In reaching a decision on the matter of TNP vs. Govinda The Court considered three core issues. Firstly, what precisely did the defendant state, and what was the context of these statements? Secondly, do these statements equate to the legal definition of fraud? Thirdly, did the defendant possess a concurrent intent to commit fraud in relation to these acts?
The issue of concurrence is of primary and absolute importance. It is a long established legal principle that no individual may be convicted of a crime for which they did not possess the intent to commit, unless in certain particular circumstances otherwise allowed for in the law. This allowance does not however exist in The North Pacific; there is no negligence statute or similar principle in existence, nor is there any relevant precedent indicating such should be considered by The Court. As such, in this matter and all others, concurrence must be, and will be, the deciding factor in court deliberations. Unless it is demonstrated, beyond all reasonable doubt, that a defendant possess a concurrent Actus Reus and Mens Rea The Court cannot and will not convict.
On the first issue, The Court considered both the defendant's statements and their context, as well as the arguments relating to their nature proffered. It was concluded that the defence's argument that the statement 'People were snorting cokes' referred to the literal snorting of Coca-Cola was fatuous. That the defendant was referring to the consumption of illegal narcotics seems beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the context of this statement was beyond all doubt humorous. A statement must be judged by its context; no fair court could conclude on the basis of assertion that one individual alone out of a group was being serious, whist all else were not. The burden of proof to support such lies with the prosecution, and this was not met. Further, whilst the defendant's attempt at humour may not be appreciated by all, his right to such is absolute under Article Two of the Bill of Rights. Once it had been concluded that the comment was intended to be humour, the Bill of Rights protected the comments in question and further consideration was not required, but was carried out for due process.
On the second issue, The Court considered whether the defendant's comments equated to Fraud. The legal definition of Fraud is the following;
'1.4.10. "Fraud" is defined as an intentional deception, by falsehood or omission, made for some benefit or to damage another individual.'
As such it must be shown that an intentional deception was made, to some benefit or damage. Not only does this support The Court's opinion on the principle of concurrence, but it also makes explicitly clear what is required for a conviction. The prosecution acknowledged this. However, The Court does not feel that the prosecution met these burdens. It failed to submit any substantive evidence, instead relying on assertion. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution, and they failed to convince The Court beyond reasonable doubt. The Court would have no choice but to acquit the defendant on grounds of presumption of innocence, even had we not concluded that the defendant's comments were protected speech.
On the third issue, the Court considered the issue of the defendant's intent. No attempt was made to show such by the prosecution. As such the prosecution's case failed the concurrence test. Acquittal could have been made on these grounds alone.
As such, and having concluding on all three issues in favour of the defendant, The Court came to a unanimous verdict of not guilty.