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The Limitations of Airpower in Kosovo
Operation: Allied Force was a NATO operation, which began on 24 March 1999, and lasted until 10 June 1999. The operation was a show of force by the NATO Alliance, in order to halt a reported mass genocide by the Serbians against ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region. These accusations were systematically denied by Milosevic, president of Serbia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)). President Bill Clinton claimed
“[NATO’s air] strikes have three main objectives: First, to demonstrate NATO’s serious opposition to aggression, and it’s support for peace. Second, to deter and prevent President Milosevic from escalating his attacks on civilians by imposing a price for those attacks. And third, if necessary, to damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future, and seriously diminishing its military capabilities.” (Clinton)
Operation: Allied Force, and the bombings of the FRY, was a partial failure in completing these objectives. The choice by NATO to use air power exclusively made the objective of stopping the genocide in Kosovo very difficult. Operation: Allied Force demonstrated that the exclusive use of airpower is ineffective due to the difficulty of distinguishing between friendly, hostile, and civilian targets, and the inability of air power alone to eliminate a ground force. In addition, Allied Force ignored the key Gulf War lesson of the extreme effectiveness of combined air and ground power.
NATO chose to get involved in Kosovo following reports of genocide and ethnic cleansing similar to those seen in Bosnia and Croatia. Diplomatic efforts were launched, in an effort to deter the FRY from continuing these actions, called for an urgent end to the atrocities, and demanded that the FRY withdraw from Kosovo. These demands were refused by Milosevic’s regime, and NATO elected that the alliance must engage in a ‘show of force’ campaign. The member nations were unanimous on the decision of intervention, but many nations (particularly France, Germany, Hungary, and Poland) were vigorously opposed to any kind of ground war, out of fear of backlash from the Russians. NATO elected that the most effective way to stop Milosevic’s military was through a limited air campaign, using precision guided munitions (Lottman).
The choice to use exclusively use air power seemed like an excellent decision in the political sphere. Even among civilians, the myth of the precision and invulnerability of allied aircraft popularized by the movie “Top Gun” was rampant. Many, even those in the Pentagon, felt the operation would only take a couple of days. The image of precision weapons and fast flying, graceful aircraft overlooked several important factors. A retired Colonel, Army Colonel Carl Bernard, claims that “an attack from the air can be easily escaped by well prepared troops operating in familiar territory,” (Lottman). This was essentially the situation which the FRY units were in. It is very difficult for aircraft to eliminate a ground force. In order for Allied Force to be successful, NATO had to eliminate a sufficient number of FRY forces to halt the effectiveness of ethnic cleansing, and force the withdrawal of FRY forces. This would prove to be extremely difficult due to the nature of airpower, and the scope of Operation: Allied Force.
Allied Force ignored important Gulf War lessons. According to Air Force General Richard Howley “Air power works best when it's used decisively” (Crawley). This was far from what the strategy was in Kosovo. “During the Gulf War… the allied coalition flew 118,000 sorties, 42,000 of which were air strikes. By comparison, NATO in its first five weeks flew 11,000 sorties against Yugoslavia, which included 4,400 airstrikes” (Crawley) In short, the air war in Kosovo was very restrained, as compared to the Gulf War. During the campaign in Iraq, Saddam Husain was quickly overrun by a combined and very well coordinated air and ground offensive. Husain also possessed a far greater number of troops than Milosevic did. Since this air war was limited in nature, and restrained, this allowed the FRY to not only strengthen their forces in Kosovo, but intensify the attacks on ethnic Albanians. Finally, even though the FRY was being struck on a regular basis by NATO, “President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia [gave] no sign that he [was] ready to initial the Rambouillet agreement” (Heisbourg). Since NATO said right from the start of the operation that they would not go all out into the campaign, it gave Milosevic an illusion that he could “ride out the storm” so to speak. His refusal to comply with the Ramboulliet agreement, despite being pounded by NATO air strikes demonstrated that the genocide would be next to impossible to stop without the aid of ground forces.
Without troops on the ground, many of the ethnic Albanians did not have a safe haven to go to. There were no “safe havens” established, which meant there was no shelter from FRY atrocities, or accidental bombings from NATO aircraft (Lottman). From 5000 feet, a line of fleeing refugees looks similar to a line of marching troops, making proper identification extremely difficult for the pilots. In order for the operation to be effective, the pilots had to be able to make that distinction, since it meant the difference between killing civilians and killing the enemy. When the risk of killing civilians was involved, many times pilots wave off, and do not engage. This allowed many FRY light infantry units to remain untouched by NATO aircraft (Hinman). Once it was determined, however, that a very large majority of the refugees had fled the country, NATO was able to intensify attacks against the FRY forces. This strategy could have been avoided initially, had NATO been able to designate safe havens within Kosovo. On the other hand, with the escalation of the campaign, Milosevic began to feel the real pressure of NATO air power.
As the war in Kosovo drew to a close, NATO painted an image of a decisive victory. They had achieved the FRY withdrawl from Kosovo, and claimed to have caused the destruction of 120 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 200 Armored Personnel Carriers (APC), and the deaths of between 5000 and 10,000 troops. Observers of the withdrawl of FRY troops noticed that the FRY forces did not seem to have suffered the casualties estimated. The new estimates are 20 destroyed tanks, a few dozen artillery pieces, and a few dozen APCs, and less than 1000 FRY casualties (Lottman). The initial assessments were based off of guncam footage, and battle damage assessment sorties. The problem is that in these photos, many times the aircraft were striking either dummy wooden tanks, or tanks that had already been destroyed, and only relocated. The updated numbers were provided by NATO Kosovo FORce (KFOR) peacekeepers (KFOR). The updated numbers show the extreme difficulty it is to distinguish between a legitimate ground target, and a dummy target. This hampered the NATO war effort, and could have been minimized by troops operating in Kosovo.
The most devastating part of the limited air campaign was, and is the ongoing impacts of the munitions on civilians. As previously addressed, there were far too many “blue on blue” incidents between NATO strike aircraft, and Kosovo civilians. These civilians were misidentified as FRY infantry, and struck as such. Other times, ordinance intended for FRY forces caused collateral damage on civilian populations, as seen in Belgrade. (UNHCR) Unexploded ordinance, including bomblets from cluster munitions used by NATO continues to kill or maim civilians and NATO peacekeepers operating in Kosovo, even thirteen years after the conclusion of the campaign. The location and disposal of this ordinance is a top priority for KFOR (KFOR). These instances reveal another limitation of airpower, as demonstrated in Kosovo. The use of cluster munitions has a very long lasting impact in a region. There is an ongoing movement to ban these munitions, declaring them “inhumane”. The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) took place in Dublin in May of 2008. This treaty was not signed by the United States, Russia, or China (ICRC).
The war also brought into light the risk of using ordinance in high population areas. Collateral damage was overlooked in the planning of several strikes in Belgrade, and resulted in civilian casualties. The illusion presented by precision ordinance is that they are very neat and surgical. This is false. The explosion of shrapnel from munitions does not stop at a building perimeter (UNHCR). In addition, there was a failure to make proper identification, even for buildings. Strikes in Belgrade targeted at military complexes sometimes accidentally struck “houses, hospitals, and even several embassies” (Lottman) The most notable accidental strike in Belgrade was the bombing of the Chinese embassy, mistaken for a military complex. This demonstrated a lapse of proper identification and planning in Operation: Allied Force’s air campaign.
NATO had a very difficult and daunting task when it elected to wage a limited air war in Kosovo. While they successfully obliterated the FRY air power in the region, they were only somewhat effective in causing damage to FRY ground units. NATO also outright failed at halting the escalation of the genocide in Kosovo. Allied Force was a clear demonstration to the NATO high command that a limited air campaign was not feasible, and that some level of ground force presence is necessary for a successful operation. Allied Force also demonstrated that collateral damage, while highly undesirable, is completely unavoidable in a sustained air campaign. Finally Operation: Allied Force demonstrated that, in order to win, NATO must be willing to undertake whatever is necessary to win, if they choose to go to war. The reason for the partial failure of Kosovo was that NATO was not willing to commit any level of ground troops, not even enough to establish safe havens for refugees. Had even this small level been done, perhaps there might have been a quicker outcome with fewer civilian casualties.
Works Cited
Clinton, Bill. "Statement on Kosovo (March 24, 1999)." Miller Center. White House Press Corps, n.d. Web. 2 Jan. 2013. Crawley, Vince. "Air Strategy Ignores Gulf War Lessons, Experts Say." Defense Week 3 May 1999: n. pag. GALE. Web. 29 Dec. 2012.
"Facts and Figures." NATO in Kosovo. NATO KFOR, n.d. Web. 03 Jan. 2013.
Heisbourg, Francois. "Can NATO Snatch Victory From the Jaws of Defeat?" International Harold Tribune 3 Apr. 1999, Opinion and Editorial sec.: 8. Gale. Web. 2 Jan. 2013.
Hinman, Ellwood. "Context and Theory: Lessons from Operation: Allied Force." Air Power History Summer 2001: n. pag. GALE. Web. 16 Dec. 2012.
"International Humanitarian Law - Convention Cluster Munitions." International Humanitarian Law - Convention Cluster Munitions. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 30 May 2008. Web. 06 Jan. 2013.
"Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign." UNHCR. United Nations, n.d. Web. 03 Jan. 2013.
Lottman, Jon. "Lessons of Kosovo: The Limits of Airpower." America's Defense Monitor. Howard University Television. WHUT, Washington, District of Columbia, 8 Aug. 1999. Television.
