Ruling of the Court of The North Pacific
In regards to the judicial inquiry filed by Siwale on the Speaker's Power to Extend Voting Periods.
Opinion drafted by Zyvetskistaahn, joined by MacSalterson and Yalkan
The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by Siwale.
The Court took into consideration the legal briefs filed by Siwale, Owenstacey, and Guy.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Constitution of The North Pacific:
Article 2. The Regional Assembly:
8. The Speaker will administer the rules of the Regional Assembly. Where no rules exist, the Speaker may use their discretion.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:
Section 6.3: Voting:
16. The number of votes required to achieve quorum for any legislative vote is equal to one third of the number of citizens who have voted in at least one of the three most recent legislative votes. A legislative vote is a vote of the Regional Assembly to enact, amend or repeal laws.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Rules of the Regional Assembly of The North Pacific:
Section 2. Voting:
3. The Speaker will, at the beginning of a vote of the Regional Assembly, decide its duration as permitted by law.
4. If a number of citizens equal to or exceeding one third of the number of votes required to achieve quorum for any legislative vote object to the duration of a vote of the Regional Assembly decided by the Speaker before the conclusion of the vote, then that vote will last for the maximum duration permitted by law.
5. If at the conclusion of a vote quorum has not been achieved, then the Speaker may extend the duration of the vote to the maximum permitted by law.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its Ruling on the Speaker's Power to End Debate:
With that decided, the Court would take this opportunity to comment more broadly on the powers of the Speaker. Under the aforementioned Constitutional clause, the Speaker is granted broad discretion, where no rules exist, to administer the Regional Assembly as he or she sees fit. Under the Bill of Rights segment also mentioned previously, the Court believes that all government officials are obligated by law to act in good faith in discharging their duties. The Court believes that the Speaker does possess the right to unilaterally table proposals, if their continued debate is not reasonably in the best interests of the region. The Constitution grants this discretion, and the Bill of Rights in effect obligates the Speaker to exercise said discretion if he or she feels it is appropriate. If the Nations of The North Pacific disagree, the procedure for Recall is quite clear, and as has been demonstrated over the past few months, is quite accessible. Legal review of the Speaker's discretionary decisions is not, generally speaking, necessary.
The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of its Ruling on the Use of the Speaker's Power to End Debate:
The Constitution establishes that the Regional Assembly has the authority to create the rules for its governance, and that it is the duty of the Speaker to administer those rules. Where there is vagueness as to procedure, or when situations arise which are not covered by those rules, or by superseding ones within the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights, the Speaker is empowered to act as they see fit within the best interests of the region. Previous Courts have interpreted this power broadly, upholding the Speaker's broad authority to maintain an appropriate atmosphere, promote a productive use of the Regional Assembly, and block proposals and votes which they deem harmful. While the relevant law has changed since the previous decision, prompting us to take this case, upon investigation the underlying principles have not.
The Court opines the following:
The Constitution provides for the Regional Assembly to make rules dealing with its proceedings. It further empowers the Speaker to take broad discretionary action where no rules exist.
The Regional Assembly has chosen to make rules in relation to the timing of votes. Those rules empower the Speaker to, at the beginning of a vote, decide the length of the vote and, at the end of it, to extend its length if it would be inquorate at the originally scheduled conclusion. They also provide citizens with a mechanism to extend the vote to the maximum duration.
It has not been argued before the Court that the Speaker was using their power under the rules to extend the vote. It has been argued, however, that if such a use was claimed, it would have been without the scope of the power. The Court accepts that this power was not exercised and that, had it been purported to have been exercised, it would have been unlawful. The power under the rules cannot be used prior to the conclusion of the vote and, in any event, the votes in question appear to have been quorate at the time the extension was made.
The Speaker has submitted that there exists a discretionary power under the Constitution to extend the duration of a vote and that the rules do not exclude the existence of such a power. The Court, in considering this proposition, is cognisant of its prior rulings on the nature of the Speaker's discretionary power: that it is a broad one; and that it is not limited strictly to occasions where no rules cover a matter, but extends to addressing vagueness in adopted rules. However, the Court does not agree that the rules permit the existence of a power of the kind the Speaker contends.
Clause 3 of the relevant Section of the rules provides for the Speaker to set the duration of the vote at its beginning, this serves to exclude the discretion of the Speaker in altering the duration of a vote. To hold that there exists a general discretion to extend a voting period during the voting period would rob this rule of a significant part of its force, effectively permitting a different period to be set after the beginning of a vote. Further, Clause 5 of the Section provides reason to think that the discretion is excluded: if Clause 3 was meant to leave intact a discretionary power to extend a vote in any circumstance, there would be no need to include an express discretion in relation to inquorate votes and Clause 5 would be rendered mere surplusage.
Where the rules cover a matter it is not necessary for them to expressly exclude the Speaker's discretion, for the discretion exists only where the rules are absent or sufficiently vague as to leave room for discretionary action. This Section is comprehensive and it does not contain a vagueness within which the Speaker's actions can be said to have fit, thus, its exclusion of a discretion to alter voting periods outside of its terms is total. The Court must conclude, therefore, that the extension was unlawful as there was no power to extend the voting period at the time the extension was made.
Turning to the remedy that the Court is to prescribe, the Court is mindful of the need to impress the importance of adherence to properly established procedure and to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, legal certainty. The delay inherent to the processes of the Court has, unfortunately, led to considerable uncertainty around a number of issues and ordering a count as though the conditions at the originally scheduled close remained true is likely to be of greater logistical difficulty for the Speaker than alternative remedies. Therefore, the Court concludes that the more certain remedy of voiding the impugned votes is the course that ought to be followed.
Accordingly, the votes on the Citizenship Security Evaluations Amendment and the motion to Admit Kasch to the Security Council are voided and the Speaker must commence fresh votes in relation to each of those matters.
