the proposal, the transfer of the AG’s records to the Delegate. There are two points I want to raise about it. First, I think there is a risk in the effect of the FoIA on those records. Currently the AG’s office is wholly without the scope of the FoIA, if those records become the Delegate’s it would seem to me that they could move into its scope. The FoIA law contains no provision to prevent the release of those records, except to the extent that they impinge on RL or regional security issues, and, insofar as they are over a year old, would compel their release. Clearly, it is possible that some of those records will relate to allegations of crime against nations that were not prosecuted and which can, I think, properly be said to have a legitimate interest in those allegations not being released.

Second, I think it may actually introduce an inconsistency in the handling of such records, in that it is not apparent to me that the prosecutors’ records going forward will be open to FoIA release. Prosecutors, as they are created under the proposal, do not exercise any power of the Delegate and are not subject to any true oversight by them but are autonomous officers, analogous to the Election Commission. The FoIA law applies to the Delegate and their Executive Officers, so would not cover prosecutors, or so it seems to me. Nor is it apparent that the Delegate would have any claim to own the records of a prosecutor, given their autonomy.
 
It can definitely be an issue if the RA doesn't see the merits of an individual being taken to justice. Zyvet is correct on elaborating with my concerns.
 
It seems I misunderstood where @Praetor was coming from with that question. @Zyvetskistaahn ’s remarks cleared it up. I’m not sure I see a really good way around this though. A confirmation vote is always capable of getting around any provisions we put in place that mandate a prosecution continue. If we give them a time limit or restrict how many votes they can hold, we may ultimately end up taking it out of their hands, and I know that in the absence of the AG a lot of people want the RA to still have a say in the process. I can’t deny this is a possibility however. Putting a reasonable clock on the confirmation may be the best way to handle it. If this outcome is as unlikely as I believe it is, the RA should easily confirm prosecutors within the timeframe. If they play games instead, then we can ultimately allow an alternative selection method. I would suggest a time frame of one month and an alternative selection method of having consent of the justices not hearing the case and the delegate, or the delegate and the Speaker, something like that.

As to the FoIA concerns, if the AG is currently left out of FoIA and prosecutors going forward aren’t subject to it, I don’t see how this changes matters from status quo. It is true that sending the records to the Delegate changes the pattern a bit, but I read that as making sure an office that is ceasing to exist has its materials somewhere and since the delegate is appointing prosecutors and the AG was an executive office, it makes the most sense to move them there. I think that if the material is particularly sensitive it can be withheld as you suggested, and those reasons for withholding should be sufficient to cover all the cases where disclosure shouldn’t happen. I’m not going to weigh in on whether I think it’s a problem that FoIA could now be extended to the AG’s office. Frankly, FoIA is something that needs a broader look and could use some updating in general. If we’re going to start entering those weeds, I think we need another bill and the RA can decide if if feels this is an area that should be explored.

Finally, to address the matter of prosecutors discontinuing a case. Yes, they absolutely should have that option. I can see there being a concern about consequences if a prosecutor drops a case people felt shouldn’t have been dropped. There really isn’t a way to hold that prosecutor accountable as they won’t be a prosecutor anymore, although obviously that would be a factor in the event they are considered for a future prosecution. I don’t see why if a bad prosecutor drops a case improperly, a new prosecutor couldn’t be appointed to reopen the case. Existing law allows for this by having the next AG manage prosecution. This change can allow us not to have as long a delay compared to that scenario. We could also add similar language spelling out the complainant’s right to manage prosecution themselves. I would note that was not subject to the whims of the RA, so if we did this it wouldn’t really be a change from status quo.
 
I'd like to propose a way around it—don't move forward with it.
But for those of us who would like to find a way, perhaps you would like to weigh in on the proposed restrictions I mentioned? I think that could address your concerns and still allow confirmation to be viable.
 
At the end of the day, power should reside with the RA. If we're going to be moving away from the RA electing an AG, the RA must still somehow remain in charge at the end of the day with whatever your new "solution" is.
 
At the end of the day, power should reside with the RA. If we're going to be moving away from the RA electing an AG, the RA must still somehow remain in charge at the end of the day with whatever your new "solution" is.
Which is why we have RA confirmation. But not too much of it in case the RA goes overboard with being in charge, if I understand your objection correctly. Could I get feedback on my proposed measure to protect against that?
 
Which is why we have RA confirmation. But not too much of it in case the RA goes overboard with being in charge, if I understand your objection correctly. Could I get feedback on my proposed measure to protect against that?
Such a measure skips the RA, does it not?
 
Such a measure skips the RA, does it not?
It gives the RA a month to confirm a prosecutor before leaving the choice to the delegate and either the Speaker or the justices not assigned to the case. This was proposed entirely because of the concerns outlined by yourself and Zyvet about avoiding scenarios where the RA can effectively veto a prosecution by not confirming anyone. If this is objectionable because the RA no longer decides on the outcome at some point, then I fear there isn’t a solution that will work for you.
 
It gives the RA a month to confirm a prosecutor before leaving the choice to the delegate and either the Speaker or the justices not assigned to the case. This was proposed entirely because of the concerns outlined by yourself and Zyvet about avoiding scenarios where the RA can effectively veto a prosecution by not confirming anyone. If this is objectionable because the RA no longer decides on the outcome at some point, then I fear there isn’t a solution that will work for you.
I see nothing preventing the Delegate from continually presenting the same prosecutor, getting rejected by the RA, after the month passes then just going ahead with this individual.

I cannot support this undermining of the power of the RA.
 
I see nothing preventing the Delegate from continually presenting the same prosecutor, getting rejected by the RA, after the month passes then just going ahead with this individual.
Why couldn't you have just said that three posts ago.
 
You could be much clearer and you know it.

Sure people in the RA and the delegate can play games like that. We can try to restrict that sort of thing by saying the rejection is final and the delegate has to choose someone else, but if the delegate thinks the nominee is going to fail that nominee can withdraw themselves and the delegate can pick absolutely unpalatable choices to end up in that situation at the end and bypass the RA. We can do this all day, but is it really fair to try to prevent every possible scenario? Anything can be sidestepped. Maybe we cut the delegate out of that alternative process then, would that be more palatable to you?

At this point I feel like I’m dealing with Lucy with the football. I would be interested in hearing what others have to say about these concerns. What’s the appropriate balancing act? Is confirmation something that should get more weight or isn’t it? There’s going to be a give or take either way.
 
You could be much clearer and you know it.

Sure people in the RA and the delegate can play games like that. We can try to restrict that sort of thing by saying the rejection is final and the delegate has to choose someone else, but if the delegate thinks the nominee is going to fail that nominee can withdraw themselves and the delegate can pick absolutely unpalatable choices to end up in that situation at the end and bypass the RA. We can do this all day, but is it really fair to try to prevent every possible scenario? Anything can be sidestepped. Maybe we cut the delegate out of that alternative process then, would that be more palatable to you?

At this point I feel like I’m dealing with Lucy with the football. I would be interested in hearing what others have to say about these concerns. What’s the appropriate balancing act? Is confirmation something that should get more weight or isn’t it? There’s going to be a give or take either way.
When further detail was necessary I provided it.

It would be much more palatable if the Delegate is sidestepped should they be unable to work with the RA in a reasonable time frame. Might I suggest perhaps reverting the burden of prosecution back to the individual who filed the indictment?
 
Seems incredibly unlikely bordering on nonsensical that a Delegate would repeatedly nominate the same person who has already been rejected. There are enough headaches as Delegate without doing something so asinine.
 
When further detail was necessary I provided it.

It would be much more palatable if the Delegate is sidestepped should they be unable to work with the RA in a reasonable time frame. Might I suggest perhaps reverting the burden of prosecution back to the individual who filed the indictment?
Actually when I get back to an actual computer I’m going to revise my version of the bill to add that language back in. The idea for it was to cover situations where the prosecutor drops the case, however, not to serve as an alternative to the delegate’s nominee. However, if the delegate has trouble getting a nominee confirmed, I imagine one possible move is to appoint the complainant. I just don’t know if automatically making them the prosecutor is a good idea since complainants may not wish to serve in that capacity and existing language always left it up to them if they wanted to pursue the case when no one else was available or willing to do so.

Seems incredibly unlikely bordering on nonsensical that a Delegate would repeatedly nominate the same person who has already been rejected. There are enough headaches as Delegate without doing something so asinine.
I agree it’s unlikely. The problem is, this sort of thing is still at least plausible and a potential problem that we can see coming. These sorts of things are partly based on risk and how much risk we’re willing to take. Just as unrestricted confirmation power allows the RA to potentially filibuster a prosecution, the delegate can run out the clock if we place these restrictions. This is why I’m interested in hearing from more people, because we have to weigh these possibilities and whether we think it’s a big or small risk.

I also wanted to quickly circle back to the question of FoIA. One option would be not to send the AG records to the delegate, but to the Court. That would sidestep the whole issue I think, and guarantees the records are somewhere. We could modify the language further to specify that future prosecution records would go to the same place.
 
I apologize for the double post, but I wanted to get my revised draft down as soon as I got a chance.

The Attorney General has Outlived Rational Applications (AGORA) Act:
The Attorney General has Outlived Rational Applications (AGORA) Act

1. Article 4 of the Constitution shall be struck null and void.

2. The remaining Articles of the Constitution shall be renumbered in numeric order.

3. Article 4 (formerly Article 5) of the Constitution of The North Pacific is hereby amended to read as follows:

Article 4:
1. The Court will try all criminal cases and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies and actions.
2. Reviews of laws or government policies and actions must be made by request of an affected party unless there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it.
3. The Court will consist of at least three Justices, who will select a Chief Justice among themselves.
4. The Chief Justice will administer the rules of the Court. Where no rules exist, the Chief Justice may use their discretion.
5. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.
6. Justices will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a plurality vote every four months.

4. Article 6 (formerly Article 7) of the Constitution of The North Pacific is hereby amended to read as follows:

Article 6:
1. Constitutionally-mandated elected officials are the Delegate, Vice Delegate, Speaker, members of the Security Council, and Justices.
2. Government officials are the constitutionally-mandated elected officials, any officials appointed by them as permitted by law, and members of the Security Council.
3. The executive category consists of the Delegate, Vice Delegate, and government officials appointed by the Delegate or Vice Delegate.
4. The legislative category consists of the Speaker, and government officials appointed by the Speaker.
5. The judicial category consists of the Justices, and government officials appointed by Justices.
6. Any temporary replacement for a government official in the case of an absence or vacancy will be considered a government official in the branch of the official being replaced, regardless of the method of their selection.
7. All government officials must maintain citizenship while in office.
8. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
9. No person may simultaneously serve in more than one elected office.
10. No person may simultaneously serve in government official positions in more than one of the executive, legislative, or judicial categories. Exceptions to this provision may be established by law.
11. Candidates in any election must maintain citizenship for the fifteen days before the opening of candidacy declarations and throughout the election.
12. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.
13. Procedures to fill vacancies and absences in constitutionally-mandated elected offices may be established by law.
14. No law or government policy may contradict this constitution.

5. Chapter 3 of the Legal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Chapter 3:
1. These procedures will govern the Judiciary.

Section 3.1: Chief Justice Selection
2. Whenever the position is vacant, the Justices shall elect a Chief Justice from among themselves by a majority vote.
3. In the event that a Chief Justice has not been elected by seven days after the conclusion of a Judicial election, including the conclusion of any required run-off votes, the Chief Justice shall be the Justice who received the highest number of votes in said election. In the event of a tie for highest number of votes, the Chief Justice shall be the one among those tied with the longest period of citizenship.

Section 3.2: Appointment of Hearing Officers
4. A conflict of interest occurs when a Justice or Hearing Officer has a vested interest in a matter before the Court, or when they are otherwise unable to rule in a fair and unbiased manner.
5. Justices and Hearing Officers are required to recuse themselves from matters where they have a certain or potential conflict of interest.
6. If one or more Justice positions are vacant, or any Justice is absent or has recused themselves, the remaining Justices will promptly appoint replacements from among available citizens to participate as temporary Hearing Officers.
7. If all Justices are vacant, absent, or have recused themselves, the Delegate will promptly appoint the needed Hearing Officers from among available citizens with the agreement of the Speaker.
8. Any recusal or absence of a Hearing Officer will be treated as a vacancy.
9. The Court may recuse any Justice or Hearing Officer by majority vote.
10. The Court must hold a vote on whether to recuse a Justice or Hearing Officer when publicly requested by the prosecution, defense, or petitioner in any matter before the Court.

Section 3.3: Criminal Trial Procedure
11. A standard procedure for all criminal trials will be established by majority agreement of the Court.
12. Any person may present criminal charges to the Court. If the charges are accepted, the Delegate will appoint a prosecutor to manage the prosecution of the case. If the Delegate is the accused or unavailable, the next available person in the Line of Succession will appoint a prosecutor to manage prosecution of the case.
13. Any citizen may be appointed as a prosecutor. Citizens will be exempt from constitutional restrictions on holding multiple government offices for purposes of their appointment as a prosecutor.
14. The designated prosecutor will be confirmed by a majority vote of the Regional Assembly. The Delegate and other officials who may have appointed a prosecutor do not have the power to remove a prosecutor.
15. In the event the Regional Assembly is unable to confirm a prosecutor within 30 days of the acceptance of charges, the Delegate, or next available person in the Line of Succession if necessary, will appoint a prosecutor to manage the prosecution of the case with the agreement of the Speaker.
16. No one may prosecute or appoint prosecutors to a case in which they are the defendant or part of the defense.
17. If the original prosecutor is unable to see a case to completion, another prosecutor will be selected by the same procedure as the original prosecutor.
18. If the prosecutor discontinues management of the prosecution of a criminal case, then the complainant may, at their discretion, manage themselves the prosecution of the criminal case. Otherwise, they may withdraw the complaint.
19. If the complainant has not stated their intent to either manage the prosecution of the case or withdraw the complaint within 14 days of the prosecutor declining the case, the complaint will be considered withdrawn.
20. For the purposes of this section, "managing the prosecution of a case" includes but is not limited to:
  • acting as the prosecutor for the duration of all stages of the criminal trial heard for the case;
  • and representing the prosecution in any separate judicial review hearings arising from the criminal trial.
21. When the management of the prosecution of a case is completed, all records associated with that prosecution will be transferred to the Court.

Section 3.4: Pre-Sentencing Ejections and Bans
22. The Delegate may eject and/or ban a particular nation from the region pending criminal charges against them, or prior to the conclusion of an ongoing criminal trial in which they are the defendant, only when that nation poses a clear security threat and their removal is necessary for the protection of the region.
23. The Delegate must seek the approval of the Court for any such ejection or ban. Where possible, this approval must be sought prior to the nation's removal from the region. Otherwise, it must be sought within one day of the action.
24. If the ejection or ban is performed during a criminal trial against that nation, approval will be at the discretion of the justice moderating the trial. Otherwise, any single justice may approve or deny the Delegate's request.
25. Any nation ejected or banned under this section may file an appeal of the decision. These appeals may not be denied, and must be decided by the full court.
26. The Delegate must immediately provide any nation ejected or banned under this section with a link to the Courtroom and inform them of their right to file an appeal.
27. If criminal charges are not brought against a nation ejected or banned under this section, or if the criminal charges are rejected by the Court, or if the nation is not found Guilty at the conclusion of the trial, any ban against that nation which was imposed under this section must be revoked.

6. Section 4.5 of the Legal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Chapter 4:
29. The election of the Delegate, the Vice Delegate, and the Speaker will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.
30. If there are more than two candidates for an election, voters may rank the candidates, with the candidate ranked 1 being the first preference, the candidate ranked 2 being the next preference, and so on.
31. All first preference votes shall be counted first. If no candidate achieves a majority, the candidate with the least votes shall be eliminated, and the next preference of all voters who had voted for the eliminated candidate as first preference shall be counted, with the process repeated until a candidate achieves a majority.
32. If all of a voter's preferences have been eliminated, the voter's ballot shall not be used in further counting.

7. Section 7.4 of The Legal Code shall be struck null and void.

8. The remaining Sections of Chapter 7 of The Legal Code shall be renumbered in numeric order.

9. Any cases currently being prosecuted when this bill is enacted will continue under the same prosecutor.

10. When this bill is enacted, ownership of all government records from the Attorney General's office will be transferred to the Court.

11. No portion of this bill will take effect unless/until all portions take effect.

3. Article 4 (formerly Article 5) of the Constitution of The North Pacific is hereby amended to read as follows:

Article 4:
1. The Court will try all criminal cases and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies and actions.
2. Reviews of laws or government policies and actions must be made by request of an affected party unless there is a compelling regional interest in resolving it.
3. The Court will consist of at least three Justices, who will select a Chief Justice among themselves.
4. The Chief Justice will administer the rules of the Court. Where no rules exist, the Chief Justice may use their discretion.
5. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.
6. Justices will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a plurality vote every four months.

4. Article 6 (formerly Article 7) of the Constitution of The North Pacific is hereby amended to read as follows:

Article 6:
1. Constitutionally-mandated elected officials are the Delegate, Vice Delegate, Speaker, members of the Security Council, and Justices.
2. Government officials are the constitutionally-mandated elected officials, any officials appointed by them as permitted by law, and members of the Security Council.
3. The executive category consists of the Delegate, Vice Delegate, and government officials appointed by the Delegate or Vice Delegate.
4. The legislative category consists of the Speaker, and government officials appointed by the Speaker.
5. The judicial category consists of the Justices, and government officials appointed by Justices.
6. Any temporary replacement for a government official in the case of an absence or vacancy will be considered a government official in the branch of the official being replaced, regardless of the method of their selection.
7. All government officials, with the exception of members of the Security Council, must maintain citizenship while in office.
8. All government officials will swear an oath of office. The content of these oaths will be determined by law and be legally binding.
9. No person may simultaneously serve in more than one elected office.
10. No person constitutionally-mandated official may simultaneously serve in government official positions in more than one of the executive, legislative, or judicial categories. Exceptions to this provision may be established by law.
11. Candidates in any election must maintain citizenship for the fifteen days before the opening of candidacy declarations and throughout the election.
12. Government bodies may create rules for their own governance subordinate to this constitution and the laws.
13. Procedures to fill vacancies and absences in constitutionally-mandated elected offices may be established by law.
14. No law or government policy may contradict this constitution.

5. Chapter 3 of the Legal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Chapter 3:
1. These procedures will govern the Judiciary.

Section 3.1: Chief Justice Selection
2. Whenever the position is vacant, the Justices shall elect a Chief Justice from among themselves by a majority vote.
3. In the event that a Chief Justice has not been elected by seven days after the conclusion of a Judicial election, including the conclusion of any required run-off votes, the Chief Justice shall be the Justice who received the highest number of votes in said election. In the event of a tie for highest number of votes, the Chief Justice shall be the one among those tied with the longest period of citizenship.

Section 3.2: Appointment of Hearing Officers
4. A conflict of interest occurs when a Justice or Hearing Officer has a vested interest in a matter before the Court, or when they are otherwise unable to rule in a fair and unbiased manner.
5. Justices and Hearing Officers are required to recuse themselves from matters where they have a certain or potential conflict of interest.
6. If one or more Justice positions are vacant, or any Justice is absent or has recused themselves, the remaining Justices will promptly appoint replacements from among available citizens to participate as temporary Hearing Officers.
7. If all Justices are vacant, absent, or have recused themselves, the Delegate will promptly appoint the needed Hearing Officers from among available citizens with the agreement of the Speaker.
8. Any recusal or absence of a Hearing Officer will be treated as a vacancy.
9. The Court may recuse any Justice or Hearing Officer by majority vote.
10. The Court must hold a vote on whether to recuse a Justice or Hearing Officer when publicly requested by the prosecution, defense, or petitioner in any matter before the Court.

Section 3.3: Criminal Trial Procedure
11. A standard procedure for all criminal trials will be established by majority agreement of the Court.
12. Any person may present criminal charges to the Court. If the charges are accepted, the Delegate will appoint a prosecutor to manage the prosecution of the casebe tasked with designating a willing citizen to manage the prosecution . If the Delegate is the accused or unavailable, the next available person in the Line of Succession will appoint a prosecutor to manage the prosecution of the casebe tasked with designating a willing citizen to manage the prosecution.
13. Any citizen may be appointed as a prosecutor. Citizens will be exempt from constitutional restrictions on holding multiple government offices for purposes of their appointment as a prosecutor.
14. The designated prosecutor will be confirmed by a majority vote of the Regional Assembly. The Delegate and other officials who may have appointed a prosecutor do not have the power to remove a prosecutor.
15. In the event the Regional Assembly is unable to confirm a prosecutor within 30 days of the acceptance of charges, the Delegate, or next available person in the Line of Succession if necessary, will appoint a prosecutor to manage the prosecution of the case with the agreement of the Speaker.

16. No one may prosecute or appoint prosecutors to a case in which they are the defendant or part of the defense.
17. If the original prosecutor is unable to see a case to completion, another prosecutor will be selected by the same procedure as the original prosecutor.
18. If the prosecutor discontinues management of the prosecution of a criminal case, then the complainant may, at their discretion, manage themselves the prosecution of the criminal case. Otherwise, they may withdraw the complaint.
19. If the complainant has not stated their intent to either manage the prosecution of the case or withdraw the complaint within 14 days of the prosecutor declining the case, the complaint will be considered withdrawn.
20. For the purposes of this section, "managing the prosecution of a case" includes but is not limited to:
  • acting as the prosecutor for the duration of all stages of the criminal trial heard for the case;
  • and representing the prosecution in any separate judicial review hearings arising from the criminal trial.
21. When the management of the prosecution of a case is completed, all records associated with that prosecution will be transferred to the Court.


Section 3.4: Pre-Sentencing Ejections and Bans
22. The Delegate may eject and/or ban a particular nation from the region pending criminal charges against them, or prior to the conclusion of an ongoing criminal trial in which they are the defendant, only when that nation poses a clear security threat and their removal is necessary for the protection of the region.
23. The Delegate must seek the approval of the Court for any such ejection or ban. Where possible, this approval must be sought prior to the nation's removal from the region. Otherwise, it must be sought within one day of the action.
24. If the ejection or ban is performed during a criminal trial against that nation, approval will be at the discretion of the justice moderating the trial. Otherwise, any single justice may approve or deny the Delegate's request.
25. Any nation ejected or banned under this section may file an appeal of the decision. These appeals may not be denied, and must be decided by the full court.
26. The Delegate must immediately provide any nation ejected or banned under this section with a link to the Courtroom and inform them of their right to file an appeal.
27. If criminal charges are not brought against a nation ejected or banned under this section, or if the criminal charges are rejected by the Court, or if the nation is not found Guilty at the conclusion of the trial, any ban against that nation which was imposed under this section must be revoked.

6. Section 4.5 of the Legal Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Chapter 3:
29. The election of the Delegate, the Vice Delegate, and the Speaker will begin on the first day of the months of January, May, and September.
30. If there are more than two candidates for an election, voters may rank the candidates, with the candidate ranked 1 being the first preference, the candidate ranked 2 being the next preference, and so on.no candidate for a given office gains a majority, a runoff vote for that office will begin within one day of the first vote ending and it will last for five days.
31. All first preference votes shall be counted first. If no candidate achieves a majority, the candidate with the least votes shall be eliminated, and the next preference of all voters who had voted for the eliminated candidate as first preference shall be counted, with the process repeated until a candidate achieves a majority.Candidates will be added to the runoff ballot in descending order of how many votes they received. Candidates who received equal numbers of votes will be added the ballot simultaneously. Once the cumulative number of votes received by the candidates on the runoff ballot reaches a majority of votes cast in the previous round of voting, excluding abstentions, no more candidates will be added to the ballot.
32. If all of a voter's preferences have been eliminated, the voter's ballot shall not be used in further counting.If no one gains a majority of votes in the runoff vote, the runoff process will be repeated until a candidate receives a majority.

10. When this bill is enacted, ownership of all government records from the Attorney General's office will be transferred to the CourtDelegate.

As I previously stated, I adjusted a few areas based on the recent feedback I received. Specifically, transfer of AG records is now designated to go to the Court rather than the Delegate, and I added language that has any records related to a prosecution also transferred to the Court. I trust that will eliminate the FoIA concerns.

To avoid a potential effective veto on the part of the RA, I added language that gives them 30 days from the time charges are accepted by the Court to confirm a prosecutor. To avoid potential end-runs on the part of the Delegate, I required the Speaker's agreement on the Delegate's appointment if the RA fails to confirm a prosecutor within 30 days. I am not completely sold on this aspect of the proposal, but this is how I would address these particular concerns.

Finally, I added in language similar to what is currently in Section 7 of the Legal Code which gives the complainant the opportunity to prosecute the case if a prosecutor drops the case. Note that the bill as originally written did not make appointing prosecutors optional, so the only time this comes up is after a case has been accepted and a prosecutor appointed. I also brought back the definition of what managing the prosecution of a case means.

Once again, I would love to hear your thoughts on this.
 
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15. In the event the Regional Assembly is unable to confirm a prosecutor within 30 days of the acceptance of charges, the Delegate, or next available person in the Line of Succession if necessary, and will appoint a prosecutor to manage the prosecution of the case with the agreement of the Speaker.
I think something went wrong in drafting this one. I think "if necessary, and will" can lose the "and".
 
I think that there is a case to make the time for a complainant to take actions shorter (indeed, substantially shorter), given that it would be a decision being made after the Court has already accepted the indictment and the defendant is actually on trial (and, potentially, subject to pre-trial sanction). I don't think a defendant should be languishing for 30 days, potentially mid-trial, for the decision to be made. I would think that somewhere in the range of 7-14 more appropriate.

I do remain of the view that there should be express recognition of the Court's jurisdiction to determine the meaning of the law. There are cases where the Court is making such determinations rather than addressing particular unlawful action (as noted with the Fraud review) and I think those cases are of assistance.
 
I think that there is a case to make the time for a complainant to take actions shorter (indeed, substantially shorter), given that it would be a decision being made after the Court has already accepted the indictment and the defendant is actually on trial (and, potentially, subject to pre-trial sanction). I don't think a defendant should be languishing for 30 days, potentially mid-trial, for the decision to be made. I would think that somewhere in the range of 7-14 more appropriate.

I do remain of the view that there should be express recognition of the Court's jurisdiction to determine the meaning of the law. There are cases where the Court is making such determinations rather than addressing particular unlawful action (as noted with the Fraud review) and I think those cases are of assistance.
Maybe it’s the hour, but I’m not quite sure what you mean in your first paragraph. I assume you’re speaking about the time after the case is dropped, not the time for confirming prosecutors. If so, that language is identitical to what we have now. The only new time period suggested was regarding confirmations. This is why I’m somewhat confused by the critique, I suppose you’re not on board with existing law then either. I would be willing to give that another look.

I continue to be of the opinion that what you’re concerned is missing isn’t actually missing, and consistent with what is drafted here. But maybe others agree. I hope to hear from them soon, I would not be opposed to extending this debate if we must, especially considering everything else going on in the RA right now.
 
I gave some thought to what you said @Zyvetskistaahn and agree there is a distinction between status quo and adopting the complainant prosecution language in this bill. Dropping the case is different from never taking it up in the first place. Consequently, I have altered the time for a complainant to decide to prosecute a case themselves to 14 days.

@Deropia the version in post #102 is what I would have brought to a vote.
 
Thank you, @Pallaith.

Formal debate has ended and no further modifications to the text of this proposal are permitted. A vote on the AGORA Act, as found in post #102 of this thread, is scheduled to begin in 48 hours. The vote will begin (time=1581868800) in your time zone.
 
I have voted in favour of the Bill, though it seems plain at this point that it will not succeed. I think that it is, in general, a welcome reform and I think that the arguments as to RA control are not as strong as they first appear, when set against the tendency towards a lack of interest in the position of Attorney General; I do continue to have misgivings as to the change in terms of the Court's jurisdiction, however.
 
While I agree with your point on the need of a reform, the "delegate appointed" prosecutors do aim to a break in the division on powers and a grab of the Executive power, in my honest opinion, over the Juditial Power. A reform could be granted without the need of dissolving the AG office, and instead of giving the power to the Delegacy, give it to the Attorney General, who would then appoint the prosecution like said in the act, just that instead of the Executive Power handling it, it's an independent system and organ, the AG, which main goal is, as we know , to represent The North Pacific's "state". We have to bear in mind that the Delegacy position has a huge political weight within the region, and the possibility of the use of the monopolization of the prosecution could be use to their advantage to avoid further prosecutions if those come to a rise.
I do hope what I say is understood.
 
While I agree with your point on the need of a reform, the "delegate appointed" prosecutors do aim to a break in the division on powers and a grab of the Executive power, in my honest opinion, over the Juditial Power. A reform could be granted without the need of dissolving the AG office, and instead of giving the power to the Delegacy, give it to the Attorney General, who would then appoint the prosecution like said in the act, just that instead of the Executive Power handling it, it's an independent system and organ, the AG, which main goal is, as we know , to represent The North Pacific's "state". We have to bear in mind that the Delegacy position has a huge political weight within the region, and the possibility of the use of the monopolization of the prosecution could be use to their advantage to avoid further prosecutions if those come to a rise.
I do hope what I say is understood.
It wouldn’t make much sense to have an AG office just to appoint prosecutors for cases, not to mention the AG already does that in the form of assigning deputies to cases when they elect to do that.

The whole point of RA confirmation is to prevent the appointment from purely being in the delegate’s hands. I don’t see how it’s fair to suggest this imbalances things in the delegate’s favor if the RA can serve as a check on the delegate. This proposal maintains separation of powers and checks. I will remind you the AG is also an executive office and is only accountable for its decisions through elections or possible recall, remedies that also work on the delegate.
 
While I agree with your point on the need of a reform, the "delegate appointed" prosecutors do aim to a break in the division on powers and a grab of the Executive power, in my honest opinion, over the Juditial Power. A reform could be granted without the need of dissolving the AG office, and instead of giving the power to the Delegacy, give it to the Attorney General, who would then appoint the prosecution like said in the act, just that instead of the Executive Power handling it, it's an independent system and organ, the AG, which main goal is, as we know , to represent The North Pacific's "state". We have to bear in mind that the Delegacy position has a huge political weight within the region, and the possibility of the use of the monopolization of the prosecution could be use to their advantage to avoid further prosecutions if those come to a rise.
I do hope what I say is understood.

This doesn’t really make sense when viewed against the contents of the bill and what this proposal actually does. Ultimately if there was more interest in serving as Attorney General and by extension more competence, this bill would not be necessary. As it stands, there tends to be neither and so I feel that this proposal is a necessary reform.
 
Considering that some people indicated they wanted to see certain changes made to the bill, changes that were implemented, and then proceeded to vote against anyway, I am even more interested in hearing what other aspects of this bill were ultimately concerning enough that they could not provide their support. I understand there is a fundamental disagreement as to whether or not the AG should be abolished in the first place, and no matter what changes are done this bill will always be problematic to them, but it was not always clear when someone was seeking to improve the bill despite intending to oppose it at the end, or when someone was seeking improvements so that they could support it.

In general there wasn’t nearly as much feedback as there should have been given the way the vote is turning out. My frequent and responsive posts may not have been enough of a signal that I did make every effort to accommodate and address the concerns of those considering the bill, but I remain committed to that effort. If this bill wasn’t good enough, I ask that you share why and perhaps another version can be crafted that would suit you better. I have always appreciated the caliber of debate the RA is capable of, and continue to invite more of it.
 
As it stands now, very few people seem to want to be THO's much less defense attorneys. I doubt it would be any different with prosecuting attorneys. I would like to see the bar be put in place and populated before we abolish the AG.
 
I do believe we still intend to pursue qualifications for prosecutors, but I believe the discussion started to lean toward having standards developed by the Court for that. And if that’s the case, it could easily be done right now (obviously for defense attorneys) or in the event this bill or one similar were to pass (for prosecutors).

Serving as a defense attorney is a very different animal than serving as a prosecutor. One could argue we see the same lack of volunteers even in our AG elections. I don’t really see us switching from that to this making a huge difference where that is concerned. However I can easily see why more capable individuals would be willing to step up to prosecute given they wouldn’t be responsible for an office for 4 months that may not ever have a single case. Deciding to do that is very different from deciding to run for AG.
 
I simply can not agree to the people losing part of their voice in government, simply on the argument that “qualified experts” can pick it for us.
 
I simply can not agree to the people losing part of their voice in government, simply on the argument that “qualified experts” can pick it for us.
I don’t understand this claim. The RA has to confirm the delegate’s pick for prosecutor. Qualified experts is in quotes but it is not part of this bill. Aside from a digression about standards for prosecutors and a possible bar, something that would not be part of this bill, I’m not sure where this idea is coming from.

It was important to everyone who actually bothered to participate in the debate that checks and balances be maintained since there would no longer be an elected prosecutor. I took pains to preserve those checks and balances, and you can see that in this thread. Your assertion is simply false and a very uncharitable read of what we’re trying to do with this bill. I certainly hope that this misconception isn’t what is driving many of you to oppose this bill, because your fears are unfounded.
 
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