The Constitution establishes that the Regional Assembly has the authority to create the rules for its governance, and that it is the duty of the Speaker to administer those rules. Where there is vagueness as to procedure, or when situations arise which are not covered by those rules, or by superseding ones within the Constitution, Legal Code, or Bill of Rights, the Speaker is empowered to act as they see fit within the best interests of the region. Previous Courts have interpreted this power broadly, upholding the Speaker's broad authority to maintain an appropriate atmosphere, promote a productive use of the Regional Assembly, and block proposals and votes which they deem harmful. While the relevant law has changed since the previous decision, prompting us to take this case, upon investigation the underlying principles have not.
We uphold the previous rulings in full, and reiterate that disagreements over best interests can be solved via recall motions. The Court is not the appropriate body to resolve such disputes.
As in the review of a Speaker's decision to end debate, we find the Speaker's power broad, but not unlimited. While the Speaker may refuse to tolerate something harmful, it is not a legitimate use of their power to capriciously stifle any and all debate. Two things therefore matter in this instance: the content of the proposal in question, and the severity of the Speaker's crackdown.
The proposal previously reviewed, which attempted to ban an individual legislatively, was determined to be controversial, to have prompted "not-insignificant" responses from the moderation team including multiple warnings (a status which we shall term "flammability"), to lack merit, to lack viability, and to lack legality. This is not a precedential, exhaustive list of instances where a Speaker is well within their rights to block a debate or vote, and the Speaker's Office is not obliged to use or refer to it for any future issue. There are, however, a number of similarities between that case and this one which help clarify our decision.
- Controversy: The Religious Exclusion Act is one in a series of legislation which have provoked a great deal of uproar about the relationship between religion and government in TNP. Like Chasmanthe's bill, this one was not introduced innocent of any knowledge of the controversy that would accompany it, but rather in full awareness and with the intent to provoke it further. It is, therefore, highly controversial.
- Flammability: A number of warnings have been handed out for escalating or outrageous behavior during the tangled course of these debates, including one to the author of this bill in a previous thread and one to another participant in the debate on this specific bill. It is, therefore, highly flammable.
- Merit: The subtitle of this post is "For the sake of silliness and fun", and the author of this bill describes it as "hysterically entertaining", "meaningless", and "unenforceable". Other posters within the thread regard it similarly. The Court is happy to agree with everyone that this proposal lacks merit.
- Viability: The majority of posters within the thread in question are opposed to the proposal, and several commented on their annoyance. It seems safe to conclude that this proposal has no viability, and would not have attained a majority at vote.
- Legality: Many of the clauses of this bill are direct violations of the bill of rights, but they are contradicted by a clause which states, essentially, that if made law this bill would not have the force of law. This is unestablished in precedent, and it is not clear that it can legally be done or how it interacts with any sworn oath to obey the law. The legality of this proposal is therefore, at best, questionable.
Based on these five criteria, the Court determines that this proposal is easily one which falls within the reasonable right of the Speaker to shut down.
As for the severity of the Speaker's response and whether any rights have been violated, the Speaker opted not to stop the debate but simply to block the proposal from going to vote. The Court therefore examined the existing voting rules. As established through testimony, current RA procedure is divided into two parts, and the two parts hold different legal weight. That portion of it which is contained within the Rules of the Regional Assembly was established by a majority vote as allowed for under Article 7, Clause 11 of the Constitution, and the Speaker is obligated to apply it as written. However, that which is contained within the Speaker's Standing Policies is entirely discretionary, and the Speaker has the power to alter its application when such is deemed necessary.
Formal debate, the rules surrounding it, and the decision to move a proposal through that stage and into a vote, fall entirely within the Speaker's discretionary procedures. They would be equally as free to put bills to vote based on the flip of a coin or a well-written original sonnet asking them to do so. While there is a written procedure, it is provided as a courtesy to RA members so they know what to expect most of the time - it is not intended or presented as a promise. The Speaker is free to deviate from their written procedures as they wish.
There exists within the Rules of the Regional Assembly a means for RA members to overrule the Speaker's discretionary policies and insist that a piece of legislation go to vote. Because the RA has the power to send something to vote even over the Speaker's objections, the use of this discretionary power does not constitute a violation of a nation's right to speech or right to vote. Procedural options are available - when the Speaker chooses to refuse any discretionary vote, they can be accused of nothing more severe than obstructionism.
Taken together, the Court concludes as follows:
1. The Speaker's option to refuse a discretionary vote is entirely legal and can be used at any time. The Speaker may deviate from the Standing Procedures at any point, provided that the deviation is not a violation of any other law or policy and does not infringe on any rights.
2. If, at any point, the Speaker determines that allowing a debate to continue is not in the best interests of the region, we concur with the previous Court that they have an obligation to put an end to it.
