[R4R] Regarding "On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination Periods"

1. What law, government policy, or action (taken by a government official) do you request that the Court review?
Previous court ruling number 33, On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination Periods.

2. What portions of the Constitution, Bill of Rights, Legal Code, or other legal document do you believe has been violated by the above? How so?

Section 4.4: Overall Election Law - Clause 23:

The option to reopen nominations will appear on the ballot as a separate question for each race.

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The ruling of the court in 2014 explicitly states that the ability to reopen nominations is reserved for general elections (Delegate, VD, speaker) and that judicial elections enjoy no such ability to reopen nominations. This ruling is no-longer in line with existing law, quoted above, which extended the ability to reopen nominations to all elections.

The opinion of the court was correct at the time of the ruling (March 18, 2014) given the existing laws governing elections and the ability to re-open nominations (RON). Shortly after the ruling was announced, CrushingOurEnemies amended their proposed bill addressing a wider scope of RON related issues which contained the above quoted clause and subsequently submitted it to the RA for vote. The bill passed on March 25th, 2014 and has remained law ever since.

3. Are there any prior rulings of the Court that support your request for review? Which ones, and how?
Previous court ruling number 41, On the Physical Representation of Outdated Rulings on Requests for Review, establishes the ability for Requests for Review (R4R) rulings to result in the overruling of previous court rulings, as is being proposed in this R4R.

4. Please establish your standing by detailing how you, personally, have been adversely affected. If you are requesting a review of a governmental action, you must include how any rights or freedoms of yours have been violated.
Standing derived by my position as Court Examiner, defined in Legal Code Section 3.6, Clause 34: "The Court Examiner will have standing in all cases of judicial review brought before the Court."

5. Is there a compelling regional interest in resolving your request? If so, explain why it is in the interest of the region as whole for your request to be decided now.
This request looks to address a contradiction in a previous court ruling with current law. It is firmly in the interest of the region, inclusive of the Regional Assembly and Judiciary, that existing court rulings are in line with currently existing law. Given the previous court ruling was made with a different set of laws governing RON ability, the court should revisit this ruling to ensure the accuracy of existing precedent is upheld.

6. Do you have any further information you wish to submit to the Court with your request?
N/A

The Court accepts the request for review. I will serve as Moderating Justice.
As the challenged action is a previous ruling by this Court, there is no responsible government official who can be recognised as the respondent.

The Court invites any interested party to submit briefs pertinent to this request for review. The deadline for briefs is set as Saturday the 22nd of July, at 2200 Central European Time.

On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination Periods is a ruling on a law that is no longer in force in the same way that it is now. Currently, the law concerning which elections in which the option to re-open nominations must appear on the ballot is covered by three clauses of the Legal Code. Clause 4.4.23 declares that the option to re-open nominations must appear on the ballot for each race.

23. The option to reopen nominations will appear on the ballot as a separate question for each race.

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Clauses 4.4.26 and 4.4.27 prevent this option from being present in run-off votes and votes which have followed a re-opened candidacy declarations period following a majority vote to re-open nominations.

26. A second round of voting for that race will begin immediately after the candidacy declaration period has closed and last for five days. The option to reopen nominations will not appear on the new ballot.
27. The option to reopen nominations will not appear on the ballot for any runoff vote.

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Notably, these clauses apply to all elections. Because the current law, established in part by Crushing Our Enemies's Reopen Nominations Fix Bill as shown by the petitioner, specifically extends the option to re-open nominations to all elections except for the aforementioned exemptions, it contradicts the Court's ruling in Reopened Nomination Periods. The Reopen Nominations Fix Bill established the exact current language of clause 4.4.23.

The option to reopen nominations shall appear on the ballot as a separate question for each race.

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The judgement on Reopened Nomination Periods is an interpretation of the statutory law in force at the time. Because it is a mere interpretation of the statute in place at the time, its place in the law is as an auxiliary in the application of the statute. When the statute changes in such a way that it contradicts a judgement on its meaning, the statute takes precedence over the judgement. As a result, the interpretation of the law in Reopened Nominations Periods can no longer be considered useful precedent or in force at all. It is an antiquated interpretation that ought to be overturned.

However, the decision to deny an injunction to Treize Dreizehn was one rendered under the law in force at the time. In clarifying the effect of past precedent, the Court must review this element of the decision with respect to its correctness under the laws at the time, because it was on actions made under those laws. While the meaning of the law changes as it is amended, and thus interpretations issued in Court judgements become out-of-date, a Court order applies based on the laws of its own time that the Court had to review and the law does not invalidate those orders because it begins to apply differently unless it explicitly does so.

While Court should overturn the already void interpretation of the law in Reopened Nominations Periods, it should not overturn the decision to deny an injunction to Treize Dreizehn because the law has changed, but instead review that decision for its correctness under the laws that applied to Treize Dreizehn at the time.

The deadline for briefs has passed. The Court will now deliberate.

The Court took into consideration the inquiry filed here by TlomzKrano.

The Court took into consideration the legal brief filed here by @Comfed.

The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the Legal Code of The North Pacific:

Section 4.4: Overall Election Law
20. Citizens will be provided three days to declare their candidacy. Voting will begin two days after the candidacy declaration period has closed and last for five days.
21. Candidates may withdraw from the ballot anytime during an election.
22. Private votes may be sent by private message to a forum account designated for that purpose by the Election Commission. In such an event, the Election Commissioners supervising the election will promptly announce that a vote has been cast privately and who that vote was cast for. The Election Commissioners may not announce any other details about the vote.
23. The option to reopen nominations will appear on the ballot as a separate question for each race.
24. Should a majority vote to reopen nominations for a given race, a further two days will be provided for candidacy declarations.
25. Candidates for that race whose names appeared on the first ballot will retain their candidacy unless they choose to withdraw.
26. A second round of voting for that race will begin immediately after the candidacy declaration period has closed and last for five days. The option to reopen nominations will not appear on the new ballot.
27. The option to reopen nominations will not appear on the ballot for any runoff vote.
28. If during any voting round for a given race a candidate becomes invalid, then all votes for that candidate will be removed from voters' preferential ranking. The Election Commission will remove the candidate from the list of candidates and notify all citizens who have voted before the candidate became invalid.
29. If at any point in counting the votes for two or more candidates are tied for one position, the candidate who has the least votes at the latest stage of counting where there is a difference in votes will be eliminated. If this does not break a tie, a runoff vote will be held between the tied candidates.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the challenged ruling:

The Court opines the following:

The provisions made in the Legal Code for the reopening of nominations apply only to general elections - that is, those for delegate, vice delegate, and speaker - and special elections for any office. As the election referred to by the petitioner is a judicial election, it does not fall under this law.

The request for an injunction is denied.

The Election Commissioners are instructed to tally the results of the Attorney General race from the first round of voting and to either certify them or hold a run-off vote as necessary.

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The Court took into consideration the relevant portions of the prior ruling by the Court On Recognizing Outdated Rulings:

2. Should Opinion 1 be modified with strikethrough tags as it has been superseded by the current Legal Code Chapter 6, Section 7?

It seems clear to the court that Opinion 1 was written when the law required the Attorney General's Office to bring all cases to trial. The current law is clear in that, in clause 38 of Chapter 6, Section 7 of the Legal Code, "The Attorney General may, at their discretion, manage the prosecution of any criminal case requested." This allows for the Office of AG to decide not to prosecute. As such Opinion 1 is contrary to, and superseded by, the current Legal Code.

The Court, therefore, opines the following:

Opinion Number 1, In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by Tim on the Attorney General Refusing to bring Trials to the Court, is hereby modified with strikethrough tags, acknowledging its obsolescence while preserving it for historical purposes. As such, the Court's Ruling issued on September 15, 2012 no longer has the force of law.

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The Court opines the following:

On Standing
The Petitioner is the Court Examiner and enjoys universal standing in all cases of review before this Court. The Petitioner thus has proper standing.

On Rulings Superseded by Legislation – Defunct Rulings
This Court is often asked to rule on laws that are ambiguous. That is the nature of a Court with the power of judicial review. Those rulings have the force of law, but they are not laws themselves. This case is about the specific request for review and the challenged ruling, but to best reach its ruling the Court finds it necessary to weigh in on the general matter of past rulings on matters where the law is subsequently changed (perhaps as corrective to the past ruling) to reach the best ruling in this case. When a ruling may be in error the most direct corrective to that is an appeal. If, instead, the citizenry – through the Court’s ruling – is made aware of a flaw in the Legal Code, the proper corrective is to clarify the citizenry’s intent with the law through new legislation. As such it should be expected that Court rulings give rise to legislation that is meant to supersede Court rulings. This is also not the first time that the Court is asked to weigh in on a previous ruling that has since been superseded. It is, however, the first time that the Court sets out to make a test for superseded rulings, and clearly spell out what the status of a superseded ruling is.

Any requested review of past rulings that may have been superseded by legislation should establish three facts. First, was the ruling correct at the time? Second, were changes made to the legislation underlying that ruling? Third, did those changes affect the ruling in part or in full? If the ruling was correct at the time, the Court did not err in judgement and as such, the material outcome of the case is unchanged. If an action was ordered, denied, or reversed by the Court, that specific action remained ordered, denied, or reversed. If the Regional Assembly changed the underlying legislation, any part of the ruling that relies on that legislation is also, necessarily, subject to change. But it is not enough for a legislative change to be something innocuous such as a renumbering of clauses, corrected spelling, or reworded or reorganized clauses that do not change the original meaning or intent of the law. The law must now have additional provisions, or have removed provisions that existed originally, or different ones than existed at the time of the original ruling, such that the Court has to consider a different law than existed at the time of the decision.

After establishing these facts, the Court should evaluate any impact on a ruling. If the ruling was correct then but would be incorrect now, the ruling is defunct: the Court should be careful not to phrase this as overturning the ruling, but instead that the ruling is superseded by subsequent legislation and is defunct as precedent. If the ruling would be unchanged the Court should uphold the ruling and explain in the ruling that it was not effectively superseded by legislation. In between those extremes the Court should carefully evaluate to what degree the ruling would be affected by the new legislation. If the substance of the ruling is significantly affected, the Court should give deference to the Regional Assembly’s lawmaking powers and consider the ruling defunct, but if a ruling is only partially superseded, then it is defunct only in that part, and the Court must let the remainder of the original ruling stand (or overturn it for other reasons).

This idea, although not the specific language, was embedded in the ruling, On Recognizing Outdated Rulings, cited above. This Court thus elaborates on that prior ruling, and codifies a specific language to distinguish between a ruling that was in error – that is, a ruling that is overturned by a subsequent ruling – and a ruling that was correct at the time, but where the law has since been changed – that is, a ruling that is superseded by subsequent legislation and is defunct as precedent. Lastly, while the Court had not yet established the specific language, the ruling On the Reconsideration of the Jurisdiction of the Criminal Code was an example of a ruling that was also not wrongly decided at the time, but which had not been fully superseded – albeit by developments over time rather than new legislation – and thus the Court revised the ruling without overturning it. That is the process the Court intends for rulings that are only superseded in part.

On the Challenged Ruling
The challenged ruling was delivered according to the law in force at the time. The provisions for reopening nominations was for general elections and special elections, with no such provision for the judicial election.

On Superseding Legislation
The Regional Assembly introduced, debated, and voted on legislation that the Delegate signed into law. This new legislation, as quoted from the Legal Code above, rewrote the relevant parts of the law to make clear the intent to make some general rules apply to all elections, and included in this the ability of voters to vote for reopening nominations. This legislation was intended to specifically address the outcome of the Court's review, and did so in full.

Holding
The Court finds that, while the challenged ruling was correct at the time, the law that gave rise to that ruling has been changed since, and in a way that would make the ruling incorrect now. As such the ruling is superseded by subsequent legislation and is defunct as precedent. Therefore, Opinion Number 33, On Candidate Eligibility in Reopened Nomination Periods, is hereby modified with strikethrough tags, acknowledging its obsolescence while preserving it for historical purposes.