[Proposal] Criminal Court of Eras (CCE)

Nightsong

Bookworm
The Office of International Services of The Rose League wishes to put forward the following proposal for discussion by the members of the Assembly of Nations. The proposal carries the current title of 'Criminal Court of Eras (CCE)' and was authored by Elizabeth O'Shea, The Rose League's representative to the International Association of Nations.

The Rose Statue of the Criminal Court of Eras establishes three core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity / sentient species and war crimes. The Criminal Court of Eras shall have “the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”. Under the Rose Statute, the CCE can only investigate and prosecute the three core international crimes in situations where states are “unable” or “unwilling” to prosecute the accused themselves.

Criminal Court of Eras (CCE):
Preamble:
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time,

Recognizing that grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,

Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation,

Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes,

Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,

Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice,

Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an independent and permanent Criminal Court of Eras in relationship with the International Association of Nations, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,

Emphasizing that the Criminal Court of Eras established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,

Have agreed to the creation of an Criminal Court of Eras as governed by the provisions of the following Rose Statue of the Criminal Court of Eras.

Article I:
(1) An Criminal Court of Eras (“the Court”) is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.
(2) State Party shall refer to the signatory nations who ratify this Rose Statute of the Criminal Court of Eras (“this Statute).

Article II:
(1) The seat of the Court shall be established at Navia-Askontar in the Federation of Kalti ("the host State").
(2) The Court shall enter into a headquarters agreement with the host State, to be approved by the Assembly of Nations and thereafter confirmed by the Secretary-General of the International Association of Nations.
(3) The Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable.


Article III:
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) the crime of genocide
(b) crimes against humanity / sentient species
(c) war crimes

Article IV:
For the purpose of this Statute, “genocide” means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part
(d) inflicting upon a people policies that overtly or covertly seek to destroy their culture and supplant them for another

Article V:
For the purpose of this Statute, “crimes against humanity / sentient species” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilization population, with knowledge of the attack:
(a) unlawful killing / murder
(b) extermination
(c) enslavement
(d) deportation or forcible transfer of population
(e) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty
(f) torture

"Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving one or more of the acts referred to above against any civilian population.

"Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life and the deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population.

"Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular children and the defenseless.

"Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.

"Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused.

Article VI:
The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes. However it may only do so when no actions to prosecute such crimes are being covered by the national jurisdiction where such crimes occurred, even after notification to the Court of such allegations. As such, for the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:
(a) wilful killing
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments
(c) wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health
(d) excessive destruction beyond necessity and / or appropriation of property
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of their rights to a fair trial
(g) unlawful deportation or confinement of prisoners of war
(h) taking of hostages

Article VII:
Prosecution of war crimes fall primarily to the jurisdiction where the crime, as referred to in Article II, occurred, and would be handled by that State’s judicial system. Should the State’s judicial system be incapable of carrying out the persecution due to not being able to handle the scope of the procedure, the courts having become non-existent due to the State failing or corruption among the ranks of the State’s judicial system, that State may call upon or be called upon by the Peacekeepers of the International Association of Nations and defer to this Court to handle the prosecution of the crime.

Article VIII:
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in Article II in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if:
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with Article IX;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a member of the Council of Nations or the Secretary-General of the International Association of Nations;
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with Article X.

Article IX:
(1) A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes.
(2) As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be accompanied by such support documentation as is available to the State Party referring the situation.

Article X:
(1) The Prosecutor may initiate investigations on his or her own on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
(2) The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he or she may seek additional information from the State Party or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court.
(3) If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected.
(4) If the Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.
(5) The refusal of the Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not preclude the presentation of a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the same situation.
(6) If, after the preliminary examination referred to in Sections 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light of new facts or evidence.
(7) A State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws.

Article XI:
The Court shall be composed of the following:
(a) The Presidency
(b) The Trial Chamber
(c) The Office of the Prosecutor
(d) The Office of Defence

Article XII:
(1) The judges of the Court shall be chosen from among persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity.
(2) Nominations of candidates for election to the Court may be made by any State Party.
(3) In total, there shall be eleven judges elected to the Court.

Article XIII:
(1) The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by an absolute majority of the judges from within their ranks. Both the President and the Vice-President shall serve until the end of their respective terms of office as judges. They shall be eligible for re-election once.
(2) The Vice-President shall act in place of the President in the event that the President is unavailable.
(3) The President, together with the Vice-President, shall constitute the Presidency, which shall be responsible for the proper administration of the Court and the Trial Chamber with the exception of the Office of the Prosecutor and the Office of Defence.

Article XIV:
(1) The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate entity of the Court. It shall be responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court. A member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.
(2) The Office shall be headed by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall have full authority over the management and administration of the Office. The Prosecutor shall be assisted by two Deputy Prosecutors, who shall be entitled to carry out any of the acts required of the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be of different nationalities.
(3) The Prosecutor shall be elected by an absolute majority of the State Parties. The Deputy Prosecutors shall be elected in the same way from a list of four candidates provided by the Prosecutor.
(4) The Presidency may excuse the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor, at his or her request, from acting in a particular case.
(5) Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall participate in any matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. They shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if they have previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted.

Article XV:
(1) The Office of Defence shall act independently as a separate entity of the Court. It shall be responsible for receiving witness testimony and other materials related to the defence of the person or State that is being charged with the crime. A member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.
(2) The Office shall be headed by the Defence Attorney. The Defence Attorney shall have full authority over the management and administration of the Office. The Defence Attorney shall be assisted by two Deputy Defence Attorney’s, who shall be entitled to carry out any of the acts required of the Defence Attorney. The Defence Attorney and the Deputy Defence Attorney’s shall be of different nationalities.
(3) The Defence Attorney shall be elected by an absolute majority of the State Parties. The Deputy Defence Attorney’s shall be elected in the same way from a list of four candidates provided by the Prosecutor.
(4) The Presidency may excuse the Defence Attorney or a Deputy Defence Attorney, at his or her request, from acting in a particular case.
(5) Neither the Defence Attorney nor a Deputy Defence Attorney shall participate in any matter in which their impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. They shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if they have previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted.

Article XVI:
Unless otherwise decided, the place of the trial shall be the seat of the Court.

Article XVII:
(1) There shall be one Trial Chamber with nine sitting judges presiding over cases brought before the Court. A sentence requires either a two-thirds majority of the judges or a full majority of the judges in order to be carried out.
(2) The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.
(3) The trial shall be held in public. The Trial Chamber may, however, determine that special circumstances require that certain proceedings be in closed session to protect confidential or sensitive information to be given in evidence.
(4) At the commencement of the trial, the Trial Chamber shall have read to the accused the charges. The Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused understands the nature of the charges. It shall afford him or her the opportunity to make an admission of guilt, to plead not guilty or to plead nolo contendere (no contest).
(5) On the grounds that the intentional, bad-faith loss or destruction of material evidence by the prosecution deprives the defendant of due process of law and equal protection of the law, a motion may be called by the Defence Attorney to dismiss the case.

Article XVIII:
(1) Where the accused makes an admission of guilt or pleads nolo contendere (no contest), the Trial Chamber shall determine whether:
(a) The accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission of guilt;
(b) The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient consultation with
defence counsel offered by the Office of Defence.
(2) Where the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the matters referred to in Paragraph 1 are established, it shall consider the admission of guilt, together with any additional evidence presented, as establishing all the essential facts that are required to prove the crime to which the admission of guilt relates, and may convict the accused of that crime.
(3) Where the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the matters referred to in Paragraph 1 are established, it shall consider the admission of guilt as not having been made, in which case it shall order that the trial be continued as an ordinary trial.
(4) Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is required for either party in the interests of justice, in particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may:
(a) Request the Prosecutor and / or the Defence Attorney to present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses;
or
(b) Order that the trial be continued as an ordinary trial, in which case it shall consider the admission of guilt as not having been made.
(5) No person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall they be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself / herself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Article XIX:
(1) The accused shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty before the Court in accordance with the applicable law(s).
(2) The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused and the onus is on the Defence Attorney to prove the innocence of the accused.
(3) In order to convict or not convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt or innocence of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Article XX:
(1) State Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified under this Statute.
(2) State Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions, cooperate as fully as possible with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
 
The Empire, having read the proposal, is for it. We believe this to be a more refined version of the previous Court proposal which effectively addresses and solves all the problems the previous proposal had.
The Kingdom of Esroniet is for this proposal. We applaud the Rose League for including the mention of sentient species in the proposal.
 
Elizabeth addressed the delegation from Navaronia, "the Rose Statute sees no reason to inject itself into the internal policing of a sovereign nation and as such has written in a provision protecting not only sovereign law but also the Criminal Court of Eras from being used to police and bully a nation. Per Article X, Section 7, a 'State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws'. As you can clearly see by this statement, should the Court pursue criminal charges against someone, an arrest warrant will be issued to the nation in question and then it is on them to bring the accused forward to be tried either by their own tribunal or national court or here to be tried by the Criminal Court of Eras."
 
The people of Ceretis in having debated and worked with the Rose League have reached a consensus on the articles of this proposal. So far as can be seen this document contains sufficient check and balance of power, safeguards against abuse, and not only recognizes but upholds the sovereign right of a people and their nation.

At current state with the understanding that has thus far been drawn from review of this document we find this document worthy of promotion.

Therefore for the foreseeable future the people of the Kingdom Republic of Ceretis will accept this proposal.
 
Again addressing the delegation from Navaronia, Elizabeth answered, "any country that declines an arrest warrant from the Court would be in direct violation of Article XX of the Rose Statute that states that 'State Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation' and that 'State Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions, cooperate as fully as possible with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court'. If the country in question will pursue and handle the criminal prosecution themselves, then there is no issue. If however, the country in question chooses to decline the arrest warrant and then does not pursue and handle the criminal prosecution, they will be viewed as having a court system that has failed the due process of law in bringing criminals to justice and letting criminals who have committed injustices against humanity run free. Lastly, should this come to pass and a country ignores the rule of law, keep in mind that that country shall be viewed as less favorable by the world community in not only relations but also in economic investment."
 
Then it is declined. You can't just send in foreign agents to essentially kidnap a citizen from a sovereign nation that you aren't at war with, its not right
 
The Stan Yera, noting the extreme similarity of this proposal to its own, would wish to provide commentary, with notes regarding clauses and articles in contention.

Article I: no contentions

Article II:

1. The Stan Yera objects to the proposed 'Host state' and 'seat of the court'. It would be recommended to either, a) place the Seat of the Court in Tolima, as the founder of the IAN, or b) set up a regular rotation of the Seat of the Court for a set period of time between consenting members of the IAN. We feel that suggestion b would be more amenable, preventing potential corruption of court powers by extended stay in a host country.

2. Does not define headquarters agreement in any explicit terms.

Articles III-VI

III: We do not see legislation preventing various forms of ordnance in an explicit manner, as would be necessary to prevent undue suffering

IV: The Stan Yera finds this use of the word Genocide poorly defined, as it could be applied with little efforts to those countries that act in an imperialist nature, or any two warring countries. It would recommend that the wording be changed to as follows: "Genocide hereafter refers to the targeted and specific mass-killings of any racial/ethnic, religious, national, or ideological group, or obliteration of the aforementioned group's cultural and societal structure for the purposes of that group's extinction"

V: The Stan Yera would note that this article potentially prohibits any killing of another person, even in times of war. The Stan Yera would also note that clause e would prevent martial law being enforced on a country so as to prevent insurrections causing undue suffering. No contention with clauses c, d, and f, though it notes that clause f appears to be mildly vague.

VI: This article appears to completely prohibit killing during times of war, and capturing of Prisoners of War. The Stan Yera would note that the term "fair trial" differs heavily in many countries, and the term might not even be applicable in a select few. We would also note that it would be easy to pass laws in any country preventing Prisoners of War from being moved, and therefore making any such attempt unlawful. The only acceptable clauses in this article are clauses b, d, and e, though it is noted that b is covered in the previous article.

VII: Any crimes of war should be treated on an international scope, and therefore fall under the ICC (or WCT)'s jurisdiction. This article should be rendered void.

VIII-X: The Stan Yera will review these articles further, but has no current contentions.

XI: These sections shall be addressed in further relevant articles.

XII: This article fails to define high moral character, integrity, and impartiality to any extent, and the values which indicate these vague determiners vary from culture to culture. All clauses in this article should be deleted. Instead, consider the proposal for electing justices from the WCT IAN proposal, copied below for convenience.

2.1 The Tribunal shall consist of a number of Justices equal to the number of nations on the Council of Nations plus half of that number (rounding up to the nearest whole integer, where the number of Justices would otherwise not be a whole integer). The nations that make up the Council of Nations will each appoint a Justice, who will serve on the Tribunal for as long as that nation remains on the Council of Nations or until they are removed by the Assembly of Nations; the remaining Justices will be nominated by any of the nations in the Assembly of Nations (save for those that are also on the Council of Nations) and will be appointed by the Secretary-General on confirmation by the vote of a majority of the Council of Nations, they will serve on the Tribunal unless they are removed by the Assembly of Nations.
2.2 The Tribunal include a Head Justice, appointed by the Secretary General from the current panel. The Head Justice may propose rules to govern the proceedings of the Tribunal. Any rules proposed must be approved by the Council of Nations to be effective and must be consistent with the IAN Charter and subsidiary legislation. When the Tribunal is to try any matter, the Head Justice will apoint a number of Justices equal to the number of nations on the Council of Nations, and four fifths of the Justices appointed by the Head Justice must be Justices appointed the Council of Nations as members (unless conflicts or absences prevent such selection, in which case the maximum possible number of Justices appointed by the nations on the Council of Nations will be selected, with the remainder being other Justices).


XIII: This article should be rendered void in consideration of the previous suggestion for election of justices.

XIV: Clause 1 appears to be contradictory to a previous statement, labeling the prosecution as a subsection of the Court. It also unnecessarily prevents outside resources, such as the prosecution's home country, support from other countries in managing the prosecution, and use of any and all evidence, as these originate from an external source.

XV: Clause 1 appears to have the same issue as XIV.1.

XVI: All trials should take place in the seat of the court, so as to prevent corruption. However, if in the case that the seat of the court currently resides in a party relevant to the case, i.e. the prosecution or defense, the seat of the court may be moved to a neutral nation.

XVII: Article 1 is addressed by the proposal in Article XII. Article 2 does not define 'fair trial', as this varies between nations, nor does it define 'rights of the accused', for the same reasons. A counter proposal is instead suggested, from the WCT proposal.

2.3 The Tribunal will be tasked with trying any matter set out in Article 3 of this Charter and determining the validity of the accusations presented. When trying any matter, the Tribunal will hear representations as to facts and law from a single prosecutor and from any defendant, and will hear representations as to law from counsel for any nation in the IAN.
2.4 The Tribunal may return a verdict of guilty, not guilty or not proven, in relation to any matter it is trying. A verdict of guilty will indicate that the accusations have been proven to the Tribunal's satisfaction and will permit the Tribunal to pass sentence in relation to the matter. A verdict of not guilty will indicate that the accusations have been disproven to the Tribunal's satisfaction and the matter will not be subject to further trial. A verdict of not proven will indicate that the accusations have neither been proven nor disproven to the Tribunal's satisfaction and the matter will not be subject to further trial unless new and compelling evidence may lead to a difference outcome. A majority of at least three-fifths of the panel is required to return a verdict, other than a verdict of not proven. A verdict of not proven will be returned if neither of the other verdicts have the requisite majority.

XVIII: Currently no contentions, but will be reviewed by the Stan Yera.

XIX: This may contradict the system of various nations, and infringes on their beliefs, in the case of Clause 1. Clause 2 has no contentions. Clause 3 is addressed in Article XVII.

XX: Any court for the IAN should not be beholden to national laws, as this may infringe on the rights of nations with a differing ideology than the accused or prosecutor. Article 2 has no contention.


The Stan Yera, as it stands, is against the proposal until its concerns can be addressed and met. It does not feel that it rectifies any major inadequacies of the WCT, and instead introduces vague language and several key oversights.
 
Elizabeth addressed the Stan Yera delegation, "before I go into further detail and address your many concerns with this proposal I must point out one major key flaw with your entire argument. The Criminal Court of Eras is not some sub-organization of the International Association of Nations nor is it beholden to answering to the Council of Nations or the Assembly of Nations. As is clearly stated in the proposal's Preamble and in Article I, the goal here was to 'establish an independent and permanent Criminal Court of Eras in relationship with the International Association of Nations, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole'. Furthermore, 'an Criminal Court of Eras (“the Court”) is hereby established. It shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute'. As can be clearly seen by these two points, it is made very clear that the Criminal Court of Eras is an independent entity that works in conjunction with the International Association of Nations and answers to its own internal governing structure as laid out by the Rose Statute. As to your argument against Article II, I was the author of this proposal and for the sake of clarity during the drafting, it was decided upon by myself and my superiors to list the city of Navia-Askontar as the seat of the Court until such time that further discussion could take place among the greater Assembly of Nations. As to your points on Article XII, the entire argument is flawed and I see no reason to argue it further as it clearly ignores the provisions set forth in the Preamble and Article I in that the Court is fully independent from the International Association of Nations. Should I have wanted this criminal court to be some political witch hunt, I would have backed your proposal and not gone out of my way to create a counter proposal that is more fair in its treatment of sovereign law and in dealing with crimes against humanity. As I have stated multiple times already, this Court is not beholden to the International Association of Nations and as such, that is the key reason it holds national laws in such high regard; it sees no reason to get involved or intervene in a sovereign countries affairs if that country is perfectly capable of handling a war criminals prosecution of injustices against humanity. Lastly, I shall review the rest of your arguments against this proposal and get back to you soon."
 
The Stan Yera must question that if the ICC as you claim is not beholden to the IAN, why it was crafted into a proposal to be placed before the IAN assembly? That simply makes no sense. Furthermore, your explicit and baseless slander against our nation's proposal is unnecessary to the extreme. This only deepens our conviction against your proposal. If you are unprepared to answer our complaints as to your proposal in their entirety, then do not immediately attack one section in a contradictory manner and then slander the nation voicing its complaints.
 
Elizabeth listened intently as the Stan Yera delegate criticized her actions and her proposal before answering, "the reason that the Rose Statute of the Criminal Court of Eras was brought before the Assembly was that it ties directly into the very goal of this organization which as stated in its very charter was to 'facilitate a better world whereby the rule of law and rights of all are respected'. As to why I made it so abundantly clear that I wanted the Court to have nothing to do with the organization or be beholden to it? For the very simple reason that there are nations here who would seek to use it for political gains which can very easily lead to witch hunts against nations that are in disagreement. You yourself openly admitted that your proposed Tribunal was by its very nature a political tool. I am trying to change that mindset and create a Court that can prosecute injustices against humanity without falling into the pitfall of political squabbling. As to why I did not critique your entire response was due to the simple fact that I wanted to point out the fundamental flaw in your argument and reasoning in how your proposed changes would gut the very thing that makes this proposed Court stand apart from your proposed Tribunal. Now... onto more pressing matters, to address your concerns with my proposal..."

MacSalterson:
Article I: no contentions

No comment.

MacSalterson:
Article II:

1. The Stan Yera objects to the proposed 'Host state' and 'seat of the court'. It would be recommended to either, a) place the Seat of the Court in Tolima, as the founder of the IAN, or b) set up a regular rotation of the Seat of the Court for a set period of time between consenting members of the IAN. We feel that suggestion b would be more amenable, preventing potential corruption of court powers by extended stay in a host country.

2. Does not define headquarters agreement in any explicit terms.

I am personally against the moving of the court every single time we hold an election but I would be open to the possibility of having the Court sit in Tolima. I do ask you this... why do you feel Tolima would make a better Seat of the Court than The Rose League?

MacSalterson:
III: We do not see legislation preventing various forms of ordnance in an explicit manner, as would be necessary to prevent undue suffering

Do you believe that if you ban a stick or a rock that nobody can find a substitute of equal or greater destructive force? Should we label all items, sub items and such of every caliber and weapon or should we use reason and set parameters? There is no need for a list of specific weapons unless you are seeking to ban competition for particular arms your nation sells.

MacSalterson:
IV: The Stan Yera finds this use of the word Genocide poorly defined, as it could be applied with little efforts to those countries that act in an imperialist nature, or any two warring countries. It would recommend that the wording be changed to as follows: "Genocide hereafter refers to the targeted and specific mass-killings of any racial/ethnic, religious, national, or ideological group, or obliteration of the aforementioned group's cultural and societal structure for the purposes of that group's extinction"

I am always open to re-writing sections of the proposals text however I feel that the concepts of A, B, C and D should still be included in this article.

MacSalterson:
V: The Stan Yera would note that this article potentially prohibits any killing of another person, even in times of war. The Stan Yera would also note that clause e would prevent martial law being enforced on a country so as to prevent insurrections causing undue suffering. No contention with clauses c, d, and f, though it notes that clause f appears to be mildly vague.

War is 'lawful' unless it is undeclaraed or brought about by those who do not hold a position of authority. If a war is going to be defined as extermination, I direct your attention to Article IV which details genocide. Section E could be re-written and changed to say lawful and furthermore there could be a set duration put in place. Section F is already mentioned in Article V where each term is defined.

MacSalterson:
VI: This article appears to completely prohibit killing during times of war, and capturing of Prisoners of War. The Stan Yera would note that the term "fair trial" differs heavily in many countries, and the term might not even be applicable in a select few. We would also note that it would be easy to pass laws in any country preventing Prisoners of War from being moved, and therefore making any such attempt unlawful. The only acceptable clauses in this article are clauses b, d, and e, though it is noted that b is covered in the previous article.

As I have said before, I am open to re-writing sections of the Rose Statute. In the case of Article VI, the following changes could be made:
(a) change willful to unlawful killing
(c) unrelated to the usual manner of war
(f) terms could be set or further defined for the treatment of prisoners during war
(g) change willful to unlawful
(h) taking civilians hostage, and failure to release prisoners of war as agreed by arrangement or failure to release all prisoners of war following cessation of war or armistice as agreed especially to use them as a bargaining chit

MacSalterson:
VII: Any crimes of war should be treated on an international scope, and therefore fall under the ICC (or WCT)'s jurisdiction. This article should be rendered void.

We view this a total fallacy to override a sovereign nation and deny their judicial system of prosecuting a war criminal. It is fully within the right of a sovereign nation to enforce its laws and having the Court intervene is a direct violation of sovereign law. As the Rose Statute makes clear, the Court will only intervene when a nations judicial system is "unable" or "unwilling" to prosecute a war criminal.

MacSalterson:
VIII-X: The Stan Yera will review these articles further, but has no current contentions.

No comment.

MacSalterson:
XI: These sections shall be addressed in further relevant articles.

No comment.

MacSalterson:
XII: This article fails to define high moral character, integrity, and impartiality to any extent, and the values which indicate these vague determiners vary from culture to culture. All clauses in this article should be deleted. Instead, consider the proposal for electing justices from the WCT IAN proposal, copied below for convenience.

2.1 The Tribunal shall consist of a number of Justices equal to the number of nations on the Council of Nations plus half of that number (rounding up to the nearest whole integer, where the number of Justices would otherwise not be a whole integer). The nations that make up the Council of Nations will each appoint a Justice, who will serve on the Tribunal for as long as that nation remains on the Council of Nations or until they are removed by the Assembly of Nations; the remaining Justices will be nominated by any of the nations in the Assembly of Nations (save for those that are also on the Council of Nations) and will be appointed by the Secretary-General on confirmation by the vote of a majority of the Council of Nations, they will serve on the Tribunal unless they are removed by the Assembly of Nations.
2.2 The Tribunal include a Head Justice, appointed by the Secretary General from the current panel. The Head Justice may propose rules to govern the proceedings of the Tribunal. Any rules proposed must be approved by the Council of Nations to be effective and must be consistent with the IAN Charter and subsidiary legislation. When the Tribunal is to try any matter, the Head Justice will apoint a number of Justices equal to the number of nations on the Council of Nations, and four fifths of the Justices appointed by the Head Justice must be Justices appointed the Council of Nations as members (unless conflicts or absences prevent such selection, in which case the maximum possible number of Justices appointed by the nations on the Council of Nations will be selected, with the remainder being other Justices).

This has already been addressed in my previous remarks. You wish to gut and change the very thing that sets this Court apart from your proposed Tribunal.

MacSalterson:
XIII: This article should be rendered void in consideration of the previous suggestion for election of justices.

See comment above.

MacSalterson:
XIV: Clause 1 appears to be contradictory to a previous statement, labeling the prosecution as a subsection of the Court. It also unnecessarily prevents outside resources, such as the prosecution's home country, support from other countries in managing the prosecution, and use of any and all evidence, as these originate from an external source.

The Office of the Prosecutor is both both of the Criminal Court of Eras an independent entity within the Court to allow it to act with impartiality and with a neutral viewpoint. Section 1 of this Article does not prohibit the Prosecutor from using external resources; it is designed to protect the Prosecutor from being influenced by outside sources that may try to use the Office as a way of swinging a criminal prosecution.

MacSalterson:
XV: Clause 1 appears to have the same issue as XIV.1.

See comment above.

MacSalterson:
XVI: All trials should take place in the seat of the court, so as to prevent corruption. However, if in the case that the seat of the court currently resides in a party relevant to the case, i.e. the prosecution or defense, the seat of the court may be moved to a neutral nation.

This has already been clarified by Article II.

MacSalterson:
XVII: Article 1 is addressed by the proposal in Article XII. Article 2 does not define 'fair trial', as this varies between nations, nor does it define 'rights of the accused', for the same reasons. A counter proposal is instead suggested, from the WCT proposal.

2.3 The Tribunal will be tasked with trying any matter set out in Article 3 of this Charter and determining the validity of the accusations presented. When trying any matter, the Tribunal will hear representations as to facts and law from a single prosecutor and from any defendant, and will hear representations as to law from counsel for any nation in the IAN.
2.4 The Tribunal may return a verdict of guilty, not guilty or not proven, in relation to any matter it is trying. A verdict of guilty will indicate that the accusations have been proven to the Tribunal's satisfaction and will permit the Tribunal to pass sentence in relation to the matter. A verdict of not guilty will indicate that the accusations have been disproven to the Tribunal's satisfaction and the matter will not be subject to further trial. A verdict of not proven will indicate that the accusations have neither been proven nor disproven to the Tribunal's satisfaction and the matter will not be subject to further trial unless new and compelling evidence may lead to a difference outcome. A majority of at least three-fifths of the panel is required to return a verdict, other than a verdict of not proven. A verdict of not proven will be returned if neither of the other verdicts have the requisite majority.

As to the first point about a fair trial... a fair trial is a neutral trial conducted to accord each party to the proceeding their due process rights. The right to such a trial applies to both civil and criminal proceedings.

As to the second point, this has already been addressed in my previous remarks. You wish to gut and change the very thing that sets this Court apart from your proposed Tribunal.

MacSalterson:
XVIII: Currently no contentions, but will be reviewed by the Stan Yera.

No comment.

MacSalterson:
XIX: This may contradict the system of various nations, and infringes on their beliefs, in the case of Clause 1. Clause 2 has no contentions. Clause 3 is addressed in Article XVII.

If a country chooses not to turn a war criminal over to the Court, but instead chooses to prosecute the crimes themselves in their own valid court system, then Article XIX does not apply as the Rose Statute prohibits its provisions from superseding those of a sovereign nation. It is only when the Court is the one prosecuting a war criminal that Article XIX comes into play.

MacSalterson:
XX: Any court for the IAN should not be beholden to national laws, as this may infringe on the rights of nations with a differing ideology than the accused or prosecutor. Article 2 has no contention.

This has already been addressed in my previous remarks.
 
Given that this proposal is entirely irrelevant to the IAN, the August Consular Office has decided not to preclude itself from commentary under our continuing commitment to nuclear disarmament. We would also point out that the continuing insistence on banning such things as "imprisonment" and "appropriation of property" whilst also refusing to explicitly ban WMDs is a purely ideological one by a nation that retains its ostensible neutrality through kowtowing to the regimes that use the threat of genocide to protect themselves from righteous retribution for their sins.

We have no reason to consider the ICC as anything other than an extension of the Rose League's soft-power doctrine, given that the Court is not only hosted by Kalti as a matter of its charter, but is also intentionally removed from the actual purview of the IAN in favour of unilateral administration.

The fatal flaws of this proposal are easily rectified by simply failing to ratify the proposal, and as a result Imperium has no interest in protecting incompetent administrations from their own folly. We have, as a result, decided not to make any substantial suggestions to amend the charter - especially given that the Rose League has been, so far, entirely uninterested in seeking compromise with the Stan Yera delegation when the Stan Yera delegation showed an extraordinary level of cooperation with the August commentary on their own proposal.

We will, however, make the following administrative statement.

The August Consular Office believes there is no legal reasoning that would justify discarding either this, or the Stan Yeran proposal, on the basis of the passage of the other. Neither proposal seems to suggest legal exclusivity between the two, and as this proposal actively eschews the IAN, both can easily come into force simultaneously. In fact, given that the ICC must apparently be ratified on a per-member basis to even attempt to take effect, and goes as far as to place the entirity of its chartered institution in the Rose League, it is effectively a unilateral statement using the Rose League's Council seat as a soapbox.

The August government would also be interested in knowing why the Rose League saught out a Council seat, if their intention is not only to fail to reform the IAN, but to use the IAN to affect the passage of institutions that are explicitly unrelated to the structures of the IAN.

OOC: Secondly, could you pick an original name? NS isn't exactly on good terms with international non-government organizations, and also I have only so much suspension of disbelief, much of which was spent on Caesar Augustus.
 
The Grim Reaper:
Given that this proposal is entirely irrelevant to the IAN, the August Consular Office has decided not to preclude itself from commentary under our continuing commitment to nuclear disarmament. We would also point out that the continuing insistence on banning such things as "imprisonment" and "appropriation of property" whilst also refusing to explicitly ban WMDs is a purely ideological one by a nation that retains its ostensible neutrality through kowtowing to the regimes that use the threat of genocide to protect themselves from righteous retribution for their sins.

As I had stated to the delegate from the Stan Yera, this proposal was not written nor was it designed to constrain weapons of war. This Court was designed with one goal and one goal only, the prosecution of injustices against humanity through the acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Expanding this Court's power to start banning weapons of war leads to a path of dictating to countries what they can and cannot use during a war. While we applaud your nations dedication to nuclear disarmament, again I feel no need to turn this Court over to dictating to nations how many WMD's they should or should not have, that should be left for its own treaty dealing with that specific subject.

The Grim Reaper:
We have no reason to consider the ICC as anything other than an extension of the Rose League's soft-power doctrine, given that the Court is not only hosted by Kalti as a matter of its charter, but is also intentionally removed from the actual purview of the IAN in favour of unilateral administration.

This is a proposal under discussion; while you point out that Kalti is the current host nation of the Court, do keep in mind that should any nation here wish to propose one of their cities as the Seat of the Court, I am more than open to hearing their reasoning on why and having a further discussion of who should host the Court.

The Grim Reaper:
The fatal flaws of this proposal are easily rectified by simply failing to ratify the proposal, and as a result Imperium has no interest in protecting incompetent administrations from their own folly. We have, as a result, decided not to make any substantial suggestions to amend the charter - especially given that the Rose League has been, so far, entirely uninterested in seeking compromise with the Stan Yera delegation when the Stan Yera delegation showed an extraordinary level of cooperation with the August commentary on their own proposal.

My grievances with the proposal from the Stan Yera are my own and I have already made clear my viewpoints on the proposal. To treat national and sovereign law in such low regard is an affront to something we in The Rose League hold dear and I, at this time, do not see a clear path forward in working with a proposal whose very nature and heart is to dictate to countries how to conduct matters of state and how to deal with the prosecution of war criminals. Seeing as the delegate from the Stan Yera came before me and this proposal and told me to destroy and void the very things that makes the Criminal Court of Eras stand apart from the War Crimes Tribunal is part of why I do not see a clear path towards compromise.

The Grim Reaper:
We will, however, make the following administrative statement.

The August Consular Office believes there is no legal reasoning that would justify discarding either this, or the Stan Yeran proposal, on the basis of the passage of the other. Neither proposal seems to suggest legal exclusivity between the two, and as this proposal actively eschews the IAN, both can easily come into force simultaneously. In fact, given that the ICC must apparently be ratified on a per-member basis to even attempt to take effect, and goes as far as to place the entirety of its chartered institution in the Rose League, it is effectively a unilateral statement using the Rose League's Council seat as a soapbox.

The August government would also be interested in knowing why the Rose League saught out a Council seat, if their intention is not only to fail to reform the IAN, but to use the IAN to affect the passage of institutions that are explicitly unrelated to the structures of the IAN.

We sought out a Council seat with the goal of helping the International Association of Nations attain its goal as stated in its charter whereby the rule of law and rights of all are respected. It is why I came forth with not only this proposal for a Criminal Court of Eras but also a Universal Declaration of Human and Sentient Species Rights. I feel that this court can attain the goal of respecting the rule of law much more highly than the War Crimes Tribunal can due to the fact that you so rightly point out. By not tying the Criminal Court of Eras so closely to the International Association of Nations, it will not get bogged down in petty politics and can focus more freely on its goal of seeking out and prosecuting criminals. The very nature of the War Crimes Tribunal means that there will always exist a level of political bias from the nations that sit on the Council and appoint judges. By severing that political tie and forcing all judges of the Criminal Court of Eras to be of impartial character and nominated by the ranks of all signatory parties, it is the Statute's goal to see trials run in a more fair and even manner.
 
The August Consular Office has considered inviting nomination and sponsorships for this legislation to go to vote, and has decided to do so.

We would ask that the author themselves nominate their proposal for vote, and then receive a sponsorship and a seconding sponsorship on the nomination before the proposal is put to vote.
 
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