Item 1:
With respect to the rights of the defendant, the Bill of Rights grants a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer. The Bill of Rights further grants to each individual nation due process of law from the actions of the governmental authorities of the region, and specifically includes prior notice and the opportunity to be heard.
That is correct, I concur.
Item 2:
"Due process of law" exists to protect an individual against the illegal, unfair, or arbitrary infringement of their rights and privileges. To afford a nation its "due process" is to infringe on such rights and privileges while scrupulously following all of the laws and procedures which govern that infringement - which must themselves be passed and enacted via the appropriate legally required mechanisms - and while ensuring that the individual affected by these infringements is informed of such actions and is able, should they so choose, to contest their validity.
That is correct. I concur.
Item 3:
As Durkadurkiranistan was informed of his trial, was able to provide for his defense, and was ultimately successful in getting the charges against him dismissed, the only possible claim of a due process violation would be if the trial which resulted in the dismissal failed to be fair, impartial, and public, or if it was not conducted before a neutral and impartial judicial officer, or if it failed to be conducted according to the procedures set out by laws and regulations.
I partially disagree as it is within the purvey of a Justice to dismiss a case based upon any legitimate concern including that a Justice may dismiss in the event that the Justice believes a fair trial at that time cannot be conducted due to political pressures or inability of the Court to be able to enforce order in the Court due to lack of specific Laws and Court Rules pertaining to matter of Contempt.
The main concern is that the Law and Constitution clearly state that the CJ may use discretion where no specific rules exist in order to assure due process and fairness in the proceedings, or to dismiss the case for future Prosecutors and Courts to adjudicate.
Item 4:
It is not the responsibility of defense attorneys to ensure that their clients receive a technically factual verdict. It is their responsibility to ensure that their clients are not found guilty, and in this, they have broad leeway to make their case even where that is to the detriment of the region at large. Due process of law is an individual right - it exists collectively only in the sense that all nations possess it, and that all laws must be followed for any ensuing actions to be legally valid. In this case, the responsibility to ensure due process is held by two individuals - the Attorney General, who is obligated to reveal information that would exonerate the defendant as well as to act on behalf of the region and prosecute to the best of their ability; and the Moderating Justice, who is responsible for ensuring that procedures are properly followed and no laws are broken. The defendant, and any chosen attorneys, are responsible solely for defending their client to the best of their ability and avoiding a guilty verdict.
This is somewhat specious and factitious in the sense that since a defendant can be a collective of individuals afforded due process as a party to a trial. Were this not the case, then if five individuals were charges in what would be a conspiracy, five individual trials would have to be conducted and without any validity to connecting those five cases with the larger concept of Conspiracy.
Also, since the prosecutor represents 'The People' all cases involving the 'state' versus an individual or collective of individuals, the People as a collective are a party to Due Process as a collective since the charges brought by the 'state' against an individual are being done in the name of the People as a whole and collective.
Your view that Due Process is not also a collective right would necessarily deny the right of the Prosecuting Counsel to Due Process simply because he represents the 'state' which is in fact the collective of all individuals considered as comprising the 'state'.
It is therefore contended that since Due Process involves all parties to a trial, be they individuals or collections of individuals, each party has a right to Due Process whether they are single or plural.
Item 5:
Given that the petitioner was the Moderating Justice for the trial in question, it is (probably) reasonable to assume that the petitioner is not asserting himself to have violated the law. The petitioner is free to correct the Court on that matter if we are in error.
Respectfully, I certainly hope that this is not a threat by the court against the petitioner in order to silence this matter.
It is absolutely reasonable that the petitioner is NOT asserting himself to have violated the law.
What the petitioner contends is that the Court appears to be refusing to make clear to anyone who brings cases before this court that the Court has any authority to deal with issues of willful Contempt in the Court Room and that this matter should be settled before someone uses the Court's apparent and very real refusal to say whether or not they have the authority to maintain order in the Court in the face of contemptuous behaviour intended to prevent Due Process from being employed.
As it is now, the current Court by remaining silent on the matter of its own Authority to deal with willful acts of Contempt sets a precedent that will be applied in the future to assert that the Court indeed has absolutely no authority to deal with matters involving Contempt, and we will see a repeat of TNP v. JAL time and time again.
In the event that another indictment against JAL is approved by trial by the Court, it is almost certain that the successful tactics employed in the recent case will be so employed again with equal success should the Court remain silent on this matter.
Item 6:
Therefore the Court sees no evidence of a due process violation. Additionally, the Court rejects the notion of an individual filing a request for review on behalf of another individual, excepting lawfully appointed attorneys during the course of a criminal trial, or on matters directly related to such a trial. If Durkadurkiranistan believes his right to due process has been violated, it is his responsibility (or that of his attorneys) to file such a petition.
This matter can be rectified when the AG brings the charges against JAL again and this clarification be re-submitted once the defence is acted against by the Court for Contempt when the Court refuses to create any rules or make a determination as to the means for dealing with Contempt. The precedent that the Court does not have the authority to deal with Contempt has already been set. Unless the Court clarifies the issue of Contempt at this time, Contempt will continue to be so ambiguous as to be totally beyond the scope of the Court to deal with.
It is also the precedent that if a defendant cannot represent or refuses to represent themselves in a fashion in which they cannot or refuse to appear before the Court, the trial still goes on (vis, TNP v H&H). The same is true for JAL. You can try him even if he refuses to appear or even respond.
Under the Court's contention that a petition can be made in someone else's name without their specific permission would absolutely imply that it is improper and even illegal for the Court to try anyone in absentia by virtue of the fact that the absent party refuses to appear, cannot appear or simply laughs at the Court and denies it's authority altogether. The Court's stated position would mean that despite the fact that TNP has tried people in absentia, the Court violated the right of the Defendant to choose Counsel by the very fact that the Court has appointed Counsel for the Defence without consent of the Defendant.
Item 7:
Turning now to the questions regarding contempt, the Court declines to comment. As no law or procedure currently exists, there is no legal or constitutional validity to be challenged, nor language to be disambiguated or deconflicted. Similarly, there has been no instance of an attempt to establish contempt as an offense except that engaged in by the petitioner himself - again, the Court will assume he is not challenging the legality of his own acts and again the petitioner is free to correct us if this is an error. The Court does not engage in hypotheticals, future or otherwise.
The Petitioner contends that the Court is in error by default and inaction concerning the matter of Contempt issues:
1.) The Petitioner implores the Court to settle this matter by making a statement on the issue of Contempt so that such issue does not become a problem once again in the future.
2.) It is only out of the Petitioner's concern for the ability of the Court to deal with Contempt in an authoritative manner as a matter of its own benefit.
3.) It is the Petitioners contention and desire that the Court revise Court Rules so as to deal with Contempt or make a statement about its Authority to Deal with Contempt in a manner that will not violate the principle of
ex post facto rules or laws.
4.) It is the Petitioner's contention that it is in the best interests that the Court arrive at a definitive position on the matter of the issue of Contempt, either by rule changes or by statement of position that will and can only be applied to future cases in which Contempt becomes an issue.
5.) It is not the wish of the Petitioner to alter past events either in outcome or interpretation; it is the Petitioner's desire that the Court make a statement on the issue of Contempt, either by statement of position or by rule changes, to prevent Contempt as a means to disrupt trials and prevent Due Process as a tactic either on the part of the Defence or Prosecution.
6.) It is the Petitioner's contention that the lack of action and issuance of an opinion on the matter of Contempt only further affirms that Contempt is a legitimate tactic, and that such a precedent will undermine the Court's authority and dignity.
The Petitioner is not asking for vindication. The Petitioner is asking the Court for a firm position, preferably through Court Rule changes or Legislative Action to deal with the matter of Contempt so as to avoid unpleasantness in the future.
Either way, your decision to deny this Request for Review has set an ugly precedent in which willful Contempt is now a legitimate tactic unless you either reconsider or change the Court Rules.
Respectfully,
R.
Item 7:
The request is therefore denied, on grounds of both substance and standing - unless the petitioner wishes to correct the Court on the aforementioned assumptions.
