NPA Doctrine Revisions

SillyString

SillyString

TNPer
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As some of you may know, I'm not a huge fan of the NPA Doctrine in its current form. It's inelegantly written, and its style and formatting match exactly none of the rest of our governing documents. I also think it needs a bit of updating in light of some changes to the game since it was passed.

Obviously this is a very tricky project, as the NPAD has struck a careful balance between the sides of what can be a very contentious argument, but I think that we've now had it long enough that we can assess its successes and failures, and make some tweaks without starting the whole battle again.

This first draft contains no content changes, and is merely a structural update so it fits in with the rest of our laws. Some punctuation, verb forms, and such have been altered to fit in that format, but nothing more. Oh also I updated the title to reflect the NPAF. :P

Chapter 8: The North Pacific Armed Forces (NPAF) Doctrine

Section 8.1: Purpose and Obligations
1. The primary purpose of the North Pacific Armed Forces is to protect and defend The North Pacific and her allies.
2. The NPAF will assist TNP's allies and friends in whatever capacity is available.
3. The NPAF will implement regional defense and diplomatic policies, as adopted under the laws of The North Pacific.
4. To achieve the above, the Delegate and the Executive Officer charged with military affairs will maintain the NPAF as a well-trained military.

Section 8.2: Deployment
5. The NPAF is always permitted to deploy to counter or preemptively stop a direct threat to The North Pacific or any of her allies.
6. The NPAF may assist another region or organization as permitted by the Delegate or the Executive Officer charged with military affairs.
7. The NPAF may deploy upon the orders of the appointed Executive Officer charged with military affairs or a person thus delegated to act in their name.
8. The Regional Assembly may mandate that the NPAF follow through on a declaration of war or a policy approved by the Regional Assembly.

Section 8.3: Regulations
9. The NPAF must obey the following regulations on every mission, except against designated enemy regions:
  • Collateral damage must be minimized.
  • The culture of the region and the wishes of the natives must be respected.
  • Threat to The North Pacific and her allies must be minimized.
  • The region must be restored to its original state before leaving.
  • When acting proactively, the most recent native delegate must be contacted.
10. The NPAF must not take any of the following actions, except against designated enemy regions or in line with a request from the reocgnized government or government in exile of a region:
  • Remove any residents from an invaded region that resided in the region prior to said invasion.
  • Act with any degree of disrespect.
  • Alter the region's chosen embassy list against the wishes of the region's natives.
Section 8.4: Operation
11. The Delegate may issue a blanket approval for the NPAF to assist another region or organization. The Executive Officer charged with military affairs, the Delegate, or their appointed representatives must still authorize individual missions.
12. Any NPAF member may refuse to take part in any mission which does not directly impact TNP security for any reason that the Executive Officer charged with military affairs or the Delegate determines is reasonable.
13. The Regional Assembly may override by simple majority vote any NPAF deployment not previously approved by the Regional Assembly. The Speaker shall accept motions to override for voting on an expedited basis.
14. The Regional Assembly must be promptly informed of any NPAF operation upon deployment, with the exception of operations which the Delegate specifically classifies. The Regional Assembly must be promptly informed of any classified operation, as well as the reasons for the classification, as soon as possible following deployment.
15. The NPAF leadership is empowered to determine the cosmetic details of military, including ranks and insignia, pending the outcome of a poll of active NPAF members.

This second draft is annotated with my suggestions, ideas that I think would improve the whole thing. I have tried to retain the same balance and freedom while removing vagueness and too much subjectivity. Red strikeouts are subtractions, blue bolds are additions, green italics are explanations for changes, and orange text is ideas that I haven't written into changes yet.

Chapter 8: The North Pacific Armed Forces (NPAF) Doctrine Charter (Because "Doctrine" and "Code" [the NPA's own subordinate governing document] are confusingly similar terms, and I think this document is where we officially charter the NPAF.)

1. The North Pacific Armed Forces is chartered as the sole government body permitted to conduct military operations on behalf of The North Pacific. (Adding this will explicitly prevent the government from creating, for example, a secret TNP Special Forces that is not bound by the law. I'm not sure if "military operation" is clear or vague. We may want to add some detail, like "military operations, such as raids, defenses, liberations, ... , on behalf".
2. The NPAF and its members must follow all applicable laws and regulations regarding its actions.
3. The NPAF will be led by an Executive Officer charged with military affairs, hereafter referred to as the Minister of Defense. The Delegate may alter this Executive Officer's cosmetic title at will, and such alterations will not affect their role as laid out in this section. ("Executive Officer charged with military affairs" is WAY too cumbersome to keep repeating, and MoD is the term we've used for quite a while, so I wanted to be able to use it in here as a much, much easier shorthand. However, the last bit also allows for the title to be changed to Minister of War, or Minister of Peace, or Generalissimo, or anything else, while still keeping the same relationship with the law.)
4. The NPAF leadership is empowered to determine the cosmetic details of the military, including name, ranks, and insignia, pending the outcome of a poll of active NPAF members.

Section 8.1: Purposes
5. The primary purpose of the North Pacific Armed Forces is to protect and defend The North Pacific and her allies. In the event that one is threatened, the NPAF must immediately prioritize its defense over any other operation. (Makes explicit what it means for this to be the primary purpose, and explicitly places the safety of our allies [and ourselves] above discretionary operations.) We could also add language that specifies that if more than one threat exists, the MoD and Del will work with our allies to best address them all.
6. To strengthen interregional ties and improve coordination and communication, the NPAF will strive assist TNP's allies and friends in their military operations, and will seek to involve their militaries in its own, whenever possible. (I'm not a huge fan of the "whatever capacity is available" phrasing since it's not really clear what that means, so I reworked it. The first part, about interregional stuff, could be removed if the RA doesn't want to adopt that justification of policy.)
7. The NPAF will follow the legal military and diplomatic policies of The North Pacific, as adopted by the Delegate, Cabinet, or Regional Assembly according to law, and will engage in operations that meet the objectives of those policies.
8. In accordance with these purposes, the Delegate and the Minister of Defense will endeavor to make the NPAF the most skillful, effective, and well-trained military in the world through regular deployment and training operations. (This is a bit more mission-statement-y than the original, but I think it strikes the right balance between "We want this to happen" and "an inactive MoD becomes a criminal because they're REQUIRED to do stuff ALL THE TIME".)

Section 8.2: Deployment
9. The NPAF is always permitted to deploy to counter or preemptively stop a direct threat to The North Pacific or any of her allies. In the event that a threat becomes known, members of the NPAF may proactively follow the orders of the government official or body responsible for responding to that threat, such as the Vice Delegate or Security Council of TNP or a representative of the legitimate government of an allied region. (This may or may not be desirable, and I welcome input from NPA leadership on the question. The idea with adding it is that if the MoD is inactive or asleep or whatever, and the delegate goes rogue, the military can still follow the orders of the SC. Or, for an ally, if they're facing immediate threat and need help ASAP, any soldier online can help without needing to wait for confirmation from an officer. This could be too broad, though, and I'm open to toning it down.)
10. The NPAF may assist another region or organization as permitted by the Delegate or the Minister of Defense.
11. The NPAF may deploy upon the orders of the Delegate, Minister of Defense, or a person thus delegated to act in their name. [While these two clauses refer to slightly different acts, the former helping another group and the latter doing our own things, I think they could be reasonably combined into one clause that permits the military to do things when so ordered by a commanding officer. Is there really a necessity to have two clauses for this?]
12. The Regional Assembly may mandate by majority vote that the NPAF follow through on a declaration of war or a military or diplomatic policy that the RA has approved.
13. The Delegate may issue a blanket approval for the NPAF to assist another region or organization. The Executive Officer charged with military affairs, the Delegate, or their appointed representatives must still authorize individual missions.
14. Any NPAF member may refuse to take part in any mission which does not directly impact the security of TNP for any reason that the Executive Officer charged with military affairs or the Delegate determines is reasonable. (This seems weird to me. Giving the Del and MoD the ability to determine what is a "reasonable" reason is fraught with abuse possibilities. Members should be able to not participate for any reason at all, be it "I'm sleeping" or "I don't want to raid" or "I don't like working with this other person and they're participating" without needing a permission slip.)

Section 8.3: Regulations
15. The restrictions and requirements in this section will be in force for every NPAF mission, except against Designated Enemy Regions. Requests from the legitimate recognized government or government-in-exile of a region which violate this section may be followed at the discretion of the Delegate or Minister of Defense. (Reworked the wording a bit, plus I combined the two sub-lists into one main section. They're all about restricting and regulating so I don't think we really need to separate them. Also I broadened the scope of what requests we can follow, which I think makes sense. If we're helping to liberate a region and their legitimate government asks us to close some embassies and ban a few sleepers, we shouldn't have to then "restore the region to its original state" when we leave.)
16. The NPAF must minimize collateral damage [I am uncertain what this means, and I think this vagueness gives wide leeway for unintended interpretation. However, I am not sure how to rephrase it and would welcome suggestions.] and respect the culture of the region and the wishes of its residents (we have phrasing in our law already that defines "residents", but there's no universal definition for "native" except the highly imperfect in-game one).
17. The NPAF must not remove any residents from an invaded region who resided in the region prior to said invasion, alter the region's chosen embassy list against the wishes of the region's natives, set the "Recruiter Friendly' tag on the region (I think this tag is the worst thing that can happen on otherwise harmless raids or tags. It opens the region up to be spammed incessantly by RMB recruiters, with no legal recourse available to the residents. In my opinion, it ruins raids and raiding and turns it from what could be "good fun" into nothing but bullying and harassment. I would love to also prohibit the NPA from working with any other group that uses this tag, but I think that may be overly restrictive and I can settle for simply banning it on our end.), or act with any degree of disrespect during its operations. The NPAF lead nation must restore a region to its original state before leaving.
18.Threat to The North Pacific and her allies must be minimized. Potential threats to The North Pacific or any of her allies as the result of any operation must be minimized. [I think what the original means is that we shouldn't attack regions who have powerful friends, or who might be able to do damage to us in return. It might also be interpreted to mean that we shouldn't *defend* against a powerful military, or against one which likewise has powerful friends. But this could definitely be more clear, and I'm not happy with my rephrasing yet.]
19. When acting proactively to proactively defend or liberate a region, the most recent native delegate must be contacted. (As currently written, this requires us to also contact the most recent native delegate of a region we've raided. This might be okay! It wouldn't be the end of the world if we had to send a TG saying "Hey, we've raided you, but don't worry we'll be gone in a few days and we'll leave the rum on our way out." But it also might not be something we need to do, and I'd be fine with either the original phrasing or the revised one here.)

Section 8.4: Designated Enemy Regions I think reference to this idea in the previous section is very vague. What is a designated enemy region? Can the Delegate simply name any region, unilaterally, and thus bypass the restrictions we're supposed to have? Should it only apply to regions we are at war with? I think we should add language that clarifies designated enemy regions in its own section, and I have done so here. Please let me know what you think!)
20. The Delegate may declare any region or group of regions, except any ally of TNP, a Designated Enemy Region. Such declarations must be made to the Regional Assembly to take effect. [Alternative would be that the declarations must be made publicly, but I think I'd be okay with the declaration going in the RA's Private Halls rather than visible to guests, just like treaty discussions and such.]
21. The Delegate must provide justification for any such declaration, and this justification must be based on more than immediate military objectives. [I'm not happy with this yet. The intent is to keep the delegate from going "X is DER so we can ban all their residents because we feel like it!" at will, and force it to actually mean something in terms of our diplomatic and military alignments. Suggestions welcome.
22. The Regional Assembly may remove Designated Enemy status from a region by a majority [alt: two thirds majority] vote.

Section 8.5: Oversight
23. The Regional Assembly may override any NPAF deployment by simple majority vote. not previously approved by the Regional Assembly. (I don't understand the reason for the restriction, here. I think the RA should be able to both require the NPAF to invade XYZ due to a declaration of war, and rescind that requirement if the war is ended.) The Speaker must accept motions to override for voting on an expedited basis.
24. The Regional Assembly must be promptly informed of any NPAF operation upon deployment, with the exception of operations which the Delegate specifically classifies. The Regional Assembly must be promptly informed of any classified operation, as well as the reasons for the classification, as soon as possible following deployment.

Aaaaand if you're like me, and all those colors and formatting things make your head spin, here's a plaintext version of my suggestion (without the comments in orange about things we could also change).

Chapter 8: The North Pacific Armed Forces (NPAF) Charter

1. The North Pacific Armed Forces is chartered as the sole government body permitted to conduct military operations on behalf of The North Pacific.
2. The NPAF and its members must follow all applicable laws and regulations regarding its actions.
3. The NPAF will be led by an Executive Officer charged with military affairs, hereafter referred to as the Minister of Defense. The Delegate may alter this Executive Officer's cosmetic title at will, and such alterations will not affect their role as laid out in this section.
4. The NPAF leadership is empowered to determine the cosmetic details of the military, including name, ranks, and insignia, pending the outcome of a poll of active NPAF members.

Section 8.1: Purposes
5. The primary purpose of the North Pacific Armed Forces is to protect and defend The North Pacific and her allies. In the event that one is threatened, the NPAF must immediately prioritize its defense over any other operation.
6. To strengthen interregional ties and improve coordination and communication, the NPAF will strive assist TNP's allies and friends in their military operations, and will seek to involve their militaries in its own, whenever possible.
7. The NPAF will follow the legal military and diplomatic policies of The North Pacific, as adopted by the Delegate, Cabinet, or Regional Assembly according to law, and will engage in operations that meet the objectives of those policies.
8. In accordance with these purposes, the Delegate and the Minister of Defense will endeavor to make the NPAF the most skillful, effective, and well-trained military in the world through regular deployment and training operations.

Section 8.2: Deployment
9. The NPAF is always permitted to deploy to counter or preemptively stop a direct threat to The North Pacific or any of her allies. In the event that a threat becomes known, members of the NPAF may proactively follow the orders of the government official or body responsible for responding to that threat, such as the Vice Delegate or Security Council of TNP or a representative of the legitimate government of an allied region.
10. The NPAF may assist another region or organization as permitted by the Delegate or the Minister of Defense.
11. The NPAF may deploy upon the orders of the Delegate, Minister of Defense, or a person delegated to act in their name.
12. The Regional Assembly may mandate by majority vote that the NPAF follow through on a declaration of war or a military or diplomatic policy that the RA has approved.
13. The Delegate may issue a blanket approval for the NPAF to assist another region or organization. The Executive Officer charged with military affairs, the Delegate, or their appointed representatives must still authorize individual missions.
14. Any NPAF member may refuse to take part in any mission which does not directly impact the security of TNP for any reason.

Section 8.3: Regulations
15. The restrictions and requirements in this section will be in force for every NPAF mission, except against Designated Enemy Regions. Requests from the legitimate recognized government or government-in-exile of a region which violate this section may be followed at the discretion of the Delegate or Minister of Defense.
16. The NPAF must minimize collateral damage and respect the culture of the region and the wishes of its residents.
17. The NPAF must not remove any residents from an invaded region who resided in the region prior to said invasion, alter the region's chosen embassy list against the wishes of the region's natives, set the "Recruiter Friendly' tag on the region, or act with any degree of disrespect during its operations. The NPAF lead nation must restore a region to its original state before leaving.
18. Potential threats to The North Pacific or any of her allies as the result of any operation must be minimized.
19. When acting to proactively defend or liberate a region, the most recent native delegate must be contacted.

Section 8.4: Designated Enemy Regions
20. The Delegate may declare any region or group of regions, except any ally of TNP, a Designated Enemy Region. Such declarations must be made to the Regional Assembly to take effect.
21. The Delegate must provide justification for any such declaration, and this justification must be based on more than immediate military objectives.
22. The Regional Assembly may remove Designated Enemy status from a region by a majority vote.

Section 8.5: Oversight
23. The Regional Assembly must be promptly informed of any NPAF operation upon deployment, with the exception of operations which the Delegate specifically classifies. The Regional Assembly must be promptly informed of any classified operation, as well as the reasons for the classification, as soon as possible following deployment.
24. The Regional Assembly may override any NPAF deployment by simple majority vote. The Speaker must accept motions to override for voting on an expedited basis.

Phew! That's a lot of words.
 
I am mostly happy with your suggestions, and agree wholeheartedly about forbidding the use of the Recruiter Friendly tag.

The first thing that jumps out at me is the bit about the Delegate alone being able to declare a region an Enemy. I think that, even if the RA can override that, that is too much power to leave to one person. I think the Delegate should propose making a region an Enemy to the RA and the RA be required to confirm it.
 
Hello Asta,

Thank you so much for your suggestions and proposals in regards to the NPA. I think that they do a great job of clearing some grey areas, and overall, I believe they will be good additions to the NPA Doctrine and in guiding our soldiers in the future.

However, there were a few areas that concerned me, and so here they are:

Section 8.2.9 – I’m not a fan of placing the authority of the NPA in the hands of those outside of the individuals who are responsible for leading it (Delegate, Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister of Defense, High Command). Requiring the Army to directly answer to someone from another region is just putting too much authority in the hands of someone who is not only a stranger, but may also be outside of the jurisdiction of TNP’s laws. Therefore, there is a lot of room for abuse and misconduct here. As for the Vice Delegate provision, I think this is putting too much authority in the hands of a person where that authority does not belong and could be easily misused for couping. Take for example, if the Delegate decides to vacation away for a week, the Vice Delegate could technically stage a “threat” and get themselves elevated to the position of Delegate by asking for the NPA’s help, making couping extremely easy. It is important to note that usually, there is always a high-ranking NPA officer online. QuietDad (the current MoD) is usually always found on the IRC, and when he’s not, one of the High Command officers (McM and Eluvatar, for example) or I, usually are online. Therefore, the additions under section 8.2.9 are unnecessary and unneeded, and in the current form, they are prone to eventual abuse and misconduct.

Section 8.2.10-11 – I don’t mind combining both of these clauses into one.

Section 8.2.14 -- I’m not sure that I agree with this part. It is important to maintain a line of communications as to why soldiers are refusing to participate in certain missions. That way we can assess how to get everyone to participate in ways that suit everyone. There’s a difference between someone who is not able to raid, because they’re a defender, and someone who is not able to raid, because they have commitments in another NS regional army. With the defender circumstance, we can come up with ways of involving them, but with the second circumstance, it is important for the Minister to get in touch with the soldier in question to evaluate their priorities. Therefore, it is important to allow the Minister or Delegate to determine what is a reasonable excuse and what is not to maintain the military as an active, competent force. As we have seen so far, this has not been abused and most likely will never be, because in then end, the NPA officers have a good base of judgment of determining what’s reasonable what is not. If a soldier feels mistreated, they have the option of recall and judicial action.

Section 8.3.16 – The way I interpreted collateral damage was unnecessary banjections, not returning the region to its original state before the mission, spamming the RMB, bullying residents, etc. I personally think it is written fine as it is, but if someone wants to rephrase, that’s fine by me.

Section 8.3.16 – I definitely agree in regards to the Recruiter friendly tag, but like you, I would not go as far as restricting the NPA from participating with regions that may use that tag. We can simply reference this section of the code to the army we’re collaborating with, and that should basically let them know that we don’t tolerate the use of that tag.

Section 8.3.19 – The revision is perfectly fine.

Section 8.4 in General seems good to me, but I understand that some may view it as putting too much power in the hands of the Delegate. I believe a good compromise would be if we were to let the Delegate put forth a motion for the designation of a region as an enemy, establish a 24 hours discussion period, and then have a vote where the motion may pass by majority.

Suggestion/Question: I want to raise a point really quick. What’s the significance of calling the NPA as the NPAF? I know that the NPA’s name was changed to the NPAF about 1-2 years ago or so, but the name change has not accomplished anything at all. Most of the Delegates, Ministers of Defense, High Command, and even other regions do not refer to the organization as such; instead they use the traditional and original name, NPA. Essentially it is just an unnecessary formality on paper. While I am not necessarily asking to revert to the old name, I wanted to put this forth since we are discussing the NPA and see how people feel about it.
 
Overall I generally agree with the suggested changes, but must note that I also agree with Tomb's comments.

I am uncomfortable with the idea of the NPA being commanded outside of its chain of command, which does exist for the betterment of the Army. In the event that the army has to deploy to support the region or an ally, standing orders can provide for that, and it could be something decided by the NPA High Command in advance. I'm wary of a possible situation where someone with no experience handling the military is forced to oversee it. A "Chain of Command" should be an internal matter for the NPA Code, decided by the Delegate, Minister and other High Command officials, with perhaps the inclusion of the Minister of Foreign Affairs given the NPA's role as a partner in TNP foreign policy

I am also uncomfortable with the Delegate having the power to designate enemy regions, and it is not a power I could see myself using without RA oversight being applied. Anything that explicitly alters our regional FA policy - such as declarations of war and/or treaties requires RA oversight, so this doesn't strike me as anything different.
 
I agree with most of these changes, and unlike Tomb I agree that abstention from an operation shouldn't be left to the Delegate or Minister of Defense to determine what is "reasonable." The only operations that should ever be required are operations related to TNP's direct security and the security of TNP's treaty allies. That said, I would suggest revising that clause to include allies, as it doesn't currently. The minimum we should be able to expect from NPA soldiers is defense of TNP and its allies, otherwise our mutual defense treaties would be potentially toothless if a large number of NPA soldiers refuse to defend a particular ally.

Regarding contacting the native Delegate, that was, as far as I can recall, intended to apply to both defensive and raiding operations. The NPA Doctrine was heavily shaped by Abbey Anumia's philosophy of moderate raiding, which included contacting the native Delegate with a copy of the WFE or, if there was no native Delegate, posting the WFE on the RMB. The point was to make it easier for natives to detag the region after a raid ended. Although that wasn't made clear in the law, I'm pretty sure that was the intended point of the clause, which is odd because we already mandate that the NPA should detag the region before leaving. Whether we want to retain the practice of contacting the native Delegate during raids is open for discussion -- and I personally think it's excessive and unnecessary -- but that was the original purpose, to the best of my recollection.

Finally, I agree that empowering the Delegate to designate enemy regions is placing too much power in the hands of the Delegate. I actually think empowering even the Regional Assembly to designate enemy regions is excessive. We already have a means to designate an enemy region and that is declaration of war. I think the definition of designated enemy region should be unambiguous and this simple: "regions against which TNP has declared war or regions that have declared war against TNP."
 
1. The North Pacific Armed Forces is chartered as the sole government body permitted to conduct military operations on behalf of The North Pacific. I'm not sure if "military operation" is clear or vague. We may want to add some detail, like "military operations, such as raids, defenses, liberations, ... , on behalf". While I don't think that "military operations" can in any way be ambiguous, an "including but not limited to..." list can be helpful (making it clear that in no way the list circumscribes the types of military operations referred to). The only clarification I might actually make is to ensure that it includes any form of training exercise, too.

5. The primary purpose of the North Pacific Armed Forces is to protect and defend The North Pacific and her allies, and in the event that any such region is threatened, the NPAF must immediately prioritize its defense over any other operation.

I think that this just makes the clause read better, despite being slightly longer.

6. To strengthen interregional ties and improve coordination and communication, the NPAF will strive to assist TNP's allies and friends in their military operations, and will seek to involve their militaries in its own, whenever possible.

I'll leave 8.2.9 to those more familiar with the practical workings of how the NPA and SC work with each other.

10. The NPAF may assist another region or organization with its military operations as permitted by the Delegate or the Minister of Defense. The Delegate may issue a blanket approval for the NPAF to assist another region or organization. The Executive Officer charged with military affairs, the Delegate, or their appointed representatives must still authorize individual missions.

11. The NPAF shall deploy only upon the orders of the Delegate, Minister of Defense, or a person thus delegated to act in their name. [While these two clauses refer to slightly different acts, the former helping another group and the latter doing our own things] I do believe that this refers on TNP going on its own mission vs assisting another military with their mission. I think the suggested changes make this clearer.

13. The Delegate may issue a blanket approval for the NPAF to assist another region or organization. The Executive Officer charged with military affairs, the Delegate, or their appointed representatives must still authorize individual missions. As this refers to 8.1.10, surely it can go with it! Or at the most, directly after it. See suggested addition above, and then I'd suggest striking this clause.

Further, while this may be controversial, I'd suggest requiring that any region/organisation whose deployments we join, must have operating practices consistent with the NPA's regulations in Chapter 8.3. Right now we have the situation where the NPA must restore the WFE of the region upon leaving it, but can freely participate in an invasion which results in the same region being burned to the ground. Not the most consistent.

At the very least, participating in raids partaking in the the most nefarious practices (such as ejecting natives, setting the 'recruiter friendly' tag, etc) should be proscribed.

Regarding 8.4, I understand the utility of it, e.g. in participating in anti-Nazi missions. Perhaps I'd suggest the following simple procedure:

1) Delegate proposes to the RA a DER

2) RA must vote on it within a short time-frame, requiring majority vote.
 
re: Tomb's post -

I disagree with his comments on 8.2.9. I think it is sufficiently accountable to allow troops to deploy to allied regions (and allied regions only - not their occupations, not their satellite regions, not their back-up regions, etc.), where a threat has been identified by the VD or the Security Council. I am by no means convinced, though. I base this decision on the fact that a) the Vice-Delegate is an elected position, and b) alliances are subject to RA oversight. I am inclined, even, to suggest that the Security Council be excluded, but on this matter I am even more unconvinced.

I also disagree with his comments on 8.2.14. I believe it is sufficient to allow troops to utilize any reason to fail to support TNP movements, unless that movement is the defense of the region of The North Pacific. It is absolutely the Minister of Defense's responsibility, or a Deputy's, to be proactive on the matter of making the NPA a participatory function of the region, rather than the responsibility of any single TNP soldier. I don't believe the 'good judgement' cited is reason enough to allow NPA officers carte blanche on this matter, just as I believe that officials re: 8.2.9 should be the elected government officials and potentially not the Security Council. Resorting to recall and judicial action is absolutely not a good decision for any GCR.

8.3.16 - I support a prohibition of the recruiter-friendly tag entirely in any occupation involving the NPA and will not be able to support a proposal that utilizes the paper tiger approach of simply forcing the NPA to resign Lead in joint operations, in favour of a region that would utilize the recruiter-friendly tag. I don't believe that the formal objections suggested are anywhere near appropriate or useful enough.

8.3.16 - 'Collateral damage' is a shitty term, which I can and will be openly hostile towards in any and all serious contexts. It is the worst kind of RL weasel word, and it peeves me that it is being used in this Doctrine. I know I'm being uncharacteristically aggressive on the matter, but I really do hate its proliferation in the media. It needs to be replaced with either an explicit description of the intended meaning, or an implicit phrasing that is less loaded and more precise (although I cannot think of a latter).

8.3.19 - I support the initial wording, in accordance with the inline commentary re: its application to both raids and defenses. I would recommend the Cat Burglars model, wherein such communications would include a) an expected, broad timeframe at the NPA's discretion, and b) a plaintext copy or a link to a plaintext copy of the WFE before changes are made. Communications that cannot be directed to a (former) Delegate (or even those that can be) should be posted on the RMB, preferably as a pastebin link rather than a full plaintext copy.

Re: Tomb's question on the NPAF terminology - it was a huge pain-in-the-arse debate and I asked someone about it on IRC, and I still don't quite understand it. It was at the time a bigger can of worms that was worth opening, although the matter may be more palatable now.
 
As I have said, the only issue I have is that orders to deploy, in order, Should only come from the Minister of Defense, The Deputy Minister, then the delegate. Too many people telling the NPAF to move leads to issues where the NPAF is deployed on a mission, like defending an ally by the MoD, then being ordered to deploy from the Delegate or outside influences that creates a political nightmare. If we move and leave the region we're defending and it falls because of it, there will be feedback, yet if we don't move because we're busy we'd get feedback for not listening. Not to hard to do.
Secondly I have no problem with soldiers refusing to participate in certain missions based on Beliefs. What I/We need to do is get soldiers to declare on application (or on query for those already in) their beliefs. Simple (I will both raid and defend/ I will only defend/ I will only raid) should suffice to prevent soldiers from being raider one day and defender the next to get out of doing missions.
Deploying for TNP defense or delegate transition will ALWAYS be mandatory.
Anything else can be discussed and handled with dialog between the MoD and the Delegate.
 
I definitely do not agree that the order of precedence should be Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister, and then Delegate. The Delegate is the elected commander-in-chief of the NPA and should always take precedence in giving orders, unless we want the NPA to become a semi-autonomous military divorced from TNP's regional interests, which I do not.
 
Cormac:
I definitely do not agree that the order of precedence should be Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister, and then Delegate. The Delegate is the elected commander-in-chief of the NPA and should always take precedence in giving orders, unless we want the NPA to become a semi-autonomous military divorced from TNP's regional interests, which I do not.
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I could have worded it better. I agree with you the Delegate is the Commander in Chief and absolutely has the right to order the MoD to deploy the NPA. If the need is there and they aren't available, then order the Deputy Minister and if that is not workable, issue the order themselves. That's what a chain of command is. ANYONE, including the Delegate jumping in and ordering the NPA to deploy out side the NPA command structure runs risks of creating problems. What happens if the MoD is working with other military groups in planning a joint operation and before it's announced a Delegate jumps in and orders the NPA to move and commit it that puts that joint mission to risk? We end up looking like people who don't keep there word and it becomes a FA nightmare. The point of deployment needs to be centralized to prevent this. The situation of the Delegate ordering the MoD to deploy anyway still exists but allows the MoD the opportunity to go to partners and explain the issue and reschedule or discuss with the Delegate alternatives. The order of precedence I stated is the one that will be followed by the foot soldier in the NPA in deployment, not the order of who's in charge.
As MoD, it's an appointed position and can always be relieved of command so it will never be a semi-autonomous military divorced from TNP's regional interests because the MoD is NOT an elected official nor is it even a cabinet member.
 
I have no issue with changes 8.1-8.8. I don't think your suggested further possibilities for expansion are necessary at this time.

I'll respond in more detail later. But to start with, I'd say that I'd agree with Tomb's comments regarding 8.29. I don't think it is necessary. Orders should be given through the Minister of Defence themselves. I recall a situation with Osiris, where the official representatives at the time (also our allies) asked us to switch our endorsements, I told them that I did not see the urgency and would wait for St George to ask me to do that. I'd definitely prefer that the MoD or Delegate/chain of command be the ones giving the orders and taking the ultimate responsibility - no reason to outsource command unless the Delegate or Minister tells you on the day that is what is happening.

Regarding the Vice Delegate - I am mostly fine with that. I would suggest perhaps that instead we use the term "Acting Legal Delegate" which I think from memory has been used elsewhere. Normally, one would expect the Minister themselves to give orders if the Delegate is temporarily absent and there is a security problem. If the Delegate is away for longer, then that is where our absences provisions should come into consideration.

8.2 10-13 I have no issue with.

8.2 14 - I think some communication on this is reasonable. Generally we're fine with people not participating, but it can become a problem when there is no explanation as to why they will not participate. For example it is not reasonable for someone to not participate in an operation because they like having WA endorsements in the region. They should not continue to have access on that grounds. I'd prefer we give the Minister/Delegate some discretion here. Any crisis or abuse of power is more than likely to become a big public affair anyway.

8.3.15 - No issue here.

8.3.16 - The NPA Code of Governance is also something we use here, which I think covers this issue more generally. I am fine with collateral damage. The NPA has not had any issue with working within this framework and I do not particularly wish to see this can of worms opened again. Collateral damage is sufficient enough.

From what I can tell, I don't have an issue with the remaining changes you've made. I don't think the name changes is necessary, and probably for old times sake alone I'd prefer the NPA Doctrine be kept. I'd also agree with Tomb that we should ditch the ridiculous NPAF and simply put NPA back as the official name.
 
I am certainly happy to remove the "F" and return the NPA to its original name that it has never actually left. As I recall, this change was made because Alunya was suggesting changing the name to the NPN (Navy), and there was some strong disagreement over whether that was a good idea. "Armed Forces", with the ability to vote on the precise name, was a compromise position.

I think it's safe enough to revert back, though, since no move since then has been made to alter the name from NPA to NPN or any other military body since its passage.

As for other comments, I have read them and I will be making adjustments to the text. A couple things to note, though:

It seems I was unclear on the wording of other people permitted to deploy the NPA. My intent there was, in the case of an internal emergency when the MoD was unavailable (and, say, the delegate had gone rogue), allow the NPA to obey the orders of the SC or VD directly on who to endorse, who to unendorse, and so on. Not to require it - if members had doubts about the orders, or thought the VD might be trying to coup and making up an emergency, they could absolutely wait for the MoD - but to allow it in case it comes up. Similarly, if an ally came under threat, NPA members could (but wouldn't have to) follow the commands of the ally's government. Right now, sure, our MoD is on regularly, but it's unlikely he'll be the MoD in perpetuity and our laws need to be able to handle situations like this.

However, Eluvatar has convinced me that this sort of delegation is best left for the NPA Code, rather than written into the Legal Code, so I will be removing that line from the draft.

As for Declared Enemy State, as it currently stands it has no restrictions or oversight (or even a definition) whatsoever. It has been exercised in the past as a standalone declaration from the Delegate, in order to permit us to engage in certain actions against Nazi regions (NAZI EUROPE, for example).

I don't mind adding in more restriction than I even have here, which requires the Delegate to declare DER to the RA and subjects it to RA override, but I do think that it is a helpful middle ground in between "at war with" and "meh no stance". For one thing, our legal code criminalizes participation in any region we're at war with, and that might be a drastic step to take just for a region we dislike and kind of want to raid and not have to restore. Like, if we ever decided to take offensive actions against UCRs that violate our recruitment standards, we might want to be able to do so without requiring anybody who might be a citizen there to choose only one.

I'd be okay with having it declared by the Delegate and subject to approval by the RA as well as override, on an expedited motion, if people would prefer that to my original suggestion. But I do think it makes sense to keep it as a separate thing from outright war.
 
I actually quite like "NPAF" because (in my head at least) it makes a distinction between the original NPA and the current military force, which operates under a very different ideology.
 
I could not help but observe that while there is no doubt that the chain of command of the NPA should be respected, the role of Secretary of State or the Minister of Foreign Affairs is absent from the Doctrine document. I think it is important for the Minister to be a part of an informal, if not formal, War or Security Council per se, in order to advise the Delegate and the Armed Forces about the political aspects of the conflicts. The Security Council could arguably provide for such advisory role, but I am not sure if the document necessitates the participation of the MFA. If I got it wrong, I'd be glad to learn about it, especially since I am new to the RA. After all, war is a part of diplomacy. As expressed by the Minister of Defense, I also lean toward keeping the Delegate as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (in terms of chain of command), but also understand and recognize the concerns voiced by the Chief Justice.
 
You are correct that this document does not establish a role for the MoFA, but that's not really its purpose.

The NPA Code would be a better place for anything like that to be laid out, though I also don't think it's necessary to do so - I'm fine with the delegate deciding whether and how to include the MoFA in any policy discussions. Not all MsoFA are skilled at military gameplay or interested in participating - and aside from the MoD and possibly a deputy, the rest of the NPA wouldn't really be involved in high-level policy planning either. It's more a cabinet issue than an NPA one.
 
SillyString:
You are correct that this document does not establish a role for the MoFA, but that's not really its purpose.

The NPA Code would be a better place for anything like that to be laid out, though I also don't think it's necessary to do so - I'm fine with the delegate deciding whether and how to include the MoFA in any policy discussions. Not all MsoFA are skilled at military gameplay or interested in participating - and aside from the MoD and possibly a deputy, the rest of the NPA wouldn't really be involved in high-level policy planning either. It's more a cabinet issue than an NPA one.
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I agree with Asta.
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To address Flem's comment, while the name change may make a distinction for you, I think it is safe to say that for most it does not. Hence the reason many people still use the NPA, even in official capacities. As Asta said in a previous post the name change was mere compromise in order to achieve a larger agenda...that's not a really logical train of though to follow for chaning the name of a major government institution.
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This has been in debate for way too long, folks. We should finish fleshing it out and bring it to vote soon.
 
that's not a really logical train of though (sic) to follow for chaning the name of a major government institution.
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Actually, the institution has a name. It is this revision that proposes changing it.
 
flemingovia:
that's not a really logical train of though (sic) to follow for chaning the name of a major government institution.
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Actually, the institution has a name. It is this revision that proposes changing it.
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I am referring to the previous change of the army's name from NPA to NPAF, Flemingovia.
 
Yep! I apologize for not working on it before now - I started a new job last month and have been wicked busy. However, I think things are settling in and I would like to get back to this asap. :)
 
Let me just say, I do like the structural change. It is strange how it is formatted currently. :/

Now about the content, I'll just go through quoting some things I have questions about:

5. The primary purpose of the North Pacific Armed Forces is to protect and defend The North Pacific and her allies. In the event that one is threatened, the NPAF must immediately prioritize its defense over any other operation.
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Suppose a [purely hypothetical] situation occurs in which multiple allies are threatened; which ally or allies take precedence? (I know it's hard to legislate to be prepared for all possible situations, but I'm just thinking out loud here) Also, "threatened" by whom or what? Maybe that needs to be clarified, or maybe it doesn't. :shrug:

6. To strengthen interregional ties and improve coordination and communication, the NPAF will strive [to] assist TNP's allies and friends in their military operations, and will seek to involve their militaries in its own, whenever possible.
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(I inserted the word "to" in square brackets) I forgot to mention I'm also looking for typos. :P Also, the words "whenever possible" at the end may be a bit too much. Maybe replace it with "as much as possible" or "often"? I'm not sure that changes the meaning like I want it to, but do you get what I'm saying?

9. The NPAF is always permitted to deploy to counter or preemptively stop a direct threat to The North Pacific or any of her allies. In the event that a threat becomes known, members of the NPAF may proactively follow the [lawful] orders of the government official or body responsible for responding to that threat, such as the Vice Delegate or Security Council of TNP or a representative of the legitimate government of an allied region.
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I just added "lawful" before orders so that the SC or VD can't issue some crazy order to support the rogue delegate or something like it. I'm not entirely sure, though, that I want the military to be under the control of a representative from some other region. I think the vice delegate or the security council (by majority vote, or whatever we decide on) should be the ones with the authority. It should be clarified who exactly may issue an order. And, what if an emergency is declared by the RA. Does this clause still have an impact?

16. The NPAF must minimize collateral damage and respect the culture of the region and the wishes of its residents.
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Like you, Asta, I don't know what to do with this one.

17. The NPAF must not remove any residents from an invaded region who resided in the region prior to said invasion, alter the region's chosen embassy list against the wishes of the region's natives [residents], set the "Recruiter Friendly' tag on the region, or act with any degree of disrespect during its operations. The NPAF lead nation must restore a region to its original state before leaving.
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Switch the word "natives" to "residents" like you did in the prior clause.

18. Potential threats to The North Pacific or any of her allies as the result of any operation must be minimized.
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Let me think about this one some more.


Finally, speaking generally about the whole section on Designated Enemy Regions: I think it might be good to have the RA vote to approve such a designation by the delegate. Require the delegate to present a motion, along with his/her reasoning, to designate a region a Designated Enemy Region, and let the RA decide if there is valid cause for the designation. Maybe make it a two-thirds majority vote?

By the way, Asta, I'm wondering how long it took you to write this up; it is super involved. Good work! I'll just say that I am certainly in favor of the reformatting of the original NPAF Doctrine (and I'm in favor of the name change to NPAF Charter). The actual content revisions could use some tweaks, but I think we can get there.

That's all I've got for now. :D
 
RPI:
Require the delegate to present a motion, along with his/her reasoning, to designate a region a Designated Enemy Region, and let the RA decide if there is valid cause for the designation. Maybe make it a two-thirds majority vote?
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Declarations of war require a three-fifths majority. :tnp:
 
This post is a notice to the effect that I see this bill, or an alternative bill of my authoring, to be the next item on my agenda as a member of the Regional Assembly.

I will seek to work with SillyString to bring her bill to a state where we are comfortable bringing it to a vote, or alternatively compose my own bill should that prove too difficult.
 
RPI:
Oops, well then maybe just a simple majority?
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It depends of whether or not the region can avoid being bomb happy. IRL, referenda's don't work for wars with the casualties and all. A majority vote system could still cause the region to become weighty. Even with the threat of actual physical damage lowered to zero.
 
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