Review: Binding effects of court decisions

Gaspo

Gaspo

TNPer
See HERE

So looking first to post 2 in that thread, COE's thing, because it's easy:
I would ask that the court take into consideration Article 4, clause 1:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
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It would be preposterous to opine that the court has the power to "resolve conflicts and ambiguities" and "review the legality" in and of every law or policy except the ones the court itself has created.
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No. Just no. He's asking us to only be able to review the policies of our own branch, and nothing else. Completely undermines the principle of judicial review, and the checks and balances our governmental system proposes. No. We can't necessarily do it sua sponte (on our own, unasked) but we can certainly review anything brought to us in a request.

Regarding the major point raised by r3n, judicial best practices say no. We can't be bound by prior courts, conclusively. It should be, and I believe is, implied in our charge as judges that we must evaluate policies based on their wording, and the impact they will have. Being blindly bound by previous rulings would result in a situation where a ruling made prior to a game mechancis change, or a change in the law, might be irrevocably binding, and that is not good. I agree with PunkD, that we ought to be able to overrule stuff as long as we explain why, and we ought to try to avoid it wherever possible, but requiring us to be conclusively bound by all prior precedent, rather than simply heavily persuaded by it, is not smart. It gives the court no ability to adapt to the changing needs and structure of the region and its laws.

Let's say we rule on, say, the admissibility of a certain type of evidence, because we don't think its form is acceptable. Affidavits, say - let's decide we don't want affidavits to be admissible as testimony. I submitted one in TNP v. JAL, and PunkD didn't object, but let's say he had. I would have appealed any decision that went against me, to the full court. We could easily have ruled we didn't want those to be admissible, because they violate the spirit of the process or whatever. That position could never, ever be changed. Ever. It would have the same binding force as the constitution, and the Legislative branch would have to attempt to legislate court rules in order to make it admissible. Except they can't, because the Court sets its own rules, and can't change its mind later, as circumstances change.

This is bad. I can't think of a single court, anywhere, that lacks the power to overturn precedent with subsequent rulings. Bad.

I'm interested in hearing more opinions before I draft a decision.
 
I'm with you. As I said elsewhere, while I think precedent can be important, we shouldn't blindly follow it. I think it'd be good policy for the Court to strongly consider any relevant precedent in a case before it, but we must have the ability to defer from that precedent. Of course in any situation we do so, explaining why is vital.

As for COE's question, I'm not entirely sure I understand where it's coming from. The Court is explicitly given the power of judicial review over government policies and laws passed by the RA. I don't understand why he thinks it only applies to policies made by the court.
 
I am in complete agreement with the both of you on this. COE's question was worded very poorly. I think what he was trying to get across is that there is no way that the Court can't review it's own rulings down the road.

I can draft a ruling on this tomorrow morning.
 
I got bored. Thoughts?

The Court has before it two issues, tangentially related but submitted loosely together. The Court will first address Crushing Our Enemies’ inquiry regarding the ability of this Court to review the policies of other elements of the government.
Crushing Our Enemies:
I would ask that the court take into consideration Article 4, clause 1:
1. The Court will try all criminal and civil cases, resolve conflicts or ambiguities in the law, and review the constitutionality of laws or legality of government policies by request of an affected party.
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It would be preposterous to opine that the court has the power to "resolve conflicts and ambiguities" and "review the legality" in and of every law or policy except the ones the court itself has created.
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The Court finds no merit in this position as stated. The Court has been specifically charged with reviewing government policies, and no reason has been given in support of the assertion that this Court cannot review other the policies and actions of other elements of the government, upon request. The Courts are granted this power to provide a balance against abuses of power, and to provide recourse to allow citizens to have their grievances addressed by a neutral party.

Under COE’s proposed interpretation, the Court would have no purpose, as it would only be permitted to conduct criminal and civil trials, and clarify ambiguity. It would not be able to hold elected officials accountable for their actions, or determine whether or not policies are in accordance with the Constitution; these powers of judicial review are essential to the operation of the court and the balanced structure of democracy within a 3-branch system.

The Court rejects COE’s assertion, and maintains that, subject to the request of an affected party, it may review and offer its legal opinion on any action, policy, law, rule, or decision made by any government official.

It is of note, however, that the Court believes COE may have been suggesting that, as specifically mandated by that Article, the Court is obliged to review its own decisions should the need arise, as it is responsible for doing with all governmental policies. If, as we suspect, that was COE's intent, then this Court wholeheartedly agrees, with some caveats, discussed below.

Turning to r3naissanc3r’s request for review, the Court recognizes that r3n’s proposed interpretation is the most literal, most restrictive view which may be taken of this Court’s freedom regarding past decisions. While this Court places strong importance on precedent, and is exceedingly hesitant to overturn it even in part, the interests of justice and the evolution of the law require that the Court be able to overturn precedent where appropriate. At one point, for example, FALCONKATS as Special Assistant Attorney General refused to bring any civil case before the Court, asserting (in direct contradiction with the Constitution) that the Court was exclusively able to hear criminal matters. Let’s say that were appealed, and the Court erroneously upheld his decision. Under r3n’s proposal, that would stand forever. The only means of bypassing it, would be for the Regional Assembly to pass a law saying that the Constitution says something that it already said in the first place. Inescapable binding in Court decisions would not advance the interests of Justice.

Let’s look at another example to illustrate this. Suppose a Counsel submits an Affidavit as evidence in a current trial. Affidavits are neither permitted nor barred, currently – they are not discussed in the current Court Rules. Let’s say that this Affidavit was submitted, and objected to, and the objection was upheld. It was then appealed, and the Court opined that Affidavits were not permissible. That would be binding forever. Ah, you say, but the legislature could legislate around that, thus restoring balance! You would be wrong. The RA would not be able to change the rules, because evidentiary concerns are addressed in the Court Rules, which only the Court can change. And the Courts would not be able to contradict binding precedent, thus permanently barring Affidavits from ever being used in TNP Courts. The law must be allowed to evolve to match society, and conclusively binding decisions carry with them the potential to greatly restrict the ability of the law, and the Court, to adjust with the times.

The Court does not believe, however, that precedent may be overturned sua sponte (unilaterally, at the Court’s discretion, without an action being brought), nor do we believe that precedent may be disregarded unless it is conclusively overturned. We furthermore believe that a heightened standard of review must be followed when reviewing the decisions of a previous Court, out of respect and deference to the law as established by our predecessors. Should it come to pass that precedent must be overturned, this Court believes that that decision must only be made after all legal alternatives have been examined, and must be done in as transparent and explanatory a fashion as possible.

In other words, the Court must explain itself fully when overturning precedent. The Court must try, wherever possible, to act in accordance with precedent, so long as that precedent does not conflict with new law, or the fundamental principles of justice established by the Constitution and Bill of Rights.

To specifically answer r3n’s questions, the binding effect prescribed by the Constitution applies to the Court to the extent that it does not bring the Court’s precedent into conflict with the Constitution or with subsequent substantive law. The Court may overturn its prior rulings, but must do so in response to a new request as a result of some factual evolution (not simply a request to “look again”), and must do so concurrent with the publication of its reasoning in doing so. The Court must avoid disregarding precedent wherever possible, but cannot, in the interests of justice and fairness, be irrefutably bound by precedent regardless of the consequences.
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