Defining "Security Threat"

wizardofoz01

wizardofoz01

TNPer
Roman posted:

Given the controversy relating to this and the unfortunate resulting denial/revokation, etc., I think it well advised to define the term "Security Threat to the Region".

The primary purpose of legislation to define the term would be to set the bar as to what defines a 'security threat to the region' and to define what actions may and may not be taken.

The potential for the application of the determination that a nation is a 'security threat' to the region is a potential opening for that determination to be used as a political tool, either to alter the electorate members, or to act as a form of censorship of electorate members or to otherwise deprive electorate members of their rights or elected positions.

I think a good starting point for the determination of a 'security threat' and what it is limited to should be:

"A security threat to the regions shall be defined as and only as:

A - Approaches a number of endorsements that treatens the duly elected UN Delegate by accumulating endorsements that are (percentage to be determined) percent of the UN Delegate's number of endorsements, and

B - Refuses to respond to a Security Council warning, or

C - Fails to conform with a direct order of the Security Council to cease and desist the gathering of endorsements within a reasonable period of time.

The definition of 'Security Threat to the Region' shall consist only of the above definition.

No nations shall be denied nor have their Registered Voter and/or Regional Assembly status denied or revoked except upon conviction of a criminal act by public trial in a court of law as defined in the North Pacific Code."

Any ideas or contributions? I would like to get a good idea of the general opinion of defining the term 'security threat' before I formally submit a proper version of this to the Speaker.


Regards,

Romanoffia
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To redirect discussion on this:

What we need to do of course is decide philosophical issues -- eg, whether to regulate speech as a security threat, and if so by how much.

Also on the table is whether the SC should be restricted to endo-swapping problems only.
 
I don't think that anything that constitutes 'free speech' should be considered a security threat to the region.

Endo swapping that threatens the delegate and the 'buffer agent' in the form of a vice delegate is a threat, IMHO.

Another threat that was brought up to me (I don't recall who at this time) is hackers who might dig around the board where they shouldn't and abuse of IP information beyond the neccessary scope of NPIA activity.

Spamming the board with the intent of disrupting the government is a threat, IMHO, but such posts should be moved to a sub-forum for moderation or an open forum titled something like 'the dust bin' (the latter the result of moderation or RA/SC decision open to review).


R
 
What is the status of the idea of requesting a judicial review on the question of disclosure of classified documents on the NPG matter? It is impossible to have a fair and complete discussion of this question unless and until those records can be disclosed.

I do not believe the best interests of the region would be served to try to limit the definition of a security threats because in so doing, one could exclude a genuine security threats for which security council action would be appropriate. The recent incident involving the RLA appears to be such an example.
 
what we cannot allow is the situation that we had with me:

a declared security threat who was punised by losing RV status (legally or not) and not being banned. surely as a threat with near 100 endos my RA status would be the last concern!
We must ensure that being declared a security threat is not used lightly or, indeed, politically
 
Grosse although I agree with you in spirit - a definition is necessary to prevent exactly what happened to Fulheadland. Further, a judicial review is a bit impossible at the current time, since the entire judiciary sits on the security council.
 
I am not completely at ease with this proposal. It seems to relegate the SC to a mere box ticking machine. Is there much point in having the council at all, if a security threat is decided by a checklist of infringements. I thought the whole point of the council was to not only observe but to analysis intelligence data.

Personally I would prefer amendments that increase the accountability of the SC, rather than ones that reduce its scope of effect.
 
Namyeknom:
Personally I would prefer amendments that increase the accountability of the SC, rather than ones that reduce its scope of effect.
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That too is a viable approach, but to whom do you make the SC accountable in terms of justifying an act by the SC?

Here's an idea: If the SC acts is should be required that the SC provide what evidence they used to either the MoJ and/or the courts to determine the veracity of the action to determine if the act should stand

- and/or -

Provide that an RA vote be taken on whether or not the theat determination/action should stand provided the evidence is substantial.

Either one or both would allow the SC to act immediately in an energency but also provide an automatic mechanism for the prompt review of action.

R
 
we must try to find the balance here...there is a difference between box ticking and defining a threat.

otherwise the council can, technically declare anyone and everyone a threat, for no reason. extreme, but hey, this is TNP
 
I agree there has to be some way of preventing the SC from going overboard. I was just saying the orginal posts outline seemed to me to be very restrictive. I'm not dismissing the idea of a consultative document as to what could be deemed a security threat (although re-reading what I said it could be interpreted so :unsure:), just trying to present the view that an SC that is too strictly controlled is as dangerous as one with no controls at all.
 
This could also be solved by having the MoJ automatically conduct an investigation/justification of any SC action as to it's veracity in the evidence department. Actually, this course of action would appear to be within the scope of the MoJ, constitutionally speaking.

Essentially, legislation requiring automatic review procedures by the MoJ to this effect could be enacted (added to the legal code) without any amendment to the constitution.


Romanoffia
 
Wouldn't that defeat the purpose of the SC? Or am I reading that wrong? They need to be able to act swiftly in case of a real threat. Slowing them down with the courts and investigations will hinder their purpose.

Finding a happy medium is NOT going to be easy. I agree the above did seem a bit too strict. The SC needs a fair length of rope tethering them to a short leash would not be the best things to do in my opinion.
 
I assume Roman was suggesting that once the SC have acted, the evidence used to ban (or whatever else the SC can do) someone would then automatically be passed to the MoJ. They would then rule as to whether the action of the SC was in response to a legitimate threat. Therefore the SC retains its 'lightning reactions' while measures are in place to prevent it from getting out of hand.
 
Namyeknom:
I assume Roman was suggesting that once the SC have acted, the evidence used to ban (or whatever else the SC can do) someone would then automatically be passed to the MoJ. They would then rule as to whether the action of the SC was in response to a legitimate threat. Therefore the SC retains its 'lightning reactions' while measures are in place to prevent it from getting out of hand.
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Exactly. The SC could act instantaneously and the MoJ would then review the action automatically.



Romanoffia
 
Leaving the endo count issue as the only security problem is surely not covering all potentials problems as you all have pointed out already. But it would be possible to include some "but not limited too" clause.
If there is a nation considered as (potential) security threat because of other circumstances, it would be good to set a time limit for the SC and make it liable to present evidence. That's pretty usual if you restrict someone's rights.

What happened to FH should be avoidable in the future.

edit: typos, sorry I was tired.
 
I think I could agree with something like that Mr. Gaunt. Not limited to clause and a set period of time to present evidence of action taken against a nation.
 
What would be the outcome if the evidence the SC had was either part of an ongoing trial, or could result in an intelligence opperative (either ours, or someone elses) being exposed?
 
I also agree. The SC must be allowed to take immediate action, but there should also be an automatic proceedure that requires them to proved what evidence they used to the MoJ (since the MoJ is essentially responsible for investigations of this nature) for review and determination as to whether or not the action was correct or not. This would essentially be an automatic appeal on behalf of the sanctioned nation/individual.


Romanoffia
 
Review of an security determination by the Security Council can already be had by review of the action of the appropriate government official whose action is based upon the decision of the security council.

As a general matter this would be the Cabinet/registered voter review mechanism, unless the issue involves expulsion or banning from the region, in which case Article VI of the constitution applies.

Constitution Article IV Section 8:
A - The registered voters shall elect a Security Council. The Speaker shall serve as the presiding officer of the Council. The Council shall have authority to endorse or otherwise approve such actions of an urgent or emergency nature that involve regional security other than the adoption of legislative bills and constitutional amendments as are specified in this Constitution and The North Pacific Legal Code. Any action by the Council does not supercede any requirement for approval by a referendum within the Regional Assembly or of the registered voters, but serves as approval for action prior to such a referendum.
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Constitution Article VI:
Section 1. Expulsion.

Any Nation may be expelled from The North Pacific if found guilty of the following:
1) Violating any of the NationStates rules as provided on the NationStates.net website or as determined by a NationStates Moderator.
2) Violations of The North Pacific Constitution.
3) Violating the Regional membership regulations as outlined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution.
4) Violating The North Pacific Legal Code or other laws of the Region.
5) Violating the Rules and Regulations for Cabinet.

Section 2. Power of Expulsion.

1) The Delegate may not expel a Nation without the express consent of the Nations of the Region by either a referendum vote, with the participation of a quorum, or by a trial and judgment that specifically imposes expulsion as a penalty or in the case of an urgent matter of regional security as referenced in Article I of this Constitution.
2) The Judicial Branch or the Prime Minister can call a referendum vote of the registered voters of the Region for the purpose of approving a motion for immediate expulsion by the posting of the case and evidence of needed action in a thread within the Regional off-site Forum and a notification of the motion and referendum on the Regional message board at Nationstates.net at any time.
3) If more than half of the registered voters who cast a vote in that thread, with a quorum participating, vote in favor of an ejection within a 24 hour period, then the Nation will be ejected by the Delegate.
4) In the event of explicit spamming of the Regional offsite forum or the Regional civil headquarters message board at Nationstates.net, a Nation may be ejected by the Delegate without a prior referendum vote if the action is countersigned by the Prime Minister upon the posting of the offense by a registered voter, and a second to the immediate expulsion motion by another registered voter. However, the subject Nation of the expulsion action shall have the right to a post-ejection referendum vote by the registered voters of the Region on a motion to ratify the ejection. The vote shall be to ratify the action to expel, and the expulsion shall be ratified if within seven days, at least 50 per cent of the registered voters with a quorum participating, approve the motion in a referendum.
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The other issue here is the confidentiality of information that originates with the NPIA:

Constitution Article III Section 2 Clause 2 Item C:
C - There is to be a North Pacific Intelligence Agency whose duties are to collect and analyze confidential intelligence information for the benefit of the Regional Government and the region as a whole. The Prime Minister shall appoint the leadership of the North Pacific Intelligence Agency after consultation with the personnel of that agency. Any matter concerning the Agency's activities and personnel, except in the case of a criminal prosecution, shall be discussed in confidence without reference in any public record; however, there may be disclosure of confidential information in connection with a criminal or impeachment proceeding. The Prime Minister shall be responsible to the Cabinet and the registered voters for the ongoing oversight of the Agency.
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Except through a voluntary waiver by the sources of the information and by the NPIA, I do not know of any way the information can be provided to the Ministry of Justice outside of a criminal or impeachment proceeding. The best solution I can come up with is that the NPIA should provide a version of its information that can be disclosed publicly by the security council once it adopts a resolution when the unedited information is presented to the security council. In that way, the members of the council can discusss with the NPIA intermediatary the accuracy and completeness of the sanitized version of the information in advance of its action, and the security council can then include the information in its public statement of its action.

This would not require legislation, but merely action by the NPIA and the security council as to the use of such a procedure. It would also have avoided the problem we're still having on the evidence presented to the security council at the end of the last term concerning the NPG.
 
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