Abolishing the CLO

Fishalamode:
Submitting the following amendment, 4th revision: "Abolishing the CLO" for review and discussion.


Fishalamode:
Submitting the following amendment, 3rd revision: "Abolishing the CLO" for review and discussion.

Article I:
Section 3: Miscellany

1. The Legal Code shall consist of Laws passed by the Regional Assembly and carried over by agreement from previous governing documents.
2. The Constitution and Bill of Rights shall share full, constitutional authority with all the rights and privileges that come with that authority. The Legal Code is second only to the previous in legal force. In case of conflict in wording, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights take precedence. Any and all other regulations and guidelines are lower in authority than the Legal Code unless otherwise specified.
3. All Government bodies are allowed to create rules for its own governance.
4. The Speaker of the Assembly, CLO members, and the Delegate and Vice Delegate shall each be elected to 4-month terms.
5. The members of the Judiciary (including the Chief Justice) shall each be elected to 6-month terms.
6. All elections shall be held on the region's official off-site forum.
7. Candidates for these elected officials must be members of the Assembly for 30 days before nominations begin..
8. Election of the Speaker of the Assembly, CLO, and Judiciary officials shall require a plurality vote of the Assembly,
9. Election of the Delegate and Vice Delegate shall require a majority of the votes cast by the Assembly.
10. If any elected official should fail to check into their account for two weeks without prior notice, the dual consent of either the Speaker, the Delegate, or the Chief Justice will commence the special election of a replacement. This replacement will fulfill the remainder of the term.
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Article II:
Section 2: Speaker of the Assembly

1. The Assembly is led by the Speaker, whose task it is to lay out a uniform set of guidelines by which proposed legislation and other actions may be considered and voted upon.
2. The Speaker decides the order in which bills will be voted upon and is responsible for opening and closing each vote.
3. The Speaker is to be given access and speaking privileges within the private Cabinet areas but is not allowed to take part in votes of the Cabinet.
4. The Speaker may, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice, place an emergency temporary halt on any specific action undertaken by the Executive branch, and present the matter to the Court for consideration as to its validity.
5. The Speaker may, with the concurrence of the Court, immediately bring any piece of legislation to an emergency vote before the Assembly in response to the presentment.
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Article III: Executive Branch

The authority to formulate and guide regional policy, command the armies, diplomats and intelligence agents in the service of TNP is vested in the Executive Branch. The Executive shall consist of the the Delegate and the Cabinet.

Section 1: Delegate and Vice Delegate

1. The Delegate shall serve as TNP WA Delegate and as Head of State.
2. The Delegate is authorized to style his own title.
3. The Delegate is responsible to ensure the good governance of the Executive Branch of TNP and may appoint and remove at will executive officers from the Assembly to serve at his pleasure.. Executive officers must maintain membership in the Assembly.
4. The Delegate is responsible for the legal management and update of the Regional World Factbook Entry.
5. The Delegate is responsible for the security of the region, and is charged with the use of regional controls to eject and ban nations from the region in accordance with the laws of TNP.
6. The Delegate may veto bills passed through the Assembly that do not attain at least 60% supermajority in favor.
7. Each Player may, at most, only serve two terms as Delegate consecutively.
8. In any instance where the Delegate is absent, incapacitated, unwilling or unable to carry out his duties the Vice Delegate shall exercise the powers of the Delegate.
9. The duty of the Vice Delegate is to have the second highest endorsement count. The Delegate shall exercise discretion in banning nations whose endorsement count exceeds that of the Vice-Delegate.

Section 2: The Cabinet

1. All members of the Cabinet shall be resident nations of The North Pacific.
2. The composition, structure, and designations of duty within the Cabinet is left to the discretion of each Delegate.
3. The Speaker and the Chief Justice are to be given access and speaking privileges within the private Cabinet areas but are not allowed to take part in the votes of the Cabinet.
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Article V:
Section 1: Membership and Responsibilities

1. The Chief Justice is responsible for organizing the proper distribution of cases to maintain timeliness and impartiality.
2. The presiding justice shall serve as arbiter of rule disputes, maintain courtroom decorum, and consider all requests of the Court with the intent of pursuing truth impartially.
3. No sitting justice shall fire a request for judicial review.
4. The Chief Justice is to be given access and speaking privileges within the private Cabinet areas but is not allowed to take part in votes of the Cabinet

Section 2: Court Powers

1. The Judiciary is vested with the responsibility to oversee all trial proceedings.
2. All matters of judicial review to examine the constitutionality of Government policies, actions, and laws are to be brought before the full three-member Judiciary.
3. The official opinions crafted as a result of judicial review are to be binding upon all agents, officers, agencies, and Government bodies of TNP. If a policy, action, or law is deemed unconstitutional, any evidence collected via these unconstitutional means is inadmissible in the Assembly or in any TNP court of law.
4. The Chief Justice may, with the concurrence of the Speaker, place an emergency temporary halt on any specific action undertaken by the Executive branch, and present the matter to the Court for consideration as to its validity.
5. The Court may vote to immediately bring any piece of legislation to an emergency vote before the Assembly in response to the presentment.
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Article IV: Council of Legal Oversight

Section 1: Membership and Powers

1. The Council of Legal Oversight (CLO) is to be comprised of the Speaker of the Assembly and three specially-elected members of the Assembly.
2. The CLO is to be given access and speaking privileges within the private Cabinet areas but are not allowed to take part in votes of the Cabinet.
3. The CLO may, with the approval of at least three of the four members, place an emergency temporary halt on any specific action undertaken by the Executive branch.
4. The CLO may vote to immediately bring any piece of legislation to an emergency vote before the Assembly.
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And finally Articles V, VI, and VII of the Constitution will be renamed Articles IV, V, and VI respectively.
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[/quote]
 
The Delegate can elect not to have a Cabinet, if he or she wishes to perform all Executive function alone. In that case, the Delegate is the Cabinet.

Article III Section 1 already requires all Executive officials to maintain membership in the Regional Assembly:

Constitution Article III Section 1:
3. The Delegate is responsible to ensure the good governance of the Executive Branch of TNP and may appoint and remove at will executive officers from the Assembly to serve at his pleasure.. Executive officers must maintain membership in the Assembly.
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I believe adding an additional section in the Constitution is unnecessary; the intent was to give the Delegate complete discretion in organizing the Executive branch since the Delegate is ultimately responsible for it.
 
4. The Chief Justice may, with the concurrence of the Speaker, place an emergency temporary halt on any specific action undertaken by the Executive branch, and present the matter to the Court for consideration as to its validity.
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I don't support this. An executive should not be constrained like this. If you have a Speaker and Chief Justice that personally oppose the elected Executive/Delegate, they can misuse this easily. (Just as the CLO could and did)

If the executive branch takes unconstitutional action, the matter can be brought before the court. That's what it's there for. And the RA can legislate against executive actions. The means to deal with unpopular actions already exists.

In example. A Delegate runs on a campaign to turn TNP into a raider region....and wins. And upon election, enacts a program of raiding. The CJ and Speaker are against raiding, and pro defender, so impose an emergency halt on those actions by the elected delegate. You are giving them the authority to do this, even though they would be in opposition to the electorate that place the executive in office in the first place.

Way too much room for misuse.
 
A one-time rogue delegate who doesn't like the CLO, or the sort of check and balance the process was intended to have, and which would continue in a different form.

That is not a surprise.

All the process under the CLO has ever been was to block questionable actions long enough for the RA to vote, or so someone could present the question to the Court. However, not having that power to suspend an action in a perceived emergency could make any sort of review futile. The whole point of the check and balance is to permit a fair opportunity for a timely response by the Court's full membership or by the RA.

Under the current constitution, the Court has very limited jurisdiction. All this does is give the Court the limited additional power to submit a proposal to a vote in the RA on terms that fit the time frame of the "emergency." Having the authority to present a matter before the Court to then submits something to the RA is a very limited check and balance. Ultimately it is the RA that decides the matter.

Having no process to check the delegate's abuse of power in an emergency is not an option, IMHO. And there's no question that Lewis and Clark, among others who have taken the delegate's chair or acted as delegate in an unconstitutional or extra-constitutional manner, was one of those for whom the CLO was intended to deal with.
 
Okay. . .stupid newbie question, what actually constitutes an emergency?

Secondly, I'm all for a streamlined Constitution with simple language, but it was just driving me nuts that we keep referring to a major part of the Executive wing, when it has no formal definition - even if it is mutable, let's recognize with more than one word. I know. . .It's just me. . .
 
Well, we could separate the two issues and let each stand on their own merit: one) Eliminate the CLO, two) Establish oversight of cabinet.

Although we are trying to keep things tight, passage of both might be achieved more readily if they are actually separated.
 
Grosseschnauzer:
The Delegate can elect not to have a Cabinet, if he or she wishes to perform all Executive function alone. In that case, the Delegate is the Cabinet.

Article III Section 1 already requires all Executive officials to maintain membership in the Regional Assembly:

Constitution Article III Section 1:
3. The Delegate is responsible to ensure the good governance of the Executive Branch of TNP and may appoint and remove at will executive officers from the Assembly to serve at his pleasure.. Executive officers must maintain membership in the Assembly.
Click to expand...

I believe adding an additional section in the Constitution is unnecessary; the intent was to give the Delegate complete discretion in organizing the Executive branch since the Delegate is ultimately responsible for it.
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Which of course constitutes a defect in 'style' - strictly interpreted, if a Delegate used that constitutional authority and seized all executive authority for himself, then, it would technically be impossible for a Delegate to go rogue no matter what the Delegate did (except in the opinion of the the non-executive authorities). Think about it.

Since the role of an executive is to execute the law it is essentially through the discretion of an executive to choose to execute his authority and the law at his will, or not as the case may be. It could be argued that the Delegate, constitutionally speaking, has the legitimate authority to entirely prorogue the government in a de facto way - simply by choosing which laws to execute and which not to execute. But this is true of any repulplican, democratic or constitutional monarchy. ;)

All said and done in my usual cynical fashion ( :D ) every form of government boils down to 'might makes right' and 'he who has the gold (power) makes the rules'. It's all reduced down to how much any executive is trusted by those who entrust power to a delegate.
 
While I don't have time right now to provide my opinions on the matter, I should point out that under the "Cabinet" section of Fishalamode's draft, it should include that Cabinet members should also be Members of the Regional Assembly, not just residents of TNP. That is the norm, yet for Cabinet accountability to the region, they should also be Members of the RA.
 
Dalimbar, aren't members of the Cabinet "Executive officers"? As I pointed out in my previous post, Article III Section 1 of the Constitution already requires Executive officers to maintain membership in the Regional Assembly.

I'm not sure it's necessary, but a sentence could be added clarifying that the Cabinet are the "principal Executive officers" under the Delegate.

(Stole that idea from the 25th Amendment of the RL US Constitution), which makes references to the "principal executive officers" in the context of presidential incapacitation procedures, which was a reference to the President's Cabinet."
 
I just say that to make it absolutely clear what we expect from Delegate appointments. Given that the current Delegate is not even a RA member (and believe me, I have tried to speak with him about this, yet I have received nothing back), while we have this current structure of government, everyone needs to be on the same page on who needs to be an RA member.
 
I don't think the Delegate is too concerned about his RA membership. If you'll recall from his campaign manifesto, he is turning his back on forum government.

This manifesto is an admission that the grand experiments of feeder politics have largely failed. The Judicial wing of TNP has never worked, the legislative wing is moribund. I propose a complete … overhaul? Abandonment? Of that aspect of the game.

It is a return, in a way, to the wild west days before we had a constitution. So no constitution, no bill or rights, no new charters or other schizzle.

First, I will not appoint any government at all. That’s right. It doesn’t work, so why pretend? All it does is lead to dissatisfaction.

This is an admission that the offsite political sim that is Nationstates has ended, as far as TNP is concerned. There are other regions still playing that game. We can go and legislate there if that rocks our boat.

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Westwind:
4. The Chief Justice may, with the concurrence of the Speaker, place an emergency temporary halt on any specific action undertaken by the Executive branch, and present the matter to the Court for consideration as to its validity.
Click to expand...

I don't support this. An executive should not be constrained like this. If you have a Speaker and Chief Justice that personally oppose the elected Executive/Delegate, they can misuse this easily. (Just as the CLO could and did)

If the executive branch takes unconstitutional action, the matter can be brought before the court. That's what it's there for. And the RA can legislate against executive actions. The means to deal with unpopular actions already exists.

In example. A Delegate runs on a campaign to turn TNP into a raider region....and wins. And upon election, enacts a program of raiding. The CJ and Speaker are against raiding, and pro defender, so impose an emergency halt on those actions by the elected delegate. You are giving them the authority to do this, even though they would be in opposition to the electorate that place the executive in office in the first place.

Way too much room for misuse.
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I understand your concern and would like to hear your suggestion on this, any chance for a compromise?
 
The whole purpose of the emergency hold is to set up a process for an a review of constitutional validity, a vote in the RA on the question, or both.

I would think that a decision to raid would have required some effort to gain support for doing so from the RA before it was undertaken. If such a vote was there, a COurt would presumably take or would be given notice of that fact, and that would settle the question. If a Delegate unilaterally chose to ezecute a raid without input from the region, one would expect that the RA would want to be able to have a say in the matter.

I don't see a problem.
 
I think that we do have to reconcile the fact that in NS "might makes right." It's the foundational mechanics of the game. No matter what is resolved here, if a delegates choses to do something, and he has the endorsements and influence behind him - as far as game mechanics go - there is nothing we can do except drop our endorsement. That's reality. If the delegate does not recognize the constitution or RA, no matter how much we legislate oversight, there is nothing that can be done except the personal dropping of ones endorsement of the delegate. I have no problem dropping the CLO. I have no problem with oversight in the Cabinet. I just don't see the feasibility of halting action or for that matter the Constitution and RA - it's unenforcible if the delegate doesn't recognize it; the delegate will do what the delegate wants to do.

I'm building my bomb shelter and stocking up. . .
 
Fishalamode, the other reality is that if the long-time residents of the region want to maintain a off-site government and enforce it, Flem is not in a position to prevent it. His influence level are lower than 31 other WA members in the region, and he doesn't have sufficient influence available, and won't.
 
This shows that the answer to the question of accountibility in the delegate is already built into game mechanics via Influence. Those that weild the influence, are the true rulers. Not a minnow delegate, nor an off-site community. As long as that off-site community is in harmony with the Influence bearing players of the region, the off-site is relatively secure - other than the odd brief interuption.

Same with the delegate - a minnow delegate can be removed with the regional protection of the Influence bearing nations.
 
So... we wait for the wheel to come round again. I understand that. . .and this might be a huge rabbit-trail, but how do we translate that into game terms. I'm not bailing on the forum - I get more out of this than the game proper - but we might bring more life to the forum and RA in times when a "rightfully elected" delegate suspends, de facto, the constitution if we provide something other than the sense of idling. Do we move for impeachment? Are the Assembly's doors nailed shut? Etc... Something to carry the continuity of the forum game while the proper game drops out.


Anyway, I move we separate the issues of removing the CLO with that of establishing oversight. I believe most want to see the CLO gone, however, there seems to be a difference of opinion on oversight.
 
And I have a problem with ditching one oversight mechanism without a replacement system.

We could easily have a special CLO election to go with the judicial election and fill the two slots while this is worked out, but I'd rather have a replacment mechanism included in the same proposal.
 
CLO is a failure, it was design to counter the executive decision to go rogue or action that is against the region interest, but they can't even stop inactivity of a delegate and there is so many coup that I lost count.

I support separating the issue.
 
John Ashcroft Land:
I move that the following amendment "Abolishing the CLO" be brought to a vote:

striking the red and adding blue:

Article I:
Section 3: Miscellany

1. The Legal Code shall consist of Laws passed by the Regional Assembly and carried over by agreement from previous governing documents.
2. The Constitution and Bill of Rights shall share full, constitutional authority with all the rights and privileges that come with that authority. The Legal Code is second only to the previous in legal force. In case of conflict in wording, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights take precedence. Any and all other regulations and guidelines are lower in authority than the Legal Code unless otherwise specified.
3. All Government bodies are allowed to create rules for its own governance.
4. The Speaker of the Assembly, CLO members, and the Delegate and Vice Delegate shall each be elected to 4-month terms.
5. The members of the Judiciary (including the Chief Justice) shall each be elected to 6-month terms.
6. All elections shall be held on the region's official off-site forum.
7. Candidates for these elected officials must be members of the Assembly for 30 days before nominations begin..
8. Election of the Speaker of the Assembly, CLO, and Judiciary officials shall require a plurality vote of the Assembly,
9. Election of the Delegate and Vice Delegate shall require a majority of the votes cast by the Assembly.
10. If any elected official should fail to check into their account for two weeks without prior notice, the dual consent of either the Speaker, the Delegate, or the Chief Justice will commence the special election of a replacement. This replacement will fulfill the remainder of the term.
Click to expand...

Article II:
Section 2: Speaker of the Assembly

1. The Assembly is led by the Speaker, whose task it is to lay out a uniform set of guidelines by which proposed legislation and other actions may be considered and voted upon.
2. The Speaker decides the order in which bills will be voted upon and is responsible for opening and closing each vote.
3. The Speaker is to be given access and speaking privileges within the private Cabinet areas but is not allowed to take part in votes of the Cabinet
Click to expand...

Article IV: Council of Legal Oversight

Section 1: Membership and Powers

1. The Council of Legal Oversight (CLO) is to be comprised of the Speaker of the Assembly and three specially-elected members of the Assembly.
2. The CLO is to be given access and speaking privileges within the private Cabinet areas but are not allowed to take part in votes of the Cabinet.
3. The CLO may, with the approval of at least three of the four members, place an emergency temporary halt on any specific action undertaken by the Executive branch.
4. The CLO may vote to immediately bring any piece of legislation to an emergency vote before the Assembly.
Click to expand...

And finally Articles V, VI, and VII in the Constitution renamed IV, V, and VI respectively.
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Since the current version of the proposal no longer addresses a replacement check and balance mechanism, I will be unable to support it. I would not favor this proposal moving to formal discussion until that issue is addressed.
 
With a proposer and a seconder, I shall move this to formal discussion. I apologize for the slight delay, I have been swamped in papers.
 
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