Brasesco
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Hello, I am new here, but I think I saw that there has been a recent debate about term limits in TNP? I thought I would contribute an article I wrote about term limits in the case of 20th century Mexico and Argentina and how they impacted the development of political parties in either case (keeping in mind that both nations could be classified as electoral autocracies rather than democracies at this point in their history).
Introduction
Argentina and Mexico experienced a radically different 20th century, with Mexico under stable one-party rule, and Argentina beset by constantly combative party relations and regular interventions by a self-serving military. This difference in outcome could likely be attributed to the difference in party institutionalization, with a highly institutionalized PRI in Mexico leading to stability and the very personalistic Peronist regime leading to instability. Why did the parties develop so differently? A combination of a very powerful presidency and a lack of term limits disincentivized Argentinian interest groups from playing by the rules in order to seize power, while that a constitution preventing reelection incentivized Mexican politicians to play nice so they could reach the presidency themselves.
The Factors at Play
At first glance, the two countries share a few relevant traits in common. The Church is not a major political actor in either country, though it has become more active in Mexico in the past few decades (Cornelius 1996). This is significant, because the Church is often seen as a factor hampering political development in Latin America. Similarly, in both countries, the labor movement has been successfully co-opted by a single actor. In Mexico that actor is PRI, the ruling party, while in Argentina it is Peron himself (Cornelius 1996; Wynia 1986). Finally and, I would argue, most importantly for the sake of examining stability and instability in the two countries, neither country has any major institutional checks on the presidency (Cornelius 1996). Mexico relies on regular regime change in order to ensure no one actor becomes too powerful rather than having any actual checks on those in power, and Argentina has the unofficial check of the military, but not much else preventing a majority coalition from using power as it sees fit (Wynia 1986). This makes the presidency itself a very desirable and crucially important office for any actor or interest group whether they are motivated by pure self-interest and greed or have an actual agenda to push. The struggle for the presidency thus becomes an area of immense import when analyzing either country or the outcomes of its political development.
In addition to this set of similarities, there are two significant differences between the two countries. The first is the prominence of the military in politics. The Argentinian military maintained its independence from the civilian government while the Mexican army was subordinated to the PRI party apparatus in Mexico (Cornelius 1996; Wynia 1986). Some may argue that the powerful military serves as the major causal factor in Argentina’s instability, however this argument is flawed in that it accepts as a necessary precondition the combative nature of Argentinian politics (thus requiring military intervention). Rather, Argentina’s combative partisanship can be traced to another major difference between Mexico and Argentina: an Argetinian lack of term limits or any rules against reelection. In this context, the powerful presidency could theoretically be seized by any political actor and then be used indefinitely to act against the wishes of all opposition actors, so long as the ruling actor maintains a slight electoral majority. This provides no incentive for the ruler to moderate themself and thus no incentive for the opposition to work within their rules.
Understanding the Outcomes
We see this in the case of Peron, who was able to portray himself as “the leader” of the people, and thus secure an enduring majority (Navarro 1982). Given his ability to be indefinitely reelected, he pursued the personalization of power such that he could not be replaced by another official with similar policies. He did this through clever political machinations such as the institution of a national Loyalty Day in remembrance of both his loyalty to the people and the loyalty they owed him (Navarro 1982), as well as through his intentional choice of an unknown labor leader in the ministry of labor so as to prevent the rise of a challenger (Navarro 1982). This personalization of power means that there is no end in sight to Peron’s leadership as well as no opportunity for ambitious underlings to rise to the top themselves. For those without power, the Argentinian system means constant fear of eradication, as the presidency is limited by no bounds and the majority shows no immediate sign of dwindling. This fear then leads the opposition to collude with the only other actor with which it is capable of forming a winning coalition: the military. The cycle perpetuates itself with weaker actors constantly feeling unsafe and finding a solution in the military.
This cycle is prevented in the Mexican system through a rule limiting presidents to one term of six years. In this context, those seeking power (though notably not the actual opposition), are incentivized to wait and participate in the ruling party in order to eventually get their own six-year term. They have no cause to rebel because even if they have a problem with the sitting president, they know that things will completely shift in six years. This incentivizes politicians to take part in power-sharing through an institutionalized ruling party, which stabilizes the country and both prevents the military from interfering as well as removing any political legitimacy for that type of interference.
Conclusion
The difference in Argentinian and Mexican stability in the 20th century can be traced back to a difference in the combativeness of relations between the political elite driven by a choice to use term limits in Mexico and to have indefinite reelection in Argentina. This difference led to factional fear and the resulting coups in Argentina, while Mexico had a period of unprecedented political stability through the institutionalization of its ruling party, PRI.
Introduction
Argentina and Mexico experienced a radically different 20th century, with Mexico under stable one-party rule, and Argentina beset by constantly combative party relations and regular interventions by a self-serving military. This difference in outcome could likely be attributed to the difference in party institutionalization, with a highly institutionalized PRI in Mexico leading to stability and the very personalistic Peronist regime leading to instability. Why did the parties develop so differently? A combination of a very powerful presidency and a lack of term limits disincentivized Argentinian interest groups from playing by the rules in order to seize power, while that a constitution preventing reelection incentivized Mexican politicians to play nice so they could reach the presidency themselves.
The Factors at Play
At first glance, the two countries share a few relevant traits in common. The Church is not a major political actor in either country, though it has become more active in Mexico in the past few decades (Cornelius 1996). This is significant, because the Church is often seen as a factor hampering political development in Latin America. Similarly, in both countries, the labor movement has been successfully co-opted by a single actor. In Mexico that actor is PRI, the ruling party, while in Argentina it is Peron himself (Cornelius 1996; Wynia 1986). Finally and, I would argue, most importantly for the sake of examining stability and instability in the two countries, neither country has any major institutional checks on the presidency (Cornelius 1996). Mexico relies on regular regime change in order to ensure no one actor becomes too powerful rather than having any actual checks on those in power, and Argentina has the unofficial check of the military, but not much else preventing a majority coalition from using power as it sees fit (Wynia 1986). This makes the presidency itself a very desirable and crucially important office for any actor or interest group whether they are motivated by pure self-interest and greed or have an actual agenda to push. The struggle for the presidency thus becomes an area of immense import when analyzing either country or the outcomes of its political development.
In addition to this set of similarities, there are two significant differences between the two countries. The first is the prominence of the military in politics. The Argentinian military maintained its independence from the civilian government while the Mexican army was subordinated to the PRI party apparatus in Mexico (Cornelius 1996; Wynia 1986). Some may argue that the powerful military serves as the major causal factor in Argentina’s instability, however this argument is flawed in that it accepts as a necessary precondition the combative nature of Argentinian politics (thus requiring military intervention). Rather, Argentina’s combative partisanship can be traced to another major difference between Mexico and Argentina: an Argetinian lack of term limits or any rules against reelection. In this context, the powerful presidency could theoretically be seized by any political actor and then be used indefinitely to act against the wishes of all opposition actors, so long as the ruling actor maintains a slight electoral majority. This provides no incentive for the ruler to moderate themself and thus no incentive for the opposition to work within their rules.
Understanding the Outcomes
We see this in the case of Peron, who was able to portray himself as “the leader” of the people, and thus secure an enduring majority (Navarro 1982). Given his ability to be indefinitely reelected, he pursued the personalization of power such that he could not be replaced by another official with similar policies. He did this through clever political machinations such as the institution of a national Loyalty Day in remembrance of both his loyalty to the people and the loyalty they owed him (Navarro 1982), as well as through his intentional choice of an unknown labor leader in the ministry of labor so as to prevent the rise of a challenger (Navarro 1982). This personalization of power means that there is no end in sight to Peron’s leadership as well as no opportunity for ambitious underlings to rise to the top themselves. For those without power, the Argentinian system means constant fear of eradication, as the presidency is limited by no bounds and the majority shows no immediate sign of dwindling. This fear then leads the opposition to collude with the only other actor with which it is capable of forming a winning coalition: the military. The cycle perpetuates itself with weaker actors constantly feeling unsafe and finding a solution in the military.
This cycle is prevented in the Mexican system through a rule limiting presidents to one term of six years. In this context, those seeking power (though notably not the actual opposition), are incentivized to wait and participate in the ruling party in order to eventually get their own six-year term. They have no cause to rebel because even if they have a problem with the sitting president, they know that things will completely shift in six years. This incentivizes politicians to take part in power-sharing through an institutionalized ruling party, which stabilizes the country and both prevents the military from interfering as well as removing any political legitimacy for that type of interference.
Conclusion
The difference in Argentinian and Mexican stability in the 20th century can be traced back to a difference in the combativeness of relations between the political elite driven by a choice to use term limits in Mexico and to have indefinite reelection in Argentina. This difference led to factional fear and the resulting coups in Argentina, while Mexico had a period of unprecedented political stability through the institutionalization of its ruling party, PRI.
