Mal, Sov, can you please confirm you can see this, so that we can begin?
[Private] Review: Special Judicial Election [Malashaan, Reginald]
- Thread starter r3naissanc3r
- Start date
Ello.
Just waiting till Mal's mask is fixed.
So, what do we need to discuss about this?
Malashaan
TNPer
Here are my initial thoughts on the state of law and issues at hand:
The Constitution states:
There is no contention in this case as to whether the positions were indeed legally vacant, so we should assume that they were, based on the common perception that they were. This requires no further inquiry. The election in question was not one of the 4 monthly ones, and so therefore is governed by whatever procedures are "established by law."
Therefore, we next turn to the legal code. There is some ambiguity as to whether the mentions of judicial elections in Section 4.3 and Section 4.5 apply to special judicial elections, or only the 4-monthly scheduled ones. Given the numerous contradictions between these sections and Section 4.6 (e.g., the times elections occur, the length of nomination period, and the length of voting period), I conclude that only section 4.6 (and the definition of a vacancy in Section 4.2: clause 8) apply.
Thus, the relevant clauses of the legal code state:
Clauses 19-21 are highly procedural, and not relevant to the current inquiry.
Clause 18 raises my first point of concern, which is closely related enough to the question at hand to consider. The use of the singular throughout implies that, in contrast to what occurred, each vacancy should be filled by its own special election. However, I see two points that act against this: 1) clause 8 says "Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election" - giving clear legal basis for multiple vacancies to be filled with a single election; and 2) TNP has a long standing tradition of Justice elections being conducted in this manner, in the absence of an explicit statement in the legal code making such elections illegal, the precedent set by tradition should stand.
Therefore, I conclude that the basic format of the elections was legal, which leads us to the ultimate question regarding the legality of vote pooling.
I note our predecessors raised the question of whether vote pooling occurred and were waiting for confirmation from the Election Commissioner. In view of the reported results, I see no need to do this. The results include only a single vote count for each candidates, clearly showing that vote pooling across positions was the method used.
The law is largely silent as to the mechanics of the voting process itself. The Constitution merely states "Justices will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a plurality vote every four months," but as I addressed earlier, this has very little to no applicability to special elections. The law regarding special elections says nothing about the voting process, other than it "will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately."
Thus, the precise nature of the voting is controlled entirely by a combination of two factors: 1) the implied authority of the election commissioner to make decisions regarding election implementation; and 2) the norms and traditions of TNP.
With regards to 1), I note that clause 6 of the legal code defines an Election Commissioner as "an individual designated to supervise a given election." The use of the term "supervise" strongly implies that such an individual has little no no authority to make rules, and must instead abide by the law and precedent already established. Therefore, the important factor in this case is 2.
With regards to norms and traditions, I again note 2 things:
1) Vote pooling is well established as the way judicial elections are conducted. I've checked the archives going back about year, and every judicial election has used this procedure.
2) While the format of the voting form used does somewhat imply that the votes for each position will be counted separately, it is by no means stated explicitly, and similar forms have been used in previous elections with no apparent confusion.
Ultimately, I believe this matter comes down to a simple determination - is a slightly confusing voting form something that can be used as the basis to invalidate an election, which certainly did not violate any written law, and was in line with the practices used in all recent elections?
My feeling at present is that any ruling that a confusing form invalidates an election would be massive judicial overreach. If there was evidence that the form was intentionally confusing in a way to influence the election, then the EC would be liable for election fraud, and we would have standing to also order the fraudulent election nullified, but that is not the question before us. The question before us is whether somebody being confused by the voting form is adequate reason to nullify an election. Unless under further examination, we can determine a deeper problem with the election, I would strenuously argue not - such a ruling would open the proverbial can-of-worms, with people suing constantly after their favored candidates lose elections claiming they didn;t understand some aspect of the election.
The Constitution states:
and
There is no contention in this case as to whether the positions were indeed legally vacant, so we should assume that they were, based on the common perception that they were. This requires no further inquiry. The election in question was not one of the 4 monthly ones, and so therefore is governed by whatever procedures are "established by law."
Therefore, we next turn to the legal code. There is some ambiguity as to whether the mentions of judicial elections in Section 4.3 and Section 4.5 apply to special judicial elections, or only the 4-monthly scheduled ones. Given the numerous contradictions between these sections and Section 4.6 (e.g., the times elections occur, the length of nomination period, and the length of voting period), I conclude that only section 4.6 (and the definition of a vacancy in Section 4.2: clause 8) apply.
Thus, the relevant clauses of the legal code state:
Clauses 19-21 are highly procedural, and not relevant to the current inquiry.
Clause 18 raises my first point of concern, which is closely related enough to the question at hand to consider. The use of the singular throughout implies that, in contrast to what occurred, each vacancy should be filled by its own special election. However, I see two points that act against this: 1) clause 8 says "Vacancies of elected offices are filled through a special election" - giving clear legal basis for multiple vacancies to be filled with a single election; and 2) TNP has a long standing tradition of Justice elections being conducted in this manner, in the absence of an explicit statement in the legal code making such elections illegal, the precedent set by tradition should stand.
Therefore, I conclude that the basic format of the elections was legal, which leads us to the ultimate question regarding the legality of vote pooling.
I note our predecessors raised the question of whether vote pooling occurred and were waiting for confirmation from the Election Commissioner. In view of the reported results, I see no need to do this. The results include only a single vote count for each candidates, clearly showing that vote pooling across positions was the method used.
The law is largely silent as to the mechanics of the voting process itself. The Constitution merely states "Justices will be elected by the Regional Assembly by a plurality vote every four months," but as I addressed earlier, this has very little to no applicability to special elections. The law regarding special elections says nothing about the voting process, other than it "will begin one day after the period for nominations or declarations has closed and last for five days, unless there is only one candidate for each vacancy in which case they will take office immediately."
Thus, the precise nature of the voting is controlled entirely by a combination of two factors: 1) the implied authority of the election commissioner to make decisions regarding election implementation; and 2) the norms and traditions of TNP.
With regards to 1), I note that clause 6 of the legal code defines an Election Commissioner as "an individual designated to supervise a given election." The use of the term "supervise" strongly implies that such an individual has little no no authority to make rules, and must instead abide by the law and precedent already established. Therefore, the important factor in this case is 2.
With regards to norms and traditions, I again note 2 things:
1) Vote pooling is well established as the way judicial elections are conducted. I've checked the archives going back about year, and every judicial election has used this procedure.
2) While the format of the voting form used does somewhat imply that the votes for each position will be counted separately, it is by no means stated explicitly, and similar forms have been used in previous elections with no apparent confusion.
Ultimately, I believe this matter comes down to a simple determination - is a slightly confusing voting form something that can be used as the basis to invalidate an election, which certainly did not violate any written law, and was in line with the practices used in all recent elections?
My feeling at present is that any ruling that a confusing form invalidates an election would be massive judicial overreach. If there was evidence that the form was intentionally confusing in a way to influence the election, then the EC would be liable for election fraud, and we would have standing to also order the fraudulent election nullified, but that is not the question before us. The question before us is whether somebody being confused by the voting form is adequate reason to nullify an election. Unless under further examination, we can determine a deeper problem with the election, I would strenuously argue not - such a ruling would open the proverbial can-of-worms, with people suing constantly after their favored candidates lose elections claiming they didn;t understand some aspect of the election.
Sorry for the delay everyone. Yesterday was busy in RL. I will first copy the general procedure I proposed to and had agreed upon by the other Justices for hearing review cases. Then, in the following post, I will write my thoughts on the case (which may take some time as I ponder the issues at hand).
I expect that all of us will jointly discuss each review, until at least the point where a decision on the matter under review that is supported by a majority is reached. Depending on how long it takes, we will also be discussing legal arguments, but for obvious practical reasons not exhaustively.
Once a decision is reached, it is customary I believe that the CJ writes the opinion in most cases. I have no problem doing that, in fact I quite enjoy writing. However, should RL time issues arise, I may be asking another Justice to do the drafting. Obviously, should I be in the minority in some case, one of you guys will need to draft the opinion.
Also, I think we should encourage a tradition where Justices in the minority submit dissenting opinions. It is not necessary to do this every time there is no unanimous decision, but I think it should be encouraged. Having a stream of dissenting opinions will, I believe, contribute considerably to the legal tradition of the region, and provide useful insights to the region and future justices into the internal workings of previous courts.
I like using google docs for NS-related drafting, as it's excellent for collaboration and makes it easy for other contributors to leave comments. Would that work for everyone?
I expect that all of us will jointly discuss each review, until at least the point where a decision on the matter under review that is supported by a majority is reached. Depending on how long it takes, we will also be discussing legal arguments, but for obvious practical reasons not exhaustively.
Once a decision is reached, it is customary I believe that the CJ writes the opinion in most cases. I have no problem doing that, in fact I quite enjoy writing. However, should RL time issues arise, I may be asking another Justice to do the drafting. Obviously, should I be in the minority in some case, one of you guys will need to draft the opinion.
Also, I think we should encourage a tradition where Justices in the minority submit dissenting opinions. It is not necessary to do this every time there is no unanimous decision, but I think it should be encouraged. Having a stream of dissenting opinions will, I believe, contribute considerably to the legal tradition of the region, and provide useful insights to the region and future justices into the internal workings of previous courts.
I like using google docs for NS-related drafting, as it's excellent for collaboration and makes it easy for other contributors to leave comments. Would that work for everyone?
Having gone through the request and related precedent, and after helpful discussions with Malashaan on skype, I have reached the following conclusions:
Before proceeding to discuss the question of law posited in the request, we first need to determine whether we will accept or dismiss the request. In doing so, we need to take into account:
1) The constitutional clause empowering the Court to hear cases and delineating its jurisdiction:
It is my opinion that the petitioner has failed to satisfy this standard. The petitioner has not identified either any specific rights they perceive to have been violated, or established any clear connection between the action they challenge and a law it allegedly violated.
Based on this, I am of the opinion that the request should be dismissed and no decision be made with regards to the legal question it presents.
Before proceeding to discuss the question of law posited in the request, we first need to determine whether we will accept or dismiss the request. In doing so, we need to take into account:
1) The constitutional clause empowering the Court to hear cases and delineating its jurisdiction:
2) The precedent set by the Court's judgment in "Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific, In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by flemingovia on the definition of “affected party”", when interpreting this clause. The Court found there thatConstitution Article 3:
It is my opinion that the petitioner has failed to satisfy this standard. The petitioner has not identified either any specific rights they perceive to have been violated, or established any clear connection between the action they challenge and a law it allegedly violated.
Based on this, I am of the opinion that the request should be dismissed and no decision be made with regards to the legal question it presents.
I posted the note of dismissal, and a statement on the reasons. The court rules allow the petitioner to ask the full court to overturn the dismissal. I have given Limi a week to do so, during which you will maintain your THO maskings.