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- Kim Philby#9330
The Court has discussed codifying prosecutor discretion n the Court Procedures. This is not something that should be done lightly, as one can easily see from adverse results in real life, and as such the Court invites public feedback on the topic.
Our system of open submission of indictments, accepted by the Court, and prosecuted by an appointed prosecutor, leaves open a real possibility of a prosecutor being asked to prosecute a case in which the evidence does not lend itself to the charge proposed when the indictment was submitted. It could be that the prosecutor finds that the evidence cannot show that a crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a different crime may have occurred. In such cases, the prosecutor should be able to either drop a case for lack of evidence or change the charge to one that the prosecutor believes can be proven.
Prosecutorial discretion should serve the purpose of giving the region the best avenue for justice – in those cases where one alleged crime cannot be proven but another can – or to save the region and accused from a lengthy trial where the outcome is given by the lack of evidence.
It would also give an accused a better avenue for justice. In the current system Justices have to approve an indictment forces Justices to evaluate the submitted evidence prior to the trial, which can stick in the Justice’s mind during the trial. To avoid pre-judging the accused, the Court has sought to merely assess whether the indictment makes a prima facie case for the crimes alleged. Leaving that to the prosecutor would make the Justices better neutral arbiters. The Court would serve solely as gatekeepers against spurious accusations, and let the appointed prosecutor assess whether any alleged crime can be proven.
In real life prosecutorial discretion is misused in primarily two instances. First, where a prosecutor declines to prosecute a crime despite ample evidence, and second, charging several serious crimes in an effort to make the accused plead guilty to some of the crimes and dropping the others in return.
The first issue is valid, but a first hurdle would presumably be the Delegate’s appointment process; the Delegate could ask a prosecutor whether they intend to prosecute the case diligently. As prosecutors can’t be removed, however, other hurdles must be institutional after the first prosecutor has decided not to prosecute. One model would see the case return to the Delegate for a new appointment of a prosecutor. If the second prosecutor also signals their intention to drop the charges, the Court must sign off before it is finalised. Further, as prosecutors have to be members of the Bar, a prosecutor who attempts an unethical manoeuvre like this would risk disbarment.
The second issue also has to be resolved institutionally. The Court would have to guard vigilantly against using additional charges against the accused for intimidation. A downgraded charge, or dropping one charge among many, would be within the intended scope, whereas adding new charges should be scrutinised. Here we have an element of luck as prosecutors don’t design the indictments themselves, and therefore inherit a limiting set of charges from the indictment. Courts can then gatekeep against adding charges on top of the initial charges, and abuse would again be under threat of disbarment.
We seek public feedback to this proposal, and we will do so for future proposals to come in this term, regardless of whether those proposals can be implemented by the Court alone or requires new legislation. This is done to arrive at the best decision, and also to maintain the Court's impartiality and legitimacy. If we propose something that could jeopardise either, we wish to know sooner rather than later.
Our system of open submission of indictments, accepted by the Court, and prosecuted by an appointed prosecutor, leaves open a real possibility of a prosecutor being asked to prosecute a case in which the evidence does not lend itself to the charge proposed when the indictment was submitted. It could be that the prosecutor finds that the evidence cannot show that a crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt, or that a different crime may have occurred. In such cases, the prosecutor should be able to either drop a case for lack of evidence or change the charge to one that the prosecutor believes can be proven.
Prosecutorial discretion should serve the purpose of giving the region the best avenue for justice – in those cases where one alleged crime cannot be proven but another can – or to save the region and accused from a lengthy trial where the outcome is given by the lack of evidence.
It would also give an accused a better avenue for justice. In the current system Justices have to approve an indictment forces Justices to evaluate the submitted evidence prior to the trial, which can stick in the Justice’s mind during the trial. To avoid pre-judging the accused, the Court has sought to merely assess whether the indictment makes a prima facie case for the crimes alleged. Leaving that to the prosecutor would make the Justices better neutral arbiters. The Court would serve solely as gatekeepers against spurious accusations, and let the appointed prosecutor assess whether any alleged crime can be proven.
In real life prosecutorial discretion is misused in primarily two instances. First, where a prosecutor declines to prosecute a crime despite ample evidence, and second, charging several serious crimes in an effort to make the accused plead guilty to some of the crimes and dropping the others in return.
The first issue is valid, but a first hurdle would presumably be the Delegate’s appointment process; the Delegate could ask a prosecutor whether they intend to prosecute the case diligently. As prosecutors can’t be removed, however, other hurdles must be institutional after the first prosecutor has decided not to prosecute. One model would see the case return to the Delegate for a new appointment of a prosecutor. If the second prosecutor also signals their intention to drop the charges, the Court must sign off before it is finalised. Further, as prosecutors have to be members of the Bar, a prosecutor who attempts an unethical manoeuvre like this would risk disbarment.
The second issue also has to be resolved institutionally. The Court would have to guard vigilantly against using additional charges against the accused for intimidation. A downgraded charge, or dropping one charge among many, would be within the intended scope, whereas adding new charges should be scrutinised. Here we have an element of luck as prosecutors don’t design the indictments themselves, and therefore inherit a limiting set of charges from the indictment. Courts can then gatekeep against adding charges on top of the initial charges, and abuse would again be under threat of disbarment.
We seek public feedback to this proposal, and we will do so for future proposals to come in this term, regardless of whether those proposals can be implemented by the Court alone or requires new legislation. This is done to arrive at the best decision, and also to maintain the Court's impartiality and legitimacy. If we propose something that could jeopardise either, we wish to know sooner rather than later.