I also do have some philosophical problem with involving the Speaker in the committee system to too great an extent. I am very attached to the Speaker maintaining impartiality and the appearance of impartiality; further the role of the Speaker is properly as a servant of the Assembly and not a master of it. While it plainly depends on the extent of the committees' scope and powers, it does strike me that there is a risk in the Speaker being seen to be partial in the creation and selection of committees if those committees take on a significant role in the region and in how the Assembly dispatches with its business. It also appears to me, again if committees do become more significant in the role they have to play, that entrusting them to the Speaker does create a risk to the role of the Speaker as a servant of the Assembly. Plainly, I appreciate that the Speaker already enjoys wide discretionary power in managing the business of the Assembly, but there are quite longstanding practices in how the Speaker goes about doing so that, together with the restraint of those in the office, have caused that not to materialise into a substantial problem for the role; however, with the creation of substantial new elements of the Assembly, it does appear to me that there would be a risk for problematic evolution in the role that must be taken into account.
To me, the Speaker's job is to be in charge of process and organization so that the functions and powers of the RA can be faithfully carried out. The speaker is accountable to the citizenry. I believe giving them the power to create or dissolve committees is fundamental to this responsibility since such a committee may be needed if something comes up all of a sudden and waiting for a vote is not feasible. The Speaker is very much a public figure and so adding or removing a committee is a significant exercise of the office. The citizens would surely hold them accountable so that no rash decision would be made. Dissolving a perfectly good committee is an action worthy of recall in my view, so the Speaker would not be so quick to act without just cause if anything out of fear of this result
I very much appreciate that the Speaker would be accountable for exercise of this power, but that is, in a certain sense, my concern. It creates a substantial area for the Speaker to act, in choosing what matters do and do not merit committees and in choosing which members staff them. These are matters which are not likely to be without public controversy. It is no difficult task to imagine that there will be matters that members think require a committee where the Speaker does not or that there will be members appointed to a committee that are considered to be inappropriate, as examples. This will be liable to lead to the Speaker becoming involved in controversy to a substantially greater extent than they have so far.
That is not to say the Speaker has always avoided controversy, sometimes they must act in a manner that is liable to provoke controversy, but it does not seem to me to be desirable to create greater scope for such controversy in an office that ought, to my mind, be regarded as being impartial.
Further, I do not see that there is likely to be an urgent need for committees. It may be that I am wrong on that point, but certainly it does not appear to have arisen yet. In any event, I do not think that such a requirement for urgency on occasion can be justification for a general power for all occasions.
As to the drafting, the two additional sentences seem, to my mind, to operate strangely together. The former empowers the Speaker to create committees unilaterally, the latter effectively requires them to be provided for by law. That is to say, it seems the Speaker can create a committee but in so doing not delimit its structure or scope and it seems that the Assembly can provide for the structure and scope of a committee but not actually create it. I should think the more proper way for this to be dealt with is for the power to create committees to be with the Assembly and then a power to appoint members to be with the Speaker.
I believe that there should be uniformity when it comes to how committees operate and that they should follow set procedures. If a committee would be created there would already be a set standard for it to function by. The Speaker has the power because of the ease of erecting a committee in a crisis if need be which is instantaneous. I honestly believe that the Speaker can be trusted
I think I may be misunderstanding on this point, but I do not think it is right to say that simply because the Assembly may make provision for committees by law that they must make uniform provision. Indeed, the power to delimit scope suggests that the Assembly could make different provisions as to the scope of different committees.
Further, I think there is a difficulty in the view of the Speaker's power to create a committee when the power to set structures and scope lies with the Assembly and where that power has not been exercised. How could the Speaker create a committee to deal with a matter if they cannot determine the scope of what the committee can deal with? How can they make appointments to it if they cannot determine the roles of those they are appointing or even how many to appoint? The assignment of the power to set structure and scope to the Assembly is suggestive of it not being contained in the general power to "create" that is given to the Speaker, so there become substantial difficulties, as far as I can see, in exercising the creation power without the Assembly having already exercised its power.
A final point I would ask about is as to why a Constitutional amendment is thought necessary. The Assembly has quite broad legislative powers that are not, or do not appear to be, limited to dealing with matters that are dealt with in the Constitution or, at least, not to matters expressly provided for by the Constitution. The cultural laws seem to stem only from the general legislative power, the Election Commission (new and old) and, historically, the offices of the Attorney General and of the Registrar of Confidential Puppets are or were creations of the Legal Code without express Constitutional provision, and any number of elaborations on the functioning of Constitutionally defined offices seem derive from a general legislative authority rather than an express Constitutional provision authorising those elaborations. So, in essence, my question is as to why the author does not propose simply to proceed directly to creating the desired committees by law.
I wish to establish the committee device as an innate right and power of the Regional Assembly. The legal code only refers to requirements for entry into the RA as well as some procedural statutes dealing with voting. I find the committee power to be much more fundamental because it is a kind of check on the Executive. The Regional Assembly section of the constitution very much focuses on the powers of the body, and I find it fitting that this power held by its overseer be there as well.
Again, I do not see that it is not already innate in the power of the Assembly, the Constitution provides that the Assembly may make laws and imposes no apparent limitation on that general power (except that such laws must not be contrary to the Constitution or the Bill of Rights). That the Assembly has, thusfar, not made certain provisions by law, such as establishing committees, does not mean that it cannot do so. It may be that I am wrong on this, but it seems to me that the Assembly could establish a committee by law, if it wished (indeed, I think it arguable that some committees could be established by rule).
That being so, why is a specific power needed and does it not play into a different understanding of the law making power, that the Assembly does not have a general competence?
