[Private] Kiwi Request for Clarification on "Fraud'

Well, "clarification" is essentially the same thing as "resolving ambiguity" which we are empowered to do by the constitution. This, I think is the more problematic part of the request:
Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context? If not, does the Court recommend reform?
Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation (as arguably occurred in TNP v Grosse)?
Those are not legal questions, and I don't think we should answer them.

As such, I think we ought to accept this review, with the caveat that those last two questions will not be addressed. Unless there are any objections, I will accept this in 24 hours or so.
 
Kiwi is stating in his request for a clarification on "Fraud" before he commences the next case on the docket (which essentially means if we do not give him a clarification he will put a log-jam in the legal system by not prosecuting anything, from what I gather).


Specifically, he's asking for a detailed definition of Fraud and what level of proof, etc.,,, is needed.

Want me to handle this?
 
Go ahead and create a draft - we'll revise once we've got something to work with.

EDIT: I stipulate that I will not join any opinion that includes the phrase "common law" >_>
 
Oh, I won't even think of mentioning 'Common Law'. :P



Should have a draught of the clarification in the next 24 hours.
 
OK, here's my draft of the clarification of Fraud (in as simple of a form as possible and no phrase "Common Law" in it at all. :P ).


Kiwi's request:

I would like the Court to review the fraud law. Specifically the elements required but more than that I would like the Court to delve into the mens rea of "intention" and discuss what it believes is necessary to prove an "intentional deception".

What specific elements are required to prove fraud? (In the Court's opinion)
What sort of intention is necessary to prove fraud? Is it a high (almost unattainable) level? Is oblique intention enough? Should the RA perhaps include a mens rea of "recklessness" in its definition?
Would a statement of "I believe" be enough to negate any finding of intention?
Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context? *If not, does the Court recommend reform?
Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation (as arguably occurred in TNP v Grosse)?
(This list is by no means, exhaustive)

As a hint to the current Court, I am going to have to prosecute another one of these fraud cases shortly (whether I want to or not) and I need to know a bit more than "yeah we don't think the intention is there".

So this is abundantly clear, the idea of this review is to provide a detailed "how-to" for future AGs / Defence counsel. I had hoped that TNP v Grosse may have had one positive outcome in that it achieved this but I was sadly disappointed.

Thanks for your time,

Kiwi
Attorney General
The North Pacific

Fraud in TNP Code:

Section 1.3: Fraud
11. "Election fraud" is defined as the willful deception of citizens with regards to the candidates running, the time and venue of the elections, or the requirements and methods by which one may be eligible to vote or run for office.
12. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.

First, we have to look at the definition of Fraud as is relates to Section 1.3 of The North Pacific Legal Code. In a pure sense of the word, and in keeping with the text of TNP Code pertaining to Fraud, Fraud can be concisely defined as such:

“A false representation of a matter of fact—whether by words or by conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of what should have been disclosed—that deceives and is intended to deceive another so that the individual will act upon it to her or his legal injury.”

Proving Fraud:

Fraud must be proved by showing that the defendant's actions involved five separate elements: (1) a false statement of a material fact,(2) knowledge on the part of the defendant that the statement is untrue, (3) intent on the part of the defendant to deceive the alleged victim, (4) justifiable reliance by the alleged victim on the statement, and (5) injury to the alleged victim as a result.

This specific definition of Fraud meshes exactly with the way Section 1.3 is written in terms of the wording and intent of the law in question.

The specific elements defining Fraud contain nuances that are not all easily proved.

First, not all false statements are fraudulent. In order to be fraudulent, false statements must relate to a material fact. It should also substantially affect a person's decision to pursue a certain course of action. A false statement of fact that does not bear on the specific issue (in this instance, the specific criminal charges) at hand is not considered fraudulent.

Second, the defendant must know that the statement is untrue. A statement of fact that is simply mistaken or is a mistaken perception or mistaken conclusion, is not fraudulent. To be fraudulent, a false statement must be made with intent to deceive a victim (whether an individual or group of individuals). This is the easiest element of fraud to prove, once the falsity and materiality of the false statement or statements are proved, because most material false statements are designed to mislead.

Third, the false statement must be made with the intent to deprive the victim of some legal right.

Fourth, the victim's reliance on the false statement must be reasonable. Reliance on a patently absurd false statement generally will not give rise to fraud; however, if the intended victim or victims are particularly susceptible to being defrauded and if the defendant knew and took advantage of their condition or abused their trust, then fraud can be considered to have been committed for all intents and purposes.

Finally, the false statement must cause the victim or victims some real injury that leaves him or her in a worse position or state than he or she was in before the fraud.

A statement of belief is not a statement of fact and thus is not fraudulent. Such a statement may not be true, it is not a statement of fact, and a reasonable person (presuming that person is reasonable) would not be justified in relying on it. However, the simple insertion of a disclaimer such as, “I believe” or “I think” into a deliberately misleading statement would negate the ‘statement of belief’ if the addition of such a phrase was a deliberate attempt by the defendant to avoid charges of fraud. This is where specifically mens rea might come into play in the sense of the defendant attempting to take advantage of a victim’s sense of reason or trust. Such a breach of trust could be proved, more or less, by the victim’s admission that belief in a fraudulent statement was based upon the victim’s trust in the defendent. Intention, in this context, is equally applicable in terms of on-line gaming as it is in real life. There is no reason to believe that one’s intents are any more or less relevant in on-line gaming or real life. Intent is intent in any world real or virtual in the same way that cause and effect equally apply. If intent doesn’t apply in on-line gaming, then intent is irrelevant and no crime could be committed in any circumstance were that the case (since under mens rea intent is required unless we take a purely strict liability approach which would be unwise in the sense that very little would get prosecuted because one would be required to ignore anything but a very narrow interpretation of any law and very little would ever get successfully prosecuted at all at best).

Oblique Action would be better replaced with the term Oblique Intention: the result (of an action) is a virtually certain consequence or a 'virtual certainty' of the defendant's actions, and that the defendant appreciates that such was indeed the case. Proving Oblique intent would involve making a determination that such a result of an action would be reasonably obvious to any reasonable person and that the defendant was of reasonable and rational mind.

Malice of forethought on the part of the defendant also comes onto play.

We must also take into account the element of ‘Presumption of Innocence’ as provided for in The North Pacific Bill of Rights under Article Seven thereof in proving any case:

7. When charged with criminal acts, Nations of The North Pacific shall have a fair, impartial, and public trial before a neutral and impartial judicial officer. In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence. A Nation may be represented by any counsel of the Nation's choosing. No Nation convicted of a crime shall be subject to a punishment disproportionate to that crime.

A defendant “is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence”, or, in other words, is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt


On to the element of mens rea - “guilty mind”:

As an element of criminal responsibility, a guilty mind; a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent. Guilty knowledge and wilfulness.

An act alone does not create criminal liability unless it was accompanied by a guilty state of mind, hence ‘intent’. The required amount of a ‘guilty state of mind’ would necessarily vary according to particular criminal offenses, and as such, may require that a person act knowingly, purposely, or recklessly.

The term ‘reckless’ might be defined in criminal cases, as one actions being conducted in a careless manner to the point of being heedless of the consequences (gross negligence).

In relation to the Attorney General’s specific question, “Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation?”, the answer would be specifically yes in most instances involving defamation.

Defamation may or may not be criminal insofar as it relates to being an element of Fraud. If it is part of an attempt to defraud, then it is a part of Fraud, per se, but not Fraud in and of itself as a stand-alone charge.

Defamation can be defined as “Any intentional false communication, either written or spoken, that harms a person's reputation; decreases the respect, regard, or confidence in which a person is held; or induces disparaging, hostile, or disagreeable opinions or feelings against a person.”

Defamation is properly libel or slander and is not specifically Fraud which is why defamation is called defamation and fraud is called fraud.

Essentially, you can defame someone all day long and not be guilty of a criminal offense unless that defamation is conducted as part of the act of committing fraud. Defamation alone is not a criminal issue but rather a possible contributory element to a criminal action.

Defamation standing alone only as defamation cannot be prosecuted criminally as there is no specific law that handles defamation as a specific offense covering it under TNP criminal offenses. It can, however, be handled in a Civil manner, defamation being a conflict between two essentially ‘private’ parties if the Court is willing to handle it under its constitutional ability to handle ‘civil’ matters.

In response to your question pair “Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context? If not, does the Court recommend reform?”

Suggesting legal reform, alterations and additions to the written legal code is not the purvey of the Court as such actions are constitutionally conducted by the Legislative Branch, such recommendations by the Court as an institution would be inappropriate.
 
Just a note -

We have been promising Kiwi a clarification of "Fraud" that may or may not be material to an upcoming case.

I'm going to give this a good edit in the next day or so and then, if the remainder of the Court agrees to it materially, then I will post it.

We can either decide this now or wait until COE's replacement is installed.
 
We need to address this immediately so that Kiwi can get on with a prosecution (he has been waiting for this advisory definition concerning fraud).
 
Making some suggestions and edits to Roman's draft, as well as putting it into decision form:

court-seal.png

Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Kiwi on the crime of Fraud

The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by Kiwi.

The Court took into consideration Section 1.3 of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:

Section 1.3: Fraud
11. "Election fraud" is defined as the willful deception of citizens with regards to the candidates running, the time and venue of the elections, or the requirements and methods by which one may be eligible to vote or run for office.
12. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.

The Court also took into consideration the relevant section of the Bill of Rights:

In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence.

The Court opines the following:

What specific elements are required to prove fraud?
In order to prove Election Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court two things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information to, or deliberately withheld true information from, any non-zero number of citizens about certain subjects relating to elections. Second, they must show that this information was "willful deception". It is not required that the deception accomplish, or even aim for, any beneficial or harmful effect.

In order to prove Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court three things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information, or deliberately withheld true information. Second, they must show that this information was "intentional deception". Third, they must show that the provision or withholding of this information either improved the standing of that individual, or damaged that of another.

Both crimes require that the act be one of deception, and thus it is necessary to establish what that term entails.

First, deception must refer to a matter of fact, and not a matter of opinion. This needs more elaboration to clarify what exactly matters of fact are, but the words aren't coming to me right now.

Second, deception must refer to a material fact, that is, one which can reasonably be expected to affect the audience's future actions for some benefit or harm. Third, deception must be plausible, that is, something which can reasonably be expected to be believed by the audience.

Finally, in order to commit deception, an individual must be reasonably expected to know that their statement or omission lacks truth.

What sort of intention is necessary to prove fraud? Is it a high (almost unattainable) level? Is oblique intention enough?
To start, the Court opines that "willful deception" is synonymous with "intentional deception", and that the difference in word choice does not require a different standard of proof between the two crimes.

As for the standard itself, there are two types of intention in the commission of fraud. The first is demonstrable intent, wherein the defendant can be shown, by their own statements or actions relating to the alleged crime, to have engaged in deception as defined previously in this ruling.

The second is reckless intent, wherein intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.

The Court does not find that, together, these types of intent present an unattainable bar to the prosecution, although one or the other may be out of reach for any particular case.

Should the RA perhaps include a mens rea of "recklessness" in its definition?
The Court declines to comment on hypothetical legislation which would differentiate recklessness from intent.

Would a statement of "I believe" be enough to negate any finding of intention?
To reiterate, a statement of opinion is not a statement of fact, and thus statements of opinion do not qualify as fraudulent.

However, simply prefacing a statement of fact with the words "I believe" (or another similar phrase) is not, by itself, sufficient to establish it as a statement of opinion. The critical factor is whether the statement is something which can be determined objectively, or whether it is a matter for subjective judgement.

To provide an example, the statement "Chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry ice cream" is a statement of opinion, as it is a matter of individual tastes. It has no truth value except insofar as it is a genuinely held belief. It is true for the individual asserting it. Accordingly, "I believe chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry ice cream" is an identical assertion, and is also a statement of opinion.

"Chocolate is made from potatoes", on the other hand, is a statement of fact, and can conclusively be demonstrated to be either true or false. Changing that statement to "I believe chocolate is made from potatoes" does not change the statement into one of opinion rather than fact. The belief itself, if it is genuinely believed, nevertheless has a truth value, and is therefore subject to the law.

Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context?If not, does the Court recommend reform?
The Court declines to comment on the appropriateness of constitutional laws. Suggesting legal reform, alterations and additions to the written legal code is not the purview of the Court, and such recommendations would be inappropriate.

Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation (as arguably occurred in TNP v Grosse)?
The measure of appropriateness in prosecution is the extent to which the facts of a particular case match up with elements of the criminal code. The Court declines to comment on terminology.

I took out some stuff I don't think we should comment on, like Fraud/Defamation and Mens Rea.
 
Wow. An impressive distillation and overall edit for clarity. Absolutely brilliant!

I think we can go with this exactly as you edited/re-wrote. The level of detail is most appropriate.

I especially agree with the removal of the Defamation/Fraud - Mens Rea commentary because we don't really want to say any more than is absolutely necessary.

OOC: Do you do legal work in RL? If you don't, you should because that edit of a clarification was absolutely outstanding.
 
Hehe, thanks Roman! I don't do legal work, no. I just do this kind of thing for fun. :P

Ator, any thoughts? If you approve, we can go ahead and publish it.
 
Excellent.

We do need elaboration or refinement of the statement:

First, deception must refer to a matter of fact, and not a matter of opinion.

Could simplify it and make it self-explanatory and say, "A deception must be of a material nature and not an expression of opinion."

"Material nature" should be sufficient in terms of the deception being of a factual nature - 'material nature' would cover deliberate omissions that are intended to mislead or deceive.
 
I get into "material" later, actually - use it to refer to things relevant to a particular issue, as opposed to irrelevant. But that's different from matters of fact.

In the context of an election, for example, a material matter of fact might be that a candidate has been convicted of a crime, while an immaterial matter of fact might be the dominant color of their avatar. A material opinion would be "I think that guy is a dick", and an immaterial opinion might be "Red is a nice color".

How about:

First, deception must refer to a matter of fact, and not a matter of opinion. Matters of fact have definitive truth values - that is, they can be determined to be true or false. A statement of fact asserts something as truth, as objective reality. A matter of opinion, on the other hand, has a truth value which can vary depending on the individual contemplating the issue at hand, and a statement of opinion asserts subjective truth - something which is only necessarily true for the speaker.

And then tweak the answer for the "I believe" section slightly, to read:

To reiterate, a statement of opinion is not a statement of fact, and thus statements of opinion do not qualify as fraudulent.

However, simply prefacing a statement of fact with the words "I believe" (or another similar phrase) is not, by itself, sufficient to establish it as a statement of opinion. The critical factor is and remains whether the statement is something which can be determined objectively, or whether it is a matter for subjective judgement.

To provide an example, the statement "Chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry ice cream" is a statement of opinion, as it is a matter of individual tastes not assumed to be universally true. It has no truth value whatsoever except insofar as it is a genuinely held belief, true for the individual asserting it. Prefacing this statement with "I believe" makes that implication more explicit, but the assertion is identical. They are both statements of opinion.

"Chocolate is made from potatoes", on the other hand, is a statement of fact, and can conclusively be demonstrated to be either true or false. Changing that statement to "I believe chocolate is made from potatoes" does not change the statement into one of opinion rather than fact. The belief itself, if it is genuinely believed, nevertheless has a truth value, and is therefore subject to the law.
 
Awesome! Here's the code for the updated text, which I encourage our Glorious Chief Justice (long may he reign) to post forthwith:

Code:
[center][img]http://www.thenorthpacific.org/images/court-seal.png[/img]
[b][big][big][u]Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific[/u][/big][/big][/b][/center][center][i]In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Kiwi on the crime of Fraud[/i][/center]

[b][i]The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed [url=http://forum.thenorthpacific.org/single/?p=8125465&t=7141063]here[/url] by Kiwi.[/i][/b]

[b][i]The Court took into consideration Section 1.3 of the Legal Code of the North Pacific:[/i][/b]

[quote][b]Section 1.3: Fraud[/b]
11. "Election fraud" is defined as the willful deception of citizens with regards to the candidates running, the time and venue of the elections, or the requirements and methods by which one may be eligible to vote or run for office.
12. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.[/quote]

[b][i]The Court also took into consideration the relevant section of the Bill of Rights:[/i][/b]

[quote]In any criminal proceeding, a Nation is presumed innocent unless guilt is proven to the fact finder by reasonably certain evidence.[/quote]

[b][i]The Court opines the following:[/i][/b]

[quote]What specific elements are required to prove fraud?[/quote]
In order to prove Election Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court two things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information to, or deliberately withheld true information from, any non-zero number of citizens about certain subjects relating to elections. Second, they must show that this information was "willful deception". It is not required that the deception accomplish, or even aim for, any beneficial or harmful effect.

In order to prove Fraud, a prosecutor must demonstrate to the Court three things. First, they must show that an individual provided false information, or deliberately withheld true information. Second, they must show that this information was "intentional deception". Third, they must show that the provision or withholding of this information either improved the standing of that individual, or damaged that of another.

Both crimes require that the act be one of deception, and thus it is necessary to establish what that term entails.

First, deception must refer to a matter of fact, and not a matter of opinion. Matters of fact have definitive truth values - that is, they can be determined to be true or false. A statement of fact asserts something as truth, as objective reality. A matter of opinion, on the other hand, has a truth value which can vary depending on the individual contemplating the issue at hand, and a statement of opinion asserts subjective truth - something which is only necessarily true for the speaker.

Second, deception must refer to a [i]material[/i] fact, that is, one which can reasonably be expected to affect the audience's future actions for some benefit or harm. Third, deception must be plausible, that is, something which can reasonably be expected to be believed by the audience.

Finally, in order to commit deception, an individual must be reasonably expected to know that their statement or omission lacks truth.

[quote]What sort of intention is necessary to prove fraud? Is it a high (almost unattainable) level? Is oblique intention enough?[/quote]
To start, the Court opines that "willful deception" is synonymous with "intentional deception", and that the difference in word choice does not require a different standard of proof between the two crimes.

As for the standard itself, there are two types of intention in the commission of fraud. The first is demonstrable intent, wherein the defendant can be shown, by their own statements or actions relating to the alleged crime, to have engaged in deception as defined previously in this ruling.

The second is reckless intent, wherein intent is established by argumentation on reasonable expectations. The harmful or beneficial consequence of the deception must be something a reasonable person could have expected, by which the defendant can themselves be reasonably expected to have either expected or recklessly ignored the risk of that consequence. Either is sufficient.

The Court does not find that, together, these types of intent present an unattainable bar to the prosecution, although one or the other may be out of reach for any particular case.

[quote]Should the RA perhaps include a mens rea of "recklessness" in its definition?[/quote]
The Court declines to comment on hypothetical legislation which would differentiate recklessness from intent.

[quote]Would a statement of "I believe" be enough to negate any finding of intention?[/quote]
To reiterate, a statement of opinion is not a statement of fact, and thus statements of opinion do not qualify as fraudulent.

However, simply prefacing a statement of fact with the words "I believe" (or another similar phrase) is not, by itself, sufficient to establish it as a statement of opinion. The critical factor is and remains whether the statement is something which can be determined objectively, or whether it is a matter for subjective judgement.

To provide an example, the statement "Chocolate ice cream is better than strawberry ice cream" is a statement of opinion, as it is a matter of individual tastes not assumed to be universally true. It has no truth value whatsoever except insofar as it is a genuinely held belief, true for the individual asserting it. Prefacing this statement with "I believe" makes that implication more explicit, but the assertion is identical. They are both statements of opinion.

"Chocolate is made from potatoes", on the other hand, is a statement of fact, and can conclusively be demonstrated to be either true or false. Changing that statement to "I believe chocolate is made from potatoes" does not change the statement into one of opinion rather than fact. The belief itself, if it is genuinely believed, nevertheless has a truth value, and is therefore subject to the law.

[quote]Does the Court believe that such a use of intention is appropriate in this online gaming context?If not, does the Court recommend reform?[/quote]
The Court declines to comment on the appropriateness of constitutional laws. Suggesting legal reform, alterations and additions to the written legal code is not the purview of the Court, and such recommendations would be inappropriate.

[quote]Is the fraud law inappropriate in a case of defamation (as arguably occurred in TNP v Grosse)?[/quote]
The measure of appropriateness in prosecution is the extent to which the facts of a particular case match up with elements of the criminal code. The Court declines to comment on terminology.
 
Actually, I just tried to add it to the Laws/Court Rulings section and I don't have the proper forum permissions to actually post it there. Technically, as Chief Justice, I am supposed to have access but have not been masked for that access for some odd reason.

I have made an admin request to see if I can either get access or get someone to post it for me there.
 
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