Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
In as much as the forum software considers the full text with all the spoilered quotations of the prior decisions involved to be too long, for the moment, I am going to divide those materials into a second post, and we can discuss what to do about that (Link only or post them as an a separately posted appendix.(
The Court took into consideration the Request for Review filed here by Silly String.
The Court took into consideration the following:
[Material in Appendix (next post)]
A. Bill of Rights, Clause 9
B. Legal Code, Section 6.7, Clauses 36 to 45, and in particular, Clause 37
C. Court Rules, Chapter 2
D. Court Rules, Chapter 4
E. Court Rulings (the numbers refer to the opinion numbers in the indexed list of decisions as maintained in the legal documents area of the official forums, including:
(1) Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as made on 6 August 2010
(2) Ruling Index Number 1. In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Tim on the Attorney General Refusing to bring Trials to the Court; Ruling delivered on September 15th 2012.
(3) Ruling Index Number 3. In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Unibot on Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, Ruling delivered on October 22nd 2012, and concerning opinion on Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as made on 6 August 2010:
(4) Ruling Index Number 17. Advisory Opinion of the Court of the North PacificIn regards to the events occurring in the course of The North Pacific v. Unibot; Advisory Opinion delivered on February 12th 2013.) (No reference to opinion of September 15, 2012.)
(5) Ruling Index Number 19. Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers (Ruling delivered on February 20th 2013.)
(6) Ruling Index Number 25. Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by flemingovia on the definition of “affected party” (Ruling delivered on April 22nd 2013.)
Opinion of the Court by Justice Grosseschnauzer; Chief Justice Severisen joins Justice Grosseschnauzer as to the holdings of part one of the Opinion, and Justice Kialga would find that the petitioner has failed to allege a sufficient conflict and therefore, does not have proper standing under the prior standard for an "affected party." As to part two of the Opinion, Justice Grosseschnauzer and Chief Justice Severisen concur that Ruling Index Number One is a nonbinding opinion, but differ as to whether Ruling Index Number 1 should be stricken or nullified. Justice Kialga would not reach the issues addressed in Part 2 of the Opinion.
The Court's Opinion and Ruling is as follows:
In this request, the Court is presented with a heretofore unseen type of request for review to strike a prior decision of the Court on the grounds that subsequent legislation has superseded that decision. In order to reach the merits of the request by the petitioner, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, it is necessary to determine several prerequisite questions, and in reaching those determinations, it is necessary that this Court reconcile some of its past decisions and Court Rules with the Governing Documents of TNP (i.e., the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Legal Code) which appear to be in conflict.
For the purposes of this Opinion, we organize the questions to be determined into two parts:
1. Does the petitioner have "standing" to bring this request for review as an "affected party" or otherwise?
2. Is the subject matter of the request for review appropriate for consideration of a governmental action in this proceeding?
As will be explained below, the summary of the Court's holding in this proceeding is as follows:
* We find that a party may have a directly or indirectly affected interest to support their standing to present a request for review based upon Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, and under this finding, the petitioner has standing to bring this proceeding;
*We find that Clause 37 of Section 6.7 of the Legal Code is facially ambiguous and is unclear as to what standing is conferred on the Attorney General.
* We find that Ruling Index Number 3 was incorrect in overruling the portion of the Court's 2010 Opinion on Residency and Forum Administration, and reinstate the 2010 opinion on the question of residency, and thereby reconcile Court precedent on providing judicially crafted definition of terms in the absence of legislation, although legislation by the Regional Assembly is the preferred means of defining all such terms.[note 1];
* We find that Ruling Index Number 1 had no binding effect by the actual language used in that Opinion and that not having any binding effect, it should be overruled and rescinded;
* We find that under the Ex Post Facto provision of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights ("No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law....") an opinion of the Court cannot be made binding retroactively; and
* We find that having determined that such Ruling Index Number 1 as not having any language consistent with binding effect, the request of the Petitioner is dismissed.
Discussion:
1. Does the petitioner have "standing" to bring this request for review as an "affected party" or otherwise?
Petitioner appears to base their right to bring this request for review on the language contained in Clause 37 of Section 6.7 of the Legal Code. ("The Attorney General shall have standing in all cases of judicial review brought before the Court.") That Clause, however, is ambiguous inasmuch as it refers to "standing" which is not defined in any of the Governing Documents of TNP, nor in the Court Rules, nor in prior decisions of the Court; and further, the Clause is facially ambiguous as to whether the "standing" is in respect of the right to participate in the request for review proceeding, or whether it is in respect of the right to initiate a request for review.
The Court has previously utilized an "affected party" approach to delineate "standing" in a request for review. (See Ruling Index Number 25; Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by flemingovia on the definition of "affected party"; Ruling delivered on April 22nd 2013.) This decision is further implemented in a template form to submit Requests for Review to the Court.
It is important to note that while precedent is an important and necessary element to the rule of law, it is also important that the Court’s use of precedent be based on the Governing Documents of the Region, and that when the Court fabricates principles and terms of use that are not expressly created and defined in those Governing Documents, it can lead to a more limited approach to the application of those Governing Documents than ought to be intended.
The terms "standing" and "affected party" are both terms of use that are nowhere defined in the Governing Documents of the Region. "Standing," as noted above is used only once in any of those documents, and the term is not otherwise defined in them. Likewise, the definition of an "affected party" is a term of use created by the Court without any definition for that terminology appearing in the Governing Documents of the Region other than a statement in Section 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution. Thus, this places the use of both terms roughly in the same footing that a prior Court found constitutionally deficient as to the term "resident" in its ruling of Ruling Index Number 3; In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Unibot on Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, Ruling delivered on October 22nd 2012, Concerning Opinion on Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as made on 6 August 2010.
It has to be noted that Chapter 2 of the Court Rules with respect to Requests for Review, Clause 1, states in pertinent part that "Anyone may submit a request to the Court for a review of government policy or law. It is not limited to any particular set of persons who may be an "affected party"...." (Emphasis added.) The above quoted provisions of the Constitution and the Legal Code with respect to request for review proceedings has to be read in the context of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights which states in pertinent part, "Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, there is a fundamental tension between prior Court decisions, the Governing Documents of the Region, and the current Court Rules as to whether the previously adopted judicial definition of an "affected party" has been too narrowly defined given the language of Chapter 2 of the Court Rules and Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights.
We are faced with two opposing options in order to reconcile these conflicting authorities. If the Court is to provide judicially crafted definitions to terms adopted in the Governing Documents or by the Court, then the action of the Court to nullify the definition of "resident" in the 2010 Opinion was incorrect and needs to be overruled. On the other hand, if that 2010 decision is valid, then it was inappropriate for the Court to fabricate definitions for terms used in the Governing Documents that for which the Regional Assembly did not provide a definition, and it should have looked only to the Regional Assembly to provide any and all such definitions.
The weight of precedent in the Court's previous decisions appear to be that the action of the Court to strike the definition of residency was in error. A careful reading of the 2010 decision on Residency and Forum Administration makes clear that the use of "resident" was a label to represent a specifically described set of factual circumstances of which nations were and should be considered part of TNP, and the 2010 opinion made that clear. (While the use of nations to visit a region to post recruitment advertisements on the in-game regional message boards still remain possible, the advent of the power of message suppression by the Delegate in-game has made that option all but obsolete.) The action of the Court in Ruling Index Number 3 to the contrary was based upon a misreading of the 2010 opinion, and was erroneous. Accordingly the discussion of which nations are resident in TNP from the 2010 opinion is reinstated, and consistent with the Court's later practices in discussing "standing" and "affected party." (The Court notes that this conclusion was initially reached in this Opinion before the enactment of the recently adopted "Voting Rights Act," although the terminology of "resident" and "citizen" that has now been adopted by the Regional Assembly would not be inconsistent with the underlying framework of the 2010 Opinion on Residency and Administration and of generally accepted practice within TNP and the official forums prior to enactment of the "Voting Rights Act.")
We now turn to whether or not the term "affected party" has been too narrowly defined by the Court in prior decisions, and in deciding whether a party that has filed a request for review has a sufficient level of being "affected" so as to have standing. Based upon those prior actions by the Court, the petitioner here would not have a sufficient nexus to claim a status of an "affected party."
However, as noted earlier, the language of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, coupled with Chapter 2 of the Court Rules on requests for review proceedings, suggest that the standard previously used by the Court is too narrow, and thus inconsistent with these two authorities as to the scope of who is an "affected party." Nowhere in the Governing Documents has an intent been shown to allow such a narrow view of an "affected party." The language of Clause 9 that each Nation in TNP "is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency," clearly evinces an unmistakable intent that the right to seek a review of governmental action is based upon this language of Clause 9.
If one labels the prior standard of "affected party" that the Court has been using as a "directly" affected party, then the scope of who may bring a request for review proceeding as to governmental action not included in that standard would be as "indirectly" affected parties, who have no less of a right to seek such review as a party than those who are more directly affected. Thus, a request for review by a member of the Regional Assembly (as it was defined prior to enactment of the Voting Rights Act, which is now a "citizen" who participates in the Regional Assembly) and who may be seeking such a review with a view towards possible legislation has just as much a right to be treated as an "affected party" under Clause 9 as a citizen who claims a personal right or interest that is impaired by some governmental act. (And this is consistent with the provision in Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights that "nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution.") (Emphasis added.) Therefore, with this broader standard in mind, the petitioner here, as a representative of the Attorney General, would not only have standing to participate in a review proceeding, the petitioner would have standing to file a request for review even though they are an indirectly affected party.
Accordingly, we conclude that based upon the foregoing, the petitioner has standing to bring this request for review proceeding, and that the broader standard announced here is required under Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights and must prevail in determining who may file a request for review.
2. Is the subject matter of the request for review appropriate for consideration of a governmental action in this proceeding?
The question here basically comes down to whether a prior court decision was binding upon any party, and whether the effect of such action, if any, has been superseded by legislation since adopted by the Regional Assembly.
The petitioner seeks to have stricken the language of Ruling Index Number 1 on the grounds that its effect is in conflict with subsequent legislation concerning the duties of the Attorney General as "the chief prosecutor" of the region. At the time Ruling Index Number 1 was issued, there was a lack of clarity as to whether the Attorney General could use their discretion in deciding what criminal cases would be filed with the Court, and whether the Attorney General could use their own judgment as to the appropriateness of whether a complaint filed with the Attorney General should be presented to the Court in an indictment or could dismiss the case before any filing was made with the Court.
It is uncertain to a heightened degree whether the language of that opinion imposed anything binding on the Attorney General; the choice of words used in Ruling Index Number 1 are not binding in their nature, and there was nothing in the opinion that showed a basis in the Governing Documents that supported the idea that the Court was basing its opinion on the then existing law in any of the Governing Documents, and not a mere expression of its belief and recommendation.
This can be compared to the way Ruling Index Number 17 on essentially the same topic was drafted and the reasoning that was used in that later opinion. The later opinion made reference to specific provisions of the Governing Documents; and most importantly, the Court never made reference to or even cited Ruling Index Number 1 in its decision. That certainly tends to support a conclusion that Ruling Index Number 1 had, and has, no binding effect and that there is no conflict for the petitioner in this proceeding between that opinion and the provisions in the Governing Documents as they currently stand enacted by the Regional Assembly.
In addition, the Ex Post Facto provision of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights ("No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law....") would also point towards a conclusion that an opinion of the Court issued prior to the review opinions of the Court on the topic of the binding effect of its opinions cannot be made binding retroactively.
Inasmuch as the Court, in Ruling Index Number 1, did not purport to base its opinion on the Governing Documents of TNP, and at a minimum did not seek to have the the Regional Assembly enact legislation to clarify what was meant by the term "chief prosecutor" in terms of the duties of the office of the Attorney General at that time. Ruling Index Number 1 is merely a nonbinding document expressing an opinion of the Court as to what it thought the duties of the Attorney General and the Court might be, and had and has no binding effect. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ruling Index Number 1 should be rescinded, and that it is unnecessary for the Court to grant the petitioner's request to strike the opinion.
(We note that we do not decide in this proceeding either the status or the effect of Ruling Index Number 17 or whether the Attorney General may bring requests for review to strike any alleged superseded opinion of this Court; we merely cite to that opinion to show the lack of effect and status that Court showed with respect to Ruling Index Number 1 and that the failure of that Court to make any reference to Ruling Index Number 1 underscores that lack of binding effect of that opinion. Because we do not decide on the purported merits on the Petitioner's request to strike as presented, we reserve decision on that question to a later time when the issue is directly presented for decision.)
Accordingly, listed opinion number 1 is RESCINDED (either by nullification or by striking its language), and the request to strike Ruling Index Number 1 on the grounds of a conflict is DENIED as moot.
[note 1] -- The Court notes the adoption of the "Voting Rights Act," and that a legislatively adopted definition supersedes a prior judicial definition not founded on a definition in the Governing Documents of TNP.
Code:
[center][img]http://www.thenorthpacific.org/images/court-seal.png[/img][/center]
[center][b][big][big][u]Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific[/u][/big][/big][/b][/center][center][i]In regards to the Request for Review filed by Silly String on behalf of the Attorney General on the Court's Ruling issued on September 15, 2012 (Ruling Index Number 1)[/i][/center]
The Court took into consideration the Request for Review filed here by Silly String.
The Court took into consideration the following:
[Material in Appendix (next post)]
A. Bill of Rights, Clause 9
B. Legal Code, Section 6.7, Clauses 36 to 45, and in particular, Clause 37
C. Court Rules, Chapter 2
D. Court Rules, Chapter 4
E. Court Rulings (the numbers refer to the opinion numbers in the indexed list of decisions as maintained in the legal documents area of the official forums, including:
(1) Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as made on 6 August 2010
(2) Ruling Index Number 1. In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Tim on the Attorney General Refusing to bring Trials to the Court; Ruling delivered on September 15th 2012.
(3) Ruling Index Number 3. In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Unibot on Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, Ruling delivered on October 22nd 2012, and concerning opinion on Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as made on 6 August 2010:
(4) Ruling Index Number 17. Advisory Opinion of the Court of the North PacificIn regards to the events occurring in the course of The North Pacific v. Unibot; Advisory Opinion delivered on February 12th 2013.) (No reference to opinion of September 15, 2012.)
(5) Ruling Index Number 19. Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers (Ruling delivered on February 20th 2013.)
(6) Ruling Index Number 25. Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by flemingovia on the definition of “affected party” (Ruling delivered on April 22nd 2013.)
Opinion of the Court by Justice Grosseschnauzer; Chief Justice Severisen joins Justice Grosseschnauzer as to the holdings of part one of the Opinion, and Justice Kialga would find that the petitioner has failed to allege a sufficient conflict and therefore, does not have proper standing under the prior standard for an "affected party." As to part two of the Opinion, Justice Grosseschnauzer and Chief Justice Severisen concur that Ruling Index Number One is a nonbinding opinion, but differ as to whether Ruling Index Number 1 should be stricken or nullified. Justice Kialga would not reach the issues addressed in Part 2 of the Opinion.
The Court's Opinion and Ruling is as follows:
In this request, the Court is presented with a heretofore unseen type of request for review to strike a prior decision of the Court on the grounds that subsequent legislation has superseded that decision. In order to reach the merits of the request by the petitioner, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, it is necessary to determine several prerequisite questions, and in reaching those determinations, it is necessary that this Court reconcile some of its past decisions and Court Rules with the Governing Documents of TNP (i.e., the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Legal Code) which appear to be in conflict.
For the purposes of this Opinion, we organize the questions to be determined into two parts:
1. Does the petitioner have "standing" to bring this request for review as an "affected party" or otherwise?
2. Is the subject matter of the request for review appropriate for consideration of a governmental action in this proceeding?
As will be explained below, the summary of the Court's holding in this proceeding is as follows:
* We find that a party may have a directly or indirectly affected interest to support their standing to present a request for review based upon Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, and under this finding, the petitioner has standing to bring this proceeding;
*We find that Clause 37 of Section 6.7 of the Legal Code is facially ambiguous and is unclear as to what standing is conferred on the Attorney General.
* We find that Ruling Index Number 3 was incorrect in overruling the portion of the Court's 2010 Opinion on Residency and Forum Administration, and reinstate the 2010 opinion on the question of residency, and thereby reconcile Court precedent on providing judicially crafted definition of terms in the absence of legislation, although legislation by the Regional Assembly is the preferred means of defining all such terms.[note 1];
* We find that Ruling Index Number 1 had no binding effect by the actual language used in that Opinion and that not having any binding effect, it should be overruled and rescinded;
* We find that under the Ex Post Facto provision of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights ("No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law....") an opinion of the Court cannot be made binding retroactively; and
* We find that having determined that such Ruling Index Number 1 as not having any language consistent with binding effect, the request of the Petitioner is dismissed.
Discussion:
1. Does the petitioner have "standing" to bring this request for review as an "affected party" or otherwise?
Petitioner appears to base their right to bring this request for review on the language contained in Clause 37 of Section 6.7 of the Legal Code. ("The Attorney General shall have standing in all cases of judicial review brought before the Court.") That Clause, however, is ambiguous inasmuch as it refers to "standing" which is not defined in any of the Governing Documents of TNP, nor in the Court Rules, nor in prior decisions of the Court; and further, the Clause is facially ambiguous as to whether the "standing" is in respect of the right to participate in the request for review proceeding, or whether it is in respect of the right to initiate a request for review.
The Court has previously utilized an "affected party" approach to delineate "standing" in a request for review. (See Ruling Index Number 25; Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by flemingovia on the definition of "affected party"; Ruling delivered on April 22nd 2013.) This decision is further implemented in a template form to submit Requests for Review to the Court.
It is important to note that while precedent is an important and necessary element to the rule of law, it is also important that the Court’s use of precedent be based on the Governing Documents of the Region, and that when the Court fabricates principles and terms of use that are not expressly created and defined in those Governing Documents, it can lead to a more limited approach to the application of those Governing Documents than ought to be intended.
The terms "standing" and "affected party" are both terms of use that are nowhere defined in the Governing Documents of the Region. "Standing," as noted above is used only once in any of those documents, and the term is not otherwise defined in them. Likewise, the definition of an "affected party" is a term of use created by the Court without any definition for that terminology appearing in the Governing Documents of the Region other than a statement in Section 1 of Article 5 of the Constitution. Thus, this places the use of both terms roughly in the same footing that a prior Court found constitutionally deficient as to the term "resident" in its ruling of Ruling Index Number 3; In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Unibot on Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, Ruling delivered on October 22nd 2012, Concerning Opinion on Ruling on Residency and Forum Administration as made on 6 August 2010.
It has to be noted that Chapter 2 of the Court Rules with respect to Requests for Review, Clause 1, states in pertinent part that "Anyone may submit a request to the Court for a review of government policy or law. It is not limited to any particular set of persons who may be an "affected party"...." (Emphasis added.) The above quoted provisions of the Constitution and the Legal Code with respect to request for review proceedings has to be read in the context of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights which states in pertinent part, "Each Nation in The North Pacific is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency. No action by the governmental authorities of the region shall deny to any Nation of The North Pacific, due process of law, including prior notice and the opportunity to be heard, nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, there is a fundamental tension between prior Court decisions, the Governing Documents of the Region, and the current Court Rules as to whether the previously adopted judicial definition of an "affected party" has been too narrowly defined given the language of Chapter 2 of the Court Rules and Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights.
We are faced with two opposing options in order to reconcile these conflicting authorities. If the Court is to provide judicially crafted definitions to terms adopted in the Governing Documents or by the Court, then the action of the Court to nullify the definition of "resident" in the 2010 Opinion was incorrect and needs to be overruled. On the other hand, if that 2010 decision is valid, then it was inappropriate for the Court to fabricate definitions for terms used in the Governing Documents that for which the Regional Assembly did not provide a definition, and it should have looked only to the Regional Assembly to provide any and all such definitions.
The weight of precedent in the Court's previous decisions appear to be that the action of the Court to strike the definition of residency was in error. A careful reading of the 2010 decision on Residency and Forum Administration makes clear that the use of "resident" was a label to represent a specifically described set of factual circumstances of which nations were and should be considered part of TNP, and the 2010 opinion made that clear. (While the use of nations to visit a region to post recruitment advertisements on the in-game regional message boards still remain possible, the advent of the power of message suppression by the Delegate in-game has made that option all but obsolete.) The action of the Court in Ruling Index Number 3 to the contrary was based upon a misreading of the 2010 opinion, and was erroneous. Accordingly the discussion of which nations are resident in TNP from the 2010 opinion is reinstated, and consistent with the Court's later practices in discussing "standing" and "affected party." (The Court notes that this conclusion was initially reached in this Opinion before the enactment of the recently adopted "Voting Rights Act," although the terminology of "resident" and "citizen" that has now been adopted by the Regional Assembly would not be inconsistent with the underlying framework of the 2010 Opinion on Residency and Administration and of generally accepted practice within TNP and the official forums prior to enactment of the "Voting Rights Act.")
We now turn to whether or not the term "affected party" has been too narrowly defined by the Court in prior decisions, and in deciding whether a party that has filed a request for review has a sufficient level of being "affected" so as to have standing. Based upon those prior actions by the Court, the petitioner here would not have a sufficient nexus to claim a status of an "affected party."
However, as noted earlier, the language of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights, coupled with Chapter 2 of the Court Rules on requests for review proceedings, suggest that the standard previously used by the Court is too narrow, and thus inconsistent with these two authorities as to the scope of who is an "affected party." Nowhere in the Governing Documents has an intent been shown to allow such a narrow view of an "affected party." The language of Clause 9 that each Nation in TNP "is guaranteed the organization and operation of the governmental authorities of the region on fundamental principles of democracy, accountability, and transparency," clearly evinces an unmistakable intent that the right to seek a review of governmental action is based upon this language of Clause 9.
If one labels the prior standard of "affected party" that the Court has been using as a "directly" affected party, then the scope of who may bring a request for review proceeding as to governmental action not included in that standard would be as "indirectly" affected parties, who have no less of a right to seek such review as a party than those who are more directly affected. Thus, a request for review by a member of the Regional Assembly (as it was defined prior to enactment of the Voting Rights Act, which is now a "citizen" who participates in the Regional Assembly) and who may be seeking such a review with a view towards possible legislation has just as much a right to be treated as an "affected party" under Clause 9 as a citizen who claims a personal right or interest that is impaired by some governmental act. (And this is consistent with the provision in Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights that "nor deny to any Nation of The North Pacific the equal and fair treatment and protection of the provisions of the Constitution.") (Emphasis added.) Therefore, with this broader standard in mind, the petitioner here, as a representative of the Attorney General, would not only have standing to participate in a review proceeding, the petitioner would have standing to file a request for review even though they are an indirectly affected party.
Accordingly, we conclude that based upon the foregoing, the petitioner has standing to bring this request for review proceeding, and that the broader standard announced here is required under Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights and must prevail in determining who may file a request for review.
2. Is the subject matter of the request for review appropriate for consideration of a governmental action in this proceeding?
The question here basically comes down to whether a prior court decision was binding upon any party, and whether the effect of such action, if any, has been superseded by legislation since adopted by the Regional Assembly.
The petitioner seeks to have stricken the language of Ruling Index Number 1 on the grounds that its effect is in conflict with subsequent legislation concerning the duties of the Attorney General as "the chief prosecutor" of the region. At the time Ruling Index Number 1 was issued, there was a lack of clarity as to whether the Attorney General could use their discretion in deciding what criminal cases would be filed with the Court, and whether the Attorney General could use their own judgment as to the appropriateness of whether a complaint filed with the Attorney General should be presented to the Court in an indictment or could dismiss the case before any filing was made with the Court.
It is uncertain to a heightened degree whether the language of that opinion imposed anything binding on the Attorney General; the choice of words used in Ruling Index Number 1 are not binding in their nature, and there was nothing in the opinion that showed a basis in the Governing Documents that supported the idea that the Court was basing its opinion on the then existing law in any of the Governing Documents, and not a mere expression of its belief and recommendation.
This can be compared to the way Ruling Index Number 17 on essentially the same topic was drafted and the reasoning that was used in that later opinion. The later opinion made reference to specific provisions of the Governing Documents; and most importantly, the Court never made reference to or even cited Ruling Index Number 1 in its decision. That certainly tends to support a conclusion that Ruling Index Number 1 had, and has, no binding effect and that there is no conflict for the petitioner in this proceeding between that opinion and the provisions in the Governing Documents as they currently stand enacted by the Regional Assembly.
In addition, the Ex Post Facto provision of Clause 9 of the Bill of Rights ("No governmental authority shall have power to adopt or impose an ex post facto law....") would also point towards a conclusion that an opinion of the Court issued prior to the review opinions of the Court on the topic of the binding effect of its opinions cannot be made binding retroactively.
Inasmuch as the Court, in Ruling Index Number 1, did not purport to base its opinion on the Governing Documents of TNP, and at a minimum did not seek to have the the Regional Assembly enact legislation to clarify what was meant by the term "chief prosecutor" in terms of the duties of the office of the Attorney General at that time. Ruling Index Number 1 is merely a nonbinding document expressing an opinion of the Court as to what it thought the duties of the Attorney General and the Court might be, and had and has no binding effect. Accordingly, the Court finds that Ruling Index Number 1 should be rescinded, and that it is unnecessary for the Court to grant the petitioner's request to strike the opinion.
(We note that we do not decide in this proceeding either the status or the effect of Ruling Index Number 17 or whether the Attorney General may bring requests for review to strike any alleged superseded opinion of this Court; we merely cite to that opinion to show the lack of effect and status that Court showed with respect to Ruling Index Number 1 and that the failure of that Court to make any reference to Ruling Index Number 1 underscores that lack of binding effect of that opinion. Because we do not decide on the purported merits on the Petitioner's request to strike as presented, we reserve decision on that question to a later time when the issue is directly presented for decision.)
Accordingly, listed opinion number 1 is RESCINDED (either by nullification or by striking its language), and the request to strike Ruling Index Number 1 on the grounds of a conflict is DENIED as moot.
[note 1] -- The Court notes the adoption of the "Voting Rights Act," and that a legislatively adopted definition supersedes a prior judicial definition not founded on a definition in the Governing Documents of TNP.