FD: Abolishing the CLO
- Thread starter Dalimbar
- Start date
Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
My problem with this proposal remains the lack of a replacement process to assure a means for prompt action in the event of an executive action that is outside the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Legal Code. To rely solely on Clause 11 of the Bill of Rights could lead to delays when more prompt action is called for.
Something is needed to replace the CLO function. (In the last Constitution, we used a elected standing committee of the RA; we could go that route again, but we'd need a different name since the Security Council is now used for a different body.
Unless this concern is addressed, I will be unable to support this proposal.
Something is needed to replace the CLO function. (In the last Constitution, we used a elected standing committee of the RA; we could go that route again, but we'd need a different name since the Security Council is now used for a different body.
Unless this concern is addressed, I will be unable to support this proposal.
You could simply place the Ministries as a part of the RA, instead of the Delegate. Especially since under the current delegacy, there are no Ministries. Elect the Ministries via the RA....they could be recalled/impeached by the RA. Keeps the oversight in the RA. No need for any extrodinary oversight body.
You cannot control an ingame delegate via a CLO, committe, or constitution. That's just plain fantasy. Time to face reality, not wishful thinking.
But since the Delegate Flemingovia declared that he doesn't recognize the Constitution, CLO or Judiciary anyway, there's little point to any of this but legislative exercise. Obviously, under this circumstance, the delegate cannot be controlled by CLO or any constitution.
I support the proposal as it stands.
You cannot control an ingame delegate via a CLO, committe, or constitution. That's just plain fantasy. Time to face reality, not wishful thinking.
But since the Delegate Flemingovia declared that he doesn't recognize the Constitution, CLO or Judiciary anyway, there's little point to any of this but legislative exercise. Obviously, under this circumstance, the delegate cannot be controlled by CLO or any constitution.
I support the proposal as it stands.
Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
The alternative is to restore the governmental structure under the last Constitution, having the Delegate solely as head of state, and not head of government, and having a prime minister elected as head of the Executive Branch. There was still an elected Delegate and Vice Delegate pretty much as is done now, but the area that created issues was the composition of the Elected Ministries in the Cabinet. There was always some pulling back and forth over some of the areas of jurisdiction, and some question as to whether some ministries were too narrow or included too much, and I can't say that issue has been dealt with any better under the current system.
There was also an emergency check-and-balances committee elected within the RA composed of ten percent of the RA which took the emergency response function of the CLO. Personally, I had no problem with remaining under that system, but others felt otherwise and they prevailed (although it took my vote as Speaker to allow that to succeed). I do feel however, some some emergency response mechanism needs to be in place. I feel strongly about that, and I can't support a chance that fails in that regard.
There was also an emergency check-and-balances committee elected within the RA composed of ten percent of the RA which took the emergency response function of the CLO. Personally, I had no problem with remaining under that system, but others felt otherwise and they prevailed (although it took my vote as Speaker to allow that to succeed). I do feel however, some some emergency response mechanism needs to be in place. I feel strongly about that, and I can't support a chance that fails in that regard.
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Fishalamode
Guest
So there seems to be agreement that the CLO needs to go. As a freshman member, I'd like to ask how many times has the function of any established oversight body worked? Has an oversight body ever stopped the actions of the executive branch that has thumbed it's nose at the Assembly or Judiciary or established law? If the Exec chooses to disregard the stop-action of an oversight body, that body has effectively become a simple toothless monitor. With all respect to the Speaker, can't that toothless monitoring action be performed by the Speaker?
Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
It hasn't been toothless, when there has been a fully active CLO membership, including the Speaker, (from my own experience as both a CLO member and as Speaker in the past) the CLO has placed a stay, and taken proposals to an immediate vote in the RA.
The system worked better with the standing committee of the RA under the last Constitution, but a compromise is a compromise and that is how the CLO was designed under this Constitution.
One of the problems with placing that authority in the hands of just one person is how would this function work in the event that official is absent, or AWOL, and cannot be reached? While we have the protocols for an Acting Speaker or Speaker Pro Tempore, we'd need to work in language that anyone acting at a given time as the chair of the Senate would be able to exercise that function. Otherwise we end up with the same problem we've been trying to address. Absentee officials.
The system worked better with the standing committee of the RA under the last Constitution, but a compromise is a compromise and that is how the CLO was designed under this Constitution.
One of the problems with placing that authority in the hands of just one person is how would this function work in the event that official is absent, or AWOL, and cannot be reached? While we have the protocols for an Acting Speaker or Speaker Pro Tempore, we'd need to work in language that anyone acting at a given time as the chair of the Senate would be able to exercise that function. Otherwise we end up with the same problem we've been trying to address. Absentee officials.
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Fishalamode
Guest
Thanks, that's why I asked. Wouldn't a transparency clause be more effective then? Meetings can be attended by all RA members - but no speaking or voting privileges; Speaker or S-pt retains speaking privileges but not voting. . . Wouldn't that get around the problem of absentee oversight?
Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
I'm not sure that can completely work. There can be issues of regional security and diplomatic questions that the Delegate and his appointees should be able to discuss in private as they formulate their policies and responses.
There might be other circumstances in the policy formulation phase that might also benefit from a cone of privacy while policy is formulated.
And all the transparent meetings one could have would not prevent private discussion using PMs, email, chat, and other forums that would not be visible to the rest of us.
There might be other circumstances in the policy formulation phase that might also benefit from a cone of privacy while policy is formulated.
And all the transparent meetings one could have would not prevent private discussion using PMs, email, chat, and other forums that would not be visible to the rest of us.
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Fishalamode
Guest
But isn't that the point. . . we could create an iron-clad oversight entity, and if the Exec branch wants to go rogue, and keep things hushed up, they can just do it. I'm not sure we can draft any effective enforceable legislation that accounts for absentee RA members, or an Exec intent on deceit. . .
Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
We have a history in TNP, and the devices that have developed here has been based on our experience as a region. I don't look for prevention because that is next to impossible to do; but I do look for a means for rapid response and to have mechanisms within the government to address actions that could against the norms we have chosen as a region to observe.
One thing that can't be done is to anticipate every variation. The wisdom of a response mechanism is that it needs to have the flexibility to tailor the response to the needs of the particular set of circumstances.
This was why the CLO has been structured the way it was; this is why the Security Council under the last constitution (which was an elected committee of the RA, as opposed to the structure we currently call the Security Council) had the authority it had to respond to threats. All I have ever said is that in eliminating the CLO, that response authority to an emergency and to structure the necessary response has to be placed somewhere.
This process works, it has worked in the past, and it is the best way to retain that ability when it should be needed in the future. As has been amply demonstrated it is self-defeating to place that authority in one individual, because if that individual is not present when the need arises, paralysis follows. It has to be a group, and it has to be a majoritarian and not a unanimous mechanism so that paralysis can be avoided.
One thing that can't be done is to anticipate every variation. The wisdom of a response mechanism is that it needs to have the flexibility to tailor the response to the needs of the particular set of circumstances.
This was why the CLO has been structured the way it was; this is why the Security Council under the last constitution (which was an elected committee of the RA, as opposed to the structure we currently call the Security Council) had the authority it had to respond to threats. All I have ever said is that in eliminating the CLO, that response authority to an emergency and to structure the necessary response has to be placed somewhere.
This process works, it has worked in the past, and it is the best way to retain that ability when it should be needed in the future. As has been amply demonstrated it is self-defeating to place that authority in one individual, because if that individual is not present when the need arises, paralysis follows. It has to be a group, and it has to be a majoritarian and not a unanimous mechanism so that paralysis can be avoided.
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Fishalamode
Guest
With all due respect to your position and many years of valuable service, we would not be discussing this if it worked. From what I've gleaned from TNP historical docs, logs, etc., an oversight mechanism has been a football battered back and forth - no one ever seems to be happy with it; it's either being circumvented, hashed, bashed, amended, removed, reconstituted. . . I understand your position on this issue, and I am in no way challenging experience - I have a great deal of respect for experience. The RA can react and does react, but let it react to the reality of the situation that has developed - not a political feint or a perceived threat.
I'm a collector. I'll come home, proudly displaying to my wife an object I've been searching for and proclaim, "Do you know how valuable this is - the person I bought it from from had no idea what it is worth." My wife response is simple, "So you going to use it or sell it? Cause it ain't worth anything sitting on a shelf."
I may be the person who does not see the true value of an oversight entity, but I am the person who says if its not going be used effectively then why have it at all.
I'm a collector. I'll come home, proudly displaying to my wife an object I've been searching for and proclaim, "Do you know how valuable this is - the person I bought it from from had no idea what it is worth." My wife response is simple, "So you going to use it or sell it? Cause it ain't worth anything sitting on a shelf."
I may be the person who does not see the true value of an oversight entity, but I am the person who says if its not going be used effectively then why have it at all.
Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
You overlook the obverse side of your srgument, and that is that the absence of anything at all is not effective, and led to the era of Great Blight and Pixiedance. I will stand firmly against any proposal that opens the door wide open to those sorts of things with nothing to use to set up an early and not a belated response.
One way or other there has to be a response mechanism in place. The history of this region before the last Constitution cries strongly against ever allowing those days to return.
One way or other there has to be a response mechanism in place. The history of this region before the last Constitution cries strongly against ever allowing those days to return.
A mean old man
TNPer
Though I am not extremely familiar with the history of the organization and the events which are referenced here, I lean towards supporting the measure. If The CLO is no longer functioning and is simply a dead appendage of the current government, it is only practical to remove it. Its duties could be assumed by a larger, more active area of the government or be given to a more modernized division created later, if need be.
Grosseschnauzer
TNPer
Maybe we need a university now more than ever, then.
Knowing the history of TNP is important if we are to avoid the mistakes of the past.
Knowing the history of TNP is important if we are to avoid the mistakes of the past.
Felasia
TNPer
I think the history of TNP clearly indicates that CLO fail without in-game power and that it is useless to attempt to regulate the government and the delegate. It is up to everyone of us, TNP citizens, to ensure that the government remain working for the interest of the people, not an institution with 3 guys that is written into a paper.
I move for a vote.
I move for a vote.