Ruling of the Court of the North Pacific
In regards to the Judicial Inquiry filed by r3naissanc3r regarding whether or not Court decisions are irrefutably binding, as well as an ancillary question put for by Crushing Our Enemies regarding the scope of the Court's review powers
Opinion drafted by Gaspo, joined by Hileville and Sanctaria
The Court took into consideration the Inquiry filed here by r3naissanc3r, and the follow-up posted by Crushing Our Enemies.
The Court took into consideration the following elements of Article 4 of the Constitution of the North Pacific:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
. . .
4. The official opinion of the Court in any trial or review will be binding on all Government bodies and officials.
The Court opines the following:
The Court has before it two issues, tangentially related but submitted loosely together. The Court will first address Crushing Our Enemies' inquiry regarding the ability of this Court to review the policies of other elements of the government.
Crushing Our Enemies:
I would ask that the court take into consideration Article 4, clause 1:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
It would be preposterous to opine that the court has the power to "resolve conflicts and ambiguities" and "review the legality" in and of every law or policy except the ones the court itself has created.
This request has two interpretations: depending upon where one places the emphasis, and whether or not one comprehends sarcasm, it may either be taken on its face, as suggesting that the Court cannot review anything other than its own opinions. We first address this interpretation.
The Court finds no merit in this position as stated. The Court has been specifically charged with reviewing government policies, and no reason has been given in support of the assertion that this Court cannot review other the policies and actions of other elements of the government, upon request. The Courts are granted this power to provide a balance against abuses of power, and to provide recourse to allow citizens to have their grievances addressed by a neutral party.
Under COE's proposed interpretation, the Court would have no purpose, as it would only be permitted to conduct criminal and civil trials, and clarify ambiguity. It would not be able to hold elected officials accountable for their actions, or determine whether or not policies are in accordance with the Constitution; these powers of judicial review are essential to the operation of the court and the balanced structure of democracy within a 3-branch system.
The Court rejects COE's assertion, and maintains that, subject to the request of an affected party, it may review and offer its legal opinion on any action, policy, law, rule, or decision made by any government official.
If, however, the statement is interpreted differently, to point out the inherent contradiction in the Court's power to review all government policies and decisions except its own (despite the Court being itself a part of the government), then we wholeheartedly agree with the stated proposition. The Court believes COE's intent was such, and holds that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is
obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise (and a proper request be made - arbitrary requests for review every time a new Court is elected are not permissible), as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's meaning, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, as discussed below.
Turning to r3naissanc3r's request for review, the Court recognizes that r3n's proposed interpretation is the most literal, most restrictive view which may be taken of this Court's freedom regarding past decisions. While this Court places strong importance on precedent, and is exceedingly hesitant to overturn it even in part, the interests of justice and the evolution of the law require that the Court be able to overturn precedent where appropriate. At one point, for example, FALCONKATS as Special Assistant Attorney General
refused to bring any civil case before the Court, asserting (in direct contradiction with the Constitution) that the Court was exclusively able to hear criminal matters. Let's say that were appealed, and the Court erroneously upheld his decision. Under r3n's proposal, that would stand
forever. The only means of bypassing it, would be for the Regional Assembly to pass a law saying that the Constitution says something that it already said in the first place. Inescapable binding in Court decisions would not advance the interests of Justice.
Let's look at another example to illustrate this. Suppose a Counsel submits an Affidavit as evidence in a current trial. Affidavits are neither permitted nor barred, currently - they are not discussed in the current Court Rules. Let's say that this Affidavit was submitted, and objected to, and the objection was upheld. It was then appealed, and the Court opined that Affidavits were not permissible. That would be binding
forever. Ah, you say, but the legislature could legislate around that, thus restoring balance! You would be wrong. The RA would not be able to change the rules, because evidentiary concerns are addressed in the Court Rules, which only the Court can change. And the Courts would not be able to contradict binding precedent, thus permanently barring Affidavits from
ever being used in TNP Courts. The law must be allowed to evolve to match society, and conclusively binding decisions carry with them the potential to greatly restrict the ability of the law, and the Court, to adjust with the times.
The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned
sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court's discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.
In other words, the Court must explain itself fully when overturning precedent. The Court must try, wherever possible, to act in accordance with precedent, so long as that precedent does not conflict with new law, or the fundamental principles of justice established by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
To specifically answer r3n's questions, the binding effect prescribed by the Constitution applies to the Court to the extent that it does not bring the Court's precedent into conflict with the Constitution or with subsequent substantive law. The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to "look again"), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.
Ruling Delivered on 20 February 2013